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ABSTRACT 
The quest for democracy in various societies has occupied modern political thinking. 
At the same time, the desire for democracy in developing countries has become a 
compelling issue. Iran is no exception. Many argue against this hypothesis by 
referring to the strong presence of Islam in Iranian society, and build their theory 
upon the intrinsic inconsistency between Islam and democracy. The present research 
attempts to challenge this assumption and examine the case of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran in pursuing democracy and its implementation: democratisation process. The 
inevitability of modernity as both notion and motion has made democracy the least 
bad way of governance. The reality of the nation-state which is politically a modern 
concept has incorporated functions and expectations that make democracy, not merely 
one option any more, but the most feasible way of governing a nation-state efficiently. 
The Western-liberal model of democracy is not the sole criterion for perceiving good 
governance. Nevertheless, non-Western attempts to reform, mainly in the Muslim 
societies, must not be seen as pre-determined to fail simply because reform or 
democracy is not indigenous. 
The formation of the Islamic Republic in 1979 and also the reform movement of 1997 
showed a discursive development within Iranian society. Iran's troubled encounter 
with modernity brought about different narratives and consequences. The emergence 
of the liberal discourse of modernity as the first result of such an encounter failed to 
accommodate Iranian society and modernity and ended with a modernist but 
authoritative discourse. The consistent failure of secular discourse to deliver an 
acceptable form of modernity caused a backlash and led to the prevalence of authentic 
discourse and profound criticism of modernity. The triumph of Islamic discourse and 
the installation of the concept of h ilayat al-fagih theorised under Shi'ism ought to be 
seen as the final phase of Iran's encounter with modernity. The present experience of 
having a modern state with elected-although weak-government and parliament 
with religious (authentic) character provides the necessary ground for understanding. 
further practice and improvement. The analysis of the Islamic Republic's Sixth Majlis 
helps in establishing this hypothesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
In the quest for democracy one question is most important: Is Western liberal 
democracy the ideal model of democracy that must be followed and implemented 
accordingly by all other societies? For instance, the relation between Islam and 
democracy has been a dilemma in contemporary political thought. As a result, many 
scholars have attempted to establish a degree of compatibility between an Islamic 
model of government and democracy. In other words, the question is whether both 
Islamic notions and democratic values can be upheld at the same time? Although 
many attempts have been made to reconcile the two, no consensus has been reached. 
The advocates of the Islamic discourse are split between those who insist on such 
compatibility and those who do not consider that Islam needs to be compatible. This 
latter group see Islam as sufficient to ground all aspects of individual and collective 
life and reject other alternatives and knowledge regarding governance. The stark 
contrast between these two existing opinions within Iranian society created an 
institutional phenomenon named the Islamic Republic and therefore new scope for 
further investigation about this modern-religious structure. 
The victory of the Islamic revolution and the installation of Islamic Republic led to a 
methodological confusion in the field of political science. The resurgence of Islamic 
notions amid to establish a religious nation-state was not seen scientifically justifiable. 
This revival of Islam in socio-political spheres was felt to be reactionary and 
backward. It thus, opened a new category within political studies to view more 
seriously the issue of religious discourse and political culture in politics. This research 
aligns itself in this field, aiming to further our understanding of the democratic 
political process (parliamentary politics) and religious discourse (the presence and 
influence of a certain interpretation of Shi"ism based on wilayat al-fagih) in post- 
revolutionary Iran. 
The fundamental and preliminary questions upon which this research attempts to 
explore its hypothesis are as follows: what are the main qualifying elements of 
democracy? Is the Western-liberal model of modernity an all-pervasive and universal 
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method for reaching democracy. or there are other alternatives and narratives for 
democratisation? What is the role and weight of political culture here? Is it feasible 
that democracy might become established in the very religious society of Iran? What 
are the signs of Iran's encounter with modernity and democratic values? And in this 
light, where should be seen the Islamic Republic of Iran? Are the main causes of the 
Islamic Republic rooted in Shi'ism as a dominant ideology-as some argue about the 
concept of 1vilayal al-fagih-or is the Islamic Republic the result of a discursive 
development? How do we see this discursive development evolving since the 
establishment of a constitution and parliament in Iran? Can we take Iran's dynamic- 
although inconsistent-institutional trajectory and intellectualism (assumptions of the 
thesis) as the sign of a democratisation process (hypothesis of the thesis)? And if yes. 
who were the movers and shakers behind this process? 
This research is therefore a fresh attempt to answer these questions and to examine the 
validity of the abovementioned hypothesis by utilising discursive analysis. To do this, 
I start by considering democracy and the democratisation process in the first chapter. I 
argue that the scientific discourse cannot solely accommodate the sophisticated and 
interwoven parameters involved in Iran's socio-political sphere. I then turn to religion 
(Shi'ism) as a formidable factor in shaping and determining socio-political realities in 
Iran, therefore impossible to ignore or underestimate. This leads me to investigate 
primary sources and texts available in Iran regarding the historical aspects of political 
Shi'a, notably wilayat ul-fagih (jurisprudent rule) until recent jurisprudential 
developments. 
In Chapter Three, I analyse the Constitution and the institutional equilibrium of the 
Islamic Republic. The study of Iran's constitutional hierarchy tells us that although 
the elected institution of parliament has been given a great deal of power to scrutinize 
government, in the broader context it has only a limited role-if any-in 
implementing democratic procedures. In Chapter Four. I focus on how factional 
politics evolved through and became a conduit for an internal reform movement 
within the Islamic Republic. Chapter Four examines the tactical alliance between 
moderate left and moderate right (conservatives) and tries to examine President 
Khatami's reformist mandate within this category. The argument therefore is to assess 
the Sixth Majlis' performance according to the publicly announced reform mandate. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The methodological foundation of the present thesis is based on qualitative methods. 
By qualitative methods I mean surveying and investigating books, journals and 
newspapers. It is essential to mention here that up to half of the sources quoted and 
cited in this thesis are in Persian and needed accurate translation and transliteration. 
Library sources both in English and Persian were consulted on great scale as well as 
archive collections for the Persian newspapers, weekly and monthly periodicals. In 
addition to sources available in British libraries. I managed to conduct six months of 
field research in Iran in the university libraries of Tehran, Shahid Beheshti and also 
Ayatollah Mara'shi's Library in Qum. 
Due to the very contemporary nature of the present research subject, sources on 
parliamentary politics in Iran are scarce. This thesis benefits from a wide range of 
newspaper achieves by extracting the relevant editorials, interviews and party 
analyses, many of which have been translated to English for first time for this 
research. In fact, it was the most challenging part of the research since many 
newspapers which I needed to take notes from had been banned and hence removed 
the collections. I also conducted an interview with a former MP. an extract from 
which is translated and reproduced towards the end of Chapter Four. In terms of 
quantitative methods. I obtained a collection of raw data and statistics from the Centre 
for Research of the Majlis and also Iran's Interior Ministry. I have classified them and 
drawn relevant tables which can be found in Chapter Four. 
For references and bibliography I have used the standard set out by the International 
Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). I have also employed a method of 
transliteration which is most compatible with the pronouncement of them in Persian. 
The exception is for the name of individuals, books and also well-established 
transliterations such as: ijtihad, fagih, Shi'ism, Sunna. Shari'a. ulama. 
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LITREATURE REVIEW 
The first issue prior to embarking on a research project is drawing up the scope and 
extent of it. The preliminary investigation to the present thesis proved that studying 
democracy and democratisation process in Iran is a multi-dimensional task. On one 
hand, one faces an enormous academic literature on democracy and related subjects, 
i. e. political thought and its history, political theories, types of governments including 
empirical and institutional experiences of democratic governments, political culture, 
charismatic and influential figures and also religions. On the other hand, the issue of 
narrowing down the subject of research becomes more challenging. One cannot easily 
exclude any of the above-mentioned disciplines from a study of democracy either as a 
concept or a model of government in a society. In my survey prior to and during this 
present research I have come across various disciplines which have had much to offer. 
On democracy, I have most benefited from two books: Models of Democracy by 
David Held and Developing Democracy: towards Consolidation by Larry Diamond. 
The invaluable Preface to Democracy by Robert Dahl provided me with great insight 
and analysis on democratic theorising. David Beetham's Defining and Measuring 
Democracy introduced me to mostly unnoticed aspect of democracy. Paul Hirst's 
Associative Democracy was essential in helping me recognise the deficiencies of 
liberal democracy and opened new windows for understanding and categorising 
democracy. Of course, classical texts by Alex de Tocqueville, Max Weber, Karl Marx 
and Schumpeter were quintessential. On democratisation process, works written by 
David Whitehead (Democratisation, Theory and Experience) and Jean Grugel 
(Democratisation, A Critical Introduction) were significant in shaping the first 
chapter. I also used Samuel Huntington's and Anthony Giddens' books on political 
systems and structure. 
On defining and relating the concept of democracy to Iranian society, this thesis 
utilised invaluable works on Iran's encounter with modernity. The most informative 
and analytical work that was referred to on this field is Mirsepassi's Intellectual 
Discourse and Politics of Modernisation in Iran. It gave the foundation stone for 
building my argument concerning the discursive development of Iran's experience of 
democratisation. Also, Ali Gheissari's excellent book Iranian Intellectuals in 20i1' 
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Cenluiy and Farzin Vahdat's God and Juggernaut: Iran's Intellectual Encounter with 
Modernity added extensive analysis and value to my research. Islam and Democracy 
by Ali Abootalebi provided significant scientific analysis and evaluation on the 
trajectory of democracy in Iran. 
On Islam and Shi'ism. I relied heavily on the primary sources. which I consulted 
during my field research in Tehran and Qum. For example, Shaykh Tusi's al-Nahay-i. 
Al-Kulayni's Usul al-Kafi. Ayatollah Khomeini's Hukumat-i Islami. Baqir Majlisi's 
Bihar al-Anvar. Mohsen Kadivar's Na_ariah-hah yih Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shia. Jamile 
Kadivar's Tahawwul-i Guftaman-i Siyasi Shi 'a dar Iran. Mujtahid Shabesari's Nagdi 
bar Oira'al-i Rasmi a. Din, and Ayatollah Montazeri's Dirasatfi al-Wilayat al-fagih, 
Ayatollah Mutahhari's various publications and Ali Shari'ati's collection of books. 
From the secondary source, the research has benefited greatly from Colin Turner's 
well written guide book on Islam, the Basics and his attempt to unveil the most 
authentic portrayal of Islam according to Koran and the Tradition. Also. Soroush"s 
Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam plus Neal Robinson's Concise 
Introduction to Islam should be mentioned here. Lloyd Rigion's Religion and Politics 
in Modern Iran was essential reading for covering the dynamics of Iran's 
intellectualism and the influence of the West. It also opens a fresh window of research 
on how religious and secular discourses evolved through time and became dominant. 
On political culture I should mention the following books: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Vebra; Political Man, the Social Bases (? /- 
Politics by Seymour Martin Lipset; and Mansoor Moadel's Political Culture in the 
Islamic Republic. On the socio-political situation in Iran and the Islamic revolution. 
three books were central: Iran between Two Revolutions by Errand Abrahamian: 
History and Politics in Iran by Homa Katouzian and, A Century of Revolution, Social 
Movement in Iran by John Foran. Of course on the political structure of Iran. 
Schirazi"s significant book is compelling: The Constitution of Iran. Towards the end 
of the thesis, the majority of sources are primary and from Iranian newspapers and 
magazines as well as internet websites. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: DEMOCRACY, MODERNITY AND 
POLITICAL CULTURE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to outline a balanced presentation of the issue of democracy and 
democratisation process, as the main goal of the present research is to explore the 
state of democracy and its institutional implementation that is parliament in the 
current Iranian state. This chapter also attempts to provide an introductory but 
informative-analytical debate on democracy related issues. Given the particularity of 
Iranian encounter with democracy after the Islamic Revolution, it becomes 
increasingly more difficult to apply the classic scientific theories for explaining and 
verifying the contemporary Islamo-Iranian issue. ' The simple justification for this 
statement is the undeniable presence and influence of the religious and cultural 
dimension within contemporary Iranian politics. In fact, the emergence of the Islamic 
Republic struck another blow against scientific discourse in political science. That is 
because for the scientific discourse the subjects of culture or religion can hardly be 
studied scientifically due to their abstractive and subjective character. 
In the wide spectrum of political studies, there is still disagreement over the name of 
the field itself, as many tend to call it "political science" while others call it area 
study" and some "political studies". It is hard to see such theoretical array within any 
other academic field as there is less disagreement over the title of the field. It is also 
true that a substantial body of work relating to democracy and democratisation 
process have been conducted through scientific discourse for two obvious reasons. 
One is that in the West experience of democratisation was primarily explained and 
theorised under the scientific method which is calculative, measurable and concerned 
with objective socio-economic development. Second, as the result of applying 
scientific method, a strong tendency emerged to construct comparative politics for 
less developed and developing counties whose trajectory to achieve their goals were 
assumed to be the same as the West's. 
' For example. Marxism or institutionalism. 
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There is, in fact, a theoretical dilemma within the field of political studies which any 
researcher must tackle prior to embarking on his/her work. Firstly, they must find an 
appropriate discourse within which they conduct their analysis. and secondly, they 
must adopt a theoretical framework within which the results of their study can be 
interpreted. Of course, this study is not excluded from such dilemma. In dealing with 
this predicament, I will argue in this chapter that critical social theory is more 
appropriate than scientific social theory for studying the current democratic dilemma 
in Iran. By so doing, the necessary theoretical ground is provided for testing our main 
hypothesis of incompatibility of Islamo-Iranian political culture with democracy in 
the Western sense of term. 
The ongoing debate and struggle to adopt a pervasive pattern of democracy in 
developing countries has cast some doubt over so far valid and indisputable 
prescriptive understanding of democracy or better say democratisation. It is also true 
that modern nation-states have many common characteristics and functions in terms 
of state-society relation that makes it feasible for generalisation and thus modelling 
patterns. But, the crucial issue which is often ignored by the political scientists is the 
wider historic, contextual and functioning qualities of developing countries and the 
scientists' over-reliance on positivism as their methodological conduct. The present 
thesis aims to shed some light on the specific nature of the Iranian state and its 
influence on acquiring democracy. So in this first chapter, our attempt is to 
distinguish the concept of democracy not necessarily as a Western by-product of 
modernity, but as a universalistic approach for embracing modernity in governance. 
In case of studying the state of democracy and democratisation process in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, as mentioned above we are faced with two major options. This 
chapter, in addition to providing an epistemological introduction to the concept of 
democracy and democratisation, has attempted to explain and explore the 
inefficiencies of covert application of scientific method in studying democratisation in 
developing countries in general and in Iranian case in particular. However, we should 
not overlook the merits of scientific method in terms of state-society relationship 
(distribution of resources. social classes and economic power. political and judicial 
institution, etc). 
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1.2. DEMOCRACY, POLITICS OF MODERNITY 
A lot has been said on the merits of democracy and its superiority over other methods 
of political rule. Also, many criticisms have been offered of the political systems 
which could not implement democratic norms and procedures. One can pose the 
question: Wherein lies the superiority of democracy? If there is righteousness. where 
does it come from? Does it come from the Western experience of modernity? Is it 
right because the Europe's socio-economic struggle after all concluded in a 
coexistence and cooperation between capitalism and democracy? Is democracy right 
and best for all other nations because through this path developing countries concede 
to follow the West in their quest for prosperity, modernity and hence continue to 
submit? Or is democracy only a tool of maintaining the long established core- 
periphery relationship for a new post-colonial era? And why democracy seems to be 
so compelling now? What is the core notion of democracy? Do not we really need to 
revise the very meaning of democracy upon which many false experiments are 
conducted? 
Of course, within the scope of this current study we cannot explore and provide 
answer for all the aforementioned questions, but these radical questions should lead 
our primary attention toward a fundamental notion of modernity and its relation with 
democracy. It is our assumption in this chapter that democracy is until now the least 
bad, hence the acceptable model for political system and also, it is the phenomenon of 
modernity and enlightenment that has expanded the inclusiveness of democratic 
necessity across time and space. However, there is a danger in assuming that the 
models of democracy found in the West are necessarily are valid in other context 
(discursive determination). Thus, the first task to tackle in this chapter is to recruit a 
more suitable discourse of discerning the dilemma (democratisation in Iran) and 
second to deploy a testable theoretical ground for our hypothesis (political culture). 
To start it is precise to ask. what is the application of modernity in politics? As 
Mirsepassi delicately maintains "answering this question requires a serious 
exploration into the genealogy of the Western narrative of modernity and its 
dichotomizing representation of non-Western cultures and societies. " Again. a 
question arises as: "Is modernity a totalizing. dominating and exclusionary ideology. 
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which is primarily and inescapably grounded in European cultural and moral 
experience and therefore incapable of understanding other cultures as anything other 
than as its inferior 'other' ? "2 Or, is modernity a mode of social and cultural 
experience of the present that is open to all forms of contemporary experiences and 
possibilities? 3 
Truthfully speaking, the communal consciousness of modem Europe has always 
tended to define its own modernity in opposition to "other's" primitive way of living 
and thinking. An important link in the genealogy of the modem-traditional has been 
always the distinction and opposition between civil and uncivil. Civil is a referent to 
the Western way of thinking and living while the uncivil is an attribute of the non- 
Western often primitive social forms. It seems that there should be a theoretical 
explanation as to redefine a new narrative to reconcile the paradoxes between 
modernity's promise of openness and inclusive qualities and the palpable Eurocentric 
narrative of modernisation that forecloses the possibility of real local experiences and 
of their contribution in the realisation of modernity. 4 
The pioneers of liberal tradition of modernity, Montesquieu, Hegel, Weber and 
Durkheim tend to privilege Western cultural and moral norms, and therefore define 
modernity in terms of Western cultural and historical experiences. This vision sees a 
fundamental hostility between non-Western cultures and modernity. a lasting 
incompatibility. However, in recent years a more radical vision of modernity has 
emerged as articulated by Habermas, Giddens and Berman that envisages the project 
of modernisation as a practical and empirical experience that liberate societies from 
their oppressive "material conditions". ' Thus, treading the path of modernity 
according to radical vision should not necessarily be in the same direction that of the 
West has been. In other words, the emphasis on the loosening of material condition to 
acquire modernity provides the possibility of a more "locally" imagined interpretation 
of modernisation. 6 
2 All Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernisation: Negotiating Modernity in 
Iran, Cambridge University Press. 2000, p. 1. 
Marshal Berman, The Experience of Modernity, Penguin, New York. 1988. 
Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse, p. 5. 
5 Ibid. p. 2. 
" Ibid. 
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As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, there are various major theories under 
which any political scientist can instigate a scientific study in the field of politics, but 
one seemingly is to encounter with difficulty in analysing and categorising the issue 
of religion and political culture as an active and participant element throughout his/her 
perusal.? It was and still is holding significant validity throughout the scientific 
discourse that oriental or Islamic political culture as non-modern (backwardness) is 
not amenable to construct of a modern and democratic system. 8 Building upon this 
assumption we face with two conclusions. These are, either the Islamic society should 
surrender its adherence to its regressive roots and beliefs by replacing them with 
modern, democratic and of course. Western values, or deconstructing the old- 
fashioned, orientalists attitudes toward Islam-not as an backward ideology-but as 
an indigenous, authentic, encouraging and after all emancipating philosophy with the 
inner ability of embracing modern ideas and practices. 9 
We can argue that the evolution of political theories in the West has been in direct 
relation to the disappearance of religion from polity. In other words, these theories 
could be best applied to secular societies within which religion no longer holds any 
significant role in determining the populace's mindset and therefore actions. The 
entrance of such issues as religion and cultural beliefs into the political discussion 
oblige the observer to recruit a more suitable platform for his/her posits. We should 
remember that the widely accepted social theory is in convergence with a secular and 
unreligious society in which it is the social contracts10 and norms that matter, not 
rather abstract concepts and subjects such as divine rule. 
11 Thus, for example, the 
interaction of a secular society with its corresponding political institutions can be best 
explained under the theory of institutionalism, while, in a religious society like Iran. 
although having long-standing modern political institutions, the theory of 
institutionalism per se is unable to elucidate the failure and malfunctioning of its 
political institutions. 
See for example. Muhammad Reza Behnam, Cultural Foundation of Iranian Politics. 
See Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West, New York. Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Two famous intellectuals can be named for each conclusion respectively: Mirza Melkum Khan and 
Jamal al-din Asadabadi. 
"'Social contracts such as conventions, law and regulations. 
See for example. Juan Jacque Rousseau. The Social Contract: and. Discourses. translated and 
introduced by G. D. H. Cole. London, Dent: Vermont, Tuttle. 2004. 
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The application of scientific discourse is a common method of perception within the 
field of political science. The resulting theory is constructed upon a distinction 
between two formations of theoretical notion, subject and object of knowledge. This 
theory which we can call the "traditional social theory" refers to a series of 
propositions whose validities lie in its correspondence with an object already 
constituted prior to the act of representation. 12 Starting from such a theoretical focal 
point, the theorist or observer pays much more attention to the object of study which 
is to be a series of factual elements (i. e. the electorate's behaviour in an election), 
while the subject (i. e. the beliefs and inner motivations of the electorates) is to be the 
passive element of an act of knowing. 13 
In opposition to this theory, we can utilize "critical social theory which holds that 
both science and the reality it studies are the product of a social praxis, which means 
that the subject and the object of knowledge find themselves socially performed. In 
other words, the object is not simply "there", deposited before the observer waiting to 
be captured, nor does the subject merely represent the reality. Both subject and object 
are the result of complex social process. The fundamental task of critical theory is 
therefore to reflect upon the structure from which both social realities as well as the 
theories seeking to account for it (in this thesis political culture) are constructed- 
including the critical theory itself. 
In analysing the Islamic Republic. social theory suggests the seemingly far-reaching 
possibility of bringing together Islam. as the dominant and popular religion and 
democracy as a systemic discourse, to fulfil modernisation. The challenge facing this 
convergence is the lack of a theoretical ground within scientific political discourse 
capable of explaining and underpinning the possible correlation between Islam and 
democracy. The persistent weakness of scientific political discourses in explaining 
socio-political developments in religious countries like Iran has thrown doubt over the 
validity of such theories. '4 As a result. it is now more than ever necessary to employ a 
balanced theoretical foundation (critical social theory) that welcomes to subjective 
notions and concepts like religion too. The general quest of Iranian society for 
12 Max Horkheimer has first identified and named it traditional social theory. 
Santiago Castro-Gomez. e journal:. Nepantila. I'ieirs. Ji"om South 1.3. (2000). p. 503-518. 
14 Mirsepassi. Intellectual Discourse, intro. 
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modernity, and the case of Islamic Revolution and its institutional result, the Islamic 
Republic in particular must be seen through this frame. 
The history of Iran's encounter with modernity goes back to the mid nineteen century. 
Since the outset, we can see two paradoxical approaches towards modernity and the 
West. One has always seen modernity as an undesirable "other", whilst the other 
approach perceived it as inescapable fate. j5 In featuring this sharp distinction Islam 16 
has played and continues to play an essential role. either to approve and accept it as a 
progressive process or to condemn and denounce it as an alien notion with absolute 
contradictions with the immutable elements of Islam. Interestingly, through such 
turbulent path of encountering modernity for majority of the Iranian people, Islam 
itself has been viewed as the authentic cultural identity (criterion tool). 
At least, the widely popular emergence and still existence of the Islamic state proves 
this proclamation. The irony of continuing encounter between Islamic discourse and 
the Western discourse primarily does not lie within their intrinsic contradictions and 
confrontations. at least as far as socio-political history of Muslim societies are 
concerned. As for more than a century these societies-including Iran-were ushered 
to embrace and incorporate modernity under secular and modernistic rule. But the 
result appeared to be otherwise. In particular. the experience of Iranian society shows 
not only that the ostensible modernistic and secular regime could not fulfil its goal of 
entering the "gates of civilisation'''7. but caused widespread disillusionment and 
facilitated the surfacing of an Islamic doctrine. 
The major socio-political by-product of fifty seven years of the Pahlavi regime was to 
re-contextualise the meaning attached to modernisation and modernity in Iran. 
Mirsepassi argues that the systemic suppression of secular opponents created a 
political vacuum for the emerging Islamic movement, and its attempts to articulate an 
alternative to oppressive Western models of modernisation. In fact, the essence of 
Iranian Revolution can be seen less as a monolithic clash between "modernity" and 
"tradition". rather as an attempt to actualise a modernity accommodated to national, 
Ibid. 
In Chapter 2a broader account of what can or ought to be constituted as Islam will be presented. 17 This legendary term was used by Muhammad Reza Shah. 
19 
cultural and historical experiences. 19 A broader account of how a strong section of 
Iranian intellectuals like Ali Shari'ati and Jalal AI-e Ahmad elaborated on this 
assumption will be presented in Chapter 2. 
At the same time, there is another widely held opinion (orientalism or/and area study) 
that stipulates the lasting incompatibility of Islamo-Iranian political culture with 
democracy and democratisation process in the Western sense of term. 19 We can name 
Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington as two pioneers of this judgment. 20 These 
thinkers directly put the blame on the foundations and principles of Islam as a religion 
and therefore present it as a paradoxical context for establishing and flourishing of 
democratic-read Western-values. In fact, orientalists such as Lewis believe in a 
deep ideological and philosophical contradiction and confrontation between Islam and 
democracy as a modern pattern of governance and emphasise the necessity of 
amending Islam. It should be borne in mind that the application of scientific discourse 
in studying a religious society in search of democracy will arrive at the same 
conclusion as the orientalists, although emanated from different departure points. 
The nuanced difference here is that the orientalists equate the failings and regressions 
of the Islamic societies with their being religious or Muslim, while the scientific 
scholars count it alongside other socio-economic and political factors, in particular. 
when debating on prerequisites of democracy such as a political culture conducive to 
democracy. In the following, we will try to present an extractive account of 
democracy, its definition, applications and types. However, one should bear in mind 
that although the following construct is chiefly articulated from the Western context, 
the culmination of this passage is based on a universalistic principles derived from the 
common denominator of the democratic approach. 
is Mirsepassi. Intellectual Discourse, p. 15. 
For example see: All Reza Abootalebi, Islam and Democraci : Slate-Society relations in Developing 
Countries. 1980-1994. Garland Publishing. INC, New York. 2000. p. ix. 
20 Samuel Huntington's ideas will be discussed later in this chapter and for Bernard Lewis in the 
Chapter 2. 
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1.3. D STEMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY 
More than any other form of government, democracy attracts elaboration and 
attention. But, what are the prerequisites of democracy? It is not an exaggeration 
to claim that since the earliest period of written history, the question of who 
ought to rule and how, has been a major debate of mankind. Aristotle gave 
particular emphasis on the composition of "social parts" to explain a political 
system"s prevailing type. 
221 He referred to the different parts of society as 
different social classes, occupations and status groups. He noticed the impact of 
societal composition or class structure (poor-rich) as the real ground of the 
difference between oligarchy and democracy. Alex de Tocqueville also argued a 
direct relation between democracy and the equality of people's economic and 
social condition. He noticed a great deal of "general equality of condition among 
the people" [in democracies]. Although for him law and political institutions are 
essential in shaping populace attitudes toward equality and democracy. 22 
Some theorists have attempted to explain the genealogy of various political 
systems and their relation to democratic norms with modernisation discourse. 
According to them democracy has "historically risen along with capitalism and 
in causal connection with it". 23 Weber presented sociological method connecting 
political economy, Protestantism, bureaucratic rationalism and democracy. Some 
went further and envisaged that modern democracy can only occur under 
industrial capitalist development. 24 It is true that in the West, capitalism has been 
a mode of production conducive to the growth of markets that resulted in the rise 
of capitalist bourgeoisie. industrial working class and of course. a viable middle 
class. All are the constituents and carriers of the development of democracy in 
the West. 
2' See The Politics ot'Aristotle, trans. E. Baker. Oxford, Clarendon, 1961, p. 1 16. 
-- See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. edited and abridged by R. D. Heffner. New 
American Library. New York. 1956. 
2.11 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Demmocracy. 
'a Seymour M. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy" in American Political Science Review. no. 53, March 1959. pp. 69-73. 
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But given the extractive and monopolistic feature of capitalism, its application in 
developing countries cannot produce the same fruit as it did in the West. In fact, 
the experience of capitalism in developing countries has wrought a high level of 
interaction with foreign economic and political interventions which only has 
added more complexity to the issue. Moreover, the rapid expansion of 
bureaucratic governments in developing countries due to their late arrival in the 
cluster of nation-states has left little room for vibrant civil society institutions 
and private enterprises. The size and power of state in developing countries is 
enormous and frightening in comparison with their counterparts in the West. 
Thus. even should we accept the criteria of scientific discourse as to establish 
equilibrium between state-society relationship in terms of a fair distribution of 
socio-economic resources for reaching democracy, the application of capitalism 
in this regard would be dissatisfying. 
Karl de Schweintiz argued that Euro-American route to democracy has been "a 
function of an unusual configuration of historical circumstances which cannot be 
repeated". `' Taking only the first part of this judgment to be true, we must 
recognise the necessity of scrutinising almost all the circumstances, if we are to 
compare democratisation between Western and developing countries. Even 
Barrington Moore in his famous book of Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy indicated that the paths toward parliamentary democracy as well as 
toward communism and fascism were specific conditions characteristic of 
particular phases of world history. Both the national and international contexts 
within which the Western democracy was born have drastically changed. All in 
all, the particular contexts within which Western democracy occurred do not 
undermine the universalistic assumption of democracy. but nor does it rule out 
other democratic models occurring in other contexts. 
'` Karl de Schweintiz. Industrialisation and Democracy: Economic A'ccc'ssitics and political 
possibilities, New York, Free Press, 1946. p. 10. 
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1.4. CONCEPTS AND NOTIONS OF DEMOCRACY 
First of all, it is clear that democracy and democratisation-related issues, like 
other fields of humanities, are characterised by a dynamic and interactive 
nature. 26 In other words, we cannot provide a final, universal and timeless 
definition of the respective disciplines of such issues, although there could be 
prevailing theories within a specific period of time. Thus, it is essential to be 
aware that studying and researching such areas require one to assess the merits 
of different and even totally opposite views. Nowadays, the terminology of 
democracy is not restricted to academic debates or to the debates of the elite, but 
is also a serious and tangible matter of importance throughout societies and 
masses. Issues of the state, its authorities and limits are now being scrutinised 
under the banner of socio-political development and the democracy resulting 
there from. In fact, we can claim that due to the ever-increasing complexity of 
modern societies, the more advanced a certain society is, the greater its demand 
for democracy will be. Also, one of the facts of political philosophy is that a 
fixed prescription of an almost faultless definition of democracy is yet hard to 
achieve. 
Our debate revolves around two notions: democracy and democratisation. On the 
one hand, democracy as the concept of people ruling themselves has become an 
abstract concept with too many definitions and descriptions. On the other hand, 
democratisation as the process of implementing the concept of democracy is also 
credited with assorted methods and schemes. In short, neither the various 
definitions of democracy can be ignored, nor the diverse methods of its 
implementation. We thus need a_floating but anchored concept of democracy, 
by which the subsequent democratisation process could be best understood as a 
long term process of social construciion. 
27 It would therefore be appropriate to 
envisage the process of democratisation as a process of social re-construction 
26 These are very debatable topics as so many societies, cultures and political systems are involved. 
See Democratisation, Theory and Experience, (ed) Laurence Whitehead, Oxford. Oxford University 
Press. 2002, pp. 7-9. 
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through which the main social (gender, class, ethnicity, religion and nationality), 
economic (modes of production and income, right to possess and taxation) and 
political institutions undergo certain developments (structural development). 
These developments will then pave the ground for the practice and maintenance 
of a system in which the state and society can interact evenly therefore 
democratically. 
First, we need to define the theoretical grounds for what we mean by democracy. 
In this chapter, by exploring various models of democracy, we aim to extend our 
definition, so as to afford a more compatible and flexible model for countries 
seeking to implement it. In this chapter we will explore current theories of 
democracy and the process of democratisation. By doing so, we will hopefully 
reach a firm foundation for the examination of the Iranian experiment of 
democratisation and find out whether the democratisation process has 
materialised or not. We cannot merely rely on the establishment of modem and, 
to some extent, democratic institutions in Iran. This will constitute only a part of 
our examination, while the rest of the examination will focus on the conceptual 
28 
and structural dimensions of Iranian state and society. 
A self-declared democracy or the implementation of some democratic elements 
like holding regular elections do not provide appropriate grounds for one to 
consider that a certain government or system is running democratically. In other 
words, we must distinguish between one or two-apparently democratic-turn- 
overs of political power in a society as one model, and a self-maintained and 
deep-rooted democratic system as another. In the former, there is a non- 
guaranteed harmony and compromise between political actors (agents) that 
maintain the regularity of the wider political status quo. whereas, in the latter. 
there is a consensus between societal structures and the political agents that 
safeguards the functionality of the democratic system. We should now ask, are 
there certain criteria to apply or a comprehensive theory by which one state can 
28 To be precise, given the religious nature of Iranian society and therefore, its ambiguous relationship 
towards civil liberty movements as in the West, the whole focus has chiefly been given to religious 
intellectuality and political actors. The lack of a robust civil society in Iran may be seemingly 
disappointing for a prospective democratic discourse. However. having seen two democratically 
inspired revolutions in less than a century makes a strong case for studying the democratisation process 
in Iran. no matter how vague and blurred it may seem at first. 
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be regarded as democratic and another one not? 29 As the rhetoric of various 
regimes suggests, claiming to be democratic is easier than practicing democracy 
genuinely. 30 
It is also necessary that our attempt should involve the application of universal 
factors to the concept of democracy. Frank Cunningham declares that 
"democracy is of unlimited scope which goes beyond political relations of public 
and government leaders. "31 As Cunningham explains the "notion of democracy 
is appropriate to all modes of human association: the family, industry, religion, 
or any other site of extensive and enduring mutually affecting interactions 
among people. "32 Moreover, John Dewy maintains that "temporal and local 
diversifications are two prime marks of political organisations. " Thus, the 
attempts of any society to regulate its common affairs which are the core of 
political democracy are experimental and will differ widely from one era to 
another and from place to place. 33 Therefore, the ways of achieving the 
"democratic progress" or "inhibiting regress" depend on circumstances (social, 
economic, cultural, etc). As these circumstances vary, the appropriate political 
institutions, policies, and practices differ accordingly. 
As a result, a suitable interpretation of an applicable model of democracy for a 
target society and hence the democratisation process ought to be a pragmatic 
one. The notion of pragmatism in the context of democracy could be translated 
as a "moderate and constructivist"" approach to the means and causes of 
democracy. 34 In other words, the context is a matter of importance when 
attempting to pin down the applicability of democracy in a very wide range of 
29 For example. the British government as the oldest and one of the best established democracies in the 
world was faced with a great paradox in acting against the majority, and utilized its own authority to 
take the country to war in Iraq in 2003. 
In fact. like other discourses relating to societal sciences. "flexibility" and adaptation are among the 
main elements needed to build a proper framework. In other words, how can we define a compatible 
theory suitable for applying (or even aspiring to apply) democracy in different societies and cultures. 
when circumstances and priorities vary considerably from one country to another? 
" Frank Cunningham. Theories of Democrat-'. A Critical Introduction. Routledge, London, 2002. p. 
143. 
Cunningham. Theories of Democraci. P. 144. 
Cited by Cunningham, ibid. 
,4 Cited by Cunningham. ibid, p. 9. 
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historical, cultural and social contexts. 35 Also, as democracy is both a descriptive 
concept and a desirable value, and since the precise outer boundaries of the 
concept are inherently debatable, there are bound to be disagreements over 
particular applications of the term. 36 Finally, whatever the prevalent and 
hegemonic conception of democracy may be, this model is also provisional and 
subject to further challenge and development in the light of further collective 
deliberation both in academia and societies. 
To clarify the meaning of the embedded diversity of democracy, we need to 
establish our preferred paradigm of `constructive approach', by posing some 
questions. As Whitehead asks, does the term democracy carry the same 
connotation after the end of Cold War as it used to in the bi-polar world? Is the 
core meaning of the word really identical in Chinese and Arabic to its meaning 
in English and Greek? Does it make no basic difference to their understanding of 
the term that different people may occupy different positions in a political 
hierarchy; or is there no difference in the understanding of democracy by men 
and women or by true believers and sceptics in an Islamic theocracy? How can 
the value-laden overtones of the word be prevented from destabilizing our 
usage? This is an important consideration in a period where power and resources 
lie in the hands of those who classify themselves as democrats, and when those 
who are in a position to classify democracy are often not dispassionate 
observers, but actively interested parties. Can we disregard historical change, 
and assume some underlying continuity of meaning for the term extending 
through the city-states of antiquity to the nation- states of modernity into the 
electronically integrated world that may soon be upon us? 37 
As Whitehead"s list of questions highlights, the difficulty around the issue as to 
whether the term 'democracy' has a clear core meaning which could be 
universally applicable and that is essentially objective or not still exists. Also, in 
the scope of humanities providing the absolute answer of 'yes' or 'no' for 
15 Of course. there cannot be substantial disagreement on the core concept of democracy, as it makes 
the debate pointless. However, there is and ought to be various opinions on the applications of 
democracy in different societies. 
'`' 
Whitehead. Democratisation, Theory and Experience. p. 7. 
37 Ibid. p. 8. 
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questions and hypotheses is simply hard to accept, and can be challenged by 
others. However, the most recent resistance towards the normative meaning of 
democracy has arisen mostly from politicians. 38 They argue that the term 
`democracy' originated from a Western intellectual background and is not 
homogenous to non-Western societies. Therefore, it could be argued that it is not 
globally applicable. In this respect, although most scholars and analysts seek to 
avoid the idea of a specific verifiable and a generally applicable meaning of the 
term `democracy'. they reach a consensus upon `democracy' and its negation. 
`authoritarian rule'. This standardises a single timeless and objective definition, 
making it a very compelling proposition. 39 
However, since the chief concern here is how contemporary experience- 
regardless of the social, economic and political context of any society-may 
challenge or destabilise pre-existing theory, the aim is not to provide a timeless 
and universal type of conceptual analysis. It is more about the reality of an 
existing democracy' rather than about prescribing one or more idealised variants 
40 of a possible and suitable model of democracy. 
However, in order to demonstrate the essential elements of democracy as the 
dominant conceptual and institutional practice of contemporary ideology from 
the Cold War onwards, it is necessary to set up a minimumal or procedural 
definition. 41 Although such a definition could be both insufficient and too 
demanding, the absence of standards and minimums will result in the problem 
remaining unsolved. Whitehead argues that the "procedural definition is 
insufficient because it excludes the inescapably of the teleological component of 
democracy which is what gives it emotional force. It is also too demanding 
because really existing democracies cannot be expected consistently to conform 
to the minimum standards that it stipulates. "4` 
For instance, the conservative faction in the Islamic republic does not recognise the term democracy 
as a universal and inclusive concept, but an ill-judged Western tool for domination over other nations. 
Whitehead, Democratisation, Theory and Experience. p. 11. 
40 Polygarchies is used in Robert Dahl's terminology. 
41 This idea was originated by Joseph Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. intro by 
Swedberg. London. Routledge. 1994, p. 109. 
42 Whitehead, Democratisation, p. 12. 
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Philippe C. Schmitter is a pioneer who introduced an overview of current 
orthodoxies on the meaning of democracy. 43 He distinguishes between 
"concept". "procedures", and "operative principles" of democracy. According to 
him, at the "conceptual level" the most distinctive feature of democracy is said 
to be the existence of a broad category of citizens, who can hold rulers 
accountable for their actions in the public realm through the competition and 
cooperation of elected representatives. 
"Democratic procedures" are said to be indispensable for the persistence of 
democracy, although on their own they are not sufficient conditions for its 
existence. And finally, there are "operative principles"" of democracy which 
guarantee and regulate the circle of democratic politics for long term. To 
produce better understanding of these levels we refer to Schmitter and Karl. 
They summarized the seven "procedural minimum" conditions for democracy as 
suggested by Robert Dahl, and have added two more of their own conditions 
which reflect the wider range of democratic experiments attempted since Dahl 
first studied them. These conditions are: 
I. Control of government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested 
in public officials. 
II. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in 
which coercion is comparatively uncommon. 
III. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. 
IV. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the 
government. 
V. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe 
punishment on political matters broadly defined. 
VI. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. 
Moreover. alternative sources of information exist and are protected by 
law. 
VII. Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or 
organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups. 
a' Transition from Authoritarian Rule, (ed. ) Philippe C. Schmitter [et all. Baltimore. John Hopkins 
University. 1986. p. 46. 
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VIII. Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional 
power without being subjected to over-riding (albeit informal) opposition 
from unelected officials. 
IX. The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of 
constraint imposed by some other overarching political system. 44 
In respect of minimum procedures. Schmitter and Karl argue that these express 
the way in which democratic regimes actually function. These principles 
constitute the active and participant consent of the people to a more 
cumbersome and conditional formula by the contingent consent of politicians 
that should act under conditions of bounded uncertainty . 
-45 Of course, it could 
be argued that the above measures are both too precise and too incomplete at the 
same time. It is too precise because it indicates that there was no democracy 
before universal adult suffrage, for example. Switzerland only became a 
democracy in 1971 when women achieved the right to vote. However. in a 
comprehensive realistic forum, this argument is not perceived valid. It is also 
imperfect as it fails to embrace sufficient safeguards to protect the oulcomes of 
its proposed ideal which is democracy. In other words, solely emphasizing 
procedures of public decision-making and accountability may cause the 
disregard of outcomes. 46 
If we concede to these minimum procedural measures and testify them with the 
reality of our case study, the Islamic Republic of Iran, we will soon realize that 
hardly three of the afore mentioned measures are applicable. The measures I and 
III are fairly applicable and measure II is partially. So for the rest of measures. 
either they are not sanctioned constitutionally or are in clear contrast with some 
essential articles of the constitution or simply have been overcome with other 
contradictive measures within the document. 47 Notably. measure IV stipulates 
that practically all adults should have the right to run for elective offices in the 
44 Phillippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. 'What Democracy is... and is not', in Larry Diamond 
and Marc F. Plattner (ed), The Global Resurgence of Democracy . 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press. 1993. p. 45. 
45 
Ibid. 
4`' David Beetham (ed). Defining and Measuring Democrac . 
London. Sage. 1994. p. 76. 
47 
A full account on the Islamic Republic Constitution will be presented in Chapter 3. 
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government. While in the Iranian constitution, certain specifications such as 
being from the clergy guild are obligatory for top political and judiciary posts. 48 
Equally, measures IV, V and VI provide the citizens with the minimum rights of 
self expression; freely obtained information; and the freedom to establish 
political parties. Again, according to the parliamentary legislations or 
institutional practices in Iran. these rights have been practically withdrawn and 
replaced with restrictive and anti-democratic rules. 49 Today's reality of Iranian 
society shows that the implementation of democratic measures and values are 
seemingly better than previous regimes and the state is constitutionally bound to 
adapt and undertake democratic norms. 
Holding more than twenty five elections in twenty four years since the 
establishment of the regime can support this assertion. Nevertheless. there are 
other reasons which suggest that the aforementioned minimum procedures are 
insufficient. because being obliged only to these minimum measures can result 
in a totally inappropriate direction. Deprivation of women's right to vote or 
reinforcing unjust laws on minorities through a democratic referendum can be 
named as examples. Thus, insisting upon only democratic norms do not prevent 
anti-democratic outcomes. 50 
Generally, the classic stress of democracy is overwhelmingly on procedures of 
public decision-making and accountability, and it could lead to disregard of the 
outcomes and the critical issue of social values. In this respect, we can refer to 
the diverse types of democracies which have employed various social values. 
For example. the Scandinavian social democracy may represent a subcategory 
and Japanese money politics another. but they are democracies in the essential 
minimum respects. Provided that the procedural requirements of a democracy 
are met. we would be obliged to classify political systems as democratic without 
regard for the social inequities they accommodated. 
4s The Supreme Leader, the Head of Judiciary, the Minister of Intelligence and the Attorney General 
must be from the clergy guild. 
49 For example, the full scale authority of the Guardian Council on vetting process of any candidates for 
any election (except City Council elections) or banning the usage of satellite by the parliament. 
50 For example, the rise of Nazi regime in Germany. 
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It is also important to note that the minimumal procedural definition of 
democracy is capable of crowding out the space for further variety of legal 
rights. In other words, if outcomes are excluded from calculation, the minimumal 
definition could cause incomplete protection of basic personal freedoms which 
inevitably concern citizens' liberty and also security. Thus for example. women 
could be democratically veiled and denied driving licenses or even access to 
education. Immigrants could be democratically disadvantaged. Of course these 
are not just theoretical possibilities but tangible, real implications of endorsing a 
merely minimumal procedure-oriented account of what political democracy can 
and cannot be expected to contain. 
In short, the implementation of a series of democratic procedures within a 
political system does not provide enough perquisites for becoming a democracy 
or even approaching a democracy. The birth of the Islamic Republic and its 
evolution over the past two decades seems to put to the test every modern theory 
of democratic discourse. The Islamic Revolution surprised and defied most 
predictions in the course of its development. In other words, the Islamic 
Revolution possessed such unique qualities and historical particularities that no 
single theoretical perspective could be applied to it: it required a unique one of 
I its ON71.5 
The relevant literature and philosophy of each modern revolution contains 
diverse and often contradictory notions of how it happened and why it evolved 
as it did. Such diverse and contradictory socio-economic and cultural elements 
seem to be the major obstacle to analysing the contemporary political 
developments. At the same time, these problematic elements are essentials to 
any understanding of the process. Moreover, there are considerable differences 
between our case study of Iran and other countries which, so far. have been 
studied in a classic framework (scientific discourse). However, on one hand, the 
very ideological and religious nature of the Iranian society differs from its 
counterparts in the Third World and, on the other hand. its indispensable reliance 
51 David Menashri, Post-Revolutionar' Politics in Iran, Religion. Society and Power. Frank Cass 
Publishers, London. 2001, p. vii. 
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on oil revenue classifies it alongside other authoritative and rentier states. 
'' In 
other words, alongside political economy there is political culture which plays a 
significant role in shaping polity whether in favour of a democratic process or 
against it. As mentioned before, in this thesis we are mainly concerned with the 
implications of political culture in reaching democracy as the prerequisite of 
democratisation. However, before engaging with the concept of political culture 
it is necessary to provide a theoretical account of democracy as a model of 
governance and its teleological basis that is legitimacy. 
1.5. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY 
In this research we take as granted that democracy is preferred over its 
alternatives such as authoritarian and totalitarian types of regimes. Hence. we 
need to underpin our understanding of democracy as the best pattern, although 
open to further revision. Nevertheless, it is not an option to study a very broad 
but crucial concept like democracy without certain principles of methodology. 
Therefore, we need to review this subject from its purely theoretical aspects to 
its practical tools and procedures. Beetham describes the concept of democracy 
as: 
[a] mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules 
and policies over which the people exercise control, and the 
most democratic arrangement that where all members of the 
collectively enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such 
decision-making directly-one. that is to say. which realises to 
the greatest conceivable degree the principles of popular 
control and equality in its exercise. 53 
Jean Grugel argues that democracy can be understood as an ideology. a concept 
or a theory. It is an ideology in so far as "it embodies a set of political ideas that 
52 After Saudi Arabia, Iran is the biggest oil producer and still more than 65% of its revenue is gained 
through selling oil. According to officials, the tax system is one of the most obvious failures of 
government apparatus. 
511, David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power. Basingstoke. Macmillan, 1991, p. 103. 
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detail the best possible form of social organisation". 54 It is also known as the 
fairest functional manner of extracting and distributing power in the public 
realm. However. there are two extreme trends evident among supporters of 
democracy. On the one hand, there are the advocates of a very idealistic 
interpretation of democracy as the best political system. And on the other hand. 
there are those who consider the concept of democracy as a decorative measure 
and a legitimacy-buyer for governing the public. A trace of the latter reading of 
democracy can be found across developing countries, including the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
It is taken for granted that a democracy implies faith in people; to believe that 
people have inalienable rights to make decisions for themselves and; to be 
committed to the notion that all people are equal in some fundamental and 
essential way. 55 However, it is fairly possible that various legal considerations 
which are mostly driven by religion or tradition imply that the essence of such 
notions can be employed in contradictory ways. From the scientific discourse 
point of view, the essence of democracy can be demolished by the contradictory 
way a particular society conduct itself in practice. '6 A successful attempt to 
theorise democracy ought to be concerned with any potential philosophical and 
political disputes which may gradually effect or victimise democracy by 
processes carried out in its name. 
There are two principal types of practice in theorising democracy: direct and 
representative democracy. The tradition of direct democracy goes back to the 
Athenian legacy of popular government within a small city state. Basically, 
direct democracy is meant to ensure democratic rights for the community as a 
whole. In this regard, it is argued that Marxism as an ideology based on 
collective action through collective decisions made by the whole population is a 
developed form of direct democracy. ' Direct democracy in this tradition is `rule 
54 Quoted by Jean Grugel from Mackensie in Democratisation, .4 Critical Introduction, 
London. 
Palgrave. 2002, p. 12. 
$5Grugel, Democratisation, A Critical Introduction, p. 42. 
56 According to the normative principles of democracy the regime of the Islamic Republic was 
established democratically (Through a general referendum to vote yes) but soon after establishment 
tended to deprive the people's social and political rights by its legislatures. 57 Grugel, Democrati=ation, A Critical Introduction, p. 14. 
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by the people through referenda'. The people are given the right to pass laws or 
veto laws. This model cannot be conducted in expanded societies and therefore 
the normative democratic practices emerged through representative democracy. 
However, in recent years, due to technological developments by which people 
can easily and securely express their opinions the idea of direct democracy has 
regained its merits and is practiced on a large scale. 58 
Alternatively, representative democracy comprises a form of democracy wherein 
voters can freely and privately choose their representative in a multi-party 
election to act in their interests. The representatives will possess enough 
authority to exercise initiatives in the face of changing circumstances. Modern 
liberal democracies are important examples of representative democracy. This 
model focuses on the liberal idea of the individual, who has the right, but not an 
obligation, to participate in politics. Therefore, by infusing the traditions of 
liberalism into democracy, it can then be defined as the prevalent mode of 
democracy. which could be best served by protecting the autonomy of the 
individual. 59 At the same time, the liberal brand of representative democracy 
seeks to justify, but limit, the sovereign power of the state. 
In modern societies, however, direct democracy is no longer the case due to the 
greater size of the population and the complexities of state and civil structures. 
Instead. the original aspiration towards direct democracy can be traced in 
participatory democracy, in particular, with the advent of new communication 
technologies. Some consider that participatory democracy requires the 
introduction of new voting systems enabling citizens to vote instantly and 
securely. Such democratic systems would need an appropriate political culture 
and accompanying techno-political arrangements. 60 In fact, democracy as a 
model is still undergoing a process of evolution. Thus, as Geraint Parry states 
"democracy is not a condition which has been achieved, but one which still must 
be striven for. "6' Moreover, the central feature of any modern society with its 
unavoidable arrangements, organisations and bureaucracy is the need for 
s" For example, holding regular referendums on the issue of the EU. 
59 Grugel. Democratisation, p. 14. 
Democracl- and Democratisation, (ed. ) Geraint Parry and M. Moran. Rutledge. London, 1994. p. 4. 
61 Ibid. 
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political leadership. And the only way in which it can be governed 
democratically is through a system of accountability which thus seems more 
practical and productive than mere participation. 
Liberal democracy has evolved a satisfactory method of accountability in the 
form of competitive elections in which rivals for the political leadership 
campaign for the votes of the electorates. Politics is professionalised and the 
system is one in which as Schumpeter describes "democracy becomes the rule 
of politician rather than of the people in any direct sense. "ý'` Also, politicians 
make possible some significant choice between packages of policies. Successful 
leaders gain from the election at least the authority to govern for a period of 
years. 63 To find out how and why liberal democracy emerged as the prevalent 
democratic theory in the contemporary era along with considering its strengths 
and weaknesses, we need to study the empirical theory of democracy. Suffice to 
say that by analysing the empirical experiments of democracy in the West, the 
theoretical insufficiencies of liberal democracy as its role model are revealed. 
1.5.1. THE EMPIRICAL THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 
During last six decades the meaning and the usage of democracy has shifted in a 
highly significant way. It became a part of the vocabulary of real politics as a 
way of distinguishing between `the free world' and the Communist bloc. As a 
result. democracy was more and more equated with the political arrangements 
current in Western Europe and the US. Thus, the idea of democracy was 
exclusively embodied within the liberal or representative form of democracy 
adopted in the West. To be precise, the implementation of democracy as a 
particular set of arrangements for government was in exact accordance with the 
empirical reality of Western governments. As Jean Grugel argues, empirical 
democratic theorising was bound up with the Cold War and with the need to 
justify liberal democracy. The negative point of this trend focused on the 
Joseph Alios Schumpeter, Capita/ism, Socialism and Democracy, Allen and Unwin, London, 1976. 
6' Parry. (ed) Democracy and Democratisation, p. 5. 
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benefits of the present political establishments in the West against its perceived 
rival "Marxism". 
More significantly, the empirical theory of democracy was less focused on 
abstract notions of the `good society'. Instead, the practice of democratic 
procedures was the only criterion for most political scientists in naming a 
political entity democratic or not. However, the rise of behaviouralism radically 
changed the way in which democracy was understood. According to Arernd 
Lijphart, democracy was a reality that existed in 'the real world'. Here he was 
attempting to say that the political systems existing in the US and Western 
Europe are as real and as ideal as democracies could be expected to be. 64 In 
other words. he induced the concept of democracy as much as possible to be a 
"normative" concept rather than a "descriptive' one. In the following passage 
Dahl delicately describes the difference between descriptive and normative 
understandings of democracy: 
One way to define democracy]... is to specify a set of goals to 
be maximised; democracy can then be defined in terms of the 
specific governmental process necessary to maximise these 
goals... A second way [which] might be called the descriptive 
method, is to consider as a single class phenomena [of] all 
those nation states and social organisations that are commonly 
called democratic by political scientists and... discover first the 
necessary and sufficient conditions they have in common and 
second. the necessary and sufficient conditions for social 
organizations possessing these characteristics. 65 
Behaviouralists worked in the second way, attempting to justify the normative 
tradition of democracy which resulted in the empirical theory of democracy. 
Schumpeter conceived democracy as a form of government and in particular as a 
`A Arend Lijphart. Democracies Patterns ofMajoritarian and Consensus Governments in Twenty-one 
Century. New Heaven, Yale University Press, 1984. p. 48. 
es Robert A Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 63. 
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mechanism for the election of leaders. 66 He emphasised the importance of 
limiting popular expectations of the democratic system. Schumpeter's crucial 
approach was an assumption that the majority of the population could not be 
entrusted with the important task of decision-making. 67 In other words. 
democracy became a way of institutionalising competition for power. 68 Thus, 
according to Schumpeter the focus is on the conditions that would apparently 
allow an intensive competition between elites. To provide such conditions, the 
following are required: high quality leadership in political parties; autonomy of 
political elites from the state; an independent bureaucracy; an opposition and 
civil society that accept the rules of the game: and a political culture of tolerance 
and compromise. 
In contrast. Dahl pioneered a different approach. He tried to be careful not to 
confuse the practices within actually existing democracies with 'democracy' as a 
political ideal. Alternatively, he suggested the use of the term 'polyarchy' since 
he recognised there were conditions for an ideal democracy which the Western 
democracies could not meet. Of course, the institutions of polyarchy are 
practically more desirable than authoritarianism where even political 
competition and the least accountability are not exercised. Put simply, the 
institutions of polyarchy are based on a combination of elected government and 
civil liberties which should secure access of different groups in society to the 
political system. 69 In short, Dahl counted the following factors as main 
institutions of a polyarchy: 
" the election of government officials 
" free and fair elections 
" an inclusive suffrage 
" the right of all citizens to run for public office 
" freedom of expression 
" citizens have a right to sources of information other than official ones 
"" Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London, Routledge, 1994, p. 34. 
`'' Ibid. p. 79. 
`'x Democracy s I'alue. (ed. ) Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 1999, p. 4. 
69 Dahl. A Preface to Democratic Theory, p. 105. 
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associational autonomy, and the right to form independent associations or 
organisations, including political parties and interest groups 
An overall view of the above list indicates that we can characterise most of the 
current democracies as `polyarchy', instead of real `democracy". In summary, 
Schumpeter regards existing democracy in the West as evidence for the 
empirical theory of democracy, whereas Dahl admits the insufficiency of 
Western democracy but ultimately accepts it as enhanced over authoritarianism. 
Thus, the point would be that the importance of "procedure" in any democratic 
government will automatically compromise the essentiality of "concept'" and 
"principals". More explicitly, the normative interpretation of democratic 
government which is acknowledged by empirical theory tends to embrace rather 
functionalist results and is predicted on continuity of state sovereignty over the 
nation. The goal of democracy could ultimately be sacrificed in this way. 
For a time the empirical theory of democracy proved useful both to academics 
working within the behavourialist tradition and to Western policy-makers. But 
the empirical theory falsely assumed that "pluralism" has been established 
within Western societies and governments and that their main goal is to preserve 
this plurality. This occurred by ignoring the great impact of "capitalism" on 
Western politics and societies. In other words, empirical theory disregards the 
structural privileges which have been generated and maintained by capitalism. 
These structural privileges evolved through an unequal distribution of power and 
disproportionate financial possessions and wealth within society. 
Hidden or structural privileges prevent a level playing field, as individuals and 
groups cannot compete equally for access to government, as pluralistic 
assumptions urge. Subsequently, neo-pluralists like Charles Lindblom diagnosed 
the structural power of capital or of business over decision-making as a violation 
of the very principle of democracy. 70 Understanding the structure of power in 
any society can explain why policy-making is not democratic despite having 
regular free and fair general elections. In other words, non-democratic elements 
7' Charles E Lindblom, Politics and Markets, World's Political Economic Systems. New York, Basic 
Books, 1977. p. 84. 
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form a kind of polity, although unelected. unrepresentative and unaccountable, 
and play a key role over and above government and parliament. " 
Moreover, empirical democratic theory only promotes an electoralist or 
procedural interpretation of democracy. In other words, it concentrates on the 
observable behaviour of political actors and thereby ignores the role of hidden 
structures of power such as cultural dimensions and practices which shape 
political activity on the ground. As a result, it provides an inappropriate model 
for the analysis of politics in the developing countries. In particular, empirical 
democratic theory misses the political reality behind the formal and observable 
structures of government. This can lead to the assumption that systems are 
democratic because elections are regularly held, and parties can freely act under 
the guarantee of the constitution. Yet the majority of population are excluded 
from decision-making and some are even repressed. 
A further problem for empirical theory is its prescriptive attitude towards 
developing countries which are supposed to follow the Western path in reaching 
democracy. Basically, it is a false aspiration to expect that all societies ought to 
follow the model that U. S. or Western countries have developed. In addition. 
empirical democratic theory fails to address how economic resources or even the 
lack of them affect the operation of the political system. In fact, empirical 
democracy (including liberal democracy) offers few propositions in regard to 
socio-economic issues or other forms of structural inequalities either within state 
or globally, simply because it assumes that they are not very important for the 
exercise of citizenship and therefore in upholding democracy. In addition. the 
experience of Third World and developing countries suggests that equal 
citizenship cannot be established alongside extreme income inequalities. 72 
"Like the critical role and influence of multi-billionaires in am' societ:. 7 Gruel, Democratization, p22. 
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1. S. 2. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
Liberal democracy is regarded as the dominant interpretation of democratic 
theories during the second half of the twentieth century. Almost all well-known 
practical democracies adopted its strengths in their structure and mandate and 
benefited from it. In the field of theorists, Francis Fukuyama is a great advocate 
of liberal democracy. In his famous book, End of Hislory, he argued that 
Western liberal democracy has become "the final form of human government . 
Of course, such a concrete judgement can be attributed to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s. But Fukuyama's straightforward admiration for 
liberal democracy yielded a much needed frame on which to scrutinise the 
advantages and disadvantages of the liberal version of democracy. 
However, at present, liberal democracy echoes two separate concepts: one could 
be defined as the historical tradition of liberal democracy which goes back to the 
I9`h century. In fact, modernity and its benefit to humanity owes so much to the 
concept of liberalism or enlightenment as it paved the way for contemporary 
thoughts on private possession, the freedom of individuals and, more 
significantly, the separation of religion from the state. The second concept could 
be called the contemporary political paradigm of liberal democracy; a method of 
ruling the nation by the state. John Stuart Mill is renowned for his theories and 
contribution in classifying the ethos of liberal democracy. In his famous writing 
On Liberty and Consideration on Representative Government, he sets out what 
is often seen as the first systematic explication and defence of liberal democracy. 
He says: 
In the past, as many observed, tyranny was something 
experienced by the majority of a nation's people at the hands of 
a minority so there was no danger of the majority tyrannizing 
over itself. But with the emergence of large democratic nations 
(like the US) a need was created for people to limit their power 
over themselves. 74 
7 -, Francis Fukuyama, The End of Histo, v and the Last Man. London, Penguin, 1992. p. xi. 74 J. S. Mill On Liberty in Focus. (ed. ) J. Gray and G. W. Smith. London, Routledge. 1991. p. 7. 
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Thus, the aim of On Liberty was to identify the principles in accord with which 
the people should secure this limitation. In short, Mill claims. the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community" against his will. is to prevent harm to others. His own good is not a 
sufficient warrant. -75 In other words, "it is a command against government 
paternalism as well as against overt tyranny. In fact, it favours what is often now 
called the pluralist mandate that citizens ought as far as possible to be able to 
pursue what they see as their own goods and in their own ways. -76 
Principally, Mill lists the most important liberties to protect, namely freedom of 
conscience, thought and feeling, holding and expressing opinions, pursuing 
one's life plans, and combining with others for any (not malicious) purpose. 
Because these liberties typically and directly affect only those who enjoy them. 77 
people should be exempt from interference, paternalistic or otherwise, by others 
and especially by the state, including the democratic state. 78 Mill prescribes less 
detail on how the liberties are to be safeguarded, but it is clear that in general he 
thought there should be areas of citizens' lives free of state regulation and legal 
limits on what even a democratically mandated government can legislate. To this 
end, he stresses on the "preservation of a distinction between private and public 
life and the rule of law. "79 Moreover, regarding democracy, Mill prescribes the 
direct citizen's participation in the affairs of government, so that "people in this 
way be able to develop intellectual talents. communal and moral values. 
However, since direct participation is unfeasible in a large society, Mill thought 
that the ideal type of a perfect government must be a representative 
government. "x0 
75 Ibid, p. 14. 
"' Ibid. p. 17. 
" Here is the fundamental difference with prevailed interpretation of Islamic thought. That is. the 
matter is not to enjoy, but the duty. 's 
. l. S. Mill On Liherti- in Focus. (ed. ) J. Gray and G. W. Smith. p. 16-17. '`' Ibid. 
80 Ibid, p. 256. 
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1.5.3. ALTERNATIVES TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
As explained before, the theory of empirical democracy has shown some 
deficiencies through its implementation. In fact, the inbuilt inability of empirical 
democracy to address social issues has provoked an intellectual problem with 
this theory. 8' This led to a focus on the failures and problems with liberal 
democracy, which is arguably the best result of empirical democracy theory. The 
intimate focusing of liberal democratic theorising with the West and its 
defensive stance towards capitalism caused an interest in exploring alternative 
approaches to democracy. The result was a renewed interest in democracy as a 
vehicle for human emancipation and as a means for promoting the good of the 
community as a whole, rather than purely the individual. Since the 1960s, along 
with building new master theories in political science, new theories of 
democracy have also emerged. These include participatory democracy, 
feminism, associationalism, citizenship theories, and cosmopolitanism. In fact, 
all deliberately suggest the notion of democracy as a utopian project and attempt 
to draw in different ways on the traditions of communitarianism. 82 
1.5.3.1. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
To challenge the myth that there is only one classical theory of democracy as 
liberal democracy, some scholars like Pateman (1970) suggested an alternative. 
participatory theory of democracy. Participatory theory starts from an 
assumption about the importance of freedom and activism and a belief that the 
existence of voting rights and alteration in government does not guarantee the 
existence of democracy per se. This theory envisages democracy through the 
development of reciprocal relations of trust between individuals. C. B. 
Macpherson distinguished the category of participatory democracy in contrast to 
h' For example, liberal democracy pays scant attention to issues like social justice, equal economic 
opportunities, etc. 
82 Grugel, Democratisation, p. 23. 
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what was known as the Schumpeterian model of democracy and its negative 
view of humanity. 83 
The grass root of such a model of democracy comes from the New Left in 
Europe and the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Despite the fact that 
participatory theory is characterized by a highly ambiguous view of the state, it 
does not reject the role of the state at the end of the day. This theory emerged 
against the vast and comprehensive role of the state after the World War 11, 
when the main stream of Western government was advocating and pursuing 
statism and welfarism. These trends tended to mute the individual's and the 
community's initiatives. " In reality. the problem with participatory democracy 
is that it is impossible to apply this theory to as large a community as the nation 
state. In other words, the virtues of participatory democracy would very clear on 
a small scale such as city councils and regional governments, but its capability to 
deal with nationwide issues is in doubt. Macpherson, who is one of the first 
proponents of participatory democracy, recognized this failure by stating: 
Not how to run it but how to reach it.... What roadblocks have 
to be removed i. e. what changes in our present society and the 
now prevailing ideology are prerequisite or co-requisite 
conditions for reaching participatory democracy? ... 
One is a 
change in people's consciousness (or unconsciousness) from 
seeing themselves and acting as exercisers and enjoyers of the 
exertion and development of their own capacities. This is 
requisite not only to the emergence but also to the operation of 
a participatory democracy. The operation of a participatory 
democracy would require a stronger sense of community than 
now prevails. The other prerequisite is a great reduction of the 
present social and economic inequality. since that inequality ... 
requires a non-participatory political system to hold the society 
together. And as long as inequality is accepted, the non- 
C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 
1977, p. 43. 
"'Grugel. Democra/isalion, p. 21. 
43 
participatory political system is also likely to be accepted by all 
those in classes who prefer stability to the prospect of complete 
social breakdown. 8 
Participatory democracy would see citizens enshrine and amend their 
constitution, form policy and shape their laws and priorities. In practice, 
politicians have a role to play: the implementation of policy. The ultimate and 
unassailable power to form policy, however, lies in the hands of citizens. The 
degree to which citizens shape the constitution, table or veto legislation and set 
budget and social priorities is directly aligned with the degree to which they 
choose to involve themselves, rather than with the good graces of the politicians 
whom they elect to serve their interests. In such a system, the balance of power 
shifts decisively away from political actors, who in the purely representative 
form of government have complete control over constitution, legislative agenda 
and community priorities, and is given back to the democratic wellspring - the 
citizen - where it truly belongs. 
Participative democracy comes in many shapes and forms and may be applied to 
any level of government. Some would argue that participatory democracy is a 
more comprehensive form of "direct democracy" or "deliberative democracy". 
Yet no single form epitomises `participative democracy' just as, for instance, 
neither parliamentary democracy nor the US congressional system fully 
embodies "representative democracy". They can be seen as just different 
expressions of attempted representative democracy. Any resemblance between 
representative and participative democracy ends here. as for representative 
democracy. it has practically rejected the delicate issue of seriously expanding 
citizen powers. In modern societies, in fact, we are faced with a "representative 
political class" made remote by the structure of representative democracy itself. 
This class at best finds itself split between the needs of its community and the 
strictures of party policy. 
as Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. p. 93. 
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1.5.3 2. ASSOCIATIONALISM 
The concentration of economic power in large corporations and the 
concentration of social welfare and social control in large bureaucracies act 
against the dispersal of social power and influence that liberal democratic 
theorists have seen as essential to the preservation of liberty. The sphere of civil 
society and secondary associations shrinks in the face of bodies that are in effect 
compulsory (one has to seek work, and large bureaucracies amount to a 
significant share of the labour force; the unemployed are subject to welfare 
tutelage) and which are not open to the social and political influence of the 
average citizen. 86 
Associationalism could be defined as a link between liberal democracy and 
participatory democracy, the two classical theories of democratic government. 
Paul Hirst also argues that associationalism offers a more democratic system 
than the present one for advanced capitalist societies. 87 He is concerned about 
the failure of the state to protect working people and the poor. Given the nature 
of capitalist bias of Western states, and the decline in the state's capacity to 
provide welfare, he suggests building upon the traditions of associationalism 
within the nineteenth century working-class movement. In order to gain the 
goals of associationalism, liberty and human welfare, the best reasonable way is 
through voluntary and self-governing associations. 
The main threats to liberal democratic society are no longer external and well- 
organised, but internal and diffuse. They include the threats of crime, poverty 
and drug addiction. none of which centralised bureaucracies handle very well. 
Hirst thinks that these problems are mainly the result of the failure of full 
employment strategies and also of collectivised welfare systems. A society is 
being created of permanent "haves" and have nots", with unpleasant results for 
general living conditions. Under such conditions. associationalism offers great 
potential. Hirst argues that committed "haves' must build well funded and 
x" Paul Q. Hirst. Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance. Cambridge. 
Polity, 1994, p. 1 12. 
87 Paul Q. Hirst, From . Statism to Pluralism: Democracy, Civil Society and Global Politics, London. UCL Press. 1997, p. 39. 
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effective voluntary associations in partnership with the poor and excluded. The 
poor will thus be helped to organise themselves, which is the only way, 
KA according to Hirst. that the slums will be transformed and social decline halted. 
Hirst also argues that certain political and economic conditions have changed in 
Western states and that this makes a revival of associationalism appropriate at 
the present time. According to Hirst, the associationalists of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries failed, not because their ideas were inherently 
impractical. but because under the political conditions of the time they could not 
compete with collectivist and centralist tendencies. The pressure toward 
centralisation was intense as states prepared for major wars. Labour movements 
were also impelled toward statism (state direction of the economy). But 
conditions have changed in the latter part of the century. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union means that Western states no longer face the external threat of 
major military competitors, while the internal threat of class war seems to have 
ended. There also appears to be less scope for the centralised management of the 
economy that these states have continuously employed since the Second World 
War to sustain economic development. Implicit here is the limits that 
globalisation places on state economic management. Manufacturing. meanwhile, 
is no longer characterised by the huge centralised organisations of "Fordist" 
mass production. In other words. firms are smaller, less hierarchical, more 
flexible and this means they require less concentration of administration. 
Associationalism gives priority to freedom in its scale of values, but suggests 
that freedom can only be pursued effectively if individuals participate in the 
community. Therefore, the main claim of associationalism is that associational 
democracy is a remedy of for the malaise of post-industrial societies and the 
deep dissatisfaction with their economic performance. 89 In fact, it could be 
interpreted as a renewal of Western democracy, which has been reduced to 
"choosing and legitimising the rulers of the big governmental machine that is out 
of control". 90 The problem with associationalism lies on whether this could be of 
88 
Ibid, p. 4 1. 
89 Grugel, Democratisation, p. 26. 
10 Hirst, From Statism to Pluralism. p. 42. 
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any assistance to developing societies or not. In other words, it has originally 
been envisaged to re-correct the roadblocks of advanced democracies and 
obviously would be inappropriate to apply for new comers to democratic 
category. 
Given certain conditions, Hirst argues, voluntary relationships (I. e. NGOs) will 
be superior to bureaucracies. He claims that, where they are properly funded and 
supported by the right kinds of laws and institutions, voluntary organisations are 
very tenacious and effective. Bureaucracies, on the other hand. are "fragile and 
rigid", easily losing impetus and spirit when crises occur. To demonstrate his 
point. Hirst uses the examples of the British trade union movement and the 
British health and welfare systems. with their bureaucratised, top-down 
organisational style. Such management. he says. is the enemy of true welfare. 
health and education. The political lesson he draws is that it does not matter 
whether power is in the hands of the extreme left or the radical right. If state 
institutions have concentrated power the result is the same. 
He also stipulates that Associationalism demands a change of thinking about 
voluntary associations in modern democratic theory. According to him. 
`Voluntary associations are usually regarded as the `cement' of civil society that 
holds the liberal democratic state together. '"91 A liberal democratic state is, in 
other words, a pluralist state (that is, power is distributed across many different 
interest groups), and voluntary associations are both the result and the condition 
of this pluralism. They are, in this view, secondary associations, subordinate to 
the dominant power of the state and perhaps of the corporate business world. 
Hirst. however, wants to reverse this priority and make voluntary self-governing 
associations the primary means of organising socio-political life. 
91 Hirst. From Statism to Pluralism, p. 43. 
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1.5.3.3. CITIZENSHIP 
The Citizenship theory of democracy is based on the renewed interest in civil 
society in politics. The main stress would be on the importance of political 
culture, civic virtue, the network of associations within and across societies and 
the significant role of contestation in the practice of democracy. According to a 
classic definition of civil society that goes back to the nineteenth century. it was 
used to: 
[I]mply a form of universal citizenship within the nation-state 
based on the one hand on the principle of individualism and on 
the other on the participation of those individuals in public life, 
a participation that was in turn based on mutuality of citizens in 
the form of compacts, contracts and the moral, economic, social 
and political ties binding those individuals. 92 
However, in the past, access to citizenship was severely limited for women and 
working-class men. Therefore, civil society was used to express an artificial 
network of relationships which were based on domination and exclusion and a 
set of values about the need for incorporation. But today, the concept of civil 
society has been extended to become a functional tool for measuring and 
analysing of associations, networks, agencies and resistance to the state. 93 In 
other words, citizenship theory draws attention on social associations and 
agencies in order to equally distribute access to private and public choices. 
In order to have a civil society, the private and public spheres must be 
legitimately separated from one another. which totalitarian and fundamentalist 
(religiously biased) states have always denied. Both fundamentalist and 
totalitarian states by their nature cannot value independence of thought. action or 
expression. and in fact tend to suppress them. These regimes assume that an 
active civil society could be nothing more than a breeding ground for dissent that 
`2 Linda J. Seligman. Between Reform and Revolution: Political Struggle. Stanford. Stanford 
University Press, 1995. p. 1 1 1. 
`'' See Vaslav Havel, The Art ol Impossible: Politics as Moralih' in Practice: . Speeches und 
Writings1990-1996. translated from the Czech by Paul Wilson. [et all, New York. Knopf, 1997. 
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would threaten the stability of the all-powerful state. It might be thought. then. 
that the historical triumph of liberal democracy over its fascist and communist 
rivals has demonstrated not only its superiority to both. but also the health of 
civil society in Western nations. Ironically, the collapse of communism in the 
East coincided with a new questioning of the state of health of democracy in the 
West. Some writers have argued further that it is precisely in the civil sphere that 
problems are most apparent. 
Certainly, advocates of liberalism have always stressed the individual"s social 
and economic liberty rather than voluntary association as the fundamental value. 
These liberals have tended to dismiss those who have argued for more 
communitarian values as sentimental dreamers. At the same time. the growth of 
both big business and government has led to an increasing centralisation of 
economic and political power. Although liberal governments have never aspired 
to totalitarian goals. the centralisation of governmental power has left few self- 
governing responsibilities to the average individual. whether alone or in 
voluntary association with others. Even as the welfare responsibilities of the 
state have increased, they have tended to emphasise individual dependency on 
the central agencies rather than the kind of voluntary self-help solutions 
associated with civil society. 
Within citizenship and civil society approaches there is a divide between 
theorists who see citizenship as an eminently political affair, and those who are 
in favour of understanding citizenship as a social and economic instrument made 
by public oriented individuals. In essence, today's theory of citizenship does not 
only imply a citizen's rights in reacting towards political and social affairs, but 
also emphasises being pro-active in all imaginable aspects of political and social 
life. This development can be better understood within the framework of current 
globalisation processes through which the role of individuals and non-state 
actors are enhanced. However, an independent debate on civil society will be 
addressed later on in the democratisation section. 
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1.5.3.4. COSMOPOLITANISM AND DEMOCRACY 
The word "cosmopolitan", which derives from the Greek word KOSMOPOLITES 
(citizen of the world), has been used to describe a wide variety of important 
views in moral and socio-political philosophy. The imprecise core shared by all 
cosmopolitan views is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political 
affiliation, do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that this 
community should be cultivated. Different versions of cosmopolitanism envision 
this community in different ways, some focusing on political institutions, others 
on moral norms or relationships, and still others focusing on shared markets or 
forms of cultural expression. The philosophical interest in cosmopolitanism lies 
in its challenge to commonly recognized attachments to fellow-citizens, the local 
state. parochially shared cultures, and the like. 
It is thought that the original source of democracy lies in civil society. rather 
than the state. In other words, according to cosmopolitanism, the state is 
gradually becoming defective or simply evaporating under pressure from 
globalisation, whereas there has been a rapidity expanding and significant role 
for non-state actors in national and international politics. As a result. the 
capacity of the state to encounter daily challenging dilemmas is being reduced 
and affected by outsider entities, such as international organisations and multi- 
national companies. Even sceptics of globalisation now recognize that state and 
citizens are inevitably affected by decisions outside their own nation state. It is 
from this point of view that the theory of cosmopolitan democracy has emerged. 
The real arena of cosmopolitan democracy, then, is the process of globalisation, 
or increased interconnectedness between states and citizens along with the 
strengthening and deepening of links between institutions. social organisations 
and citizens. 94 To this end, David Held views cosmopolitanism as a number of 
disjunctures (structural overlapping)95 in the world order. He argues that the first 
and perhaps the most directly significant is the disjuncture between the formal 
`'a Giddens ' Theon" of Struc turation:. 4 Critical Appreciation. (ed) Christopher G. A. Bryant and David 
Held London, Routledge, 1991, p. 95. 'S Based on neo-liberalism theories of International Relations, the monopoly of only state-actor ear has 
finished. 
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authority of states to manage economic policy-making inside national territories 
and their actual capacity to do so, given that the main players in the global 
economy are no longer either states themselves or organisations within the 
control of states. They are multi-national corporations (MNCs). and controlling 
financial capital which is not tied to any particular state formation. 96 
The point is that MNCs and financial capital holders not only control the 
production of wealth but also organise the routes through which the wealth. 
knowledge and technology are created and co-ordinated. The second disjuncture 
is the vast array of international regimes and organisations that have been 
established to manage whole areas of trans-national activities (trade. 
transportation, access to and exploitation of the seas and oceans and so on) and 
collective policy problems. This caused considerable changes in the decision- 
making structures of world politics and a shift away from state control towards 
, new and novel forms of geo-governance'. ' Thirdly. international law is 
becoming more developed and powerful in order to challenge the sovereign 
immunity of the state. Finally. globalisation undermines the hegemony of what 
is called an autonomous culture centre". 98 
Accordingly, the above mentioned factors lead to the reduction of state control 
over various issues dominated by the state hitherto. This would be seen as a 
move forward to global democracy. However, the factual evidence of today's 
world reflects a different story, as disorder and unlawful activities all around the 
globe (such as international terrorism, human and drug trafficking. and so on) 
rigorously threaten such ideals. Therefore, it seems unrealistic to undermine 
even further the role of the state without having an established suitable substitute 
for it. To this point, some scholars suggest a global democratic authority in 
charge of present major problems within the international community. Again. 
this sounds idealistic and out of touch, at least in the near future. Nonetheless. 
drastic differences between governments. both in their structural and functional 
,c David Held, Mode/s of Democracý7, Cambridge, Polity Press. 1996. p. 343. 
" Held, Models of Democrach, p. 345-7. `9Ibid. p. 29 
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level across the world affect their ability to contribute to such a democratic 
global authority. 
Before prescribing or even foreseeing that the globalisation of states is a 
tendency which will soon overcome national sovereignty, we must ask how still 
the concept and procedure of a globalised democracy could be accommodated. 
Many doubts have been expressed about the "hyper globalisation thesis" the idea 
that globalisation leads ineluctably to the collapse of the state. 99 The current 
preoccupation with globalisation and the fading of the state has even been 
attributed to changes in the global ideological climate, rather than material 
changes in the distribution of political and economic resources away from states, 
and the growing hegemony of free-market liberalism (ideology). ' 00 
99 Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson. Glohalisation in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities ?t Governance, Cambridge. Polity Press. 1996. p. 24. 
110 Aspect ut Statehood and institutionalism in Contemporary Europe, (ed) Malcolm D. Evans, 
Aldershot. Dartmouth, 1997, p. 67. 
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1.6. LEGITIMACY AND PARTICIPATION 
The concept of political legitimacy is no longer a mere academic issue between 
thinkers, but a crucial element of stability in any political order. There is a linear 
causal relation between legitimacy and democracy. Rationally, a democratic 
political system is legitimate and vice-versa. In fact, the essence of empirical 
democratic theory is based on a stable democracy that requires a belief in the 
legitimacy of democracy. Diamond says: the growth of this belief and 
behavioural commitment is the defining feature of a consolidation process. "101 
Preferably, this belief should be held at two levels: as a general principle that 
democracy is the best or the least bad form of government possible; and as an 
evaluation of one's own country's democratic regime; that in spite of its failures 
and shortcomings, it is better than any non-democratic regime that might be 
established. 102 Both of these approaches, particularly the latter, are relative 
judgments compared with most known alternatives. In other words, recent 
experiences with alternative regimes can powerfully shape the readiness of the 
public to embrace the legitimacy of democracy, not necessarily as an ideal form 
of government but as preferable to any other system that has been tried. ' 03 
However, it is sometimes assumed that popular legitimacy could be known as 
the core component of democratic consolidation. Also, mass-level survey data 
on popular support for democracy would provide tangible measures of progress 
towards democratic consolidation. Spain. Greece and Portugal were not only the 
first-comers to democracy in the 1970s, but were also the first to become 
consolidated. Many surveys show that these three traditional, authoritarian 
European countries developed political culture that was highly supportive for 
democracy. Equally significantly, being geographically adjacent to democratic 
Europe undoubtedly facilitated and prompted their integration into democratic 
circle. This privilege therefore worked to benefit them both economically and 
culturally. 
1°1 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy towards Consolidation, p. 217. 
11' The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan (ed. ), Baltimore. Johns 
Hopkins University, 1978, p. 16. 10' Democracy and Its Alternatives, Understanding Post-Communist Societies, Richard Rose. William 
Mishler [et all. Oxford Polity Press, 1998. p. 65. 
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On the other hand, the debate about legitimacy up until recently has had a 
different meaning and aim in religious societies, particularly in Muslim 
societies. Thus, when we talk about legitimacy in societies where religion. in 
particular Islam, has a strong influence, we must take into consideration what 
legitimacy means for that particular society. Ironically, the term legitimacy has 
an astonishing translation in Persian: mashru'iat which originally is an Arabic 
word. It comes from the adjective mashru' which means issues approved by 
Islamic law (Shari 'a). As a result, even linguistically, the meaning of legitimacy 
for Persian speakers conveys a religious context. In other words, mashru ' means 
that whatever is approved by the Islamic law (Shari 'a) is legitimate and vice 
versa. The result of this simple but essential finding draws our attention to the 
political culture in these societies and the importance of all-encompassing 
education. 
In principle, the major elements of legitimacy in a deeply religious society are 
far from what they are in a secular one. It is not considered an outrage in a 
religious society to claim that divine will is the only source of legitimacy and 
this will ultimately prevail, as the preamble and Article 4 of the Constitution of 
Islamic Republic of Iran stipulates. In this light, the paradoxical episode of the 
1979 Revolution is understandable. It stemmed from a mass mobilisation to 
topple a monarchy and replace it with an Islamic phenomenon which bears the 
title of republic. According to scientific discourse, through a democratic vote a 
theocracy was established and benefited from the people's consent. 104 
Surprisingly, the contrast is more vivid when the main driver of this social 
movement was a thirst for freedom. 105 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish what legitimacy means in different 
societies. As said before, the debate needs to be broadened with linguistic and 
hermeneutic interpretations of legitimate rule in mind. The need for a supportive 
political culture in Muslim societies is not only necessary to consolidate 
democracy, but also essential to initiate democracy in the first place. To reach 
In the Islamic Republic. people's consent is not essential but gives an advantage. Quoted by Asgar 
Owladi. Director of Mu'tali/ah Party in weekly Shonra, Tehran. No. 65. December 22,1997 
1p5 It was the most prominent slogan of demonstrators during the 1979 street unrest: 'Independence. 
Freedom, and Islamic Republic. ' 
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this unconditional stage for democracy. the delicate subject of relations between 
governance and religion should be thoroughly examined by all major political 
(or political thinker) and religious groups and associations. We will explain the 
case of Muslim interpretation of democracy and legitimacy in the next chapter 
1.7. DEMOCRATISATION 
As mentioned above, there are several current interpretations in political 
scholarship which might configure a sustainable model of democracy. As a 
result when given these divergent models, diverse forms of democratisation will 
emerge. Disagreement on the shape and boundaries of democracy comes not 
only from its opponents. but from its proponents, and is constantly open to 
further scrutiny and error-finding through its implementation. Diversity and 
differences of interpretations cannot exceed a certain level as this would 
undermine its universality and applicability as a coherent concept. The same 
plurality can be applied to democratisation process as the path of implementing a 
sustainable democracy. Therefore, as Whitehead describes "if democracy itself 
is to be viewed as both a contextually variable and a deontological concept. then 
democratisation cannot be defined by some fixed and timeless objective 
criterion. " 
1 06 
Before beginning our discussion on the epistemology of the democratisation 
process it is necessary to broaden our criterion of the spectrum where 
democratisation can be situated. In other words. the hasty pace of social changes 
can overcome routine procedural shifts and establish a democratic paradigm. For 
example, the simple two turnover test says that "a democratisation begins with 
the exit of an authoritarian regime and ends after competitive elections have 
given rise to two successive peaceful transfers of government between 
'Ö`' Whitehead. Democrat alion Theorj- and Experience. p. 26. 
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contending parties". 107 Of course, this minimalist definition embraces a wide 
range of political transitions. 
Therefore, by applying this test it is not clear when South Africa reached the 
point of democracy. 108 Equally. Colombia, Sri Lanka and Venezuela would have 
qualified by the 1960s, notwithstanding the obvious evidence that thereafter 
many major tasks of democratic construction remained to be tackled. 
Significantly in Iran, after the landslide election of President Khatami and the 
forthcoming sixth Majlis with reformists in a majority many believed that the 
democratisation process has been accomplished. However, the reality of 
domestic skirmishing showed otherwise. Hence as an alternative, it has been 
argued that democratisation is complete when all significant political actors 
accept (with good will or ill) that the electoral process has become "the only 
game in town" for reallocating public office. 
Considering this criterion, for example we can again pose the question when or 
whether democratisation was complete in Spain during the 1970s. Whitehead 
elaborately raises the following questions to challenge the implementation of 
democracy in Spain: "Are the Basque separatists a significant political actor? If 
yes. why cannot they be involved in the political process and be disarmed? If 
not, what kind of democracy is that when such groups with certain public appeal 
in their areas are unable to be engaged with the government? -109 Initial studies 
of democratisation in the 1970s and 1980s held that the meaning of 
democratisation was self-evident. In other words, it simply meant a 
transformation of the political system from non-democracy towards accountable 
and representative government. Basically. these studies adopted a process- 
oriented approach, concentrating on identifying the mechanisms or paths that 
lead to democratisation. 110 
"" 
Ibid. p. 32. 
1 "' There were consistent democratic elections, but with exclusion of black people which made the 
whole process nonsense. 
")"Whitehead. Democratisation: Theory and Experience, p. 41. 
1"" Gru-el, Democratisation, p. 3. 
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Accordingly, Stepan identified eight distinctive paths leading to the end of 
authoritarianism and the onset of democratisation. These are set out below: 
TABLE: I METHODS OF DEMOCRATISATION 
Internal restoration after external re-conquest Netherlands. Belgium. Norway and Denmark(all 
after 1945)* 
Internal reformulation France (after 1945) 
Externally monitored installation West Germany and Japan (after 1945) 
Democratisation initiated from within 
authoritarian regime 
Spain (1977). Brazil (1982). Portugal (1974) 
Societe-led termination of the authoritarian 
regime 
Argentina (1969) Peru ( 1977) 
Party pact Colombia (1958) Venezuela(1958) 
Organized violent revolt (led by democratic 
parties) 
Costa Rica ( 1984) 
Marxist-led revolutionary war Nicaragua (1979) 
*According to the current implant democratisation brave. the US government would add Afghanistan and 
Iraq to this category. 
Source: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and 
Post-Communist Europe. (ed. ) Alfred Stepan and Juan Jose, Baltimore. Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996, p. 13. 
As Stepan's list shows. the emphasis is on the procedural factors in the main 
criterion of examining whether the democratisation process in different ways has 
been exercised or not. Notwithstanding. bi-polar international politics has had its 
own influence on how the democratisation process has been perceived and of 
how it ought to be practiced. The profound change that world politics has 
undergone since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has created a different 
environment of understanding. Indeed, the effect of removing the communist 
threat from the international scene boosted the emergence of alternatives to pure 
liberal democracy. For instance. New Labour in Britain benefited from this 
healthy environment and opened a new front of social democracy in the heart of 
liberalism. 
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Accordingly, the recent wave of democratisation can be seen more or less as 
collaboration between the Western bloc and its allies in the developing countries 
(core-periphery aspect). During the third wave of democratisation it became 
evident that although a few countries made the transition to democracy 
successfully, some collapsed and many others failed and remained in the 
category of problematic democracies. " Consequently, academic interest shifted 
towards identifying those factors that make new democracies more solid and 
stable. This involved the consolidation of democracy as a principle focus. There 
was a transformation of primary interest in "structure" and "agency"' 12 and their 
respective roles in causations towards a focus on how political culture, political 
economy and institutionalism characterise outcomes. 113 
In contrast with the procedural definition of democratisation, it is now preferable 
to develop and explore the issue of democratisation in a more interpretive 
approach rather than concentrating on mere procedural factors. As said earlier, 
the previous paradigm of democratisation is no longer sufficient to answer the 
new dilemmas of the globalisation era. Whitehead redefines democratisation as 
follows: "Democratisation is best understood as a complex, long-term, dynamic, 
and open-ended process. It consists of progress towards a more rule-based. more 
consensual and more participatory type of politics. "14 Democratisation like 
democracy, necessarily involves a combination of fact and value, and so 
contains internal tension. In short, the main dispute is between those who insist 
on a minimal definition of democracy as a satisfactory level of democratic 
implementation and those who argue that democracy implies not only the afore 
mentioned procedures for government, entails substantive rights and tasks. The 
difference between minimal (or formal) and substantial democracy is captured 
by Vejvoda: 
Formal democracy is a set of rules, procedures and 
institutions... substantive democracy [is] a process that has to 
111 For example, Argentina. 
112 See Giddens' Theoi of Structuration: a Critical. 4ppreciation, (ed) Christopher G. A. Bravant. 
David Jary, London. Routledge, 1991. 
Stepan, Problems ot'Democratic, (ed. ) p. 28. 
114 Whitehead. Developing Democracies, p. 37. 
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be continually reproduced, a way of regulating power relations 
in such a way as to maximise the opportunities for individuals 
to influence the conditions in which they live, to participate in 
and influence debates about the key decisions which affect 
society. 
115 
1.7.1. THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION 
Grugel argues that it seems sometimes there are "recipes" for successful 
democratisation, as if it were somehow possible to choose paths to. or models of. 
democracy from a menu of options whereas democratisation is a slow and 
painful task. "6 Structural factors (i. e. extreme socio-economic imbalance, 
gender inequality), frequently impede the deepening of democratisation. and 
globalisation can be as much an obstacle as an assistance. Therefore. it is not 
surprising if the number of successful democratisations is outweighed by either 
failed or stalled experiments. In other words, neat theories of democratisations 
differ from the real world experiences of partial, ambiguous. fuzzy and also 
disappointing democratisations. 117 However, in assessing the project of 
democratisation in various conditions. it is appropriate to regard it practically 
rather than persistently focusing on an idealistic approach. 
Since 1974. when the Portuguese dictatorship was removed, the number of 
democracies in the world has multiplied significantly. Before this time. there 
were about forty democracies. This number increased moderately through the 
late 1970s and early 1980s as several states experienced transitions from 
authoritarian rule to apparently democratic rule. By the end of 1980s, along with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the pace of global democratisation accelerated 
markedly. As a result. by the end of 1995. there were as many as 117 
"` Ivan Vejvoda in Democratisation in Central and Eastern Eu ope. (ed. ) Marv Kaldor and Ivan 
Vejvoda. London. Pinter. 1999, p. 117. 
Gruýgel, Democratisation. p. 1. 
117 Ibid. p. 1-3. 
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democracies or as few as 76, depending on how one assesses and counts them. 118 
Samuel Huntington named this post-1974 period the third wave of global 
democratic expansion and showed the central importance of regional and 
international democratisation effects. ' 19 
How to perceive democracy is as crucial as ever. This perception is an essential 
influence on whether we can call self-declared democracies democratic or not. 
No doubt, holding elections or toppling one authoritarian regime and replacing it 
with another one, even with massive popular support, does not entitle any 
regime to join the democratic club. Huntington refers to the removal of military 
regimes as a vividly important dawn of third wave democratisation, but he 
reluctantly by-passes the rationale behind such a move. He argues that this 
development occurred only because of the rapid emergence of democratic 
discourse, but in fact it was by wide socio-economic alteration at a national and 
super-national level which led these countries to commence the democratisation 
process. In other words, the old political system was no longer capable of coping 
with the increasing pace of change in socio-economic structures and was to be 
exposed and dismantled. 
Modern democracy can be seen as the result of a gradual but profound 
development in political thought. Its gradual flourishing across the globe since 
the nineteenth century has proved its capacity to extend modem values and 
attitudes. Nonetheless, this development did not proceed in a linear and 
uncontested way. But the motives and incentives of democracy have varied over 
time and place. While the main cause of change in the nineteenth century and 
afterward was class, by the 1980s and 1990s it was driven by a complex mix of 
social conflict, state building. free global trade and external influence. 
Meanwhile, there were enormous efforts to explain the expansion of the 
democratic paradigm. Up to now the most attractive theory with a broad capacity 
to encompass different issues was known as the wave theory introduced by 
Diamond, Developing Democracv, p. 154. 
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave, Democratization in Late Twentl Centturr. University of 
Oklahoma Press. 1991. 
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Huntington. This suggests that democratisation in the countries linked together 
in the wave at least have common causes. 
Huntington also suggests that waves of democratisation have been followed by 
reverse waves of authoritarianism. He supports his view by pointing at those 
societies that either failed to consolidate democracy or experienced democratic 
collapse. Despite the fact that the wave theory of democratisation has become a 
conventional part of the democratisation story, it does not provide a sufficient 
explanation of cause, mandate and safeguards of democratisation. Huntington 
explains a wave of democratisation as follows: 
A wave of democratisation is a group of transitions from non- 
democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified 
period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in 
the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also 
involves liberalisation or partial democratisation in political 
systems that do not become fully democratic. Each of the first 
two waves of democratisation was followed by a reverse wave 
in which some but not all of countries that had previously made 
the transition to democracy reverted to non-democratic rule. 120 
For Huntington. the long first wave started at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century and the number of democratic governments grew gradually until about 
1930. It was correlated by the expansion of liberal democracy both in theory and 
practice. The second wave identified by Huntington was considerably shorter. 
Its beginning was signalled by the physical defeat of the Axis powers in 1945. 
The American led coalition was the chief sponsor of democratisation in the 
occupied territories of Germany, Japan and Austria. Democracy also started to 
spread around this time in parts of Latin America, although most of the 
newcomers were unstable and formalistic. Democratic consolidation was 
inconsistent through the 1960s and early 1970s. 
120 Huntington. The Third Wave. p. 1 1. 
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In some countries of central Europe during the 1930s and 1940s, violent and 
repressive regimes such as Fascist movements operated as real dictatorships. 
Their allies survived in southern European countries till the 1970s. Huntington 
illustrated a third wave beginning with democratisation in Portugal in 1974. 
which was followed swiftly by Greece and Spain. In the 1980s a number of 
Latin American countries began to democratise and finally, in 1989, 
democratisation reached Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. It is argued that geographic adjacency and strong economic ties with 
democratic European countries acted as catalysts for European dictatorships to 
embrace democracy. Therefore, desperate need for economic growth and 
popular awareness about political developments greatly contributed to their 
relatively smooth and painless integration into the democratic club. 
We can extend these positive needs and developments to other developing 
countries, as many of them have shown a great desire for democratisation. 
However, one should bear in mind that in many of these countries these 
objectives have been counterbalanced and outweighed by conditions that 
rendered electoral democracy increasingly shallow, illiberal, unaccountable, and 
afflicted. 121 In other words, having established some democratic institutions 
which are supposed to be occupied by elected members cannot be seen as a 
proof of successful democratisation in itself. Perhaps, it is a mere weakness and 
naivety for any newly elected government (semi-democratic) to claim that it is 
determined to establish a promised political system, both in structure and 
function. Guillermo O'Donnell terms these semi-democratic governments as 
"delegative democracy". 
Diamond also argues that to a considerable degree the gap between democratic 
form and substance is an institutional gap. Unlike natural science. no political 
system can operate strictly according to its formal institutional prescriptions in 
reality. Given this, we cannot expect to have a complete and effective political 
system. and that is why in developing democracies it is possible to take reverse 
12) Transition from Authoritarian rule, (ed) Guillermo O'Donnell. Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence 
Whitehead. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. p. 81. 
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steps. Diamond named this vicious process as "a great defection articulated in 
democracy". '22 In other words, the political institutions of these countries are too 
weak to ensure the representation of diverse interests, constitutional supremacy, 
the rule of law, and the constraint of executive authority without primary 
structural foundations, both economic and political. Thus, we can bring to use 
the terms low-intensity democracy, democracy by default, poor democracy, 
empty democracy, and hybrid regimes to describe the current reality happening 
in developing democracies. 
More practically, as O'Donnell's conception of delegative democracy shows. it 
hints at the relative absence of horizontal accountability between the elected 
executive body and the other two branches of government. '23 Although 
delegative democracies (i. e. Turkey) have the formal constitutional structures of 
democracy and may even barely meet the empirical standard of liberal 
democracy. they are institutionally unable to deliver a democratic operational 
system. 124 In these cases. voters are mobilized by clientelistic ties and personal 
appeals rather than programmatic ones. 12' Consequently. parties and 
independent interest groups are weak and fragmented. Instead of producing 
effective means of ongoing representation of popular interests, such systems 
prepare the ground for electing a delegation of stylish agents to promote their 
particular political class. As a result, the winner, under the banner of democratic 
power. will not hesitate to govern by decree and even by whim. Furthermore 
they may claim to embody the will of a nation while invoking an authority based 
more on personal charisma and possibly the backing of a popular movement 
than on a political party or institution. 126 
O'Donnell argues that because power is allocated to a single office, even swift 
and precise change-including economic reform-cannot result in a mistake- 
free outcome. This is due to its very swiftness and lack of consultation. On the 
other hand, as election campaigns do not produce any clear programmatic policy 
122 Diamond. Developing Democracy. p. 59. 
123, O'Donnell. Delegative Democracy. Notre Dame University Press, 1992. p. 38. 
124 In Turkey's case, the military is constantly controlling the government and parliament's policies and 
decision-makings. 
is An accusation rendered by the opponents or critics of the Islamic Republic. 
L. Diamond, Developing Democracy. p. 34. 
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agenda that subsequently must constrain power holders. lack of political 
commitment is inevitably widespread and can lead to inefficient governance, and 
failure to fulfil and maintain political democratic requirements. The case of 
Argentina as a secular state can be easily included in this category. '27 
However, in another example of a semi-democratic system where political Islam 
is granted supremacy and is being practiced by a majority of the people we 
witness an obvious example of a delegative democracy, of course on its own 
scale. The Islamic Republic of Iran could be counted as an "ideological 
delegative state". Its critics describe it as a genetically ill infant of democracy in 
the Middle East which was delivered in 1979. By referring to most studies 
contemporary to the Islamic Revolution we can show that most observers gave 
their primarily support and cheered it as a truly popular and legitimate 
movement which aspired to freedom and independence. However. this view was 
quickly subjected to extensive revision and even opposition. Critics insist that 
having obligatory religious consideration in a political system for citizens 
eliminates any possibility of being considered democratic. '28 This assumption 
again leads us to review the standard meaning of democratisation and its 
empirical aspects. 
1.7.2. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DEMOCRATISATION 
The contemporary democratisation process is actually far more complex than 
what Huntington suggests in his wave theory. In fact, the wave theory fails to 
clarify very different explanations for democratisation. First of all. it is necessary 
to separate the causes of democratisation. Secondly, the wave approach assumes 
that there is now a global movement to establish democracy. But. according to a 
more accurate consideration, the number of stable (liberal) democracies is 
actually growing very slowly. 129 Huntington presumed that more democracies 
were emerging because more elections were being held. whereas holding 
i2' O'Donnell, Deligaiive Democracy. p. 40. 
"" For example. Hatam Qaderi who is known as a secular Iranian reformist. 
Diamond. Developing Democracy. Page. 24 
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elections, as mentioned before, does not necessarily indicate the implementation 
of democratisation. Basically, conventional studies of the democratisation 
process tend to refer to the "social conflict" theory as the trigger of the 
democratisation process. 130 
The social conflict theory is known as the classic analysis of political reform and 
is based on capitalism. This theory stipulates that capitalism radically 
transformed the traditional equilibrium of class structure which led to the 
emergence of the middle class. It subsequently created an indispensable demand 
for socio-economic reform to sustain this new situation. Seymour Lipset believes 
that capitalism leads to the development of bourgeoisie and middle class 
professionals who are the key to political reform (democratisation). 13 1 The 
relationship between classes, capitalism and democracy is rather complex. 
The core concept of Marxism is also devoted to analyse these interactions in 
order to produce a suitable explanatory theory. The notion of capitalism emerged 
through the accumulation of substantive amounts of wealth in the hands of a few 
while others were doomed to labour for this project. The expansion of labour 
and technology automatically created an industrial class which had strong ties 
with holders of capital to secure the floating of investment into it. At first sight, 
such mutual interdependence indicates a natural alliance in favour of preserving 
political status quo. Therefore, since the implementation of political reform 
would require inclusive citizenship provisions and a relatively equal distribution 
of resources and power, there is an initial conflict of interest within the 
bourgeoisie (capitalism) and any reformation of the system. 
However, according to Marxism the antithetical relationship between the 
expanding bourgeoisie and the existing political system leads to a synthesis of 
unavoidable political reform. It says: due to the enterprising nature of the 
bourgeoisie, based on expansion and securing of consumer markets. principles to 
create an ever-expanding market should be operative. Therefore, the survival of 
Karl Marx: Econonm, Class and Social Revolution, edited & introduction by Z. A. Jordan, 
London, Nelson, 1972. p. 11-19. 
Seymour M. Lipset, Social Motility in Industrial Society, Berkeley. University of California Press, 
1959, p. 27. 
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the bourgeoisie depends on certain socio-political conditions that can be only 
guaranteed through certain socio-political reform. For some scholars. the roots 
of democratisation began in 1776, when the American Revolution occurred. In 
particular, Dahl dates democratisation from the triumph of the idea of 
representation which led to the American Revolution and created the USA. For 
others including Huntington. democracy is equated with individualism and 
hence the first wave began in since seventeenth century. Apart from the 
historical point of view, just as important is the idea that capitalism rapidly 
advanced in Western countries, unleashing a fierce social struggle and 
introducing new conflicts in society. 
Economic growth generated the structure that allowed the gradual empowerment 
of the non-elites or the lower classes, and caused them to recognize their 
previously denied rights. To this end, democratisation processes emerged as a 
consequence of social disputes. However, capitalism and its resulting social 
conflict, led to the emergence of a modern and relatively autonomous state. 
capable of playing a crucial role in advancing social reform. This new state 
made possible the implementation of the economic and social reforms that, in 
Europe, began the first initiatives towards democratisation. 132 In other words, 
democratisation was the result of socio-economic pressure, combined with the 
development of a liberal state that was to some degree autonomous of society. 
Contemporary experiments in democratisation contain several kinds of self- 
declared democracies. The creation of liberal democracy in some countries, the 
introduction of limited electoral change in others. and the problematic nature of 
democracy in most developing countries provide the whole picture. Hence it is 
important to distinguish between problematic or partial democracies and 
consolidated democracies. In short, contemporary democratisations encompass 
failures and successes. The question raised here is. why do some democratisation 
experiments succeed and others fail? The following is Grugel's short answer to 
this question: 
ý' Grugel, Democratisation. p. 37. 
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Democracies are political systems comprising institutions that 
translate citizen's preferences into policy, have effective states 
that act to protect and deepen democratic rights, and count on a 
strong participatory and critical civil society. A consolidated 
democracy is one in which this political order is routinised and 
accepted. Consolidation, then, implies both the deepening and 
stabilizing of democracy. In addition, the chances for 
consolidation are greatest in cases where favourable 
international circumstances are allied with state capacity and a 
growing, vocal and effective civil society. ' 33 
The advocates of wave theory were mainly inspired by the emergence of pro- 
democracy movements (Western inspired intellectuals and youth) in countries 
where capitalism and other prerequisites were not fully developed. This 
challenges many assumptions about the democratisation process. In particular. it 
could raise doubts as to whether democratisation process is still dependent on 
class conflict or if new factors have become involved. To this point, 
globalisation was posited as an alternative explanation which brought significant 
alterations in the value system of societies. Obviously, this does not disregard 
class and other forms of social conflict within societies, and these factors still 
matter for explaining democratisation. It is worthwhile here to draw out the 
implications of past attempts at the democratisation process in contemporary 
examples. 
Initially, the democratisation process started most strongly in economically 
developed states. Nevertheless, democracy was contested in some capitalist and 
economically developed countries like Germany in the 1930s. Also in some 
authoritarian regimes, democracy was replaced by fragile democracies. This 
suggests that although capitalism is important it does not guarantee the 
emergence of democracy e. g. in Malaysia. Meanwhile. democratic forms of 
government survived in some countries for considerable periods, even though 
economic development was slow and elitism was still in force (e. g. in India). 
''''' Ibid, p. 36. 
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The wave theory constitutes a useful metaphor for situating democratisation in 
its global context, but it lacks the capacity to embrace factors democratisation 
involves. It points to the importance of recognizing that the chances for 
democratic outcomes to social conflict are greater at particular moments of 
global history. 
However, as mentioned before, the application of wave theory on a greater scale 
is quite confined. It gives the impression that cross-national and cross-regional 
connections are predicated on an advancing democracy. but it fails to explain 
how democracy actually comes about in national societies-for example. who 
are the agents and bearers of democracy? Therefore, to understand the issue, we 
need to consider theories of social and economic change and political action. 
These theories are rooted in political and social dynamics, and in particular. 
related to nation-states. In other words, it is necessary to harmonize the global 
focus and pressure for democratisation along with the potential and capabilities 
of domestic politics within the political entity of the state. In next chapter we 
will take into account the socio-religious dynamics that have strongly influenced 
Iranian society and state in its road toward democratisation. 
1.7.3. DEMOCRATISATION AND THE STATE 
The purpose of democratisation so far has meant the building of a democratic 
state. It is natural to ask, what this entails or how it can be brought about. There 
is a general agreement that it means more than just the holding of elections, but 
still there is no academic consensus about what reforms, precisely. are required. 
But we know that the state is. ultimately, an instrument of social domination. 
Democratic states, therefore, tend to rule through hierarchical structures that 
combine legitimate power, persuasion and bureaucracy. Another characteristic 
of democratic states is that they generate multiple sources of authority and 
decision-making. However. in undemocratic states, the apparatus of the state is 
the primary target of democratisation. Thus. expecting that an undemocratic 
state will attempt to democratise itself is a rather absurd idea. 
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In sum, the legitimacy of democratic governments rests on the fact that they can 
plausibly lay claim to be representative and accountable to the people. In other 
words, democratic states ought to be held accountable to the people, and 
accordingly, act in the people's interest. We could argue that despite the fact that 
democratic states under capitalism have a natural trend towards business and a 
profit-based agenda, they are more likely to respond to social demands and 
economic justice as their survival is subject to actual balance between social 
demands and economic prosperity. On the issue of using forceful means it is 
generally accepted that the state has the capacity of coercion and violence. It is 
argued that the only reason to implement such forces in a democratic state is 
either in order to defend against outsider threats or against those who 
substantially break the law and cause social disorder. 
Grugel has assessed some fundamental characteristics of a democratic state: 
I. Territorial integrity, either as a result of the belief that the state 
represents a nation or through negotiations and legitimate and 
binding agreements that make a multinational state possible. 
II. The rule of law, that is, minimal rights and duties of citizens are 
legally encoded and the parameters of state activity legally defined. 
III. A minimal use of legally sanctioned violence against its own 
citizens. 
IV. Popularly elected and representative government that is formally 
controlled by constitutional channels of accountability. 
V. A complex bureaucracy that can make claims to impartiality. 
VI. The existence of multiple centres of power. 
VII. The formal existence of channels of access to decision making. 
even for subordinated social groups, which are operational to some 
degree. 
VIII. Some commitment to social and economic justice. however 
defined. ' 34 
134 Grugel, Democratisation, p. 37-40. 
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In short, a full democratisation of the state will be accomplished when: 
institutional change (regarding the form of the state); representative change 
(regarding who influences policies); and functional transformation (regarding 
what the state does) have been achieved. In contemporary democrat isations, 
most attention has focused on engineering institutional change to the state rather 
than bringing about representative or functional transformation (agent theory). 
There is a general presumption that to some extent, representative change and 
functional transformation will automatically follow from institutional change. 
However, as functional and representative change is more radical, the possibility 
of being obstructed by ruling elites is higher. 135 Thus, we cannot easily assume 
that substantive transformation will necessarily follow on from the introduction 
of new institutions. 
Therefore. it could be argued that the reforms prescribed and even practiced in 
contemporary democratisation processes have exposed serious challenges 
concerning issues such as national sovereignty and political integrity. These 
challenges can act as destabilising factors for the state through prompt 
introduction of radical political reforms in seeking democracy. Empirically. 
some Eastern European countries proved capable of shifting swiftly and 
painlessly whereas some others underwent very violent and distressing 
upheavals. '3' Finally. evidence so far suggests that states (state apparatus) can 
initiate and experience some institutional change but still resist a deeper 
democratisation. ' 37 Given the inherited inefficiencies of the state. to accomplish 
democratisation we shift to our next phase to discuss our hypothesis concerning 
the necessity of having a political culture conducive for achieving democracy. 
' For example. the great resistance towards controlled privatisation in Iran despite the Constitution's 
direct permission and even protection. 
''`' For instance. Czech Republic was democratised very smoothly compare to what occurred in former 
Yugoslavia or Kosovo. 
137 Grugel. Democratisation, p. 70. 
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POLITICAL CULTURE 
A very strong explanation attributes the lack of democracy or failure in 
implementing democratisation by any state to the absence of an appropriate 
political culture within its citizens. By accepting this explanation and building 
upon its merits we could argue that democratisation relies on certain beliefs or 
psychological attitudes in a society. As for example. Daniel Lerner pointed out 
the notion of "civic attitudes" or Almond and Vebra's renowned concept of 
"civic culture'". Even Robert Dahl stated that democratic stability requires a 
commitment to democratic values, norms and rules. ' 38 As we will shortly 
explore the multi-faceted conception of political culture, it is necessary to note 
that for political scientists having a political culture conducive to democracy 
relates to the stability and maintenance, and not the establishment, of 
democracy. In other words, the scientific discourse considers a suitable political 
culture as a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for the successful 
implementation of democracy, instead emphasising the level and quality of 
socio-economic development. 
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One can pose a question that after all this elaboration on merits and qualities of 
democracy-what are the causes of democracy? Dankwart Rustow has 
attempted to answer it by focusing on the political ingredients of political 
culture. He argued that "in the process of genesis of democracy, an element of 
what might be termed consensus enters at three points at least. " First, there 
should be a consensus regarding which socio-political community the citizens 
believe they belong to. Second, there must be "a conscious adoption of 
democratic rules Third, and most importantly, the essence of democracy is the 
habit of dissention and conciliation over ever-changing issues and amidst ever- 
changing alignments". 140 In Chapter 2 we will question whether the three causes 
of democracy categorised by Rustow can be seen in conformity with a religious 
society like Iran. 
ý'" See Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? New Haven. CT. Yale University Press. 1961. 
139 
140 
See Abootalebi. Islam and Democracy, intro. 
Dankwart Rustow. Transitions to Democracy, cited in Abootalebi. 
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However, there is an academic disagreement over the validity and application of 
political culture as a perquisite of democracy. This trend finds the introduction 
of cultural explanations methodologically problematic. The proponents of 
scientific discourse (positivism) claim that cultural explanation offers a vague 
ground for one to attribute all sorts of behavioural patterns to particular cultural 
traits. suggested by those very patterns. Accordingly, they maintain that the 
application of cultural explanation is to avert the route of scientific method of 
empirically testifying of the independent evidence of hypotheses. The following 
paragraph vividly illustrates this criticism: 
If no other causes can plausibly explain significant differences 
between societies, it is inviting to attribute them to culture. 
Just exactly how culture is responsible for the political and 
economic difference one is attempting to explain is often left 
extraordinary vague. Cultural explanations are thus often 
imprecise or tautology or both. at the extreme coming down to 
a more sophisticated rendering of the French are like that, " 
on the other hand, cultural explanations are also unsatisfactory 
for a social scientist because they run counter to the scientists' 
proclivity to generalize. 141 
We should bear in mind that this criticism of cultural explanation can be rightly 
posited if the theorising ground remains for traditional social theory. As 
explained in the outset of this chapter, the emphasis on the objectivity of the case 
study under the traditional social theory should circumvent the political scientist 
to take into account rather subjective elements like belief sets or cultural traits. 
In contrast, the critical social theory provides a necessary theorising framework 
for encompassing all the relevant objects and subjects pertinent to the social 
praxis. It is not anymore a matter of dispute in the spectrum of social sciences 
that the superiority of positivism as the single method of academic study has 
expired. The cornerstone of positivism is a simplistic copying of the natural 
141 Samuel Huntington, The Goals of Development" in Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington. (ed). 
Understanding Political Development. Boston. Little Brown, 1987, p. 23. 
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sciences by employing the same methodology. 142 Such a mechanistic approach 
towards social relations has drawn rigorous criticism, not only from anti- 
positivists but also from recent positivists. '43 
This self-critique was pioneered by Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert who 
argued that there is a profound difference between the world of nature and the 
world of society, as the latter has unique aspects such as values, ethics, norms 
and symbols which can be abstracted as culture. Therefore, the scientific 
discourse is limited to phenomena that can be constrained within any analytical 
and verifiable fragment of the reality. In other words, it would be impractical to 
measure freedom, religious belief or various unpredictable actions that are 
common in human behaviour, either singly or collectively. Furthermore. the 
knowledge can never be neutral as its correlation with power makes the attempt 
of positivists to draw an artificial line between observer and the subject fairly 
absurd. 
Juergan Habermas is a pioneering critical sociologist who developed the concept 
of critical theory in sociology by freeing it from the direct influence of Marxist 
theorists and their chief emphasis on political economy. 144 In other words, 
critical thinking paved the way for conceptualising critical knowledge that 
enables observers to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through 
self-reflection and taking psychoanalysis as the paradigm of critical knowledge. 
This development augmented the possibility of critical theorising within the 
scope of social sciences, leading to developments such as structuration theory 
(Anthony Giddens), post-colonial theory (Edward Said), critical race theory 
(Derrick Bell), and social ecology (Murray Bookchin). 
142 The major themes of positivism can be summarised as follow: 1. Unity of scientific method for 
producing the law of general understanding for any phenomenon. 2. Scientific knowledge is testable, 
using inductive logic to make testable statement. 3. Science is value-free, regardless of morals and 
human preferences. 4. Universal conditions apply at all times and places. 
'4' The main points raised against positivism in the social sciences are: (I) the involuntary influence of 
the experimenter on the individuals being studied, (2) the complexity of culture and history limits 
generalisations; (3) the observer has his own value orientation. 
144 See Mirsepassi. InIelleclual Discourse. 
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Given the above analysis, the point introduced by Horkheimer concerning the 
interconnectivity of subject and object in socio-political studies seems to hold 
more authority. His critique is the recognition that studying a society cannot be 
conducted merely upon natural facticity but is itself a social construction. Thus, 
culture cannot be discerned as sets of habits. norms and symbols with no 
determining effects on contemporary or modern polity, but as the network of 
power-relations that produces values, beliefs and forms of knowledge. Also. 
theory itself should not be perceived as "a set of analytical propositions 
uncontaminated by praxis, but as an integral part of this net of inclusions and 
exclusions called social power. "' 45 
For having a firm methodical explanation in studying socio-political power- 
relation and the democratisation process, we arrive at the point of utilizing 
critical social theory in politics. By applying critical social theory in politics, we 
find a direct relation between democracy objectified as a political system and 
societal interaction considered as political culture. As Behnarn puts it "politics is 
a distillation of certain fundamental qualities of the more general culture. As a 
system, culture functions to give coherence, meaning and predictability to a 
society. [I shared beliefs and collective values of a people and the form of 
government are unified by the concept of culture. '" 146 In the following passage, 
we concentrate on the theoretical aspects of political culture and its relation with 
emerging democracy. 
Prominent theories of democracy, both classic and modern, claim that 
democracy requires a distinctive set of political values and orientations 
(conceptual level) from its citizens such as moderation, tolerance. civility. 
efficacy, knowledge and participation. Also. beliefs and perceptions about 
regime legitimacy have long been recognized as critical factors in order to 
evaluate the possibility of persistence or breakdown of democracy in a political 
system. 147 Countries differ significantly in their patterns of politically relevant 
145 Santiago Castro-Gomez, A'epantla, Views. from South. no. 1. Vol. 3.2000. p. 505. 
146 M. Reza Behnarn. Cultural Foundations of Iranian Politics. Salt Lake City, University of Utah, 
1986, p. 4. 
147 Larry, Diamond. Developing Democracy toward Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press. 
London, 2002. p. 161. 
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beliefs, values, and attitudes. Even within different classes of a nation these 
elements of political culture can be diverse and can influence that nation's stance 
towards democratic idea and practice. Gabriel Almond argues that these 
parameters of political culture are clearly shaped by life experience, education, 
and social class. 148 
Accordingly, to provide a better perception of the political atmosphere of any 
society we need to take into account the importance of the political culture 
rooted in that society and the effects of modernity on it. It is specifically acute in 
Iran because that country underwent the first modern revolution when the 
mainstream attitude of society was still exclusively derived from traditional and 
native sources. In addition, the constitutional turmoil was coincident with moral 
and religious claims that were in confrontation with the ideological and political 
currents of the contemporary world. 
149 Political culture also can be seen as a 
dynamic and evolving force in analysing social progress or regress. In short. 
political culture is the product of both a collective history of a society and the 
life histories of its members; it provides the subjective orientation to politics and 
shapes individuals' perception of who they are and how they differ from others. 
Political power is also so sensitive to cultural bearings that cultural variations 
play a decisive role in determining the political development of the society. 
As early as the 1950s, Seymour Martin Lipset pointed to some evidence 
demonstrating not only a strong relationship between economic development 
and democracy but also the political beliefs. attitudes. and values as an important 
variable in assessing economic and political development. 15 0 Later, in the 1980s 
Alex Inkeles and Larry Diamond presented more direct evidence of the 
relationship between a country's level of economic development and the 
prevalence among its people of such democratic cultural attributes as tolerance, 
trust. and efficacy. In the 1990s Ronald Inglehart showed that life satisfaction, 
interpersonal trust, and rejection of revolutionary change are highly associated 
148 Gabriel A. Almond, and Sidney Vebra, The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes & Democracy in Five 
Nations. Princeton University Press. 1963. 
14'9 Mansur Farhang, Iran. Political Culture in the Islamic Republic, (ed). quoted from Foreword by 
Farhang, Routledge. London, 1992, p. IV. 
15° Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Alan. The Social Bases of Politics, Baltimore. John Hopkins 
University Press. 1981, P. 27 
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with a stable democracy, and that political culture may be a crucial link between 
economic development and democracy. ' '1 
The most important finding here is the autonomy of political culture in the 
determination of political trends. Nevertheless, socio-economic development can 
generate "modern" attitudes and values, greater tolerance and valuing of 
freedom, higher levels of political efficacy. greater capacity of participation in 
politics and civil life. '52 However, political experience with democracy and 
alternative regimes, and how well a formally democratic regime functions to 
deliver the political goods of democracy could have sizable independent effects 
on political attitudes and values, often overpowering those of the country's level 
of socio-economic development. the individual's socio-economic status. and 
regime's economic performance. 153 Accordingly, Diamond believes that the new 
democratic experiments in deeply impoverished countries such as Nepal. 
Mongolia. Benin, and Mozambique are reaffirming the crucial and positive 
effect of political culture. He says "there is no developmental perquisite for 
democracy" and adds: "there is no better way of developing the values, skills, 
and commitments of democratic citizenship than through direct experience with 
democracy, no matter how imperfect it may be. "' 54 
However, it should not be ignored that the constructive aspects of political 
culture have mostly been stressed, while in reality the diversity of cultures 
throughout the societies have created different and even paradoxical political 
culture. Thus, not any political culture would be conducive for promoting and 
consolidating of democracy. For instance, the existence of a religious-bound 
political culture with a power seeking interpretation can be in tension with 
substantial elements of democracy. So, again, it is important to enhance our 
understanding of what political culture is and how it is structured. To this end. 
first we need to establish a conceptual ground for political culture through which 
we could verify its fundamental dimensions. Almond and Vebra describe 
It Ronald Inglehart. Culture Shirt in Advanced Industrial Countries. Princeton University Press, 1990, 
p. 45. 
152 Diamond, Developing Democracy. p. 162. 
15' Ibid. p. 169. 
114 Ibid. p. 170. 
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political culture as "a people's predominant beliefs, attitudes. values, ideals, 
sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of their country and the 
role of the self in that system". ' These components of political culture could be 
summarised as three distinctive "orientations to action": 
"A cognitive orientation, involving knowledge of and beliefs about the 
political system 
" An affective orientation, consisting of feelings about political system 
" An evaluation orientation, including commitments to political values and 
judgements (making use of information and feelings) about the 
performance of political system relative to those values. 156 
Accordingly. it is sensible to suggest that in developing countries such as Iran. it 
is largely the "cognitive" and "affective orientations"' which usually shape the 
political culture based on its specific characterisation. 157 Such a political culture 
cannot be active in a productive dialogue with political system, rather tends to 
submit to the status quo. However, in developed societies; it is the "evaluation 
orientations" which float across political actors and parties and bridge a solid 
interaction between society and government. In fact, in a democracy, not only 
the cognitive and affected orientations are acting in the line of maintaining and 
developing of democracy. but through evaluation orientations the continuity of 
democracy can be scrutinized, guaranteed and secured. As Diamond argues, 
evaluation orientations may readily change with empirical experience, but norms 
and values represent the most deeply embedded and enduring orientations 
towards political action and the political system. ) ý8 
In addition, the elements of political culture in developed countries are in favour 
of strengthening the legitimacy of political system, whereas in most developing 
countries, these pre-dominant attitudes and values are not conducive to create a 
democratic political system. Perhaps in such societies it is also likely that the 
See Almond and Vebra. The Civic Culture. Boston, Little Brown, 1980, p. 15. 
Ibid. p. 15-17. 
'" For example, in Chapter 2 we will explain in more detail the importance of religious sentiments and 
its influence on determining political affair. 
"" Almond, ibid. 
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political regimes themselves conspire to misuse (populist policies) the 
indigenous socio-political culture of that society simply to strength their 
authority and survive longer. 159 Here is the departure point for supporters of 
"educational prerequisite" as a fundamental element of building any "democratic 
oriented society" capable of reaching the "democratic run state". 
Despite the importance of these substantive considerations in the development 
and maintenance or failure of democracy. the classic works on democracy have 
tended, until recently, to neglect these parameters. But, with the surge in the 
1990s of theoretical and empirical attention to the process of democratic 
consolidation, political culture has recovered a central place in the comparative 
study of democracy. The same negligence applies to the study of Iran's 
experiments with democratic movements. The majority of works on the two 
Iranian revolutions largely focus on either the factional and personal rivalry 
within political actors (historiography) or political and economic development 
made by the state. Few pay enough attention to political economy and political 
culture of modern Iran. Some researchers have attempted to study the nature of 
politics in both pre and post-Islamic revolutionary period regardless of political 
slogans and trends. 160 Most are descriptive and lack a guiding thesis or an 
explanatory theorem. 16' 
Notably John Foran argues that "a combination of both indigenous and 
heterogonous social, political and organisational-mobilisation factors 
collectively favoured the rise of the Islamic Republic. " 162 He goes further and 
counts four principal concepts which underline the ideology and political culture 
in shaping of the Islamic Republic. First is fundamentalism, a strong and 
159 For instance, propaganda by totalitarian regimes aims at a diversion in socio-political culture to buy 
legitimacy. 
160 See Introduction. Iran's Political Culture, Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi (ed. ). 
Routledge, London, 1992, p. 2 
161 The latest book by Homa Katouzian provides an exception in this matter as it comprehensively 
attempts to analyse the nature of political action within Iranian society either during the Pahlavis or the 
Islamic Republic, Iranian Histon' and Politics, the Dialectic of State and Society. Routledge Curzon, 
London. 2003. 
1`'2 See A Century of Revolution, Social Movement in Iran. (ed) John Foran. University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994, p. 163. 
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overarching preoccupation with the question of religious resurgence. 163 Second 
is populism, an ideological belief in the common people as the subject of history 
and social change. Third is an aspiration for social justice, a mobilisation 
ideology164 to restore the grievance and give economic security to the vast 
numbers of people, who had been disenfranchised by the shah's regime. Fourth 
is the contemporary Third World's strategy of revolutionary violence to achieve 
liberation, independence, change, and social justice for and by the masses. 165 
Also. it is true that both authoritarian and democratic regimes have two major, 
opposite political cultures. The latter is conducive to democracy and the former 
is not. But, still, within the authoritarian regimes there are differences on 
sustainability of that authoritarian regime. 166 Thus, speaking of the "political 
culture" of a nation would be correct while maintaining a distinctive mixture or 
orientations within that particular country. However, one could argue that such 
an interpretation of political culture can be seen as a stereotype to create a causal 
determinism. In other words, political culture more or less predetermines both 
the political structures and the political behaviour of a political system. Not 
surprisingly, such a perspective has attracted strong appeal in the political 
literature of Latin American and Middle Eastern politics, and offers cultural 
interpretations. This view suggests that authoritarianism, despotism, and 
hierarchy, are rooted in the monastic cultural heritage of these societies. '67 
Such a culturally deterministic theory is not valid across the board. There are 
two points of criticism for this orientalistic theory. The first is theoretical: 
Gabriel Almond argues that the cultural determinism stereotype is a distortion of 
his and other theories about the relationship between political culture and 
democracy. He writes: the early advocates of political culture explanation 
recognised that causality worked both ways. that attitudes could influence 
structure and behaviour, and that structure and performance in turn influence 
16' A Century of Revolution, (ed) Foran. p. 163. 
16' It will be discussed in more details in Chapter 2 and 3. 
'" lbid, p. 160-165. 
"" For example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we see a pattern shift in nearly all members of 
the former Eastern bloc by implementing democratic values and system, whereas in Muslim countries 
which experienced regime change, the characteristics of new regime remained untouched. 
Quoted from Diamond, Developing Denmocracy. foot note (Pye and Luis), p. 162. 
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attitudes" Thus. "political culture affects government structure and 
performance-constrains it, but surely does not determine it. "168 To back this 
argument. he points to the "civic culture" which has shown that the cognitive. 
attitudinal, and evolutional dimensions of political culture are fairly resilient and 
can change quite dramatically in response to regime performance, historical 
experience, and political socialisation. 
A second reason for rejecting a deterministic approach to political culture is 
empirical. Considerable evidence has accumulated that, while political culture 
affects the character and viability of democracy, it is shaped and reshaped by a 
variety of factors. These not only include the types mentioned above (political 
learning from historical experience, institutional change, political socialisation) 
but also broad changes in economic and social structure, international factors 
(including colonialism and political diffusion) 169, and of course the functioning 
and habitual practice of the political system itself. 
170 This progressive evolution 
occurred in countries like Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain and Portugal, which 
were once assumed to be infertile soil for democracy. This suggests that even the 
deeper normative layer of mass political culture may respond fairly rapidly to 
major changes in a country's political system, making it possible to entrench 
democracy even when a country has little if any prior historical experience of 
It 
171 
Although the majority of political scientists do not consider the concept of 
political culture as a prerequisite of democracy, it is still useful in explaining the 
dilemma of democracy in most undemocratic countries. This dilemma is found 
mostly in countries which have had several opportunities to implement 
democracy (Iran and its three opportunities in 1906,1951, and 1979). This 
inability to acquire democracy becomes more obvious particularly when we 
analyse the authoritarian characteristics of the society. Tendencies towards 
authority drive to the very heart of what democracy is about. Inkeles portrayed 
R, s The Civic Culture Revisited, Gabriel Almond and S. Erba (ed) Newbury Park. Sage. 1989, p. 98. 
16" For example, Singapore and Hong Kong are two Asian countries which through being separated 
from mainland and having different educational and political order could become democratic. 
1o See Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries: 
Afi"ica, Asia and Latin America. Boulder, Colombia Press, 1988, various pages. 
17 ' Diamond, Developing Democracy: toward Consolidation. p. 165. 
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democratic political culture as the inverse of an authoritarian personality 
syndrome. which includes faith in powerful leaders, hatred of outsiders and 
deviates. a sense of powerlessness and ineffectiveness, extreme cynicism. 
suspicion and distrust of others, and finally dogmatism. Thus, a democratic 
culture contains flexibility, trust, efficacy, openness (to new ideas and 
experiences), tolerance of differences and ambiguities, acceptance of others and 
an attitude towards authority that is neither 'blindly submissive' nor 'hostilely 
rejecting' but rather 'responsible' even though always watchful. 172 
Sidney Hook adds that "a positive requirement of working democracy is an 
intelligent distrust of its leadership, scepticism stubborn but not blind, of all 
demands for enlargement of power. and an emphasis upon critical method in 
every phase of social life. " 173 Intimately connected to this is a belief in what 
Jacques Maritain called the inalienable rights of the person and intrinsic worth 
or dignity of every individual". 174 On the other hand, an undeveloped political 
culture generally lacks these essential orientations of individualism and 
suspicion of authority. Thus, the prospect for liberal and competitive democracy 
in these societies is limited. 
In almost all Middle Eastern societies political culture lacks substantial 
orientation towards individualism and healthy scepticism of political authority. 
On the other hand, the right understanding of how the concepts of power. 
authority and legitimacy in these societies are conceived is significantly 
important. In fact. it is a religious or a sort of divine legitimacy that determine 
the fate of present political system. not the standard and routine interpretation of 
legitimacy used in the West. This brings us to the aspects of an ideal model to 
identify the common tendencies within these societies, in particular the tendency 
of preferring collectivity over individual freedom and needs. Favouring a 
paternalistic authority relationship within the family throughout most social 
classes is also another reason for the absence of individualism as a driving force. 
'', Inkeles. , National Character, a psycho Social Perspective. Alex Inkeles, D. J. Levinson [et al]. New 
Brunswick. Translation Publishers, 1997. p. 195. 
17' Sidney Hook. The Paradox of Freedom. Berkeley. The University of California Press. 1970. p. 67. 
174 Ibid, p. 78-80. 
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Fear of upsetting the unity of community, and knowledge that any reproach 
towards the ruling class could lead to ostracism are considered as additional 
factors in preventing these societies from becoming democratic. The argument is 
that the influence of religion in these countries is seen as a substantial factor 
preventing people from perceiving issues independently. To be precise. the 
difficulty indeed is not religion per se, but the religious officials whose long 
rooted interests would be jeopardised if their particular interpretation of religion 
was demonstrated to be inappropriate. In contrast to other societies in which the 
main power struggle occurs between different social classes, in Muslim 
societies, the conflict mainly lies between the ruling class (state). the masses, 
and also the religious ministers who can shift their position from one side to 
another. However, determining that democracy is totally incompatible with 
Middle Eastern countries is biased and based on an orientalistic approach. 
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1.9. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we first established our main theoretical ground against the 
inefficiencies of scientific discourse in analysing both the concept and 
application of democratic theories in developing countries in general and in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran in particular. In fact. we assumed the phenomenon of 
democracy as the political by-product of modernity and general enlightenment. 
Our debate circled over the inclusion of both objectivity and subjectivity in 
conducting a political study. while the scientific discourse is rationally reluctant 
to encompass abstractive issues like cultural traits and religious beliefs. We also 
criticised the narrow-minded attitude of the pervasive orientalistic approach in 
studying political development in societies like Iran. To support this proposition 
we employed critical social theory instead of the traditional social theory which 
is chiefly concerned with perceived measurable objective social realities. 
In the main body of chapter, we tried to present an inclusive but to the point 
account of what theoretically and practically constitute democracy for our 
further examination throughout of the thesis. Liberal democracy as the main 
Western model of democracy received a substantial attention for understanding 
its roots and dimension. Equally, the alternatives of liberal democracy were 
discussed to elicit the fundamental notion of an ever-growing and open-end 
characterisation of democracy. Although democracy first materialised within the 
Western socio-political frameworks, it no longer belongs to any specific region 
or discourse. It has constructed its own discursive parameters, which are, 
universalistic. 
The significance of this chapter lies in its fulfilling two functions. First, it 
provided us an essential ground for our understanding of democracy, 
democratisation process and political culture. Second, it evidently assisted us to 
establish our hypothesis of examining political culture as the primary criteria for 
examining the implementation of democracy or democratisation. Therefore, in 
the following chapter we will focus on discussing and analysing Islamo-Iranian 
political culture with specific attention to the concept of Islam. Shi'ism. Shia 
jurisprudence and finally patrimonial and despotic elements of Iranian society 
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2.0. CHAPTER TWO: THE ISLAMO-IRANIAN POLITICAL 
CULTURE 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
For a long time it has been an unequivocal challenge faced by political scholars as 
how to deal with democracy and democratisation process in Muslim societies. The 
Muslim culture. traditions and in fact people are often portrayed as having an intrinsic 
contradiction in their way of thinking and living with modernity in general. and with 
democracy in particular. Such depictions are rooted in the history of Western 
scholarship and of course cannot be reversed quickly. In this chapter our aim is not to 
engage with this issue in depth as it needs an independent form of study. However. 
the interconnectedness of democracy and the prevailing religion in any given society 
is not a marginal debate in political studies and therefore compelling for us to 
consider its right weight in examining our hypothesis of having appropriate political 
culture as necessary for democracy. 
As discussed in the first chapter. the concept of democracy ought to be based on 
universalistic principles while preserving its core meaning and function. We 
explained the trajectory of growing liberal democracy as the Western narrative of 
encountering, interpreting and finally embracing modernity through its own 
contextual circumstances. Then, we touched upon the alternatives to liberal 
democracy, to demonstrate the ongoing process of defining democracy in a broader 
sense. Our analysis centred on bolstering the application of critical social theory 
instead of traditional social theory to enable us to take into account the notions 
ignored by the scientific discourse: political culture and religion. 
Academically, there has been resurgence in importance of political culture and its 
influence in formation of governments and policies. Also. early endeavours utilising 
political culture tended to assume that Islam specifically hinders modernisation and 
democratisation. For example. Halpern in 1965 argued that a modern middle class 
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was emerging in the Middle East that would lead the process of modernisation in the 
region. He even branded Islam as an irrational and very dangerous threat to this 
process. ' Daniel Price categorises the academic literature focusing on the relationship 
of Islam and politics into four levels: 
1- 
7_ 
The study of Islam in the West is distorted by its relationship 
to Islamic societies. The West has always approached the 
study of Islam from a position of power and dominance. the 
coloniser and the hegemon[ic]. which has prevented Western 
scholars from gaining an accurate understanding of Islam and 
Islamic societies. 
Islam is a very mysterious and irrational force that 
overwhelms societies. This trend attributes almost all 
behaviour [in] Islamic societies to Islam. In other words. Islam 
is used to explain everything and is the most important 
variable in understanding these societies. Changes in 
behaviour are attributed to cyclical fluctuation in the influence 
of Islam. 
3- An approach to collect information on Islamic political 
groups, the chains of events that have been associated with the 
rise of political Islam. and the nature of the ideologies [which 
have] been offered. 
4- Realising that Islam's role in society was not weakened as 
much as originally claimed by the writers of the 1960s and 
1970s. this strain of literature attempts to understand the 
relationship between Islam and politics by applying the 
methods of the social sciences while, at the same time. 
recognising that Islam might produce a political culture that 
varies from those of the West. 2 
See Manfred Halpern. The Politics of Social Change in the . 
lliddle East and, Vorih Africa. Princeton. 
Princeton University Press, 1965. 
2 Daniel E. Price. Islamic Political Culture, Democracy and Human Rights, Westport. New York. 
Praeger, 1999, p. 16-17. 
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It is also fundamental to bear in mind that the emancipation of the West from the Dark 
Age of the medieval era was not merely the product of certain societies living in a 
vacuum of time and geography. It seems so naive to envisage the evolution of human 
societies in a context cut off from other present or past societies. It is also very selfish. 
biased and even racist to ignore the undeniable contribution of other cultures and 
civilisation which were employed and developed in the West and infused with new 
ideas. In other words, it was the West's turn to lead on vet unfinished course of 
history. 
With recent military, security and political developments occurring after the atrocity 
of 9/11 in the US, the issues of Islam and obviously the Muslims have been occupying 
far more prominence in both individual and governmental level. Now an ordinary 
Western citizen is being taught to be very concerned about an imminent threat posed 
by either "radical Muslim terrorist groups" or "Muslim state sponsored terrorism" 
thanks to the thrill-thirsty enemy-hunger media and of course governments in the 
West. Implicitly, from the Western perspective a Muslim can be equated as a barbaric, 
uncivilised and violent believer who does not comprehend the value of freedom, 
democracy. humanity and modernity because they blindly follow a regressive belief 
system called "Islam". If we look at the issue more deeply we can see a vicious circle 
embedded in the outlook from which the Islam and the Muslims are perceived. 3 
The position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this milieu is of a great importance 
from various viewpoints. First of all, it is the first modern state that adapted a full 
range of Islamic (Shi'a) principles into its constitutional and written law as well as 
policies. Second, the Islamic Republic was initiated through a popular uprising and a 
democratic constitutional vote. Third, the geopolitical and economic situation of Iran 
has always been an essential factor in determining its internal affairs. In this chapter 
the focus is placed on the root causes of the first parameter due to its substantial 
congruency with the premises this research is based on. Methodologically, it is 
important to note that from political science point of view, socio-economic structure 
is the natural result of how and on what bases socio-economic resources are 
The latest controversy over how Islam and Muslim are perceived in the West occurred in September 
2006 by the Pope Benedict XVI who quoted a conversation between a Byzantine Emperor and a 
Persian Scholar at 16'x' century in which the Prophet and Islam were described as violent. 
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distributed. Therefore, if a society resorts to establish a religious regime which 
ostensibly is in contrast with modern nationhood, the root cause is the lack of 
appropriate socio-economic development, not ideological and religious sentiments. 
Hence, they (political scientists) argue that such notions (religious sentiments) are 
being misleadingly used by the political leaders who aim to manipulate power through 
popular medium of religion. 4 
However, in our case study of Iran whether we assume that it is the lack of socio- 
economic development which is the main cause of Iranian society drifting towards 
adapting Islamic (Shi'a) principles or that it is a genuine source of rebellion and 
power seeking attitude within the Shi"a Islam that turns it against non-Islamic political 
rule. dilemma remains. The theoretical predicament we face is first to clarify the 
essential meaning and purpose of Islam in general and Shi'ism in particular. Second, 
we must establish a linear relationship between religious notions and political 
motions. In the following passage we will focus on measuring the compatibility of the 
essence of Islam and two main interpretations of Shi'ism (Usuli and Akhbari) as its 
second most important sect. Also by critical analysis of the issues of legitimacy and 
necessity of religious rule in Shia Iran, we will arrive at discussing the concept of 
jurisprudent rule (1vilayat al-faqih). Our debate will benefit from the dialogue between 
the socio-political stance of prominent but various adherences to the Shia school of 
Islam and their opponents. mostly in the contemporary era. It is also necessary to 
remind ourselves that in such a sensitive and subjective area of research, the outcome 
of the debate cannot be free from self-interpretation and understanding" which of 
course, applies to all work done in this field including the present research. 
° Abootalebi, Is/um and Dennocracv, 
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2.2. ISLAM 
The first question to pose is what do we really mean by Islam? What are the 
differences between someone declaring him/herself as Muslim and the real criteria for 
this attribution from Islam itself? And above all, can we really describe certain 
political statements, organisations and even states which declare themselves to be 
Islamic, as such? Colin Turner elaborately tries to broaden our perception of Islam by 
saying: "Yet one has to scratch the surface to reveal that Islam is no monolith, it is a 
vast, multifaceted entity with as many different forms of expression as there are 
people to express them. It is therefore impossible to talk about Islam without 
qualifying it. "5 It does not seem that this is an assertion by a scholar who merely likes 
to defend Islam, but a pronouncement emanating from the core meaning of Islamic 
source that is Koranic scripture. It is a very elaborate and sophisticated scripture 
which was revealed about 15 centuries ago and must not be cut into pieces for the 
purpose of singling out one particular element while ignoring the rest. 
The historical trajectory of the Muslim world shows a great interconnectedness 
between political rule and the message of Islam. On one hand, we witness Islam as a 
delicate source of human emancipation from the self and other suppressing controls. 
On the other hand, we can interpret Islam as a monolithic set of beliefs which can be 
most suitable for repressing and restraining human freedom in favour of establishing a 
rigid order of political rule. That is why some argue we must separate the religion as a 
conducting code from the revelation around which it has accreted. 6 The focus 
according to this judgment is to distinguish between the Koran and its ideals and the 
communal response to it that is shaped in the frame of "organized religion". There are 
various examples, of non-compliance of what Muslims do despite the Koran 
forbidding it. Therefore, "why should be Islam held responsible for the faults of 
Muslims? " asks Turner. Equally, as we cannot take accountable the Christianity for 
all the atrocities carried out by Christian Hitler under frustrating silence of the 
Vatican? 
Colin Turner, Islam, the Basics. Routledge, London, 2006, p. 3. 
6 Ibid. 
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Therefore, it cannot be wrong to say that although "there is overlap between all of 
these different approaches to Islam, [... ] one can only conclude, as many have, that 
there are as many kinds of Islam as there are individual Muslim. '' However, such 
understanding of Islam is not aimed at reaching a reductionist analysis of Islam as a 
loosely and boundless religion which can be defined and practiced by anyone who 
likes to proclaim it. Rather, it is to illustrate the capacity and potentiality of Islam of 
to be a conclusive form of emancipation for the totality of mankind. Peter Clarke 
beautifully utilises Gellner's comparison between Islam and Christianity by saying: 
"one of the most striking aspect of this religion as it has travelled and developed 
beyond its original homeland is, to use the biological concept of homogenises, 
likeness of offspring to the parent body, and the theoretical absence of a Church. and 
hence of a central authority on Faith and Morals", so as we witness "there is no 
obvious agency which could have enforced this homogeneity. "8 
The abovementioned introduction on Islam is essential for when we turn towards the 
alleged contradistinction between Islam and democracy. That is a debate fuelled 
largely by overemphasis on intrinsic contradiction between democracy that emanates 
from common law and the Islamic law enshrined by the divine religion of Islam. In 
short, there are two main understandings over the meaning and implementation of the 
Islamic law. Gellner describes Islam in its pure form as the blueprint for social order. 
It holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the 
will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society. " However. Turner tells us a 
different approach on seeing the Islamic law. He states: 
Both Muslims and non-Muslims alike continue to talk about 
'Islamic law' or 'Islamic theology' as though these terms 
actually signify something. They do not. For the qualifier 
'Islamic' implies that whatever is so described carries the kind 
of divine sanction that renders it immutable and definitive. To 
describe a law as 'Islamic'. for example, is to say that it is 
representative of Islam and thus somehow sanctioned by God. 
Ibid. 
First part of the quotation is of Gellner quoted and added by Peter Clarke in The World's Religions, 
/slam, (ed) Peter Clarke, intro. Routledge. London. 1988. p. 3. 
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Yet in reality, law as a discipline is a human endeavour, and 
as such a wholly fallible one. 9 
Here it is crucial to remind ourselves of the deliberate absence of central and official 
authority in Islam. Based on Koranic description there are three fundamentals of 
Islamic belief: belief in Divine Unity (lawhid), belief in prophethood (nabuvah); and 
belief in resurrection and the hereafter (ma 'ad). ' ° The issues of political governance 
and the establishment of an all-encompassing political rule have no presence in the 
Koranic terms of Islam. However, the creation of an Islamic Umma in Medina under 
the Prophet Muhammad's (S) rule has been perceived for many as a proof of an 
inevitable intermarriage of Islam and governance. Evidently, although as God's 
messenger, Muhammad's (S) religious leadership of the Muslims was sanctioned by 
divine decree, his political leadership and jurisdiction in Medina comprising both 
Muslims and non-Muslims could not have been justified merely by his position as 
God's Prophet. To solve the dilemma, the political institution created by him was 
based on a series of agreements known collectively as the 'Pact of Medina'. It is 
utterly important to note the delicate path of consensus seeking approach taken by the 
Prophet in order to materialise a unified community under his rule. 
Regarding Islamic law, we face both academic criticism and a media frenzy 
condemning it as a kind of return to the uncivilised way of life. But what is the 
Islamic law really about? 11 What are the constituents of this law? Is its totality really 
the same as it is portrayed in the West? Neal Robinson asserts: the aim of Islamic 
jurisprudence or, Tgh is to understand God's law. 12 The reproduction of the term law 
for the purpose of describing the framework of Islamic thought can be confusing. 
Ironically, this term for many critics and advocates at the same time meant 
implementation of temporal legislation based upon the Islamic (Divine) 
recommendations. However, by combining the two ostensibly different criteria 
mentioned above (Turner's and Gellner's) we can conclude that people are given the 
" Turner, the Basics, Islam, p. 69. 
"' Ibid, p. 73. 
'' It is crucial to note that throughout the history of Islam the. figh has performed as the most important 
academic discipline which supported and produced its own philosophical and political discourse. 
literature. art and in one word: civilisation. Thus, treating it as merely a series of extravagant 
superstitious is totally ignorant. 
'- Neal Robinson. Islam: A Concise lnnroduction. Routledge Curzon. London. 1999. p. 149. 
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option of accepting the "Divine Guidance'" 13 and once that guidance is adopted by 
them as law. that legislation does not merely bear its divinity but human temporality. 
In other words, it is still divine in theory but temporal in practice, simply because its 
reinforcement is bound to be carried out by humans. 
The Islamic Guidance has two principal components: fin-u'-al-figh (branches of 
understanding) and usul al-figh (roots of understanding). According to Robinson, 
furu'-al-figh consisted of various regulations grouped in topics under two main 
headings: first i 'badat or acts of worship (purity, prayer, almsgiving, fasting and 
pilgrimage), and second mua'malat or interpersonal acts such as: family law. 
mercantile law, criminal law and so on. The usul al-figh is concerned with the 
categories of law as to clarify which regulation or act under what circumstance is 
obligatory, recommended. permitted, disliked or forbidden; the sources of law (varied 
depending on which school is concerned) includes Koran. Tradition (Sunna). 
consensus, analogy14 and intellect. The two latter cases are respectively the rules for 
extrapolating norms from the sources which are the rhetorical devices (use of 
analogy) and the theory of ijtihad (use of intellect) or the exercise of independent 
judgement. 15 The conductors and members of such scholarly elaboration are known as 
the ulama. 
2.3. THE ULAMA 
It is a frequent and essential usage of the term ulama in this thesis and of course 
relevant literature in this field. Therefore. important to know who are the ulama and 
what authorities a section of them claim to possess and finally where did their 
unrivalled status come from? The term ulama literally means those who have 
knowledge (ilm). Here we have no space to open a discussion over the fundamental 
differences between what is known and called "knowledge and science" in modern 
It is preferred to use this term: Divine or Islamic Guidance, however, due to frequent usage of Divine 
or "Islamic law" in relevant literature, we might use it as a well established term without assuming its 
terminological implications. 
14 Robinson. Islam, p. 149. 
15 The acceptance of the source of intellect and its offspring ijtihad is exclusive to Shi'ism and analogy 
to Sunnism. 
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terminology and equally what indicates of "knowledge and ilm (literally: science)" 
within the Muslim or religious context. But we just present a background of how the 
ulama emerged as one of main source of reference in Muslim societies. The ulama 
first performed as interpreters of Koran and transmitters of Tradition (Sunna or 
hadith). Through categorising and classification of such divine manuscript and the 
Prophet's quotations, they started elaborating and outlining the Islamic law (Shari 'a). 
They also were essential in educating the public both in religious scholarly and 
general literature and even math and science. 
The emergence of various madrasa (residential seminaries) was instrumental in fixing 
the superiority of the ulama in training the elite in various fields. "These medieval 
institutions developed a rigorous circullium centred around instruction in the law, 
training future jurists, theologians and most importantly state functionaries. " 
16 This 
system of higher education was the first in a series to link the ulama to political 
authority. The ulama are also referred as a class with the membership of judges and 
lawyers with the legal skills critical to regulate the Muslim society in both social and 
commercial matters such as will, marriage and trade. According to Zaman, until mid 
nineteenth century. state bureaucracies in the Middle East employed members of the 
ulama as tax collectors, scriber, secretaries and market inspectors. To this end, the 
ulama formed a cultural elite and sustained the respect and authority over the Muslim 
masses. This way, they were also involved with the state apparatus, at the same time. 
were perceived as the true guardians and interpreters of Islam. 17 
" Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. Princeton. 
NJ. Princeton University Press. 2002. p. 34. 
17 Ibid. 
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2.3.1. THE SHI'A JURISPRUDENCE 
There are four principal schools of law in Sunni Islam18 with nuanced differences in 
approach for explaining and implementing Islamic law which are out of our scope and 
one main school. Twelver Shi'ism or Jihna A'shari. 19 The concept of legitimacy. 
necessity and formation of political rule has been an essential ingredient of Shi'ism 
throughout the centuries. 20 The more inclusive capacity of usul al-fiyh in Shi'ism 
which includes intellect and independent judgement along with other fundamental 
sources of Islam utilised the possibility of rational debate concerning political order. 
Robinson argues that "Shiite reflection on usul al-filth began in earnest in early 
eleventh century Bagdad with scholars who were influenced by the rationalism of 
Mu'ia. ila thcolo 21 
Shaykh Mufid who we can refer to as an early definer of Shia theology. accepted the 
pre-eminence of the Koran and the Shia Tradition. 22 But he argued that reason should 
be used to interpret texts which appeared partially contradictory., ' He decisively 
rejected the use of analogy as a source of understanding due to its possible false 
consequences or the fallacy of undistributed middle; instead he put emphasis on ijma ' 
as the consensus of the Islamic community. Thus, Mufid by being content with the 
authority of traditions. tended to reject those which were contrary to reason. Another 
influential figure to shape the Shia school of law is A '11ama Hilli in the fourteenth 
century. He also argued for the importance of independent judgement (ijtihad) but 
emphasised that this source should be applied exclusively by the jurisprudents, that 
meant a significant development in socio-religious status of the jurisprudents 
(increase in their prerogatives). In other words, it means that an ordinary believer 
should follow the decisions of a living religious authority known as a nnrjtahid. This 
18 The Hanaui School, the A9aliki School. the Shufi'1 School and the Hunhali School. 
19 Since the majority of the populace of the target society (Iran) are Shi'a and the political system is 
also attributing itself explicitly to Shi'ism. our enquiry revolves according to Shia School of Islam. 
20 Here it seems necessary to explain that the division caused by emerging Shi'ism in early years of 
Islam relates to the concept of who was ought to be considered as the Prophet's successor. One 
decisive issue which is always been neglected is that the core claim of Shi'ism could be about the 
Prophets' religious successor, not the Prophet's political successor. As if it was about political 
succession, how Imam All, for example. conceded to cooperate with three elected Caliphs without a 
single attempt to restore his proclaimed political leadership for 25 years. 
21 Robinson. /slum. p. 156. 
22 It means the tradition (Sunna and Hadith) of both the Prophet and twelve Imams. 
23 Robinson, ibid. 
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reasoning has been employed by recent Shi'a jurisprudents24 to prove their righteous 
leadership of the Muslim populace and building the concept of wilayat al-fagih. 
`5 
However, through deductive reasoning we can argue that since mujtahids are fallible 
human beings, their independent judgement can be fallible too, therefore subject to 
26 change and temporal. 
Demographically speaking, despite some Shia dynasties whose political rule either 
lacked the totality of Iran's geography or being short-lived, it was under the Safavid 
Empire that Iran emerged as a Shia state. The Turk-origin Safavid dynasty was Shia. 
and established a central authority in Iran comparable with the pre-Islamic era in 
terms of territory and control. The new political order under the Turkish descendants 
of Safi Ali Shah27 needed a uniting element to form a new integrated Iranian state, and 
that was spreading the adherence to Shi'ism. This conclusion seems more realistic 
when the most eminent rival and enemy of the Safavid were the Ottoman Empire as 
the leader of Sunni world. Thus, the Safavid government invited many distinguished 
Shi'a scholars from South Lebanon, Iraq and Bahrain to Iran. The immigrant 
jurisprudents were welcomed and given positions as preachers. teachers and assisting 
government bureaus in the handling of judicial and social matters. 
Apart from the increasing involvement of Shi'a jurists in cooperating with and 
assisting the Safavid government-despite clear indications of its illegitimacy due to 
its impious and fallible rulers (which we will turn to in the next section), an important 
phenomenon occurred in the field of Islamic Philosophy. Julian Baldick points to 
"brilliant revival of philosophy in Safavid Iran'". He asks "why did this take place. 
when in the rest of the Muslim world philosophy, and indeed theology. had 
effectively been suppressed? "28 The explanation he provides for such a moot point 
seems plausible and enlightening: the theological positions of Shi'ism, taken over 
from the Mu 'ta: ila sect, which had borrowed its methods from Greek philosophy. " 
,y 
24 Since Safavid era. 
25 The origins and the logic of the concept of lrilavut al /agih will be discussed in the following section 
of this chapter. 
2( We will utilise this deduction in our conclusion to establish the congruity of Shi'a Islam and core 
concept of democracy, not to be mixed by contemporary models of democracy. 
27 A Turk but Shia Sufi lived in Ardabil North West of Iran in fifteenth century. 
28 Julian Baldick in The Worlds Religions: Islam. (ed) by Peter Clarke. Routledge. London. 1990. 
p. 56. 
29 Ibid. 
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This development laid the foundation stone for Shi'ism itself to be divided into two 
patterns of inferences: Usuli (principalist) and Akhbari (traditionalist). The pioneer of 
this philosophical revival is Mullah Sadra in the seventeenth century who 
revolutionised the philosophical discipline of Shi'ism by founding a kind of 
"existentialism". According to him "existence" itself is original and prior to the 
essence of things, therefore, "being"' in its acts of existing, produces essences. which, 
since they are not original, are changeable. 30 Built upon this philosophical reasoning 
Sadra broadly succeeded his predecessors in deepening and liberating the Islamic 
philosophy from its conventional self-restrictions. 
The division between Usuli and Akhbari as two patterns of inferences was based on 
discerning the authority which each pattern confers on Shia jurists for the 
interpretation of Islamic theology and law. The Akhhari method insists that the 
jurisprudents' understanding originates with and conforms to the canonical sources of 
religion (Koran and Tradition). whereas the Usuli method holds the self-authority of 
qualified jurist to exercise and utilise his own independent judgement which is ijlihad 
alongside conventional sources. By the eighteenth century, the Usuli method 
prevailed in the Shia school of Islam. There are two possible explanations for such a 
significant development and assuming each of these explanations will provide us with 
two perspectives on how to define the concept of political Shia and its surge to 
proclaim political rule. 
The first perspective which is held by the majority of scholars-predominantly 
Western-attributes the rise and attraction of the Usuli method-in comparison with 
Akhburi-that lies in its empowering Shi"a jurisprudents with massive political 
supremacy. 3' Since the exercise of independent judgement is granted. the jurist can 
issue a religiously bounding order (fatwa) whether or not there is explicit indication 
pertaining to the issue in the Koran or Tradition. However. as a second perspective, 
we can suggest that the rise of Usuli method can also be seen in the line of the Shi'a 
evolutionary trajectory inherited from the embodiment of rationalism (i 'ii: alia) from 
its nascent periods. In other words. why should we not see it as a self-modernising- 
ability of Shi"ism to free itself from traditional and conventional scholarship. Of 
Ibid. p. 57. 
'ý Such as Neal Robinson, Julian Baldick and Colin Turner. 
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course, this theoretical manoeuvring could be utilised by some jurists or politicians 
for fulfilling political ends. 32 Thus. by mentioning the second explanation. we now 
can turn towards the controversial concept of wilayat al-fagih or the rule of 
jurisprudent. In the following section we present a brief but historical-theoretical 
analysis regarding this concept. We will try to better understand the development of 
this concept. and see how from being a guidance for Shia population-either on 
individual or interpersonal level-it has become a "full-fledged theory of political 
leadership". 
2.3 2. THE CONCEPT OF JURISPRUDENT RULE (WTJLA)ATAL-FAOIII) 
The issue of wilayat al-tagih or the guardianship of the Islamic jurist holds two 
theoretical and practical dimensions. The practical dimension will be extensively 
discussed in the next chapter alongside other aspects of the constitution of the Islamic 
Republic. But the theoretical account will be analysed hereafter. To begin, we need to 
know that the concept of fallible rule (hukurnat-i ga),, r-i ma'sum) had long been a 
matter of contested debate between Shia jurists. As a matter of fact, the most obvious 
difference between Shi'ism and Sunnism was over the issue of succession of the 
Prophet and the firm stance of Shi'ism on the righteous rule of Imam Ali and his sons 
as infallible Imams. One may quickly notice the seemingly undemocratic and 
hereditary nature of succession in Shi'ism in comparison with apparently democratic 
and consensus-driven approach of Sunnism. But, the underlying explanation that is 
often ignored is the difference between political succession and spiritual succession. 
In terms of succession of the Prophet. Sunnism and Shi'ism represent essentially two 
different approaches. in particular. when the Prophet died without leaving clear 
instructions about who was to succeed him as leader of the community. ' 3 It is 
difficult to believe that a religion which has superseded any other religion in terms of 
instrumental guidelines and regulations accidentally leaves the very eminent issue of 
succession without clear indication. In contrast, it is more likely to assume that such 
lack of evidence is intentional and also an essential part of understanding Islam. 
32 As for example. liberalism has been used for fulfilling other political ends. 
Robinson, /slum. p. 163. 
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Robinson argues that "in the face of this crisis [demise of the Prophet and not having 
decided the successor] the majority whom we may think of as proto-Sunnis. assumed 
that the era of the Prophet's charismatic authority was over and done with . "34 As a 
result., the majority "sought a return to a routine stable life... [and] fell back on 
principles which had prevailed in pre-Islamic Arabia: respect for seniority. and the 
pre-eminence of the Quraish tribe. "' ' 
Such criteria were followed for choosing the first four Caliphs. Robinson also rightly 
recognises the distinction between the role of Caliph as political leader and Imam as 
religious and spiritual guide. What we can extract from the above analysis is to learn 
that despite all the allegations that Islam is an intrinsically political religion which is 
most concerned about seizing political power, it remains silent over political 
succession and transition of power. In fact, it leaves ample room for both Shia and 
Sunnis to speculate. Therefore, as Turner points out, the religion of Islam is not 
political in essence but through the course of time and due to socio-political 
'' necessities has become politicised. 
The concept of irila}at al-fayih ought to be conceived as an evolutionary theory 
developed within the Shi'a jurisprudential system to fulfil the societal needs, in 
particular when it is asked to take the responsibility in absence of appropriate 
institutions. This initially socio-religious concept gradually gathered a political 
dimension over the course of centuries and became the keystone of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in 1979. The majority of nascent transcripts of Shi'a jurisprudence 
were chiefly concerned with the concept of the Hidden Imam and his messianic return 
as the Twelfth Imam. Therefore, there is little evidence of early Shia jurist, ' 
elaborations on taxation, execution of penal code, Jihad, directing to the good an,: 
preventing what is prohibitcd (unir hi nt41 /11/ va Ihu/IF ,- nýrýfýýrr)_ anal u}ýlýýýlýliný (Llc 
sermon of Friday Pray cr 
ilýlPliü 
.A it dU Li ý 
lýlýll ýýll .1 ýUiiýlý 
Ilýii U 11C xUU\L IL'ýIýLi11ýý d Uiiiai ý)ýý; 111ý, 1i 
power along with rejecting its righteousness. Nevertheless. overthroww in of this 
'4 Ibid. 
'` Ibid. 
'c' See Colin Turner. /. dun the Ba, i. \. 
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government was not recommended too. "37 Even in the early decades after occultation, 
the main focus of Shi"a jurists were to emphasise the absolute illegitimacy of any 
fallible rule. 38 In other words. the essence of Shi'ism exclusively designates the role 
of Imam for only the twelve infallible descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (S) and 
no other person under any circumstances. 39 We may interpret the determining position 
of Shi'ism regarding imamate with termination of the Prophethood by demise of the 
Prophet Muhammad (S), as one of core defining elements of Islam. 
The illegitimacy of fallible rule was the dominant perception until the commencement 
of the trans-transcription era or rationalism (i'ti. alia) in Shia jurisprudence . 
Statistically, too, the amounts of Traditions which referred to as for denial of fallible 
rule were of greater in number. However, in the trans-transcription era the references 
to the Traditions which extrapolate the necessity of government in the Muslim 
community were augmented. To give a better understanding, in the following passage, 
we mention salient examples of the Traditions which represent both the pro- 
establishment and anti-establishment attitudes of Shia Islam: 
A- Traditions that emphasise the illegitimacy of fallible rule: 
I- Imam Reza (the 8th Imam): the Imamate has the same privilege of the 
Prophethood... And it is because of Imam that the principles of Islam like 
prayer, fasting, almsgiving, pilgrimage, Jihad and execution of punishments 
can be exercised and preserved. `" 
2- Imam Sadiq (ja"far bin Muhammad, the 61h Imam): Government and execution 
of Islamic law plus the Friday prayer cannot be undertaken except under 
[infallible] Imam's rule. 42 
3- Imam Sadiq: the Imam whose verdict is obligatory is from us. 43 
Hamid Algar, Din va Dawlat dar Iron (Religion and Government in Iran), trans. Abulgasim Seri, 
Tehran. Tus Publication, 1366 (1987). p. 21. 
Shaykh Tusi, ul-Nahat'i. /i Mumujrid al-Faqih val-Fatatiri. trans. Muhammad Taqi Danesh Pazhuh. 
Vol-], Qum, Iran, Bita Publication. pp. 207-208. '9 
Ibid. 
40 Trans-transcription era is the equivalent to fora-nass garaie in Persian 
" Al-Kulavni. Muhammad Yaqub. U. vul ul-Kati, Publication: Daftar-i Nashr-i Farhang-i ahl-al-Beet. 
Tehran. Vol. 1, p. 199. 
42 Hussein Ali Montazeri, Dirasat, /i al-Wilavat al-lagih. Publication: Markaz-i A'lam-i Islam. Qum, 
Vol. 1. p. 140. 
98 
4- Imam Ali: No war is permitted without the Just Imam, and no fight is correct 
without pious Imam. 44 
The explicit meaning of these Traditions whose accuracy and correctness is well- 
known in Shi'a jurisprudence demonstrate the illegitimacy of any fallible rule since 
the Imamate as the right and just succession of the Prophet occupied by the Caliphs. 
Such Traditions are representative for evolving the theory of "absolute imamate" and 
total rejection of any fallible rule. Hashem Aqajari explains the initial but official 
Shia position by saying: "Since the political leadership of society is bound on the two 
key elements of infallibility and transcription's (Koran or Tradition) approval, any 
government except the rule of infallible is considered unjust. It was the case for any 
movement or revolt even against oppressive rule if not authorised and led by infallible 
Imam. "`ýs Therefore, the genuine Shia jurisprudence holds that the political 
legitimacy descended from prescription and transcription (nasb va nass). 
B- Traditions which extrapolate the necessity of government and disallow the state of 
anarchy: 
1- Imam Ali: it is God's obligatory decree on the Muslims that if the 
leader has died, or is killed, whoever he was, either astray or guided, 
oppressive or oppressed, do nothing, unless they have elected a 
leader who is chaste, knowledgeable and informed of judiciary and 
Tradition. 46 
2- Imam Reza: We do not know any nations that survive without 
having a sage chief, since in dealing with both temporal and sacred 
affairs is no other option. 47 
Having compared the abovementioned Traditions. I proffer the existence of two Shi'a 
perspectives regarding the issue and applications of government: the Privative view 
'' Muhammad Baqir Majlisi. Bihar al-Amvar. Publication: al-Wafa. Beirut. 3`d edition, 1403 (Islamic 
year), p. 23. 
44 Kulavni, Usul u/-Kgfr, Vol. 1. p. 303. 
45 Hashem Agajari, }'adman-i Khaiami (An Academic Collection for the Memorial of Avatollah 
Ruhollah khatami), with assistance of Muhammad Taqi Fazil Meybudi. Publication: Imam Reza' 
Islamic knowledge Institution, Qum. 1376 [1997], p. 188. 46 Montazeri. Dirasai_f al-wi/avat a/-fayih. vol. 1, p. 179. 
47 Hur Aamili, l'asave/ a! Shl'a, vol. 11, p. 131. 
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(salbi) and the affirmative view (ijabi). It should be born in mind that the privative or 
initial view not only disapproved any fallible government, but also prohibited any 
cooperation of the jurists with such government too. From the Tenth century, the 
affirmative view on government gained strength within some Shi'a jurisprudents. The 
lengthy duration of the period of occultation swayed the jurisprudents to revise their 
firm stance on the illegitimacy of any cooperation with current government. in 
particular when the government was Shi'a and intended to protect and promote Shia 
faith. The argument centred on the necessity of guiding Shi'a believers in fulfilling 
their religious obligations and also observing the implementation of Islamic law. 
We can argue that if the jurists were to refuse further from upholding and arranging 
the implementation of religious duties, the whole community would lose its integrity. 
The socio-religious history of Iranian Shia shows that unlike the Vatican position 
during the Medieval Ages; it was the people who enthusiastically sought guidance and 
leadership from the jurisprudents and not vice-versa. In short. the jurists were 
encouraged to take up some responsibilities which hitherto were assumed exclusively 
for the infallible Imam. One must note that these duties had as yet no overlap with 
political rule and just related to socio-religious affairs. The entrance of Shi'a dynasty 
of al-Buyyid as new conquers of Bagdad and their honouring of Shi'ism and their 
support for performing Shi'a rites softened the privative view and paved a fresh route 
for a new independent judgment (ijtihacn. 
Shaykh Mufid was the first revered Shia jurisprudent who discussed and created an 
exception on the issue of cooperating with the sultan (ruler), while the prohibition of 
any kind of cooperation with fallible rule was always a canonical principle in Shia 
jurisprudence. 48 Mufid amended this canonical code by saying: "helping the fallible 
rulers in accomplishing a just matter or obligatory matter is allowed. This cooperation 
is only permitted for the ones who have been permitted to do so from infallible Imam. 
and not otherwise. ' 49 It was an unprecedented opening in Shia jurisprudence to ratify 
any kind of collaboration with fallible ruler and commenced what we can call the 
jurisprudence of government (fiyh-i hukumati). In other words. Shaykh Mufid 
48 With an exception of urgent occasions of religious questions (istifta'). 
Shaykh Mufid, Masr-al-Shia. /i Mukhtasar Talrarikh al-Shari'a. in Silsile Mu'alifat-i Shaykh al- 
Mufid. Publication: Dar al-Mufid. Beirut. 1414 [... ], p. 44. 
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balanced between the concept of occultation and the necessity of political order in 
terms of protecting and promoting people's life according to Shia principles. He 
justified the vouchsafing of some matters from the infallible Imam down to the 
jurisprudents under the title of "general vicegerency"" (niyabai-i a 'amnia). 
He replied to his opponents by saying: "the prolongation of the duration of occultation 
may cause to the cessation of the Islamic law in terms of its implementation such as 
judicial law and Jihad which is necessary for protecting the Muslim community 
against external threats. "'0 Mufid's deductive verdict was based on the manner of the 
Prophets who communicated their message with the remote people through their 
representatives. 5' In so doing, he could make an analogy between the prophets" 
messengers and the jurists who were supposed to preserve and promote Shia 
theology as vicegerency. Through this development, the exclusive religious and 
jurisprudential functioning of the infallible Imams was shifted toward Shi"a scholars 
and jurists. In fact, the new interpretation assisted jurists to declare their new position 
as a source of emulation. Again this emulation is in regard to religious and judicial 
issues and is excluded from political subjugation. 
Agajari argues that "by the explicit and specific comprehension of Shi'a jurists on 
exclusive political authority of infallible Imam. the alteration of such well-established 
reading seemed impossible. "'`` However, Mufid's elaboration greatly changed the 
moral ground of the previously isolative approach of Shi'a jurists, Aqajari adds. He 
also explains how Shaykh Mufid confirmed the eligibility of jurists to interpret the 
Islamic law: "since for people new cases are occurring in time without clear 
indication in jurisprudence which need respective verdicts, it is therefore, obligatory 
for a lay person to consult with Shia jurist in order to receive his/her religious 
decree. " 53 
Another influential Shia jurisprudent was Shaykh Tusi whose efforts to categorise 
the authority of jurists under the title of i4wilayat al-fagih (jurist rule) are essential. He 
so Ibid. 
Shaykh Mufid, a/-Masail-i al-Saqani-i, Silsili Mu'alifat-i Shaykh Mufid. Publication: Dar-al-Mufid. 
Beirut, 1414 []p. 106. 
52 Agajari, Yadman-i tihatami, p. 188. 
5' Shaykh Mufid. Masar al-Shi'a fr Mukhtasar Tawarikh al-Shari'a, p. 15. 
101 
believed in the "necessity of imamate" . 
54 In his famous book: Tah: ib al-Ahkam 
(Refining of the Rules), he attributed the fundamentals of his judgement to Shaykh 
Mufid's readings on the authority of jurists to take up socio-religious duties and added 
the obligatory duty of jurists to undertake judicial duties whilst the Just Imam is 
hidden. He also permitted jurists to cooperate with the suppressive government if that 
leads to upholding divine regulation between people. However, he reserved the right 
to vouchsafe such authority merely by the infallible Imam, that without his permission 
any ruling on people and judging is not authorised. '5 
Many scholars consider Shaykh Tusi the one who inaugurated and justified the idea of 
jurisprudent rule (wilayal al-faqih). The overall impression from his scholastic 
collection authorises jurists to interfere in societal matters, but there is a decisive 
condition to which he refers, which has been mainly neglected by researchers. In his 
book, al-Mabsut f fiqh-i al-Imamia (A comprehensive Account on Imamia 
Jurisprudence), he explicitly preconditioned any interference by the jurists in dealing 
with socio-judicial issues if not bearing any possible damage to his own or any other 
Muslim's life. 56 It is also noteworthy that although Shaykh Tusi deemed having a 
government necessary, he did not relate it to the concept of legitimacy as he strictly 
held the same mainstream of Shia reading on the illegitimacy of fallible rule. 
Jamile Kadivar in her book, TahatiawN'u1-i Guftaman-i Siyasi Shi 'a dar Iran (the 
Discursive Shift of Political Shi'a in Iran) argues that from the occultation until the 
Safavid government, one cannot find an independent book or thesis written by a Shia 
jurist on political affairs. Unless we assume that judicial performance including 
mediation and execution of punishment. performing as Imam at Friday Prayer and 
dealing with inter-personal matter (umur-i hisbi) are bearing political weights. 57 All in 
all, there was always a fierce debate between Shia jurists on whether a jurisprudent 
can perform the responsibilities that are strictly for infallible Imam and. if yes, under 
what conditions. Through reading the majority of texts written by famous Shia jurists 
54 Montazeri, Mabani Fiqh-i Hukumat-i Islami, trans, Mahmud Salavati, Publication: Bita, Qum, vol. 1, 
p. 21. 
$5 Abu Ja'far al-Tusi, a/-Mabsut fi Fiqh-i /mamia. Publication, Matbaq-i Hiydarivyih, Tehran. 1378 
[1999], pp. 283-284. 
56 Ibid, pp 284-285. 
"Jamile Kadivar, Tahawwu/-i Guftanian-i Sii'asi Shia dar Iran, (The Evolution of Political Shia 
Discourse in Iran) Publication: Tarh-i Naw. 2nd edition, Tehran, 1379 [2000], p. 63. 
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we can find a consensus by which they all have come to the conclusion that permits 
jurists to act in judicial and religious matters under two conditions of: first, being 
"qualified jurisprudent", and second, acting upon as the general vicegerency of Just 
Imam. The expansion of the jurisprudents' duty and authority within society altered 
the practical meaning of term: ii ilayai, which primarily meant: closeness. 
companionship, friendship and guardianship, but gradually acquired connotations of 
rule and sovereignty. 
We can categorise the political thought of Shi'ism into five historical periods. First is 
the Imamate period (10-329 H. G). 58 In this era Shi'ism was established on the bases 
of Imam Ali and his eleven sons for 250 years until the occultation of the twelfth 
Imam. This period is extended until year 329 in which the last "special vicegerency" 
59 was died. 60 The second period covered from 329-905 H. G and can be named as the 
era of the Just King or Sultan. In this period the original balance and stability of 
spiritual belief in Shi'ism was challenged. and most Shi'as did not know their exact 
duty given the absence of the Just and righteous Imam and the presence of illegitimate 
and fallible rulers. 6' 
Therefore, the grand Shia jurisprudents like Ibn Abi Ziynab Amani. Shaykh Mufid. 
Seyed Murtaza and Shaykh Tusi launched a series of scholastic and philosophical 
arguments to prove the existence of Hidden Imam on one hand. On the other hand. 
alongside considering the illegitimacy of fallible rule. they tried to reconcile the ideals 
of Shi'a belief and the practical reality of political rule. The main dilemma in this 
period was whether or not to authorise any cooperation and co-ordination between 
Shi'a jurisprudents and the current rulers. In other words. the main focus was to 
That is started from the Prophet Muhammad's demise ten years after emigration (Hijrul) to Medina 
that is equivalent to year 631 AD till 941 AD. 
59 According to Shi' ism. there were four special vicegerences who were appointed by the Twelfth 
Imam and after them: nobody can claim being appointed or having direct consultation with him. That's 
why the term general vicegerency is used afterwards. 
"' Hassan Yusufi Eshkevari. Tashau': Sheri dar Farhang va Tannaddun-i Tashau' (A Journey Through 
Shi'ism's History and Civilisation). "Andishaha-i Sivasi" (Political Thoughts). in Dai'rat al-ma'arif--i 
Tashau' (The Encyclopaedia of Shi'ism), Tehran, Publisher: Saeed Muhebbi. 1371 [1994]. p. 273. e' Ibid, p. 285. 
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establish an extensive collection of Shi"a jurisprudence in private and judicial issues 
62 rather than public issues. 
The third period is that of giving legitimacy to the Just King (905-1324 H. G) that 
appeared during the Safavid Empire and extended through the Qajars. The main focus 
of this era was to justify the government and kingdom of Shi'a kings according to 
Imami jurisprudence. 63 Although still the Shi'a jurists maintained their explicit belief 
in exclusive right and authority of Infallible Imams to rule, they argued that during the 
occultation, it is up to the Shia jurisprudents to act as Imam vicegerency not only as 
their right but also as their duty. Hence, there is a mutual relationship between Jurists 
and Imam on one hand, and jurists and people on the other hand. The first is called 
niyabat (vicegerency) and the latter is wilayat (guardianship). Ever since, a majority 
of Imami jurisprudents proclaimed themselves as vicegerence of Just Imam and 
therefore: wali. fagih (guardian or leader). 64 
Mirza Muhammad Ali Kashmiri, a Shi'a jurisprudent during last decades of Safavid 
Empire, concludes that "during the occultation, it is the qualified jurisprudent who is 
representative of the Hidden Imam, whoever he is. in order to uphold the divine law 
(hudud-i ilah-i) and because the issue of government and commanding the army is not 
for the jurists, they vouchsafe it to the right king of the time. "65 However, the reality 
was different and as the governmental decrees during the Safavid era indicate, it was 
the king who appointed the highest religious positions such as Sadr (revered), Shaykh 
al-Islam (Islamic jurist) or Imam Juma' (Friday Prayer Imam). In short, although 
some jurisprudents had asserted a kind of carte blanche for themselves in terms of 
comprehensive rule under the theory of vicegerency. there is no evidence of claiming 
political rule. We can name this period as "kingdom and guardianship" through which 
the Shi"a jurisprudence divided its authority into religious judiciary issues (umur-i 
Shari) and communal or political issues (umur-i u 'rfi). The first was constantly 
`''' Mohsen Kadivar, Na_arivah-hai)vih Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shia (the Theories of Government in Shia 
Jurisprudence), Tehran, Publisher: Nashr-i Ney, p. 13. 
`" Hassan Yusufi Eshkevari, ibid. p. 289. 
Seyed Hassan Amin. in Kivan: "Hakamiyat va Hukumat dar Fiqh-i Shi'a va Sunni" (Soverei(, nty 
and Government in Shia and Sunni Jurisprudence), Vol. 5, No. 24, March April 1994, p. 32. 
`'` Mirza Muhammad Ali Kashmiri. Nujum al-Samrna (the Astronomy of Skies). Qum. Publisher: 
Basirati, p. I11. 
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elaborated to become more exhaustive than ever, and the latter was assumed by Shia 
b jurisprudents vouchsafed to the political rule of the Shi'a Sultan . 
ý' 
The fourth period begins with the advent of constitutional movement in Iran (1906- 
1979). The introduction of constitutional reform through establishing the parliament 
undermined the hitherto totalitarian Iranian state. Consequently. the traditional Shi'a 
thought faced with challenges. The new developments initiated a series of debates 
within different circles of the Iranian upper and middle classes including: clergy, civil 
servants, land owners and merchants. A very fundamental question. was raised as to 
determining whether the right of sovereignty belongs to the people or to one person as 
king. The entrance of modernism into Iranian society and the turbulent nature of 
world affairs had eased the waves of relative liberalisation that hit both the socio- 
economic and political fronts of Iranian state. 
No doubt, the absolute inefficiency and malfunction of Qajars contributed hugely to 
welcoming perception of Iranian society to liberal ideas, including surprisingly, the 
clergy. The new attractive paradigm seriously challenged the disastrous status quo 
imposed by the Qajar dynasty through overhauling the absolute monarchy into 
constitutional one. Muhammad Hussein Nai'ni in his crucial book Tanbih al-Umma 
va Tan_ih al--Willa tries to make a linkage between constitutionalism and the general 
vicegerency of the Twelfth Imam. He again argues that any fallible ruler is 
illegitimate, however, limiting this rule through constitutionalism, although it does not 
make it legitimate, is better than leaving it unrestricted and absolute. ' 
Nai'ni's argument is also aimed at giving jurisprudents a political role. and observing 
and vetting capability over legislation of the parliament. Via this measure, he intended 
to provide a religious legitimacy for the legislations passed by an elected assembly 
whose verdicts ought to be binding on the government and the people. This period can 
be identified as an era of "observance and constitutionalism" with special reliance on 
emancipation and egalitarianism. In other words, in this period. the government came 
under the scrutiny of an elected assembly empowered by the constitution and the 
61, Mohsen Kadivar, ibid. p. 12. 
67 Muhammad Hussein Nai'ni, Tanbih a/-umrna va Tanbih al-Mi/la, intro. Ayatollah Seyed Mahrnud 
Taliqani, Tehran. Publisher: Sherkat Sahami Intashar, 1378 [1999]. p. 51. 
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congruity of legislation with the Islamic principles was secured through the vetting 
authority of five jurisprudents introduced by the sources of emulations and approval 
of the parliament. 
The fifth period commenced from 1979 to date and can be named as the era of wilayat 
al-fagih (jurisprudent rule) that implies the superiority of one Shi"a jurisprudent in 
terms of legitimate authority to conduct political leadership. ý'8 The concept of the 
general guardianship of jurists over all societal issues was first discussed and 
introduced by Mullah Ahmad Naraqi. whose emphasis was on explaining the 
necessity of how the religious people's lives ought to be looked after and cared for by 
the Islamic scholars (ulama). 69 It is believed that the main inspiring text for Ayatollah 
Khomeini to introduce a full-fledged framework for adaptation of jurisprudent rule 
was Mullah Ahmad Naraqi's. It should also be noticed that the concept of u"ilayat a! - 
faqih in practical socio-political issues had not been publicised until Ayatollah 
Khomeini challenged the status quo and pressed for its implementation. In the 
following passage we explore further the underlying elements and aspects of making a 
religious state. 
2.4. THE INTEGRATION OF RELIGION AND STATE 
Apart from the last quarter of the twentieth century, it was widely understood for 
decades that the role of religion in state is a matter of history. However, the course of 
events towards the end of millennium proved otherwise and showed that religion can 
still exercise a great deal of influence over socio-political issues. Ironically. such 
resurgence of religious sentiment did not only occur in the developing countries but in 
the most advanced political systems like the United States of America. 70 To justify or 
explain the reasons involved in the increased influence of religion. different opinions 
have been expressed. One explanation points out the ever-increasing role of the 
secular state and its crushing effects on the moral grounds of society as a provocation 
`'b A detailed account on the aspects of wilavai al-fayih in the structure of Islamic republic of Iran will 
be given in Chapter 3. 
`'`' Jamilah Kadivar, Tahairwul-i Gufiaman-i Sirasi Shia dar Iran, ibid. p. 43I I. 
"' The revivalism of Christian sentiments by neo-conservatives in the US politics. 
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for the revival of religious sentiments. This argument is voiced by two different 
groups: 1- the advocates of the return of religion to public life, and 2- the critics of 
modernism who see the monolithic character of liberalism-capitalism as creating a 
need for a reconfiguration of identity. 7' 
Here, our focus is not to explore the motives behind the advocacy of religious 
interference and association in politics; rather, our interest is to find the arguments 
prescribing such correlation. 72 The critics of religious rule usually focus their criticism 
on the functional and behavioural level of analysis. Their primary focus is the 
consequent dictatorship and autocratic nature of most religious governments, which 
cannot guarantee the implementation of democratic rule. However, they reluctantly 
ignore the underpinning arguments made by the advocates of religious rule which 
possess their own philosophical and religious foundations and in respective societies 
hold great sway. In the following paragraphs a summary of these arguments are 
stated. 
The first and foremost reason offered by the advocates of religious integration with 
politics (here Islam) is the assumption that Islam is a comprehensive religion and 
therefore should be rationally incorporated into politics. For instance, Ayatollah 
Khomeini explicitly argues that since Islam is the last and most complete of religions. 
it cannot be reduced and understood as merely for individual salvation, but rather is a 
community code of conduct. ' Accordingly, human life in this world is connected 
with the afterlife, and the way in which mundane affairs are handled directly shapes 
the eternal destiny. 74 This argument holds that worldly prosperity is linked with the 
afterlife, and assumes that any doubt over whether Islam has a programme for 
managing all aspects of life in this world is nonsense. In other words, being religious 
Hussein Bashiriyah, 'Din, Siyasat va Tawsi'-ah (religion, politics and development), in Rah-i Naw. 
Vol. 1, no. 11, June 1998. p. 10. 
72 The critics of religious rule usually focus their criticism on the personal and behavioural level of 
analysis. Their primary focus is the consequent dictatorship and autocratic nature of any religious 
government which cannot guarantee the implementation of democratic rule. However, they reluctantly 
ignore the underpinning arguments made by the advocates of religious rule which possesses its own 
philosophical and religious foundation and in respective societies does yet hold a great sway. 
Ruhollah Khomeini, Shu'un va Ikhtiairat-i Wa/i Faqih (the qualities and capabilities of jurisprudent's 
rule) translated from the section: Wali faqih of Al-Beiy (Buy). 2nd edition, Publisher: Sazman-i Chap va 
Intasharat-i Wazarat Farhang va lrshad lslmai, Tehran. 1369 [1990]. p. 19. 
74 Muhammad Hadi Ma'rifat. Wilavat al-fagih, Publisher: Al tamhid Institution. Qum, 1377 [1998], 
p. 9. 
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or in this case, being Muslim, makes necessary having a structured ontological and 
epistemological attitude on the quality of life both individually and collectively. A 
perusal over many scripts of Islam including Koran and Tradition can be employed as 
evidence of interconnectedness between Islam and polity. 
The second argument attributes the upholding of many Islamic rules conditioned to 
availability of a political entity, as for being implemented. The proponents of this 
opinion deny the possibility of implementing issues like Jihad, judging. Islamic 
finance and directing to good and preventing from prohibited (in a broader sense), 
without an Islamic government in place. ' We can distinguish three categories of 
believers in Islam who consider the Islamic law as valid and obligatory but in terms of 
collective implementation vary significantly: 
1- Fundamentalist Muslims (wahhabism and Salafism) who seek to establish a 
society in which all inherited rules and codes of Islam that were understood to 
be practiced in the time of Prophet Muhammad (S) must be re-introduced and 
reinforced. 
2- Traditionalist Muslims who put the main emphasis on personal worship of 
God and servitude. Accordingly. acting upon the Islamic rule is necessary, but 
its success is not subject to its being implemented by the government. 
3- Reformist or modernist Muslims who tend to herald the spiritual aspects of 
Islam. This trend does not believe in the inflexibility of Islam as a religion 
descended 14 centuries ago, but rather views it as a timeless message for 
salvation of human beings. Then, of course, adjustable to new situations. 
In short, the argument of having an Islamic government as a necessity for 
implementing the Islamic law seems to be risen from various Islamic scripts. Here we 
encounter the issue of varied interpretations of religion in different times by different 
individuals and the hermeneutic of religious scripts. No doubt, this debate possesses a 
cardinal significance in determining a religious manifestation of government and we 
will address it later in this chapter. 
75 For example see: Habibollah Tahari. Tahqiqi Pirann, n-i biz/ava/ a/ fuyih (A Research on 
Jurisprudence Rule), 5"' edition, Publisher: Daftar-i Intasharat-i Islami Wabastah bi Jami'ah Mudarasin 
Hawzah l' Imiyyih Qum. 1377 [1998], p. 197. 
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The third reason for the advocates of correlating Islam and government is the 
Prophet's practical method (sira). It is an indispensable part of Islam to recognise and 
identify the behaviour and function of the Prophet as primary and founding source of 
Islam. Therefore, for many, the establishment of Islamic government by the Prophet 
in Medina is seen as an explicit model for all Muslims to follow. 76 However, there is a 
disagreement over the origins of political leadership of the Prophet Muhammad (S). 
Some attribute his political supremacy to his prophecy and say: he created a 
government as to fulfil his Prophethood. as other prophets too desired to do so. but 
were unable to accomplish. 77 In contrast. some argue that there is no direct association 
between prophethood and establishing a righteous government. In fact, the essence of 
missionary is in contradiction with exercising political power. unless that is required 
and approved by the people. 
78 But. in general. the popularity of this analysis with the 
hindsight of Islamic government in Medina is understandable, although it cannot be 
said to be deductively supported. 
The forth argument is based on the view that Islam as a religion takes into account 
and describes the qualities a ruler must possess in order to be eligible to rule. In fact. 
the advocates of this perspective connect the divinity of the Prophet Muhammad's 
government to his successors as to tread his line and be appropriate to sit on his 
Chamber. 79 The concept of uwali , 
fagih is a direct product of such perspective which 
considers Islam as a religion with defined and particular qualities for the ruled and 
rulers at the same time. We can argue that in an evolutionary process the "descriptive 
criteria" of an acceptable ruler has ossified and altered to a "prescriptive set of 
principles" possible to be found merely in a certain type of graduates from seminary 
school S. 80 This perspective gained permanency during Iran's Islamic revolution and 
7' For instance, when Khatami was asked to clarify and define his position toward civil society. he 
replied: the civil society we seek is the same as Prophet Muhammad's (S) Medina al-Nahbi. (City of 
Prophet in Medina). 
"Ali Rabbani Gulpaygani, "Nabuvvat va Hukumat' in Khirad: A Memorandum of the Congress to 
Celebrate the Revered Pundit Muhammad Taqi Ja'fari, under supervision of Ali Akbar Rashad. 
Publisher: The Research Academy of Culture and Thought. Tehran, 1376 [1997]. p. 230. 
'" Shavkh Tusi, Al-risalat-i fi Farq-i beyn al-nabi va al-imam, ( An Epistole in differentiating between 
Imam and Prophet in al-risail al-a'shr, p. 112 quoted by Mohsen Kadivar, Hukumat-i IJ'ilavi. p. 263. 
'`' Ali Rafi'i. Takapu-i . 4ndisha-ha (Quest for Thoughts). A collection of 
Interviews with Muhammad 
Taqi Ja'fari. 2°d edition, Publisher: Daftar Nashr-i Islami. Tehran. 1375 [1996], p. 327. 
80 For example. it is unimaginable for an excellent graduate of Islamic studies from universities to 
expect become a member of scholars eligible to be considered as a faqih. 
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perceived as backbone of jurisprudent rule which accordingly is supposed to be 
carried out by an educated clergy explicitly in line of seminary scholarship. 
However, there is a fundamental rift between the Shia scholars on how to 
contextualise the concept of wali fagih. The first group originates the legitimacy and 
absolute authority of lrali fagih as a linear hierarchy descended from God down to his 
last Prophet. Infallible Imams and then obviously to the Shia jurisprudents. 
Accordingly, the jurisprudent guardianship and leadership over people is granted by 
divine legitimacy and is not subject to collective consent. Nonetheless, the practical 
exercise of power by the jurisprudent is assumed to be given by popular acceptance 
and theoretically. in case of disobedience the jurisprudent ruler cannot forcibly 
govern. "' The embedded dilemma within this approach is the consequent conclusion 
of assuming people as interdicted individuals who cannot recognise their goodness 
and therefore need to be instructed and guided virtually in all aspects. This view can 
be named as "direct divine legitimacy" (nrashr"u 'ia! ilahi bi-vasita). 
A second group of Shia jurists ` tend to ratify a different perspective on legitimate 
political leadership which can be identified as "public-divine legitimacy"' (mashru 'ial 
ilahi-mai-dumi). Interestingly, the adherents of this view do not exclude non-clergy 
persons to obtain the leadership of Muslim population subject to their being pious and 
knowledgeable in terms of Islamic framework. They argue that in a broader sense 
God conveyed His right of rule down to people during the occultation period. This 
right to rule is protected. legitimate and can be exercised as long as it is congruent 
with the Islamic law. Based on this view, the Nýali. figih ought to be elected by people 
either directly or via representatives. As a result, wali, fagih is not perceived as being 
appointed within divine hierarchy, but his qualities and responsibilities are 
conditioned by Islamic law and principles. Also, in case of breaching his code of 
conduct, in particular losing his justice. he no longer is considered as wali or ruler and 
automatically is sacked. 
" Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, 'Hukumat va Mashru'iat' in Ketuh-i Nagd (the Book of critique). 
no. 7. p. 53. 
"2 Essential articles of the Islamic Republics constitution stipulate such an interpretation and recently 
this aspect of the Constitution and other independent judgment have been echoed by reformist clerics 
such as Mohsen Kadivar. Yusuf Eshkevari and Muhammad Mujtahid Shabestari. 
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It is essential to note that there is a consensus in Shi'a jurisprudence over the concept 
of jurisprudent role (not rule). as being judge and source of emulation in religious 
practices, if qualified. It of course applies only for the devoted followers. However, as 
mentioned before, we see a deep disagreement over extending this religious 
guardianship into political one. Even the group of Shi'a jurisprudents who are in 
favour of iviluyut ul-fuyih still have different opinions on the extent of such authority. 
83 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabestari is a prominent Shi'a scholar who has extensively 
elaborated on the issue of political Shia as state religion and in particular the concept 
of ivilayal al-fagih. From his works we can extract his opposition to politicised Islam 
based on his three component argument: 
I. The encounter of the Muslim World with modernism and the quest for 
development. 
2. The Islamic Revolution and the introduction of a rational interpretation of 
Islam. 
3. The pathology of the Official interpretation of Islam. the challenges and 
failures. 
In his famous book, "A Critique on Officiul Interpretation of Religion'", the main 
emphasis is put on the "paradigm shift" and the expansion of modern ideas and 
inspirations into Muslim societies. He argues that whether we like or dislike, the 
course of history has brought about a new era in which traditional and classic ways of 
thinking and acting are insufficient both theoretically and functionally. He refers to 
the general acceptance and desire of modern achievement and progress and concludes 
that the widespread yearning for technological advance cannot be answered with 
scholastic debate over what is allowed and what is forbidden according to traditional 
jurisprudence. 84 In short, his first argument illustrates the challenge Muslim societies 
are facing to incorporate scientific founding and knowledge which is ultimately in 
accordance with divine wisdom. 
Seyed Hassan Amin. 'Hakamivat va Hukumat dar Fiqh Shia va Sunni' (State and Government in 
Shia and Sunni Jurisprudence) in Kivan. vol. 5, no. 24.1374 [1995]. p. 32. 
14 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qira'a, Rasmi a= Din (a critique on official 
interpretation of religion), 3 id edition, Publisher: Tarh-i Na"'. Tehran. 1384 [2005]. p. 12. 
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The second reasoning he refers to is the "rational trajectory" upon which the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 was initiated, progressed and finally triumphed. As the main 
slogans of the revolution clearly spelled out, the main aim and goal of this popular 
movement was "independence, freedom and Islamic Republic". Shabestari furthers 
his argument by saying that the message of the Islamic revolution as a religiously 
inspired revolution was to convey the emancipating capacity of Islam as its true 
essence rather than establishing a monolithic government driven by a particular intra- 
religious adjudication (ijtihad-i fighi). Having studied the Constitution of 1980- 
approved by a majority of populace-we cannot extrapolate that this document is 
directly presumed from Shia jurisprudential knowledge (Koran and Tradition). 
Shabestari admits that the charismatic personage of the revolutionary leader, the 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, had a great deal of influence not only over political 
entities but also peoples' heart and minds. However, he takes into account three 
defining elements which make the Islamic revolution a product of the socio-religious 
and socio-political context of Iran rather than a jurisprudential development: ]- the 
-formation of a new regime" which is in totality a modern structure. 2- The "function 
and responsibilities" of the new regime which is very similar to other modern nation- 
states and 3- the "Judicial-political values and orientations" of the new constitution 
which is a combination of both secular-democratic discourse and Islamic-religious 
discourse. 
Having noticed these parameters. Shabestari concludes that the structure of the 
Islamic Republic is based on an amalgamation between democracy and Imami 
jurisprudence. Regardless of examining whether it was a successful or a failure. the 
point he emphasises is the general and public debate which occurred during the 
negotiation period proceeding to the ratification of the constitution. For him. the way 
in which the Islamic Republic"s constitution was publicly debated, tailored and 
ratified is significantly decisive. 8 In terms of legal and political rights, Shabestari 
signifies the broad category of rights which the new constitution considers for the 
people regardless of their religious affiliations. It is a grave detachment from 
traditional and seminary jurisprudence to recognise and uphold universal suffrage in 
Shabestari. ibid, p. 23. 
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terms of citizenry's rights. Regarding the political structure of Islamic Republic and 
its similarities with conventional form of modern governments, we will extensively 
study the democratic aspects of the Islamic Republic's constitution in the next 
chapter. 
'. 4.1 
. 
ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY. A PARADOX OR CPATIFY 
With the emergence of the Islamic Republic and implementation of a vast array of 
Shi'a jurisprudential norms and rules within the new constitution, an unprecedented 
combination of religion and state came into existence. A famous thinker whose 
thoughts and theories directly aim at connecting theology and governance is Abdul 
Karim Soroush. He maintains that "religious law or Shari 'a is not synonymous with 
the entirety of religion, nor is the debate over the democratic religious government a 
purely jurisprudential argument. " To prove this. Soroush argues that jurisprudential 
statements are different from epistemological ones. and no methodic mind should 
conflate the two realms. " He continues by saying that the 'jurisprudential conception 
of Islam has so occupied certain minds that epistemological arguments are allowed to 
pose as jurisprudential propositions. "86 
Soroush's critical approach towards a monolithic interpretation of religion and its 
application in terms of governing doctrine provides us with a ground-breaking 
framework of intra-religious and extra-religious discourses. In his elaborations on 
issues concerning democratic religious government, he challenges the critics of such 
combination and rejects their assessment of the concept of democratic religious 
government as "preposterous". For him, the critics have built their arguments to prove 
the inner incompatibility of Islam and democracy on a selective narrative. Therefore. 
issues such as gender in Muslim societies. theocracy. the absolute authority of 
jurisprudents, designation of death penalty on apostates, the regarding of infidels as 
impure. dogmatism of some beliefs and inflexibility of some decrees should not be 
accounted as evidence of the inherent animosity of religion and religious government 
towards democracy. 
x" Abdul-Karim Soroush. Reason. Freedom and Democracy in ! slam: Essential Writings of Ahdu-l 
Karim Soroush, trans. edited and intro by Mahmud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri. Oxford University Press, 
2000. p. 134. 
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He mentions three obvious errors which are made by three critics. First, for the 
critics. democracy is equated with extreme liberalism. Second, through this approach 
religious jurisprudence is severed from its core foundations, quoted out of context, 
and then presented as evidence. Third. religious democratic government is equated 
with religious jurisprudential government and attacked as a monolithic whole. " It is 
essential to note that the essence of Islam as an emancipating religion has always been 
neglected and instead both its adherents and opponents have been keen on stressing its 
jurisprudential aspects and precepts. 
2.4.2. ISLAMIC POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY 
It is a well known assumption that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradictory to 
the values of Western societies and indispensably crucial in shaping political 
outcomes in Muslim nations. The consequences of such generalised and biased 
attribution are primarily based on the textual deduction and ad hoc studies of 
individual countries without taking into account other factors. RR Therefore. the 
involvement of Islam in socio-political sphere is perceived as either "upcoming 
Islamic fundamentalism" or non-conductive to "liberal democracies". Perhaps. like 
those of other religions, Islamic texts and traditions can be employed to advocate 
specific political systems and policies as it has been the case throughout the history. 
Daniel Price argues that country-specific studies do not provide us with applicable 
patterns for varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of 
the Muslim world. To support this argument in order to explain the varied influence 
Islam exerts on politics, he emphasises the necessity of comparative studies focusing 
on various factors related to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, 
economic situations, ethnic cleavages and societal development. He concludes that 
much of the power attributed to Islam as the driving force behind politics and political 
systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the abovementioned factors. 89 
Ibid. 
88 Daniel E. Price, Islamic Political Culture, Democracy and Human Rights. Praeger. Westport, 
Connecticut, 1999. Preface. 
"" Price. Islamic Political Culture. 
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?. 4.3. POLITICAL CULTURE. DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATISATION 
It is a core assumption for classical development theories that the dissolving of 
traditional political culture is a necessary step in the process of development. It is 
assumed that traditional political cultures do not boast rationalisation, modernisation. 
bureaucratisation and democratisation. 90 However. we may ask. whether tradition and 
modernity are mutually exclusive and therefore development is a linear process across 
all spheres of society, or, whether is a mutual beneficiary between tradition and 
modernity to pursue a continuous and stable progress to achieving development. Even 
the conservative scholar Huntington acknowledges that the ties of tradition are 
necessary to unite nations during difficult period of rapid growth. 
`" 
Larry Diamond argues that the study of political culture has enjoyed a recent 
resurgence and challenged the dominant rational choice paradigm. 
`' In other words, it 
is no longer absolutely valid to assume that individuals are self-interested utility 
maximisers. if we are to sufficiently explain political decisions. Max Weber was first 
to articulate the significance of reformed religious belief and its positive influence on 
capitalist mode of production resulting in a more liberal socio-political structure and 
system. In contrast, some put greater emphasis on factors such as geography. wealth 
and historical circumstances. 93 This debate has been continuing between advocates of 
cultural. structural and rational choice theories ever since. However. Price argues that 
advocates of political culture have been left with the difficult tasks of: 
I- showing that political culture is not simply a concept that is 
used to account for everything that remains an anomaly in a 
(given society. 
?- showing that differences in political culture can explain 
differences in political behaviour across governments and that 
90 Daniel E. Price, Islamic Political Culture. Democracy, and Human Rights: .A 
Comparative Study. 
Westport. New York. 1999. p. 2. 
`'] See Samuel. P. Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Heaven. Yale University 
Press. 1968. 
'), See Political Culture in Developing Countries, edited by Larry Diamond. Boulder. Colo, London. 
1993. 
`) " See Comparative Perspective on Social Change. edited by S. N. Eisenstaedt, Boston. Little, Brown. 
1968. 
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changes in political culture across time result in changes in 
political behaviour; and 
3- codifying and identifying different variants of political 
culture. 
94 
Since according to Weberian analysis it is only capitalist societies which become 
modernised, rationalised and bureaucratised, the classic theories of development have 
put great emphasis on the third task and therefore focused on the division between 
tradition and modernity. Weber argued that that the influence of certain tenets of 
Protestantism as an alternative to the official doctrine of Catholicism facilitated a 
transformation in the shared beliefs and attitudes of society. The outcome was a new 
ideological foundation conducive for new modes of economic production on one 
hand, and on the other hand, transformation from "religious-based ideology"" to 
"secular rational ideology" as the cornerstone of liberal theories of development. 95 
Max Weber, in fact. viewed the character of a society's religion and religious 
institutions to be historically one of the most important factors in determining its 
political outlook, in particular whether it could develop a liberal tradition or not . 
96 In 
his famous book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930) he extends 
the same argument into the economic realm by suggesting a causal nexus between the 
"Protestant Ethic", especially of the Calvinistic variant, and rational capitalism. 
Weber identifies a series of variables as characteristic and prerequisites of capitalistic 
enterprise such as: appropriation of physical means of production by the entrepreneur. 
freedom of the market. rational technology, rational law, free labour and finally the 
commercialisation of economic life. 97 
To verify this thesis Weber carried out an experimental cross-cultural comparison of 
civilizations to discover whether these factors were present and whether a causally 
dominant ethic was absent. The result showed that, in India. China and the Muslim 
societies many of the prerequisites of capitalism were absent. In the specific case of 
" Price. ibid, p. 10. 
95 Ibid. 
96 See David Beetham. Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics. London. Allen and Unwin. 
1974. pp. 185-186. 
97 Cited by Turner. 1974, p. 12. 
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Islam the focus was on the political, military and economic nature of some Muslim 
societies as a patrimonial form of domination with "prebendal feudalism" as its core. 
In attitudinal terms also Weber perceived Islam as a purely hedonistic spirit, 
especially towards women, luxuries and property. 98 
Weber never completed his works on Islam and the sociology of religions. However. 
from what we can extract from his writings. he believed that Islam was anti-modern 
and that its value system might not facilitate capitalism. 99 Perhaps, it is not far from 
reality that Islam (Koran and Surma) does not support specifically capitalist modes of 
productions. In other words, although there are various recognitions of private 
property and market oriented norms in the Islamic jurisprudence, the totality of 
capitalism contradicts with some essential elements of Islam. 
Daniel Lerner applied the liberal theory of development to Muslim societies and 
identified a series of parameters such as urbanisation, literacy and communication. He 
maintained that these factors function to break down traditional society and stimulate 
economic and political development through the destruction of the old assumptions 
and attitudes supportive of the traditional paradigm. 100 He went further and asserted 
that once traditional communities become connected to the modern world. the 
traditional patterns of thought cannot survive and are replaced with modern patterns. 
This line of thought was followed and developed by Lipset, Deutcsh. Inkeles and 
Rustow throughout the late fifties and sixties. In short. this approach maintained that 
when people moved to the city, learned more and came in contact with the wider 
world. they would develop the skills necessary to shape and take part in a 
participatory society with less subordination towards divinely sanctioned modes of 
control. 
Classical development theories strongly echoed the liberal paradigm as an inevitable 
paradigmic shift towards the separation of spiritual and temporal in political and 
social discourses. Smith, a liberal theorist, introduced a four-step process regarding 
religion's influence on politics: l- separation of religion and politics: 2- the expansion 
'"` See Seyed Anwar Hussain, Max Weher Sociologi" of /slam: A critique, London. 2001. 
Price. ibid. p. 12. 
110 Daniel Lerner, The Passim of'Traditional society: Modernising the Middle East. with the assistance 
of Lucille W. Pevsner and introduction by David Riesman. New York. Free Press. 1958. 
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of secularised polity into areas previously dominated by religion; 3- secularisation of 
political culture; and 4- polity domination of religion. 101 These steps are based on a 
linear presupposition of declining the role of religion in society due to the 
introduction of modernity. However, the empirical evidence does not prove such 
causality, for example, the case of Iran under the Shah's robust non-religious policies 
which led to nothing but a full-fledged Islamic revolution. 
Even the second trend of development theories (Marxist Theorists) believed in the 
subordination or adaptation of religion to economics. They including Cordoso. 
Faleto1°', Rodinson, Gran and Amin elaborated their socialist-based theorising under 
the title of dependency theory. With regard to Islam. for example, Rodinson argues in 
his book Islam and Capitalism that even in purely traditional Muslim societies. 
religious beliefs did not significantly affect economic practice. 103 In other words, if 
religious doctrine stood in the way of gain and profit, it was either ignored or 
interpreted liberally. Amin104 and Gran10' also point to the irrelevance of Islamic 
doctrine in regulating economic practice. However, it is evident that the aspirations of 
development theorists either liberals or socialists have not been materialised and still 
various societies are struggling in their way to approach economic and political 
development. Price correctly says: "Had these theories been true, the cross-national 
and case study of political culture would not be necessary because all modern political 
cultures would be relatively similar. However, the study of political culture will 
remain important because modernity was not necessarily the final stage in the 
temporal progression of political culture. " 106 
We have now assessed the core elements and logic of political culture, and this has 
made clearer the necessity of studying the Shi'a tradition of thought alongside the 
democratisation process in Iran. On the one hand, we witnessed a loud and strong 
trend in studying Muslim societies, including Iran. which dismissed altogether any 
111 Ibid. 
102 See Fernando Henrique Cordos and Enzo Faleto. Dependency and Development in Latin America. 
trans by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi, Berkely, California University Press, 1979. 
10' See Maxime Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World, tarns by M. Pallis, London. Zed, 1979. 
104 See Samir Amin, The Law ?t Value and Historical Materialism. London. Monthly Review Press, 
1978. 
105 See Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Eg pt, 1760-1840, Austin, University of Texas Press, 
1979. 
10`' Price, ibid. 
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idea that religious attitudes and sentiments could be considered as determining any 
socio-political productivity. 107 On the other hand, the essence of religion and its 
profound interaction with the human mind has always been a source of change and 
progress. Even, the negative effect of religion proved to be useful for the 
enhancement of societies in the long run. Thus far, the indispensable influence of 
Shi'ism on Iranian culture and polity should not necessarily to be seen as a backward 
regression rooted in history. Having covered the principle elements of democracy and 
democratisation process within the discourse of critical social theory, and also 
explaining the socio-political underpinnings of Shi'a thought, we now turn our debate 
into intellectualism in Iran. From both secular and religious point of view. as well as. 
advocacy of modernity or and criticism towards modernity. 
2.5. INTELLECTUAL CONTRIBUTION AND DEMOCRATISATION 
PROCESS IN IRAN 
The issue of intellectualism and intellectuals in Iran has always been one of the 
preoccupying factors in conducting any research or observation regarding 
contemporary Iranian socio-political history or development. Whether we believe in 
the role of intellectuals 108 as the bearers of modernity and progressive paradigms into 
the Iranian society or acknowledge them as the product of modernity per se. their 
influence in shaping the popular socio-political discourses in Iran is a matter of fact. 
From the nineteenth century the encounter with modernity brought about a wave of 
critical thinking on both the "emancipatory" and "dominative" aspects of socio- 
political life. Hence, a combined perception of modernity entered into the socio- 
political discourse of Iranian society. 109 Although, it does not necessarily mean that 
there was no attempt or desire for reform hitherto, 11° the encounter of these two 
107 Informal discussion with Hushang Schahabi. 
108 The term Rawshanfakri was first introduced by Jalal Al-e Ahmad by which he meant to distinguish 
between a completely Westernised thinker and an enlightened thinker. However, the usage of term 
Rawrshanfakr in Persian and intellectual as a universal name is not limited to the ones Al-e Ahmad 
attempted to qualify. 
""' Farzin Vahdat. God and Juggernaut: Iran's Intellectual Encounter With Modernity, Syracuse 
University press, Syracuse. 2002, p. 23. 
See for example Abbas Milani. Lost Wisdom: Rethinking Modernity in Iran, Washington D. C. Ma-, -, e Publishers, 2004. 
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fundamental aspects of modernity generated a double paradoxical dilemma which 
prevented the process of the institutionalisation of modernity. 
The Iranian encounter with the West had initially started during the Safavid Empire. 
through which the main point of contact was to acquire necessary tools and it was 
since the mid nineteenth century onwards that Iranians felt lacking new "ideas" rather 
than only new "tools". Interestingly, the bearers of the reform concept were mainly 
men of power, either from courtiers or governmental officials with some cases from 
the clergy class. It is also important to contemplate some essential questions regarding 
intellectualism. How intellectualism is defined? What is the milieu of intellectual 
activity? What would be an intellectual movement? And finally who can be called an 
intellectual? The common answer to these questions is that intellectualism deals with 
thought-a complex phenomenon that develops gradually and subtly with almost no 
sudden or sharp shifts. III 
Philosophically speaking, intellectualism is deriving knowledge from reason alone. 
However, broadly speaking, there are three definitions as qualifying to be intellectual. 
The first category consists of individuals who are deeply involved with ideas, books, 
the life and the mind. The second definition whose origin comes from Marxism 
categorises the intellectuals as of recognizable occupational class consisting of 
lecturers, teachers. lawyers. journalists and such like. The third is cultural 
intellectualism whose members are those of notable expertise which allows them 
some cultural authority and who then use that authority to speak in public on other 
matters. 
112 
Of course, the last classification is more suitable and inclusive to reflect the criteria 
we mean as an intellectual in this research. Thus, our description of intellectuals 
includes those whose ideas directly or indirectly were influential in creating a 
paradigm shift in cultural and social discourse and other writers, journalists, lecturers 
and professionals who function as a link between the intellectually creative and the 
111 Forough Jahanbakhsh, The Emergence and Development of Religious Intellectualism in Iran' in 
Historical Reflections. 2004. Vol. 30, no. 3. 
112 Third definition has more congruency with the theme this research conceptualises an intellectual. 
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public. ' 13 In Iran, intellectualism is as diverse as of that any other nation since a wide 
array of intellectual trends emerged throughout the contemporary history. Some 
survived, some vanished despite their significant start and some still hold sway over 
large parts of the society. ' 14 
The issue becomes more complicated and also difficult for a high degree of precision 
when one intends to periodise and characterise the intellectual phenomena of a nation. 
However, it is only possible to embark on such a task after the impacts of intellectual 
trends become manifest in social and political transformations. 115 To know the 
manifestation of such impacts and the interactions involved in it we again arrive at the 
focal point of political culture. A political culture which includes a broad array of 
intellectual and ideological values that not only influences the planned orientations 
both individually and collectively. but also shapes concepts such as legitimacy and 
criteria for determining what constitutes virtue. 1 6 Ali Gheissari summons two key 
elements as the core of Iranian political culture and ideological history: "autocracy" 
and "attitudes towards the influence of the West". 
Autocracy can be elucidated as having two features. One is an ossified form of 
religious intolerance which mostly emanates from a power-seeking interpretation of 
religious texts, and the other is the inherited patrimonialism and imbalance between 
gender and class relationships within any given society. On attitudes towards the 
West, as Lloyd Ridgeon argues. "can be little doubt that most Iranian responses to the 
challenges and difficulties of the modern age reflect the influences that have emanated 
from the West. " 117 In his articulation Ridgeon adds that it is yet impossible to 
bracket the West out in an attempt to identify how Iranian intellectuals and reformers 
have responded to the challenges they have faced in these past one hundred years 118 
Jahanbakhsh, ibid. 
114 Western oriented intellectualism. Leftist or Marxist intellectualism and Islamic intellectualism 
respectively can be named. 
115 Jahanbakhsh, ibid. 
11` Ali Gheissari. Iranian Intellectuals in 20"' Centun', University of Texas Press, Austin. 1998. 
Preface. 
1 17 Lloyd Ridgeon, Religion and Politic_c in Afodcrn Iran. ' .4 
Reader- I. B. Tauris. London, 2005_ cited 
from introduction. 
1" Ibid. 
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In other words, we can summarise the contemporary socio-political history of Iranian 
intellectualism as being a constant struggle for dissolving autocracy and embracing 
modernity. At the same time, as mentioned above, the two intrinsic elements of 
modernity itself, the emancipatory (liberalism, freedom, subjectivity) and the 
dominative (essentiality of functioning nation-state, systematic institutions. 
universality), clashed respectively with the "desire to dissolve autocracy" and 
"embracing Western modernity". In short. while the emancipatory element engaged 
with autocratic elements such as dogmatic religious beliefs and socio-political 
patrimonialism, the dominative element of modernity was under constant influence 
and interference of Western economic and political interest. 
To this end, the following sections of this chapter focus briefly on the various strata of 
intellectualism in Iran with particular attention to its dialectical process. In doing so, 
we can trace back the stance taken by significant intellectuals towards critical notions 
of their paradigmic view as "movers and shakers" of socio-political development in 
general and the democratisation process in particular. As mentioned before, 
intellectualism in Iran encompasses a wide array of tendencies and ideological 
dispositions. We begin with intellectuals who advocated the notion of modernity 
according to its original Western attributions, who were naturally secular and 
therefore were in favour of democratisation based on liberalism. Then we turn to 
assess the secular critics of modernity, to discuss their disenchantment with "failed 
adaptation of modernity in Iran". In the third phase and as the synthesis of preceding 
thesis and antithesis, the religious critics of modernity will be discussed and finally 
the chapter concludes by addressing, again briefly, the religious advocates of 
modernity who defend modernity and democratisation with the aim of proving its 
conformity and compatibility with religious-here Islamic principles. This 
categorisation is thought to be thematically appropriate and relevant. 
It is true that toward the end of Muhammad Reza Shah's reign 
the credibility gap between the people and the state had 
widened, but in that period the intellectual opposition was 
concerned mainly with transcending its self-avowed 
"theoretical poverty" regarding the analysis of contemporary 
122 
society in order to define an effective challenge to the 
authority of the state. As revolutionary events unfolded, 
popular dissents gained momentum and brought down the 
monarchy surprisingly rapidly. In these circumstances. 
intellectuals found themselves following rather than leading 
the events... on the whole they were unable to articulate a 
"historically logical" sequence linking Iranian society under 
the Shah to the increasingly dominant Islamic features of the 
revolution, because events ran so counter to the conceptual 
premises that underlay the intelligentsia's determinist and 
formalist approach to historical time-namely. the idea of 
linear progress of reason in history, in which the role of 
traditional phenomena remains hopelessly vague. 119 
2.5.1. ADVOCATES AND CRITICS OF MODERNITY AND 
DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS 
The controversial debate over modernity and tradition in Iran encompasses a very 
wide range of issues, as well as intellectuals and thinkers. Some advocate and 
promote modernity and some criticise and even reject the notion of modernity. in 
particular from a socio-political point of view. However. for long the encounter of 
Iranian intellectuals with modernity circled around constant-dichotomy of the 
Western teleological concept of modernity and a local-oriented authenticity discourse. 
As discussed in the first chapter. the advocates of scientific discourse of modernity 
place their conjectural foundation on the classic social theory derived from positivism. 
whereas the new critical social theory incorporates the element of subjectivity and 
therefore cultural and local articulations play a decisive role. Thus. in this section. we 
aim at briefly examining the secular advocacy of modernity (secularism) through two 
influential intellectuals during both pre- and post-Islamic revolution: Ahmad Kasravi 
and Mehrangiz Kar. 
" All Gheissari. Iranian Intellectuals in 20'x' century. University of Texas Press. 1998. p. 2-3. 
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Secularism can be seen as the first intellectual product of Iran's encounter With 
modernity. Secular discourse asserts the freedom of religion and also freedom from 
religion. This discourse prescribes the total separation of state from religious 
institutions and beliefs. In this line. secular intellectuals have considerably contributed 
to criticising totalitarianism and the intervention of religion in politics at the same 
time. However, in terms of gaining a socio-cultural stronghold. secularism in Iran has 
failed and remained marginal if not completely ineffective. Although secularism was 
congruent with the policies of Pahlavi regime, due to its inherited contradictions it fell 
short of making its ideals and principles acceptable within a deeply religious society. 
Forough Jahanbakhsh describes the failure of secularism in Iran by arguing: " It was 
seen by many to be westernised. alien, and even anti-revolutionary. anti-Islam and 
directed by foreign interests. But more importantly. secular discourse hardly went 
beyond criticism, it failed to provide alternative solutions from within the Iranian 
tradition. "1 20 
Mirsepassi in his enlightening book The Intellectual Discourse and Politics aJ 
Modernisation argues that "much of scholarship on the social history of modern Iran 
is modelled after a perceived European narrative of progress. "'`' At the same time and 
in contrast, some Iranian scholars have tried to produce a narrative of development 
within the Iranian (local) setting. i. e. Jalal Al-e Ahmad who will be discussed later in 
this chapter. Mirsepassi expands his explanation by saying: "this genre of 
historiography renders the struggle between "tradition" (Islamic. feudal, 
backwardness. local) and "modernity" (cosmopolitan. Western-secular. progressive). 
positing the eventual victory of modern ideas. institutions, and personalities over local 
costumes, outlooks, and cultural habits. '" 122 Matin Asqari also argues that "the 
question of Iran's "backwardness" along with its attendant narrative of "self 
criticism" had preoccupied Iranian intellectuals since nineteenth century. " 123 
12" Forough Jahanbakhsh. "Religious and Political Discourse in Iran: Moving Toward Post- 
Fundamentalism" in The Journal of World AJtairs, vol. IX, no. 2, Winter/Spring 2003. 
12' Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernisation, p. 54. 
Ibid. 
Afshin Matin Asghari. 'The Intellectual Best-sellers of Post-Revolutionary Iran: On Backwardness, 
Elite-killing and Western Rationality' in The International Society for Iranian Studies. Carfax 
Publishing. Vol. 37. no. 1, March 2004 
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However, we need to bear in mind that such self-criticism has undergone two 
transformations between 1960s-1970s and 1990s to date. The prevailing intellectual 
tendency, well before the Islamic Revolution of 1978, concentrated on return to an 
authentic and glorified Irano-Islamic "self', whereas a decade after the revolution, the 
intellectual mainstream was changed to a more critical attitude toward national 
culture and/or character. "'24 In other words, we can distinguish the common theme of 
intellectualism before the Islamic revolution as emphasising "weakened-self' and 
"Westoxication-' of the society and diagnosing the solution as a return to "national" 
and "indigenous" values. In contrast, the common theme of intellectual articulations 
after the Islamic revolution is mainly concerned with the double burden of political 
and religious totalitarianism (despotism) which will be addressed later on under 
religious advocates of modernity or religious intellectualism. 
?. 5.1.1. SECULAR ADVOCATES 1. E. KASRAV1. A1EHRA; 1'G1L KAR 12-i 
A prominent and outspoken figure whose ideas considerably contributed in shaping 
modern intellectualism in Iran is Ahmad Kasravi. 126 Although he began his early 
adulthood as a clergyman who had passed religious seminaries, soon after the 
constitutional turmoil and atrocities carried out by several clergymen in executions of 
constitutionalists in Tabriz he underwent a fundamental ideological transformation 
and became a secular advocate of modernity. His advocates believe that the 
importance of Kasravi's role in Iran's modern intellectualism is due to his knowledge 
and experience acquainted from religious discourse and the criticism he attempted to 
establish against religious bigotry. Kasravi strongly believed that reform of Iran could 
be achieved only through educating the masses. 
The common theme in his manifesto was the promotion of democracy. economic 
welfare, education and social and personal life. 127 In addition, he was vehemently 
against the practice of Islam throughout the society, in particular Shi'ism as the main 
cause of Iran' lagging behind the progressive world. He described contemporary 
124 Ibid. 
'" The reason to include Kar alongside Kasravi is the thematic link and congruency between their 
attitudes towards modernity and also indirectly indicating the obstacles faced by current secular 
reformers has historical example. 
12(' He was bom i 1890 in city of Tabriz. north eastern of Iran. 
127 Quoted from Religion and Politics in Modern Iran. - .4 Reader, edited 
by Lloyd Ridgeon. Religion London. 
I. B. Tauris, 2005, p. 56. 
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Islam as full of superstitious beliefs, too much concern for jurisprudence, and a 
tendency to glorify the past in expense of adapting to existing realities. 128 His blunt 
stance against Islam brought him nothing but categorical rejection from conservative 
parts of the socio-political establishment and paved the way for his assassination. He 
considered himself as pak-din (unsullied believer) in his creed as rah (path) based on a 
conflict between raiwwan (source of altruism) and jan (source of egoism). His solution 
thus in this spiritual and intellectual connotation is with the assistance of khirad (the 
faculty of distinguishing right from wrong) by which, he believed, individuals could 
free themselves from various constraints and live prosperous. 129 
Kasravi's grave disappointment from the clergy gradually turned into a fierce 
resentment by which he constantly attempted to attribute whatever is problematic in 
Muslim societies to Islam and its preachers. His binary articulation divided the 
Muslim populace into true believers of Islam and unbelievers. The first group 
comprised of devoted individuals to Islam. who inadvertently are devoid of the desire 
for freedom, honour and dignity. and also are hostile towards freedom seekers. The 
second group. according to him. is made up of those who disassociated themselves 
from religion and inspire freedom for their country and dignity for their nation. 
130 He 
went further by rejecting Islam altogether, saying: "The truth is that in the world as it 
is, Islam is not suitable for a large free country... the political institution of Islam 
were not meant for today's world. It is not possible to run a country with them. -' 
31 
As for the post Islamic revolution, secular intellectual Mehrangiz Kar is a salient 
example. She is known as a non religious political activist whose focus is on the 
impediments imposed on women's judicial-political rights and participation. As a 
well-versed scholar in Iran's civil and penal code as well as constitutional law, her 
attempts to raise the issue of inequality within Iranian society have even brought her 
an international recognition. I'2 However. the quintessential difference between Kar 
and many gender rights activists is her clear stance on rejecting the concept of Islamic 
128 Ibid, p. 57. 
129 Iraj Bashiri, A Brief Note on the Life of Ahmad Kasravi. 2000. cited from: 
<www. anglefire. com'rnb'bashiri/authors'kasravi> (17 January 2007). 
130 Cited from Religion and Politics in Modern Iran. p. 61, originally quoted from The Detrimental 
Consequences of Islam'. translated into English by M. R. Qanunparvar in On Islam and Shi'ism 
1'1 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 254. 
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values and culture. Not only she does not intend to prove the compatibility of Islam 
with issues such as democracy. human rights and women's rights, but also explicitly 
defend the total separation of religion from state. Her book. Women's Political 
Participation in Iran offers considerable insight on opportunities and obstacles for a 
broader participation of women in political process. 
In her introduction to the book. Kar argues that most articles of the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic have not disfranchised completely women from equal political rights 
with men, but put emphasis on specific expertise such as being jurisprudent to be 
eligible to become president. 133 She also expressed her appreciation towards several 
religious politicians and sources of emulation for their efforts to resume the 
legitimacy of women's participation in politics. At the same time. Kar is keen to press 
on possibility of changing unfair and unjust laws through reconsideration of exegeses 
of Islam. Albeit it needs to be added that this book was written and went to 
publication inside Iran, though with hindsight of Kar's lectures outside of Iran, we are 
led to believe that she presented her views rather cautiously. Interestingly to know. 
Kar's strong aspiration for implementing complete secularism struck with a paradox 
when she is analysing the unveiling order imposed by Reza Shah. She admits that the 
obligatory unveiling order is in sharp contradiction with principles of freedom of 
individuals choosing what to wear, at the same time acknowledging the necessity of 
demystifying the Iranian populace to abandon their regressive and discriminating 
costumes and taboos. 134 
In this regard. Lloyd Ridgeon explains that in order to make it presentable to public 
domain. Kar attempted to base her argument for the cessation of systematic violation 
of women's rights in the Islamic Republic on the on "Islamic perspective". ' 35 Elahe 
Rostami Povey in her analysis based on a survey argues that: In the period 1990- 
2000. Muslim and secular feminists in Iran have found their own ways of coming 
together, making demands and pressurising the State and institutions to reform laws 
and regulations in favour of women's rights. -136 Therefore. the tacit conformity 
1" Mehrangiz Kar, Musharakat-i Sivasi Zanun, A9uvani' va lmkanat. (Women's Political Participation. 
Possibilities. Impediments). Rawshangaran Publishing. Tehran. 2"R edition. 1380 (2001). 
Mehrangiz Kar. Afusharakat. p. 28-29. 
"5 Lloyd Ridgeon, Religion and Politics in Modern Iran. p. 254. 
136 Elahe Rostami Povey. 'Feminist Contestations of Institutional Domains in Iran' in Feminist Review. 
no. 69. Winter 2001. p. 44-72. 
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between women's socio-political rights and the moderate interpretation of Islam 
which can be found in Kar's articulation ought not to be seen merely as a cautious 
way of expression, but needs to be looked at as an unwritten alliance between secular 
and Islamic feminists to further their cause with less price. 
The following quote is taken from Kar's speech at UCLA in 2003 in which she 
bluntly criticised the whole establishment of Islamic regime and even tended to praise 
the militaristic approach adapted by anti-clergy organisations in their quest to 
overturn Islamic republic: 
From the early days of the revolution. many Iranians became 
disenchanted with the apparent contradiction between 
revolutionary ideals and brutal reality. Many revolutionaries 
and radicals militated against the reactionary structure of the 
new constitution. They aimed at eradicating the forces of 
reaction with revolutionary zeal and speed. But the judiciary, 
utilizing the defence of Islam as a justification, promptly 
suppressed the opposition. The eight-year war with Iraq 
provided the regime with the perfect excuse to increase the 
level of violence that led to the horrific mass executions of the 
political prisoners. 137 
Although Kar's radical speeches and interviews after leaving Iran as a diaspora 
clearly present her irreconcilable position with the Islamic regime, she surprisingly 
invited all Iranians to participate in the presidential election of ? 005 by nominating 
free minded and liberal candidates. In her article published in Jihhijy'ih melli 
(National Front) website she argues that the two extreme opinions of: "full 
participation in the election" and "boycotting the election" are posing a grave 
challenge to the democratisation process. '38 In her vigorous article she rejects the 
whole electoral procedure as rigged but emphasises the need to utilise democratic 
formats of regime change even through convincing international organisations to 
monitor the election. 139 It is therefore evident that the functional alliance between 
l37 ww+'w. iso ucla. edu: article. as arentid-55 37 > p. }ý. p (23 January 2007) 
''" <www. jebhemelli. net'htdocs/viewsi2005'Kar_on_election. htm > (25 January 2007) 13,1) 
Ibid. 
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secular and religious women activists to promote their cause could be effective to 
pave the way for a transitional shift towards implementing more adjustments. 
2.5.1.2. SECULAR CRITICS OF aIODERAIT}', I. E. AL-E AHMAD, 
NA R. '1 O1, SIIA YF_ GAN' 
As mentioned before, it is not possible here to analyse extensively the evolutionary 
trajectory of intellectualism in Iran. However, in order to illustrate the dialectical 
nature of such evolution we need to limit our concentration both on number of 
intellectuals discussed here, thus, conveying the major points. It is largely perceived 
that the secular Iranian critics of modernity belong to the leftist ideologies, mainly 
Marxism and its various ramifications, whereas more careful investigation informs us 
of the great influence of "nineteenth century's critical philosophy of Germany". '4° In 
fact, the authenticity discourse which emerged in German philosophy throughout 
nineteenth century-chiefly due to its slightly late embracing of modernity-did 
provided the ideal ground for the disenchanted Iranian intellectuals to turn towards 
modernity for their antithetical theorising. 141 
Iran's initial encounter with modernity lasted from the mid-nineteenth century to the 
beginning of the twentieth. For about 75 years. two trends dominated and divided the 
hearts and minds of scholars and thinkers. In short. they were either anti-modern 
traditionalists who utterly rejected modernity as a negative phenomenon against 
religion and religiosity, or pro-modern anti-traditional thinkers who inspired replacing 
everything with the Western modernity. ' 42 Kasravi in 1942 explicitly demonstrates a 
sense of frustration within Iranian people by saying: 
All Iranians are saddened by the backwardness of their 
country..... What lies at the root of this drastic decline? At the 
beginning of this century. reformers could claim that the main 
culprits were the despots who had a vested interest in keeping 
their subjects ignorant and unenlightened. After twenty years 
of constitutional government, however. we cannot in good 
14" See Mirsepassi. Iniellectiial of Discourse o/ Alodernisation. 
141 Famously taken from: Mirza Melkum Khan's prescriptive notion of chanuin`e everything into 
Western, form forehead until toe_ if the society intends to modernise. 
1J'_ 
First used by Al-e Ahmad. 
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conscience give the same answer. We now know that the main 
blame rests not with rulers, but with the ruled. Yet, the chief 
reason for underdevelopment in Iran, perhaps in most Eastern 
countries, is disunity amongst the masses. 143 
In fact, the failure of constitutional revolution and ever-deteriorating state of affairs in 
terms of national integrity, unity and prosperity led many thinkers to reconsider their 
theoretical foundations. taking on rather critical dispositions against liberal modernity. 
In other words, the abovementioned quote reflects a widespread disillusionment 
among intellectuals with the development of civil society in Iran after the 
Constitutional Revolution which gradually drifted towards "monolithic 
nationalism" 144 and also embracing dominative aspect of modernity--incarnated as the 
Pahlavi regime. 
It is also necessary to note that at this phase. Marxism played a crucial role in the 
expansion of intellectual discourse throughout the society, in particular in the 
emerging educated middle class. However, due to very much politicised character of 
Marxism14'-its association with the Soviet Union's foreign policy-and also its 
epistemological dichotomy with indigenous culture and religions, advocates of 
Marxism either stuck to their orthodox hypotheses or gradually switched to alternative 
theories by which the peculiar nature of Iran's encounter with modernity would be 
better accommodated. Jalal Al-e Ahmad is a perfect example of such ideological 
transformation. However, before discussing him, we briefly mention of two identical 
secular critics of modernity: Ehsan Naraqi and Daryush Shayegan. 146 
14? Ervand Abrahamian, "Kasravi: The Integrative Nationalist of Iran" in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia 
Haim, eds., Towards a Modern Iran: Studies in Thought. Politics and Society. London, Frank Cass, 
1980, p. 112. 
144 Farzin Vahdat. God and Juggernaut: Iran's Intellectual Encounter with Modernity. Syracuse 
University Press, Syracuse. 2002, p. 87. 
145 For example. Bijan Jazani is a radical Marxist whose anti-capitalist and anti-Western ideas made 
him a very influential figure before the Islamic revolution. He was also one of the founders of "the 
Organisation of Iranian Peoples' 'Feday i Khaly'. In prison, he rejected the theory of survival and wrote 
an essay: the Armed Struggle: a Strategy as well as a Tactic". However, his radical and militaristic 
approach a guerrilla led us to exclude him from intellectual critics of modernity. 
146 Although Daryush Shayegan abandoned his critical attitudes towards modernity after the Islamic 
revolution. his pre-revolution contribution to critical discourse of modernity in Iran ought not to be 
omitted 
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Naraqi as a sociologist focused on the Western countercultural critique of modernity. 
His main argument circled around pursuing the return to the self. In his first book, 
Qurhat-i Qarb (the alienation of the West). Naraqi examined the West"s confession of 
its loss of authenticity as a confirmation that if Iran emulated the West blindly, it will 
arrive at the same point. '47 In his next book, he explored the feasibility of adapting 
and reproduction of certain element from the "native" culture. '48 He urged Iranians to 
understand more carefully the significance of Western countercultural movement as a 
warning that the same alienation between man and nature in the West can become the 
issue in Iran. He was anxious about the Western domination of nature as a paradoxical 
phenomenon, simply because" human is also part of nature and thus his domination 
over nature automatically dominates his subjectivity (freedom). 149 
Although Daryush Shayegan's thoughts and opinions changed considerably after the 
Islamic revolution, his critical observation towards modernity marked his prominent 
place within secular Iranian intellectuals. Vahdat differentiates between Shayegan and 
Al-e Ahmad and Naraqi in their criticising certain aspects of Iran's encounter with 
modernity. He believes that both Al-e Ahmad and Naraqi upheld the pillars of 
modernity. but this was not the case with Shayegan. '30 We can argue that before the 
Islamic revolution Shayegan was heavily influenced by Martin Heidegger, whereas. 
as Vahdat clarifies, after the revolution, he shifted his beliefs entirely. In short. 
Shayegan lamented the nihilism that modernity would bring about to a society 
through its destructive. violent and ubiquitous movement. Shayegan referred to 
Nietzsche as the first scholar who diagnosed the spreading essence of modernity in 
destroying spirit. 151 In recent years, Shayegan attempted to explain his inconsistency 
in intellectual theorising through an "intellectual dichotomy" and "cultural 
schizophrenia. " 52 
147 See Ehsan Naraqi. Qurhat-i Qarh [the alienation of the West]. Tehran. Amir Kabir. 1353 [19741. 
148 Ehsan Naraqi, Anchah Khud Dash! [what the self had], Tehran, Chav Publishing, 1380, p. 165. 
149 Ibid. p. 163. 
"" Vahdat. p. 123. 
15' See Daryush Shayegan, Asia Dar Burabr-i Qurh [Asia confronting the West]. Tehran. Baq-i Aivnah 
Publishing. 1992. 
152 Ali As-har Ha-hdar, Daryush Shai eg>an va Buhran-i Ma'navii"a! -i Sunnali [Daryush Shayegan and 
the Crisis of traditional spiritualism]. Tehran. Kavir Publishing. 1382 [2003]. p. 18. 
l3l 
Interestingly, Shayegan in his book "Qu'est-ce qu'une Revolution Religieuse? "" 
transcended from his nostalgic attitudes towards Iranian indigenous culture and argues 
that the Islamic revolution demonstrated how the "intermediary epistemology of 
tradition" can transform into an "ideology" which ultimately will be unleashed as 
"revolutionary sentiments and violence. -153Shayegan in his last publication Nigah-i 
Shikasiah (broken sight) praised concepts such as democracy, freedom and pluralism 
while recognising their Western epistemological origins. though ontologically 
universal. As hugely as the industrial revolution changed human's life and overcame 
the challenge of feeding millions of people, he argues that, modem concept of public 
awareness and participation (democracy) is the only way to preserve the local 
cultures. 154 In short, we can summarise Shayegan's critique of modernity as 
following: "the most painful consequences of modernity: the reduction of thought to 
calculation and of ethics to utilitarianism" the dismissal of the essential forms of 
spirituality as metaphysics, and the radical transformation of the world from "hearth" 
to "mechanism. ""' 55 
Al-e Ahmad is another critic of modernity who initially belonged to secular camp of 
critics, but gradually tended to boast and even promote Islamic notions. He was a 
former Marxist who admired the concept of social change by proposing an "Eastern 
Iranian identity" to protect Iranians from "erosive effects of Western cultural 
imperialism" and accentuated increasingly towards Islamic symbolism. i>r Vahdat 
delicately distinguishes Al-e Ahmad's significant reliance on religious sentiment and 
his sometimes harsh criticism of Western modernisation and imperialism. In this line. 
Mirsepassi concludes that despite his eventual religious affection. Al-e Ahmad's 
criticism of modernity belongs to authentic discourse. Therefore, since phenomenally 
and epistemologically the authentic discourse emanates from within modern 
discourse, we include him in this section. 
Perhaps. Al-e Ahmad's political and intellectual background and affiliation leads us to 
investigate his role in preparing the "shifting phase" from a popular secularistic 
criticism of modernity towards a popular un-secular (religious) criticism of 
is' Ibid, p. 19. cited from Darvush Shavegan. Ou'est-ce qu'une revolution religieuse' Paris. 1991 
1'4 Ibid. p. 21. 
155 Vahdat, p. 126. 
is` Vahdat, p. 1 14. 
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modernity-leading to the Islamic revolution. Al-e Ahmad's versatile relationship 
with the Tudeh Party and his disassociation was not only a personal issue, as many 
including Khalil Maleki. a well-known Tudeh Party member-were to disjoin the 
party aiming to establish a new party. 157 The main feature of Al-e Ahmad's 
intellectual elaboration was his book: garb_adagi (literally West-struckness) 
published in 1962. There have been various translations of this expression into 
English such as: Occidentosis, Westamania and Westoxication. However, considering 
what Al-e Ahmad meant by coining garb: adagi, it would be best translated as 
dysiplexia158 (a Greek neologism coined by Ahmad Fardid). 1'9 
Some have misinterpreted Al-e Ahmad by blaming him for the consequences of the 
Islamic revolution, for instance, Al-e Ahmad's praising of some anti-modem clergies 
like Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri. Thus, his intention by defining garb_adagi and its 
negative effect should not lead us to believe, firstly. that his criticism of modernity 
was merely based on religious sentiments, or secondly that he was anti-modern. The 
following definition given by Al-e Ahmad demonstrates his genuine attempt to 
appreciation of modernity provided its comprehensive embracement. not only 
utilising its instruments, without understanding its logic: 
The aggregate of symptoms afflicting the life, culture. 
civilisation, and mode of thought of a people having no 
tradition to function as a fulcrum, no continuity in history. no 
gradient of [inclusive] transformation, but having only what 
the machine brings them .... 
Thus gharb: adegi is the 
characteristic of a period of our history when we have not yet 
conquered the machine and do not understand the secrets of its 
logic and structure. 160 
157 Toilers' party (He: h-i Zahmat-kashan) in 1948. 
158 Ali Ghessari has explained Fardid's Greek coinage c(vsiplexia as combining from dysis which means 
"the West" and plexia which means " being struck by or afflicted with something, 
159 We will give a summary account on Fardid's role in shifting Iranian intellectualism from secular 
basis towards religious sentiments. 
1(10 Al-e Ahmad. yarh: adagi [Westoxication], Tehran, Ravaq Publishing. 1356 [1977], p. 34-35. 
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Understandably. Al-e Ahmad proposed and praised a new concept of rairshanfakri 161 
to fill the gap of "empty self' or better say "weakened self'. The bearers of this 
concept called ratirshanfakran, according to Al-e Ahmad can restore the lost 
authenticity and appreciation from society. Vahdat argues that, although rawvshanfakr 
in modern Persian is almost equivalent to "intellectual", rawshanfakri at least, as 
applied by Al-e Ahmad can be translated as "enlightenment". 162 According to Al-e 
Ahmad. freedom and free thinking constitute the substance of raw shanfakri. This 
belief puts him in sharp contrast with dogmatist religionists whom he excluded from 
being rawshanfakr, since they are obliged to follow the unchangeable norms of 
religion. 163 
Al-e Ahmad acknowledged that secular ideologies could not permeate into the Iranian 
society even since ancient time. He alluded to the failure of secular reformer Geumat, 
while stressing the success of Zoroaster in conveying his religious message. 164 He 
also praised the method of independent judgment (ijtihad) as a logical tool for 
deduction of secondary rules from the Koran and the Tradition. Mirsepassi argues 
that: "Al-e Ahmad's critique of the West (garb_adagi) is a complex and contradictory 
concept that cannot simply be reduced to an anti-Western polemic. " 165 At the same 
time. his latest affinity to Islamic principles does not imply his belonging to the 
religious camp criticising modernity. His wife. Simin Daneshvar. the famous writer. 
gives an interesting explanation of how Al-e Ahmad converted intellectually: 
If he turned to religion, it was the result of his wisdom and 
insight because he had previously experimented with 
Marxism, socialism and to some extent. existentialism. and his 
relative return to religion... was toward deliverance from the 
evil of imperialism and toward the preservation of national 
161 Although the term intellectual and intellectualism were being used for long in Iran, Al-e Ahmad 
introduced the term ralrshanfakri as the "authentic" equivalent of intellectualism in Persian. 
162 Vahdat, God and Juggernaut. p. 1 17. 
'c Ibid. p. 1 18. 
164 Al-e Ahmad. Dur Khadmat va Khiv anal-i Rawrshanfakran [On the service and treason of 
intellectuals], Tehran. Ravaq Publishing. 1359 [1980]. p. 156-158 
u6" Ali Mirsepassi. Intellectual Discourse and Politics of Modernisation. p. 101. 
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identity. a way toward human dignity, compassion. justice, 
reason, and virtue. Jalal had need of such a religion. I66 
Mirsepassi maintains that Al-e Ahmad's perception of modernity, secularism and 
religion underwent a number of changes. but remained fundamentally consistent. "" "'7 
In his early years of writing, Al-e Ahmad is more focused on the "ignorance" and 
"defencelessness" perpetuated by religion upon the common people. In the later 
period, while in latter period, he yearned for self realisation. authentic experiences 
and integrated identity. Although Al-e Ahmad in Oarb: adagi extended his critique of 
Iran's encounter with modernity by blaming the whole tradition of modern 
secularism. his critique remains within modern epistemological framework. 
Mirsepaasi relates Al-e Ahmad's criticism of modernity to German romanticism and 
argues that Al-e Ahmad's "garb_adagi discourse" was an answer to a yearning for an 
"authentic" (Islamic) identity. 168 
2.3.1.3. RELIGIOUS OR UN-SECULAR CRITICS OF MODER: 17ITF. I. E. 
ALI SHARI 'ATI. AfOTAIL4RI 
Dr. Ali Shari'ati (1933-1977) played a key role in remodelling Iran's socio-political 
attitudes by designing a radical intellectual at the same time completely religious 
ideology. He was exposed to many aspects of Western philosophical and political 
thought during his studies of sociology in France, as it is evident in his writings. 
Shari'ati endeavoured to explain and provide solutions for the dilemmas faced by the 
Muslim societies through resorting to and utilising traditional Islamic principles. 
Shari'ati was successful in penetrating into the deepest psychology of the Iranian 
society by combining a rhetoric of modern sociology with Shi'a sentiment. He was an 
enthusiast at experiencing many philosophical, theological and social schools of 
thought with an Islamic view. "One could say that he was a Muslim Muhajir who rose 
from the depth of the ocean of Eastern mysticism, ascended to the heights of the 
formidable mountains of Western social sciences, yet was not overwhelmed. and he 
returned to our midst with all the jewels of this fantastic voyage. "" 169 
166 Al-e Ahmad, Iranian Society: an Antholokn- of Writings, compiled and edited by Michael C. 
Hillmann. Lexington, Mazada Publishing. 1982. preface. 
16' Mirsepassi. Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernisation, p. 101. ux Ibid. p. 105. 
Quoted from Shari'ati's Biographic website: <www. Shari'ati. com> 
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Shari'ati's advocate believe that he was neither a reactionary fanatic who opposed 
anything that was new without any knowledge nor was he of the so-called 
westernized intellectuals who imitated the west without devote independent 
judgment 170. He was a true believer in preaching the youth as the only element of the 
society who can overturn the deteriorating condition of Iranian society. His 
determination to enlighten and also encourage the masses, in particular the youth. 
spread seeds of radicalised activity that was conducive for making the populace 
rebellious and ready for revolution. 171 Shari'ati considerably developed a strong 
aspiration to create a society based on "humanitarian and communal values" in the 
young generation who were anxiously feeling a deep rupture between Westernised 
modernisation and their deteriorating identity. He vigorously employed the re- 
introduction of the Koran and Islamic history to the youth as the path for finding their 
"true selves". Shari'ati wrote many books and conducted many lectures in which he 
tried to present a dynamic and progressive interpretation of Islam as the only way 
towards a successful social change. 172 
Some scholars see Shari'ati's ideology as the continuing of Al-e Ahmad's critique of 
the secular political culture of that time for ignoring the significance role of Islam in 
Iranian culture. The nuanced difference between Al-e Ahmad and Shari'ati. however. 
lies in the additional emphasis Shari"ati put on constructing and popularising a 
"modern Shia ideology as a more authentically grounded alternative to the existing 
secular ideologies", 173 whereas Al-e Ahmad concentrated more on the critique of 
Western modernisation and secularism in Iranian culture and politics. In a more 
radical view, some argue that: "It was a mistake that Iranian intellectuals fell for 
Shari'ati's version of Islamism in 1970's. and dropped secular liberalism and 
democracy under the anti-Western slogans. which brought nothing but reactionary 
backwardness for Iran. "74 For his critics. Shari'ati is a chief ideologue and theorist of 
10 Ibid. 
171 For many years prior and after the Islamic revolution. Shari'ati was officially declared as the mentor 
and main ideologue of Sa_man-i Mujahidin-i Khalq (People's Fighters Organisation). 
172 Up to 28 titles of book: 1- Hajj (The Pilgrimage), 2- Where Shall We Begin, 3- Mission of a Free 
Thinker, 4- The Free Man and Freedom of the Man, 5- Extraction and Refinement of Cultural 
Resource, 6- Martyrdom, 7-/mum All, etc. n' Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernisation, p. 114. 
"' Sam Qandchi is a sympathiser of MKO and has written extensively on criticising Islamist thinkers 
mainly in his website: <www. ghandchi. com. com! 23-Shari*ati-Al-e Ahmad html? 
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the Islamic revolution whose exegeses from Shi'ism and Islam only mobilised the 
masses to replace a monarchy with theocracy. 
In sharp contrast, some found Shari'ati liberal compared to Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Monique Girgis argues that: "basic to Shari"ati's writings was the concept of human 
will, as opposed to the more commonly held idea of predestination. '" 175 Accordingly. 
Shari'ati viewed the Koran as a source of religiosity to be comprehended by each 
generation as time changed. Shari'ati frequently condemned reactionary segments 
introduced and promoted by the majority of clergy as Islam. 176 It is even believed that 
due to Shari'ati's anti-clerical sentiments, the Pahlavi regime ironically eased the 
initial pressure on him hoping his critical debate against the clergy would disenchant 
the public of the ulama. 177 However, Shari'ati in his infamous book. Tashau' Surkh 
dar barabar Tashau' Siyah (Red Shi"ism vis-ä-vis Black Shi"ism) portrays an 
interpretation of Shi'ism which boasts emancipation against dictatorship: 
We can see that for over eight centuries (until the Safavid era), 
Alavite Shi'ism had been more than just a revolutionary 
movement in history which opposed all the autocratic and 
class-conscious regimes of the Omayyid and Abbasid 
caliphates and the kingships of the Ghaznavids. the Seljuks. 
the Mongols, the Timurds and the two Khanids. who had 
made the government version of the Sunni school their official 
religion, and it waged a secret struggle of ideas and action like 
a revolutionary party, Shi'ism had a well-organised, informed, 
deep-rooted and well-defined ideology, with clear-cut and 
definite slogans and disciplined and well-groomed 
organisation. It led the deprived and oppressed masses in their 
movements for freedom and for seeking justice. It is 
considered to have been rallying-point for the demands. 
distress and rebellions of the intellectuals seeking to gain their 
1, ,5 Monique Girgis, cited in <www. iranchamber. com/podium/societ-, 'Shari'ati. htm> (2 Feb 2007) 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
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right, and for the masses in search of justice. 178 (Emphasis 
added) 
Shari'ati attempted to make a connection between the ruthless, dictatorial and 
oppressing features of the governments of time and their Sunni branch of Islam, not of 
course to blame Sunnism for all these atrocities, but for singling out its silent and 
inactive mechanism of subordination towards the status quo. In fact, what Shari'ati 
tries to articulate from Shi'ism is a manifestation "against the harsh prejudices and the 
soulless, petrifying censorship of the theological and legal system attached to the 
ruling group. "'79 The core of Shari'ati's discourse can be extracted in a trilogy of 
"liberty, equality, and spirituality" equivalent in Persian to concepts of A_adi. 
Barahari, and Ma'naviyat. Of course. his objective in praising "liberty" would be 
without the implementation of capitalism, by the same token, "equality- and social 
justice without materialism and totalitarianism, and "spirituality" and religion without 
clerical institution and charismatic ideologues such as Shari'ati himself. ' 8) 
Mahdavi argues that one of the continuing objectives of Shari'ati's writings was the 
critique of systems of power, referred to in his text as Istibdad (despotism). Isti 'mar 
(material exploitation and injustice) and Isti 'mar (religious manipulation and 
alienation-cultural hegemony in the Gramchian sense). '8' It is not hidden that 
Shari'ati was concerned about clerical monopoly of power through resorting to 
specific interpretations of Islam conducive for engendering Lstihdad-i Rawhani 
(clerical despotism). He stipulates that it would be the worst and the most oppressive 
form of despotism possible in human history'. 182 Indeed, it is argued that because of 
the fear of materialising such possibility. Shari'ati called for an Islamic Renaissance 
and Reformation". 1s' Mahdavi believes that this task taken by Shari'ati was certainly 
deemed too difficult to be accomplished. understandably because of the centuries of 
clerical supremacy based on their conventional interpretation of Islam. 
178 Ali Shari'ati. Tashau ' Surkh dar Barabar Tashu' Sh ah cited in 
<www. iranchamber. com/personalities, 'aShari'ati/works, red_black_shiism. php> (Feb I st. 2007). 
179 Ibid. 
180 Mujtaba Mahdavi, `Islamic Forces of the Iranian revolution: A Critique of Cultural Essentialism', in 
Iran Analysis Quarterly. vol. 2. no?, Fall 2004, published by Iranian Studies Group at MIT. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Shari'ati, Majmu'-i Asar-i Dr. A/i Shari'ati [collective works of Dr. Ali Shari'ati]. Vol 20. Tehran. 
1360 [1981]. 
18; Ervand Abrahamian. Radical Islam: the Iranian Mujahidin. London. Tauris. 1989. p. 1 19. 
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Shari'ati, however, according to Abrahamian failed to answer the potential problems 
for his idealised-progressive-Shi'ism. The unanswered challenges are: "If Shi'ism was 
a revolutionary ideology, why was it surrendered to the iron law of clerical or political 
establishments? If revolutionary ideologies were capable of changing the 
infrastructure. why then had Shi'ism failed? And. if it had failed in the past how could 
one be sure that it would not fail again in the future? " 184 However, despite the 
unresolved but critical questions, Shari'ati's main aim was not to establish a political 
system through a political revolution. What he desired. according to his words, was 
raising public consciences through a radical transformation of the social order. Of 
course, he went further and tried to pinpoint "where is Iran in the historical process? " 
by employing a Marxist discourse. He argued that Iran is neither in the twentieth 
century, nor in the process of an industrial revolution. To him, the society still lives 
"in the age of the late feudal era, just on the eve of the Renaissance. " 8 
To this end, Shari'ati referred to the intelligentsia (raº, 'shanfakran) as the bearer and 
the active participants of such development. Shari'ati stressed that if the intelligentsia 
do their main task which is initiating and pursuing "renaissance and reformation", the 
"critical conscious of the public" would be raised, which is the prerequisite for any 
change. All the intelligentsia have to do is to raise public conciseness: people will do 
the rest. 186 It is also noticeable that Shari'ati took a more reconciling approach with 
concepts such democracy in his last writings unlike the earlier ones i. e. Umma va 
Imama (believer masses and the leadership). For instance, in ha_gashl (return) he 
repeatedly clarifies that the role of intellectuals or elites is not to instruct or provide 
revolutionary leadership, but merely to enlighten and educate a sense of self- 
consciousness. Shari'ati even referred to Rousseau by quoting him as saying: 
"intelligentsia is not to make plans for people. Political leadership is not the task of 
the vanguard. It is not for us to create a plan for all the future. what we have to do is 
the critical analysis of all that exists. "' 87 
Overall, Shari'ati should be seen as a theorist who introduced a mix of authenticity 
discourse and revolutionary ideology. By doing so, he managed to bridge the inner 
184 Ibid. p. 123-124. 
185 Mujtaba Mahdavi, ibid. 
186 Ali Shari'ati. Majmu'-i Asar [collective works]. vol. 4. Tehran. 1359 [1980]. 
187 Ibid. 
139 
contradictions for a generation of Iranian Muslim youth to play greater role in their 
thinking and acting simultaneously. It is also important to know that Shari'ati's 
"project in fact, amounted less to a categorical split between "Western ideology" and 
-Shia Islam" and more to a dialogue between the two, creating a modern 
revolutionary ideology for the Iranian context. " 188 Thus, for better understanding of 
Shari'ati's status in the shaping of Iran's contemporary socio-political movements, his 
achievement should be understood in the context of reconciling the experience of 
modernisation with Iran's indigenous culture. He desired to introduce a dynamic 
interpretation of Islam which is not only capable of surviving but also of 
triumphing. 189 
From the psychological point of view, in addition to many other socio-political and 
economic parameters. a large portion of Iranian society including low, working and 
middle class plus university students from all social strata. both in urban and rural 
areas. became greatly disappointed by the Pahlavi regime. No doubt, Shari'ati's 
writings and speeches had profoundly provoked the mainstream of the middle class, 
in particular university students, to better articulate their demand for change. The 
general theme within the society was a thirst for change, but not any change. In other 
words. as explained throughout this chapter, the Iranian society had been experiencing 
modernisation, in both Western-style democratic method from 1906-1924 and from 
1941-1953, and Western-style authoritarian method from 1924-1941 and 1953-1978. 
The failure and oppression of the Pahlavi regime which was manifested in a Western- 
secular style of modernisation paved the ground, this time, not only for a paradigmic 
shift, but also for an institutional change. 
Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari (1920-1979) is a crucial figure who theorised in more 
detail and also in a more presentable manner what Ayatollah Khomeini 190 had 
announced under the title of hukumal-i Islami (the Islamic government). If we 
included Mutahhari in the religious or un-secular intellectual category. it does not 
necessarily mean that we are reluctant to use the conventional criteria of 
'x" Mirespassi, Intellectual Discourse and the politics gj'Modei"nisution. p. 116. 
'"`' Ibid. 
'`9" We will elaborate on Ayatollah Khomeini's political and theological ideas in the next chapter. 
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intellectualism. Since for many19' the adjective of intellectual cannot be given to a 
clergyman who chiefly designed and justified the structure of a religious state, for us, 
his ability to reform many dogmatic and undemocratic elements of scholastic Islam is 
more important and merits his inclusion. It is true that for a secular intellectual or for 
an ordinary citizen Mutahhari has not any particular quality to be known as an 
intellectual, but considering it from the ossified and concrete frameworks of the 
official Islam presented in seminaries, he deserves to be seen as such. 
He produced 22 books, several articles and also various tape cassettes. For many 
Iranian Muslims, Mutahhari was one of the most versatile Islamic scholars and 
prolific writers of recent times, deeply rooted in traditional learning and enamoured of 
its exponents. 192 He studied fiqh (religious jurisprudence) and usul (principles of 
religious) which are the core subjects of the traditional Islamic curriculum. However. 
unlike many clergymen, he did not confine himself to theological training and showed 
a great deal of interest in reading and learning philosophy, both Islamic and non- 
Islamic. including Marxism. He even enrolled to study rational sciences at the 
University of Tehran. Mutahhari noted that in addition to the supremacy of the 
Western technological achievements, it is now the ontological basis of Iranian society 
which came under severe pressure to abandon its Islamic characteristic. 
Hamid Algar in his introduction to Fundamentals to Islamic Thought-written by 
Mutahhari, describes Mutahhari's elaborations on Marxism as a rigorously logical 
attempt to demonstrate the contradictory and arbitrarily hypothetic nature of key 
principles of Marxism. Algar goes further. saying that Mutahhari's polemical writings 
are characterised more by intellectual than rhetorical and traditional force. '9' 
However, we need to bear in mind that although Mutahhari's view of Islam was 
philosophical, it does not mean that he tended to undermine the authenticity of 
revealed dogma by philosophical interpretation. In other words. in ontological terms 
he was as a faithful believer in the righteousness of Islamic revelation. but in 
epistemological terms, his method differed considerably from the mainstream of 
191 In none of works the writer used for this thesis written by academics. Mutahhari is referred to as 
intellectual. 
192 <www. iranchamber. com/personalities/motahari/morteza motahari. php> (3 Feb 2007). 
19' Murtaza Mutahhari. Fundamentals of Islamic Thought: Cod, Man and he Universe. trans. R. 
Campbell. intro by Hamid Apgar 
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clerical thought. For Mutahhari, attainment of knowledge and understanding was the 
prime goal and benefit of religion. To this end, in his deliberations he assigned to 
philosophy a certain primacy among the disciplines cultivated within Islamic 
scholarship. 194 
To grasp an understanding on Mutahhari's attitudes towards Islam and politics we can 
mainly refer to his three books: 1- Imamat va rahbari (guiding and leadership), 2- 
Ijtihad dar Islam (jurisprudential judgement) and 3-Alushkilat-i Asasi dar Sa_man-i 
Rani'haniyat (fundamental problems of clerical's authority-hierarchy). Even the titles 
of these books reveal the essential contribution made by Mutahhari to Islamic 
discourse and its interaction with the realities of modern life. When the possibility of 
an Islamic government in Iran emerged in 1978, Mutahhari started describing his 
jurisprudential views on the future Islamic political system. He stressed that the next 
political regime which was supposed to be replaced with the Pahlavis will not be only 
a "Republic", but an "Islamic Republic In other words, what Mutahhari meant by 
this. in short, was that both the content and the form ought to be Islamic. Some are not 
in favour of excluding Mutahhari as a religious intellectual because of his firm stance 
on the "rule of jurisprudence" according to the Shi'a school of thought. 195 
He bluntly made it clear that being Islamic means that this government will be run 
according to the Islamic principles and regulations (usul). However, to answer the 
critics who could easily challenge such a regime as authoritarian and oppressive. 
Mutahhari, ironically, tried to justify the establishment of an Islamic state based on a 
secular and democratic rationale. He resorted to the collective will of majority 
Muslim citizens and argued that if the majority want to have an Islamic state and vote 
for it. then is it against democracy? He asked. shouldn't it be more questionable and 
unacceptable if the people were deprived to exercise such a right? So. if the opponents 
of the Islamic state reject it as undemocratic. Mutahhari argued. they need to 
reconsider their one-way understanding and recognise the right of majority to choose 
their own religion as the essence of governance. '96 
"Ä Ibid. p. 12. 
195 See Ziba Mir-Husseini and Richard Tapper, Islam und Democracy in Iran: Eshkevuri und the Quest 
for Reform. London. I. B. Tauris. 2006. p. 64. 
""' See, Imamt va Ummat (Imamate and Believers) and Alahahis-i dar Ingalah-i Islami (the issues on 
the Islamic revolution). 
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For Mutahhari there is no clear-cut division between political issues and spiritual 
ones, as Islam is a lifestyle of mankind which includes everything relating to both the 
outward (zahari) and the spiritual (»na'navi) dimensions. Islam, Mutahhari argues. is 
not merely a teacher or philosopher of ethics who leaves some books or students to 
society. Islam is not only an ethical and cultural school but is also a socio-political 
system with completely new regulations for people. Islam creates a new method of 
speculation and new social organization. Islam keeps spirit within matter, the invisible 
within the visible, the afterlife within this life and the kernel (maq: ) within the skin 
(puss) (of a seed). In short, what he wanted to portray of Islam was an omnipotent 
religion which either offers an answer to everything, or potentially is capable of 
producing answer for any matter or issue. 
197 
This view vigorously attempted to refer and resort to philosophical arguments in a 
thoroughly logical and cogent fashion. It was in order to demonstrate that religious 
principles and traditions already contained those rational premises, therefore, such 
principles are not only religiously obligatory, but also rationally structured. '98 Not 
surprisingly, such religious zeal turned into a radical notion and became a political 
fashion in early years of the Islamic revolution as to replace "Western produced 
knowledge and even science'" with "Islamic ones". To be precise, the Islamisation 
movement in all aspects (social, economic and political), became the main agenda of 
new revolutionary elements which can be attributed as a radical multiplication of 
authentic discourse in the aftermath of a revolution. 199 Mutahhari was also appointed 
as the head of "Revolutionary Council" by Ayatollah Khomeini to ensure the 
implementation of Islamic principles with the emerging institutions and also to 
oversee the process of drafting the Constitution. 
In the following section. we address the other ramification of religious or un-secular 
intellectualism which advocates modernity and democracy. This trend emerged after a 
relatively strong experience of criticism against modernity (1970s and 1980s). 
º"' Taken from three abovementioned books written by Mutahhari. 
199< www. iranian. com/BTW/I999/May/Soroush'indexI. htmI> (5 Feb 2007) 
º" For example. the infamous phrase: iyiusud mu! -i khar ast [the economy is for donkey] quoted in 
Guardian. January 30,2007, in Only the US Hawks Can Save the Iranian President Now' by All 
Ansari. 
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although it takes on board many elements of modernity and democracy in the 
constitution of the Islamic Republic. In so doing. we trace again the dialectical nature 
of the modernity discourse in Iran. This ongoing process of evolution aims to rectify 
the "conceptual level" or, in other words. nurture a more universal narrative and 
application of modernity alongside preserving and respecting indigenous and 
authentic elements and notions, although they are traditional. 
?. 5.1.4. RELIGIOUS OR UN-SECULAR ADVOCATES OF MODERNITY: 
RELIGIOUS INTELLECTUALIS, 11 I. E. SOROUSI1"10 
It was accepted as a norm for most of the twentieth century that intellectualism and 
intellectuals could not be associated with being religious. For the majority of 
intellectuals their association with religion was discrediting and shameful. All they 
had to boast was belonging to the secular ideological universe of either the West or 
East. Jahanbakhsh argues that even as late as the mid-1960s. when someone like Al-e 
Ahmad began to voice their self-criticism within intellectual circles, religion and 
intellectualism were still deemed mutually exclusive. 201 As mentioned previously, 
Shari'ati seriously challenged such assumptions and altered the existing definition of 
the intellectual, primarily in terms of using religious sentiments and ideals as 
incentives for mobilising masses aimed at social change. The triumph of the Islamic 
revolution proved that "a new breed of intellectualism had been born and come to 
stay. "`'0` A quintessential figure to represent this branch is Abdul Karim Soroush. 
Soroush was born in 1945 in Tehran and studied both analytical chemistry and 
philosophy of science. After the Islamic revolution he published his first book: 
Danish va Ar. ish (knowledge and value). 203 For the first years after the revolution, he 
performed as a member of the Council for Cultural Revolution whose primary task 
was to purify and restructure the universities staff and syllabi. The membership of the 
2'" Due to limited space, only Soroush is included in this section, while the ideas and thoughts of 
Mohsen Kadivar and Mujtahid Shabestari have been discussed through the first part of chapter. 
201 Forough Jahanbakhsh, The Emergence and Development of Religious Intellectualism in Iran'. ibid. 
2('2 Ibid. 
'"' The theme and content of the book is aliened with the revolutionary fervour and cannot be seen as 
an intellectual work, but otherwise. 
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Council was appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini. In his personal website we read: He 
submitted his resignation from membership in the Cultural Revolution Council to 
Imam Khomeini and has since held no official position within the ruling system of 
"204 Iran, except occasionally as an advisor to certain government bodies. 
From early 1990s Soroush gradually expanded his criticism against the clerical ruling 
class and also confounded a monthly magazine. Kiyan. It was via Kiyan that he could 
publish and spread his controversial articles on religious pluralism, hermeneutics. 
tolerance. clericalism, etc. In short, we can summarise that Soroush attempted to 
reconcile Islam and modernity by creating a worldview that is compatible with 
both 
... 
205 Forough Jahanbakhsh argues that well before the landslide election of 1997 
and the official entrance of Islamic reformists into political sphere. a steadily 
emerging new trend of religious intellectualism challenged the previously 
untouchable doctrine of the Islamic republic, manifested as the ideological 
understanding of Islam . 
206 She traces the roots of religious intellectualism since the 
mid 1980s to the fact that "educated religious individuals outside the political power 
structure started debating issues such as rationalism, pluralism, tolerance versus 
violence, rejection of non-critical and blind emulation of the fugaha, critical analysis 
of the ideologization of religion. rights versus duties, and reconciling religion and 
democracy Henceforth, Soroush and his likeminded were called Islamist 
reformists. The dilemma, however, remained as to recognise the concrete standpoints 
of such thinkers. For example. Filali-Ansari argues that: 
[M]any controversies surrounding Islamic thought focus so 
heavily on semantics, on names for ideas and persons that the 
real issues often disappear from sight. [Thus]. many thinkers 
who are called or who call themselves "Islamists" make such 
large concessions to the power of unaided human reason that 
one may wonder what is left to render their thought Islamic. 
On the other hand, many secularists. especially nationalists. 
204 <www. drsoroush. com/Biography-E. htm> (Feb 6 2007) 
205 Cited by Abdo Filali-Ansari from Robin Wright, 'Islam and Liberal Democracy: the Challenge of 
Secularisation' in Journal of Democracy. vol. 7, no 2,1996. p. 76-80. 
206 Forough Jahanbakhsh. 'Religious and Political Discourse in Iran: Moving Toward Post- 
Fundamentalism' in Broiu"n Journal of World Affair, Winter/Spring 2003. vol. IX, not. 
207 Ibid. V- 
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pay such reverence to Islamic dogmas that one may wonder if 
reason has any role left to play in their thought. The whole 
confrontation sometimes seems like so much posturing, where 
the real choices are never clarified or faced . `'08 
For Soroush. the main problematic issue remains within Muslims themselves, or 
rather within a complex of traditions that has long barred Muslims from the free 
implementation of reason and from direct contact with the sources of their faith. He 
acknowledged an urgent task of freeing Muslims from Islam understood as a social 
and historical heritage, as a set of overwhelming external conventions defining views 
and behaviour. 209 The general theme of Soroush, works tends to put emphasis on the 
inward characteristic of Islam. He argues further that this turn toward Islam 
understood as an "open religion" represents not a radical innovation, but rather a 
return to the original essence of the faith in its purity. For him, the basic reality and 
objective is the person, the individual believer. L10 Filali-Ansari concludes that Soroush 
has attempted to present an Islam which one is free to adhere to and full of piety 
mostly based on this free adherence. The Islam which is perceived and practiced on 
personal commitment rather than custom, habit and conformism. Thus, Soroush can 
be seen as a modern humanist and true reformer. 211 
The most controversial theory articulated by Soroush was the "contraction and 
Expansion of religious knowledge". This theory targeted a very sensitive yet 
fundamental aspect of the prevalent religious understanding-its epistemic 
foundations. It argues that any understanding of religion is bound to be temporal and 
subject to change. For many observers this theory meant that "no understanding of 
religion is ever sacred, absolute or final and laid the foundation of an epistemological 
pluralism that is the basis of any democratic pluralism. "212 Such a theoretical 
breakthrough constructed within religious discourse ensued far-reaching 
consequences in both intellectual and political milieux. In short, the possible 
2R 
Abdo Falili-Ansari. ibid. 
20`) 
Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Jahanbakhsh. Forough 'Religious and Political Discourse in Iran: Moving Toward Post- 
Fundamentalism' in The Brown Journal of World Affair, vol. IX, no?. 
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multiplicity of readings of religion, then taboo, had dramatic implications for the 
configuration of an Islamic regime with republican structure. We will address the 
political development which chiefly emanated from this breakthrough of religious 
intellectualism in the final chapter. 
2.6. CONCLUSION: 
It has been a general perception and also a constant intellectual preoccupation to find 
out whether Islam and modernity can be accommodated in terms of socio-political 
implementations. of course, without much elaboration on what really can "constitute 
Islam" and what is the "late application" of modernity The ramifications of such a 
critical enquiry have spread into various fields of scientific and intellectual researches 
and observations. As discussed extensively in the previous chapter, we can divide our 
mode of inquiry into two methodological and theoretical categorisations. 
Methodologically, the challenge in studying the impasses in Muslim countries in 
particular. and other developing countries in general, has been whether one should 
take into account both the objectivity and the subjectivity of the issues, or merely 
adhere to the scientific discourse of considering measurable objectives and chiefly 
disregarding beliefs and attitudes. In other words, we are faced with two distinct 
methodological premises. one based on classical positivism and the other seeing 
subjective elements such as political culture and religion as being decisive upon the 
formation of political structure and ultimately decision-making outcomes. 
To this end, the first half of the present chapter was allocated to study Shi'ism and the 
trajectory of what we can call "Political Shi'a based on Shi'a interpretation of Islam" 
which is manifested in the concept and position of irilayai al-fagih (jurisprudent rule). 
We could not simply ignore the gravity and influence generated and inserted by Shi'a 
thought throughout the history of Iranian society in all social. economic and political 
realms. although due to limited space. we could only present an account of its political 
dimension. We tried to distinguish between spiritual Islam and its jurisprudential 
identity and apparatus. Throughout this chapter. we extended our knowledge about 
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different interpretations within Shi'ism. Our emphasis on intra-disciplinary study and 
argument within Shiism aimed at resolving the current impasse of radicalised 
Shi'ism from the within, by showing the multi-faceted and emancipatory nature of 
Islam. The bitter experience of secular and anti-religious intellectualism of the early 
twentieth century proved not only unsuccessful, but catastrophic. We even had to 
allude to early the years of Islam to trace back the evolutionary development of Shi'a 
political thought. 
The second part of this chapter was concluded by revealing the dialectical nature of 
socio-political discourses envisaged and proclaimed by "movers and shakers". 
213 By 
analysing each intellectual paradigm. we recognised the corresponding relation 
between each prevailing discourse and the resulting political system. The 
constitutionalism came about after an encounter with modernity and a struggle to 
establish a minimum rule of law, justice and acquisition of knowledge lasting almost 
40 years. . 
The Pahlavi regime emerged after more than 30 years of continued failure 
under the Qajars. The characteristics of the Qajar regime included a deterioration of 
national integrity and welfare, weak government and lack of order ensured by a strong 
secular tendency which embraced the dominative pattern of modernity, but was 
critical or ignorant of the liberating pattern of modernity. Then, it was the autocratic 
and Westernised Pahlavi regime that created the possibility of the emergence of an 
authentic Islamic discourse. And then, with the Islamic Revolution in 1979. the 
Islamic discourse had the chance to embody itself within the framework of the Islamic 
Republic with a hybrid identity. 
The religious criticism of modernity could win the hearts and minds of Iranians 
mainly due to two parameters: 1- sociologically it was based on authentic theory. 2- 
Shi'ism, despite its long reluctance to interfere in politics and because of the 
development which had begun since the Safavids, stepped in directly and took over 
the modern phenomenon of critique of modernity and established the Islamic republic. 
Institutionally, the new regime is based on democratic (modern) pillars, such as a 
written constitution, separation of powers, and direct elections. However, at the same 
time, traditional elements derived out of a particular interpretation of Shi'ism 
, I' By movers and shakers, we mean a range of intellectuals, politicians and even clergymen, whose 
thoughts and efforts made a difference. 
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constitute the criteria upon which the whole system stands for. It is essential for us to 
scrutinise the materialised phenomenon of Islamic discourse of the Islamic Republic. 
In the next chapter, we attempt to shed light at the structural dimension of the Islamic 
Republic by analysing its interwoven nature, as having a religiously derived character. 
but pragmatist policies. In short, we look for the implementation of religious ideals 
and through modem democratisation and also undemocratic institution. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 
CONSTITUTION AND PARLIAMENT 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The mass revolt of 1979 in Iran surprised almost all observers, from journalists 
and diplomats to political theorists. From its beginning, it attracted very strong 
international attention and therefore many works have set out to analyse such an 
unexpected revolution. However, despite the sizeable portion of literature 
devoted to the causes and nature of the Iranian revolution in 1979, many issues 
remain un-clarified and unresolved. ' In other words, for many an inclusive 
theoretical framework within which we could describe the Islamic Revolution 
has yet to be achieved. It is also argued that the Islamic Revolution with its 
unique characterisation has caused a disruption in the political theory of 
revolutions. '' Nonetheless, the classical theories relating to social revolutions 
always provide substantial ground for further investigations, two viable 
examples being Marxism and structuralism. 
To explain socio-political revolts, Marxism insists on an analysis of classes. their 
coalitions and conflicts, while structuralism looks for the units of a society and 
the rules governing them. Since the 1960s. a trend in social science based on 
scientific discourse introduced "structural functionalism". This approach looks 
for disequilibrium in the relationships between the economic, political and 
cultural subsystems of society. 3 For example. James C. Davies examined 
"frustrated expectations" and "relative deprivation" as sources of revolt. 
Subsequently. some have applied Davies's `J-Curve' theory to explain the 
' For example: 1- The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, (ed), Nikki Keddie and Eric 
Hoglund, 1986.2: The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, (ed) John L. Sposito, 1990.3: Economic 
Origins (? Ithe Iranian revolution, Robert L. Looney. 1982. etc. 
2 That is why the most prominent scholars on Iranian politics like Homa Katouzian. Fred Hallida\ and 
John Foran introduced a new model designed for explaining the Islamic Revolution. instead of 
rendering other theories to explain it. 
See Social Structure and A4ohility in Economic Development, (ed) Neil Smelser, and Se\ rnour Martin 
Lipset. London. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1966. 
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Islamic Revolution. This theory states that a period of increasing prosperity 
followed by a sudden economic decline can lead to a social revolt. 
5 This is a 
direct reference to Iran's oil boom after 1974. However, John Foran agues 
differently: 
It is doubtful that a single factor theory can explain the 
outbreak and most of these models suffer from reducing 
collective action to psychological states that are hard to observe 
or measure. They are also cast at a very high level of 
abstraction that make it hard to see why revolutions are so rare, 
given that discontent presumably always exists among some 
sector of a population. `' 
On the other hand. the positive side of Davies's approach has been to take 
seriously participants' beliefs and sentiments, which was not the case with either 
structuralism or Marxism. Even behaviouralism proved not very applicable, in 
particular for religious societies, simply because its core foundation is based on 
rational choice theory that again is derived from a materialistic perspective. 
Therefore, it is not applicable to strongly religious societies. The absence of a 
peasant component in the Islamic Revolutionary coalition affected the arguments 
of structuralists like Barrington Moore. Eric Wolf. Jeffery Piage and Theda 
Skocpol. 7 As a result, the importance of culture and ideology, either religious or 
secular took the lead and gained substantial weight. In addition. the uniqueness 
of the Islamic Revolution posed a question for social theorists in the early 1980s. 
whether or not the Islamic Revolution should be considered as a uniquely non- 
standard case of revolution, or whether the causality of social revolutions (linear 
progress theory) should be re-examined in the light of the evidence from Iran8 
° Nikki R. Keddie. 'Iranian Revolution in Comparative perspective' in American Historical Review, 
no. 88, June 1983. p. 589. 
5 See When Men Revolt and Wh v: a Reader in Political iViolence and Revolution. (ed) James. C. 
Davies, London. Collier McMillan. 1971. 
'A Century of Revolution. Social Movements in hran. (ed) John Foran. University of Minnesota, 1994, 
p. 161. 
Ibid. 
8 Ibid. p. 162. 
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Foran argues that a survey on the literature written on the Islamic Revolution 
reveals the necessity of further developments within conventional social theory. 
In sum, he puts forward four explanations of the occurrence of revolutions: 1- 
the cultural significance of the revolution. 2- political economy and structural 
disequilibrium. 3-politics-oriented resource mobilisation approaches, and 4- 
conjunctural. multi-causal analyses. The first view is the official interpretation of 
the post-revolutionary regime as it has also been stated in the preamble of the 
Constitution. 9 Hamid Algar advocates such an opinion and says: the Islamic 
Revolution has been, among other things, an implicit repudiation of Marxism as 
a revolutionary ideology and as a doctrine relevant to the problems of the Iranian 
society or valid for humanity at large. "10 This factor also finds its believers in 
secular and post-orientalist sociological theorists like Theda Skocpol. She states: 
"This remarkable revolution forces me to deepen my understanding of the 
possible role of idea systems and cultural understandings in the shaping of social 
action. "' 
Alternatively, the theorists who oppose a cultural approach reinstate the setting 
of political economy and its rational causality in social revolts to explain the 
Islamic Revolution. M. H. Pesaran for example argues: 
Contrary to what might appear at first. the February Revolution 
came about not because of a sudden and dramatic Islamic 
resurgence, but largely as a result of socio-economic conditions 
and ever-rising inequalities as well as political suppression by 
the old regime that became intolerable as soon as the masses 
realised it was possible to avoid them. '2 
"The causes of the revolution were not economic: rather. the Shah was overthrown for not adhering to 
Islam. Inserted to the preamble of the Constitution by Ayatollah Beheshti. 
Hamid Algar. in Preface of Ali Shari'ati, "Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic 
Critique", Berkley. R. Campbell, 1980. p. 12. 
Theda Skocpol. 'Rentier State and Shia Islam in the Iranian Revolution' in Social Revolutions and 
the Modern World. Cambridge University press. 1994. p. 268. 
12 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions. p. 23. 
l52' 
Slightly differently, Ervand Abrahamian maintains the structural disequilibrium 
between the economic and political development in Pahlavi's period as the main 
cause of the Islamic revolution. He states: 
The failure of the Pahlavi regime to make political 
modifications appropriate to the changes taking place in the 
economy and society inevitably strained the links between the 
social structure and the political structure, blocked the 
challenging social grievances into the political system, widened 
the gap between new social forces and the ruling circles, and. 
most serious of all. cut down the few bridges that had in the 
past connected traditional social forces, especially the bazaars. 
with the political establishment. 13 
In contrast to previous approaches. another useful trend to explain the Islamic 
Revolution has focused on political dynamics. Misagh Parsa employs "resource 
mobilisation theory"' to describe the emergence of a revolutionary coalition 
based on class and group interests, communication networks. organisations. 
resources, and leadership. 14 This theory provides an inclusive ground when 
taking into account almost all the elements involved in making the revolution 
such as bazaaris, the working class, the clergy and intellectuals. John Foran 
praises this theory by saying: "resource mobilisation theory is at its best in 
studying the dynamics of social movements. rather than as a theory of the causes 
of revolution per se. either on the macro-structural level of development or on 
the cultural-ideological motivational level of the actors themselves. '"1' 
To be more precise in the case of the Islamic Revolution. Val Moghadam 
introduces a "populist" approach. Her theory emphasises both cultural and 
political factors at the same time. however. giving more attention to the political 
behaviour of a society based on its economic interests rather than political 
1' Ervand Abrahamian. 'Structural Causes ofthe Iranian Revolution' in MERIP (Middle East Research 
and Information Project). May 1980. p. 21. 
14 Misagh Parsa. The Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, New Brunswick, Rutgers University 
press. 1989. 
15 John Foran.. 4 Century of Revolution, p. 164. 
15' 
culture and beliefs. She argues that "although the February Revolution emerged 
as a complete Islamisation outcome, it must be seen as a populist, rather than an 
Islamic upheaval. The reason lies within broad-based coalitions of a populist 
movement (multi-class) which have the best potential to succeed, although 
tending to disintegrate after succession. "16 It occurred in the post revolutionary 
era in Iran, when the ulama, secular intellectuals, merchants. artisans, workers. 
the urban poor. the peasantry and women across various classes began to 
struggle for their own interests. In fact. a populist coalition acted as a short-lived 
alliance to reach a primary target-the overthrow of the Shah-whereas, the 
main target naturally was seizing power. 17 
Another suggested theory of the Islamic Revolution is "multi-class populist 
coalition". This theory insists that the causes of the revolution are multiple, "that 
they had to occur together-i. e. conjunctural-and that they operated along 
economic, political and cultural/ideological axes. " 18 In regard to the Islamic 
Revolution Michael Fischer says: "The causes of the revolution, and its timing 
were economic and political: the form of the revolution, and its pacing, owed 
much to the tradition of religious protest. "19 Fred Halliday also maintains this 
inclusive understanding and tries to make a complex system which fits into the 
nature of the Islamic Revolution. He maintains: the main reason why the 
Revolution occurred was that conflicts generated in capitalist development 
intersected with resilient institutions and popular attitudes which resisted the 
transformation process. -20 Halliday classifies five principals which he asserts 
can help explain for the Islamic Revolution: 1- Rapid and uneven capitalist 
development, 2- the political weakness of the state (monarchy). 3- the broad 
coalition of the opposition forces, 4- the mobilising force of the Islamic religion. 
5- the ambivalent international context. 
21 
"' Valentine M. Moghadam, 'Populist Revolution and the Islamic State in Iran' in Revolution in the 
World System, (ed), Terry Boswell. Greenwood. Westport. 1989. p. 147. 
17 Ibid. 
'R John Foran, ibid. 
'' Michael M. Fischer, /ran, From Religious Dispute to Revolution, Harvard University Press, 1980. 
p. 190. 
20 Fred Halliday. 'Iranian Revolution: Uneven development and religious Populism' in . Journal of 
international. 9ffairs, no. 36.1982-83. p. 193. 
21 Ibid. 
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But until recently, in analysing the Islamic Revolution less attention was given 
to paradigm shifts and the dialectic of discourse. Throughout the last two 
chapters we studied the trajectory of conceptual developments both regarding 
contemporary theorising of democracy and Islamo-Iranian political cultural. The 
prevailing Islamic discourse of 1979 created a new set of modern institutions 
embodying both democratic and undemocratic institutions and functions. 
Therefore, in the case of the Islamic Revolution, although political and economic 
disequilibrium played a critical role in making it happen, the weight of cultural, 
religious and political parameters was heavier. This is the fundamental 
conclusion upon which we will base our argument in terms of describing the 
institutional changes of the Islamic Republic, while the state-society structure 
still struggles to adapt new democratic concept (conceptual level). 
Based on applying the critical social theory which we developed in previous 
chapters, we arrived at authenticity discourse, within which the combination of 
Islamic elements and political institutions is not considered merely anti-modern 
or reactionary. Hence, in this chapter we embark on addressing the institutional 
framework and principles of the Islamic republic. Our aim is to support the 
hypothesis that the Islamic Republic as the produce of Islamic discourse is in the 
line of an "evolutionary encounter and embracing of modernity". In other words. 
although we will explain the both democratic and undemocratic elements 
embodied in the constitution, the whole framework provides a ground for a kind 
of internal dynamics conducive for democratic exercise and ultimately 
transition. To this end, we will study the formation of the Islamic Revolution's 
subsequent expression that is the Islamic Republic and its constitution 
From the political science perspective too, the Islamic Revolution brought about 
widespread institutional changes which reflected the popular demands of a 
frustrated population in various economic, political and social arenas. Therefore. 
with the hindsight of the revolutionary configuration (main revolutionary forces) 
which comprised largely of the educated middle-class who unwittingly helped to 
create a religiously bound regime, we can attribute the emergence of the Islamic 
Revolution as a reaction to the current political order (state-institutions), not 
specifically to the social order (social classes-structure). So the application of 
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conventional political theories, not only solves the problem, but also adds to the 
dilemma. 
In addition, there are considerable accounts regarding the institutional setting of 
the Islamic Republic which enlist it within countries seeking out democracy. 
Opting for various democratic principles within the constitution of the Islamic 
Republic and in particular the creation of a relatively strong parliament 
demonstrates a shift towards democracy (at a procedural level). Nevertheless, 
such a shift has been halted through the same constitution which makes it 
ultimately dysfunctional (lack of operative principals). This is a grey area of 
interwoven paradox in which the conceptual level still does not yet correspond 
fully with the procedural level. In the following section, based on our previous 
observation in Chapter Two, we will explore the strong presence of a particular 
interpretation of Shi'a political thought envisaged by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 
constitution and alongside other modern and democratic elements, notably the 
parliament. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the existence of democracy depends on three 
fundamental levels: conceptual, procedural and operative. An absence of either 
of the first two causes a puncture in a developing democracy. preventing the 
system reaching its operative level. In this chapter, we will discuss the existence 
of democratic procedures in shaping political order in the Islamic Republic. 
However, in order to discuss the conceptual dilemma, we shall first examine the 
relationship between religious authority and the legal and political structures. In 
so doing, we will first analyse the embodiment of the theory of the "rule of the 
jurist' in the popular Islamic discourse prior to the revolution and hence into the 
constitution. In other words. we want to find out how this concept was 
transformed into an institutionalised model of governance. With the hindsight of 
what already has been discussed in the previous chapter. and based on the 
conceptual background linking Shia Islam to government. we will focus on 
Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas and precepts. We will elaborate in more detail the 
prevailing interpretation of political Shi'a incarnated in jurisprudent rule 
(ii ilayat al-fagih). 
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Then we will focus on the legislative organ (National Assembly) as a 
structurally democratic element or elected institution, sanctioned by the 
constitution. However, as there are various non-elected institutions empowered 
by the ruling jurisprudent with vested legislative prerogatives, it is essential to 
measure their counterproductive effect on the functionality of the parliament. 
Such parallel legislative organs hold a heavy sway over the parliament's 
verdicts, through either validation. rejection, or even the power to pass 
legislation separately. 22 The second half of this chapter will explain their effects 
on the main legislative body. These co-legislative organs are the Guardian 
Council, the Expediency Council, the Supreme Council for National Security. 
and the Supreme Council for the Cultural Revolution. 
ý. ý. IýI-IE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
Politically speaking, the phenomenon of Islamic revolution served to implement 
Islam through the bearers of this belief known as Islamists. For them. Islam is 
not only a religion, but a political system where Islamic law is pre-eminent in all 
fields of society. The revolution was unique for the surprise it created throughout 
the world: it lacked many of the customary causes of revolution-defeat at war. 
a financial crisis, peasant rebellion, or disgruntled military ". 23 It overthrew a 
regime thought to be heavily protected by a lavishly financed army and security 
services. 24 Hence, applying the conventional theories of revolutions seems to be 
not very satisfactory. 
Nevertheless, the general study of socio-political revolutions has always been an 
essential area of research in social sciences. Even now, given the advances in the 
recording and documentation of whole episodes, the truth of the experience 
needs to be unearthed through classical methods of research, such as theor\ 
testing. experimental examinations of existing assumptions, and making ne\\ 
deductions. In other words, the very cohesive nature of revolutions limits the 
12 The Guardian Council validates or reject. The Expediency Council, the Supreme Islamic Cultural 
Revolution and the Supreme Council for National Security can pass the law. 
'' Arjomand. Turban, 1988. p. 191. 
Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions. 1982. P. 492. 
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possibility of conducting comprehensive scientific research at the very time the 
revolution is occurring. Therefore, different attempts have been made to describe 
revolutionary phenomena. including the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Of course. 
each account accentuates particular aspects and dimensions of the whole. The 
list includes theories on cultural and religious importance. theories on socio- 
economic factors. theories based on stressing geo-political and international 
politics, or even highlighting the conspiracy theory. 
25 
The political culture theory mainly explores the values and inspirations that 
mobilised the masses against the former regime. it considers the historical. 
communal and psychological context of the society in which a revolution occurs. 
By applying this approach to the Islamic Revolution. the massive role and 
influence of Shi"a political thought inspired by certain clergy become more 
apparent alongside the appetite in a majority of the population for a return to an 
"authentic self". On the other hand, theories of political economy only shed 
more light on the issues relating the imbalanced distribution of resources and 
structural inadequacies throughout state-society relationship. For example. 
Robert Looney has analysed the strategy of economic development by the 
Shah's regime. revealing its substantial underestimations and faults. 26 
An unbalanced relation between economic transformation and the distribution of 
resources dramatically undermined the level of support for the regime. Notably. 
Homa Katouzian in The Political Economy of Iran presents a description of the 
causes of the Islamic revolution. He examines Iran's conditions from the 
nineteenth century until the establishment of the Islamic Republic. He identifies 
1961-1978 as the years of oil dictatorship in which the symbols of modernism 
were being fed by an ever-increasing oil income. According to him, this artificial 
situation gave shape to what he calls pseudo-modernism: non-critical negation of 
traditions, values. agencies, and so on; and Iranians as handicapped people. 
' 
15 Refer to scholars named in the introduction of this chapter. 
26 See Robert Looney. The Economic Origins (? /'the Iranian Revolution. New York. Pergamon Press. 
1982. 
27 See Homa Katouzian, The Political Econonn" of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-modernism in 
Iran, 1926-1979, London. Macmillan. 1981. 
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He goes further and argues that a combination of oil dictatorship (rentier state) 
and pseudo-modernism underpinned the origins of the Iranian revolution. Thus, 
either we attribute the causes of the Islamic Revolution to a mere socio- 
economic basis (scientific discourse), or attribute it to purely cultural and 
religious factors (discursive analysis); we cannot ignore the fact that the 
structure of the Islamic Republic as the product of the Islamic Revolution is 
based on cultural and religious elements (Shi'a Islam). By granting a specific 
interpretation of Islam and the installation of its elements into the constitution, 
the new system was designed accordingly to meet ideological aspirations. 
The proposed Islamic mandate overshadowed other socio-political developments 
and strengthened its superiority. In short, democratic legislation was legally 
limited within scope of the Islamic law. 28 Therefore, we can conclude, although 
various social economic and political factors paved the way for the Revolution 
of 1979, its results and consequences were shaped by cultural and religious 
elements (authentic discourse). Thus, the emphasis of the next section is mostly 
on identifying and evaluating the conceptual background of such a political and 
ideological system. 
3.2.1. THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Prior to the establishment of the Islamic Republic, a spectrum of advocates of 
Islamic discourse intended to portray a legitimate, righteous and historic 
framework for the theory of "Islamic Government'". 29 They linked the inspired 
Islamic regime back to fourteen centuries ago when the first Islamic state was 
established in the Arabian Peninsula by the Prophet Muhammad (S). Thus, a 
range of revolutionary clerics aimed their efforts to establish a source of 
legitimacy and sanctity. buttressed by conventional principles of Twelver Shi'a 
school of thought and law. They craved to prove their interpretation of Islam in 
28 For example, the constitution stipulates the commitment of the Islamic Republic's government to 
other Muslim communities around the world which prevent having a normal modelling of national 
interest. 
29 Hussein Ali Montazeri. Hukumui-i Fagih [the Ruling of Jurist], Qum. Rah-i Islam Publishing. 1359 
[ 1980]. p. 2-4. 
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general and Shi'ism in particular with "divine order" that is the Holy Koran and 
the Prophet Muhammad (S) and Twelve Imams' sayings and doings. 30 It is a 
fundamental belief in Shi'ism that the exclusive legitimate successor of the 
Prophet is Imam Ali and his eleven descendents. It is one of the fundamental 
elements of Shi'ism that Imam Ali was directly appointed by the Prophet before 
his demise. 31 Accordingly, because of political rivalry, Ali was denied to obtain 
his right to rule. This denial to righteous successor for Shi'ism meant 
illegitimacy of any government after the Prophet, although based on historical 
evidence endorsed by the Shia Ulama, none of the Twelve Imams, aroused to 
fight to obtain that promised political power. 32 
In other words, according to the Shi'a school, the righteousness of any rule is 
solely by the immaculate Imam but this will not occur until the majority of the 
people accept and convey this power to him. Also, it is evident that throughout 
the presence of Islam in Iran we cannot find any uprising against the ruling 
system in favour of returning the power to fuqaha as the only legitimate 
successors of immaculate Imam. Therefore, the only legitimate rule can be 
conducted by immaculate persons. explicitly, and no other person. 33 On the 
other hand, as the Shi'a school trust, the last immaculate Imam is in hiding now. 
he will appear someday and will establish the promised fair and just government. 
Until that day. there is no legitimate government whatsoever. 34 
As already mentioned in chapter two, however, the only sub school of Shi'ism 
which had co-existed with any ruling system was the Usuli sect. This school 
began to flourish and become dominant during the Safavid Empire as the 
Safavids needed their support to resist the Ottoman Empire and the Usuli clerics 
needed the Safavid to become the leading religious establishment in Iran. Not 
surprisingly, this alliance was deliberately inherited by the Qajars and went 
In Shi'ism, this source is expanded to the twelve Imam's sayings and doings as well. 
In Chapter Two we discussed the various aspects of Imam Ali's approval by the Prophet as whether 
it was a governmental succession's appointment or otherwise. 
332 ]'mad al-din Baqi, Jami'ah Shanasi-i Qivam Karbala [the sociology of Karbala movement]. Tehran. 
Tarh-i Naw. 1383 [2004]. intro. 
According to Shi'ism, the immaculate persons are strictly limited to the Divine Prophets, the twelve 
Imams plus Fatima (daughter of the Prophet Muhammad). 
"' The Hujjati Association in Iran is one of advocates of this belief. They do not even recognise the 
Islamic Republic as a legitimate Islamic government. 
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further to its ultimate stage of considering the Shah as `God's shade on the 
Earth'. The Pahlavis were not keen to convey a great deal of reputation and 
power to the ulama but, at the same time, were very anxious not to cause them 
offence by their secular attitude. '` 
Following the traditional alliance between the government and the Usuli ulama 
since the Safavid and Qajars dynasties-although weakened by the Pahlavis- 
some of the ulama were provoked to reclaim their influential role. After toppling 
the national government of Mosaddeq in 1953, and reinforcing a suppressive 
mode of governance by the Pahlavi regime. the majority of people felt frustrated 
with the secular discourse represented by the current political parties and 
individuals and went into a disgruntled silence. This frustration and apathy 
gradually turned into an embrace of Islamic discourse. Al-e Ahmad and Shari'ati 
contributed greatly to this shift. The amalgamation of Islamic intellectualism and 
political Islam envisaged by Ayatollah Khomeini gained momentum and toppled 
the Pahlavi regime. 
In general. the discourse of revolutionary Islam was not a pre-existing ideology 
based on the well-known political theory of classical Shi'ism, but the existence 
of a strong religious entity with its broad influence on the Iranian political 
sphere. In fact, the period between the Tobacco protest movement and the 
triumph of the Islamic Revolution can be viewed as the embryonic period of 
political Shi'a. As a matter of fact, there was close collaboration with the ulama 
from Mirza Shirazi's fatwa on banning tobacco, until Ayatollah Kashani's 
strategic alliance with Mosaddeq. Nevertheless, such collaborations can be 
perceived as a request to implicate Islam when necessary, not implementing 
Islam throughout the government verse by verse. 36 In other words, there was no 
ready political interpretation of Islam to be employed by discontented groups 
against the monarchy, and in particular against the Shah. Only following a 
decade of political silence after 1953. a few ideological icons such as Ayatollah 
Khomeini, Ayatollah Mutahhari, Dr. Ali Shari'ati. and Jalal Ale-Ahmad voiced 
Suliyman Behbudi. 25 Sal ha Re_a Khan Mir Panj [25 Years with Reza Khan Mir Panj]. Tehran. 
Tarikh Publishing, 1364 [1984], p. ix. 
Ali Mirsepassi. Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernisation: Negotiating Modernity in 
Iran. Cambridge University press. 2000. p. 79. 
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their opposition to the status quo and demanded reform based on a return to 
Islam (self). Their reasoning proved to be appealing and mobilising thanks to the 
restraints, repressions and uneven distribution of resources imposed by the 
secular-modernist Pahlavi regime. 37 
The idea of an Islamic regime was then construed in contradistinction with the 
current state ideology of the Shah's regime because, for the revolutionists, the 
aim was to oppose the ideology of the state. To a large extent, the ideal model 
was in reaction to what the Shah's regime was based on. Interestingly, the 
revolutionary movement was a heterogeneous combination of various Islamic 
and non-Islamic ideologues with totally diverse backgrounds. interests and 
political aims, but with one common enemy, the Shah. The opposition's demand 
was not the overthrow of the Shah in the first place, since opposite opinion 
existed amongst them. But public unease accumulated over the regime's 
performance-politically and economically-and the government was unable to 
address this in due time and with a consistent course of actions. 38 
The increasing affiliation towards Islamic discourse coupled with the resentment 
towards the Pahlavis' secular and semi-modern agenda produced a rebellious 
zeal. This mobilising adherence emerged throughout the masses and tackled the 
Pahlavi regime's authority and stability. At the same time. the constitutional 
monarchy had practically been altered into an absolute monarchy. The extreme 
exclusiveness of the political system in general and the weakness of the 
parliament in particular greatly contributed to widening the split between the 
majority of society and the ruling system. The implementation of a liberal policy 
on cultural affairs had worsened the situation and irritated the majority of 
Muslim believers who finally returned to their grassroots (Islam and clerics). 
In the early 1970s only a faction among the low ranking clerics affiliated to 
Ayatollah Khomeini's scholarship took advantage of the Shah's unpopularity 
within the masses and publicly demanded the establishment of an Islamic 
Mansur Moadel, Class, Politics and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, Columbia University Press. 
1993. p. 144. 
3R For example. order to dismantle the existing political parties and establishing a single party 
" Rastakhi_ '. 
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government under the exclusive control of the supreme religious leader (the 
. 
fagih). The majority of the ulama treated this trend with apathy and preferred not 
to challenge it. 39 The rest of the opposition. however. consisted of leftists' forces 
with considerably varied religious beliefs and manifestos. from the mixed 
Muslim-Socialists of the People's Militant (Ma jahidin Khalq) to pure 
Communists (He_b-i Tudeh). 
All in all, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was not that different from the French 
Revolution of the late eighteenth century, or the Russian Revolution of the early 
twentieth century . 
40 In both these cases. violence, chaos. conflict and radical 
politics came to dominate the system for years thereafter. Simply. following the 
collapse of the former regime, each of these post-revolutionary societies were 
characterised by an extended period during which rival forces contended for the 
control of the state apparatus. 41 Likewise, in the outset of the Iranian Revolution. 
all opposition forces were united in their objective of overthrowing the 
monarchy. Once it was achieved, division and conflict arose over the issue of 
what type of government should be implemented in Iran. 
As was the case with the Iranian intellectuals discussed in the previous chapter, 
the number of political factions or ideologies involved in resisting the Pahlavi 
regime was quite diverse too. They ranged from the Tudeh (Communist) Party to 
the Islamist fundamentalist of the Fadaiyan-i Islam (Islamic Brigade), from the 
moderate National Front to the conservative clerics (mostly based in Tehran and 
Mashhad). But not surprisingly, this time a symbol of the ulama-in the absence 
of any compatible lay figure-took the leadership of the movement. Ayatollah 
Khomeini had begun his open criticism of the Shah's regime in the early 1960s. 
His sharp condemnation of the performance of the Shah's regime plus his 
clerical manner which could convince the masses led him to be perceived as a 
very capable major opposition leader. However, in spite of previous 
confrontations, this time the dispute was not over hoNw to rule but about who 
ought to rule. 
Mirsepassi. Intellectual Discourse and Politics oi'Modernisation. p. 81-84. 
40 Bakhtiar. The Parliamentary Politics in Revo/utionari- Iran, Florida University Press. 1996, p. 53 
" Seyed Amir Arjomand. The Turban for the Crown: the Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York. 
O. U. P. 1988, p. 183. 
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In fact, Khomeini's project commenced in 1940s, with the writing of a series of 
essays discussing the "virtue of ruling the state in accordance with the Islamic 
principles". From the beginning, he wisely suggested that those trained in 
religious law should not rule but rather should act as guardians. "We do not say 
that government must be in hands of one. fagih (jurisprudent); rather we say that 
government must be run in accordance with God's law, for the welfare of the 
country and the people demand this, and it is not feasible except with the 
supervision of the religious leaders. -42 This statement to some extent resembles 
the same proposition made by Shaykh Nuri during the process of writing the 
Constitutional supplementary, although with one difference. That is. Nuri 
insisted on establishing a religious authority to supervise legislative proceedings, 
whereas Khomeini stipulates the necessity of Islamic supervision throughout the 
whole system: politically, socially and economically. 
During Ayatollah Khomeini's exile in Iraq, he developed his views on 
governance, and elaborated them more specifically in a series of lectures which 
were later published under the title of Hukumat-i Islami (Islamic government). 
Accordingly, following the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime, Khomeini's 
hardliner advocates made their best effort to incorporate his ideas into a new 
constitution for an Islamic Republic. The foundation stone of the new regime 
was based on the rule of the jurist instead of the King. Khomeini explicitly 
stated that a jurist (Mujtahid) "has the same authority that the Noblest 
Messenger (the Prophet) and the Imams had", except that that authority was 
granted directly by God whereas, in this case, the religious experts should 
discover it within themselves. 43 
Although Ayatollah Khomeini spoke of equal functions, it did not mean that he 
equated the status of a faqih with that of the Imams and the Prophet. Very 
wisely, by saying "authority", he meant the government: the administration of 
the country and the implementation of the divine law, the Shari'a. Practically. 
the governance of the jurist is a type of appointment. like an appointment of a 
42 Ruhollah, Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrar [Discovery of Divine Secrets], Tehran, Amir Kabir Publication, 
1369 [ 1990]. p. 222 
4', Hamid Algar, The Roots of the Islamic Revolution. London, Open Press, 1983, p. 38. 
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guardian for a minor. However, it seems that Khomeini's theory was initially 
accepted by the masses, providing him with an absolute support in the course of 
the revolution, as he was called Imam by the people without any official 
announcement. Meanwhile, other high-ranking Ayatollahs did not show their 
agreement with Khomeini's radical proposal of rule by jurists. 44 Obviously they 
knew that the success of Khomeini in establishing and expanding his theory 
meant not only the rule of one Ayatollah over the people. but also the rule of one 
Ayatollah over other Ayatollahs. 
In addition to other socio-political constraints which the notion of ii'ilayat al- 
fagih would cause, either on conceptual or procedural levels, another major 
problem is the plentiful number of fuqaha who are literally present and also 
eligible to practice this theory. For instance, what about the distinguished 
Ayatollahs who do not believe in this theory and yet are known as Grand 
Ayatollahs? 4' If it was subject to the discretion of the people"s vote to choose a 
leader from the jurists, then this argument would be obscured altogether. But. 
when the mechanism to appoint the leader to rule over the state is perceived as 
an illumination process (kashf-i misdaq) which is something empirically false. 
ground is laid for disagreement and uproar among the jurists. 46 
Once the triumph of the Islamic Revolution was assured on 10 February 1979. 
Ayatollah Khomeini set up a Revolutionary Council composed of his devoted 
supporters. Soon after, the council proposed to Khomeini the creation of a 
provisional government headed by Mahdi Bazargan, the secretary general of 
Iran's Freedom Movement (IFM). It was a very wise decision at the time to 
appoint some moderate and well respected figure as Interim Premier though with 
very limited power. The real power resided in the Revolutionary Council where 
critical decisions were made such as holding referendums, dismantling a vast 
4' For example, Ayatollah Shari'at-madari. 
°` For example. Grand Ayatollah Khuyi. Grand Ayatollah Gulpaygani and Grand Ayatollah Shari'at- 
madari. who were known as Khomeini .s teachers but did not agree with his theory. Thus, from the 
point of major Shia leaders, the legitimacy of i, ilui ut al-fagih's theory is in doubt. 
4" There are widespread although oppressed disagreements between the Grand Ayatollahs sitting in 
Qum. Mashhad, and Esfahan over the theory of wilavat al-fayih. But, according to a traditional 
principle of Shi'ism, they do not tend to announce it publicly (tagilva). 
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part of the army and more significantly taking over the policing and security 
manaoement. 
The advocates of Islamic doctrine were successful in monopolising the 
achievements of the revolution as the key military and judicial posts were kept 
exclusively for them. Symbolically, by choosing the title: Islamic Republic: 
instead of Democratic Republic or even Democratic Islamic Republic. the 
"fundamentalists proved to have the upper hand from the beginning of the 
process"'. ' On 30 March 1979, a referendum was conducted which with ninety 
eight percent of yes votes replaced the monarchy with an Islamic Republic. The 
major secular parties like Tudeh Party. the National Front and the Iran Freedom 
Movement (IFM) had no choice but to accept the formulation of the Islamic 
Republic since the balance of power was in favour of the Islamists. 48The next 
stage was to draft a new constitution for the new Islamic Republic. For the 
theocrats the importance of writing an Islamic constitution was well received, 
but the obstacle was laid on the other side of the coalition which intrinsically 
believed in a non-Islamic system. The paradox was to write a constitution which 
had to embrace a selection of contradictions while continuing Islamic elements 
due to the beliefs of a majority of the people. The result was a mixture of both 
religious and non-religious elements. 
Schirazi in The Constitution of Iran argues that two fundamental contradictions 
within the constitution of the Islamic Republic emerged which had a decisive 
impact on the management and development of the Iranian state since the 
revolution. The first is the contradiction between the constitution's Islamic 
legalists and the non-Islamic or secular elements, which surged largely from the 
claim that the state is set up on the basis of the Shia School of Islam. 
According to him, the state should be ruled by an Islamic jurist (faqih) who is 
capable of offering the solutions needed for all problems. not only in Iran, but 
throughout the world. The second is the contradiction between its democratic 
and anti-democratic elements. arising mainly from the conflict between the two 
a' Shaul Bakhash, The Reign gfthe. 4. ratollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution. London. 1. B. Tauris. 
1985, p. 72. 
ax However different political parties refused to accompany this process and boycotted themselves from 
the mainstream. For example: the Kurdistan Democrat party and the Pan Iran-ist Party. 
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notions of sovereignty embodied in the document: the sovereignty of the people 
on the one hand, and of the Islamic jurists on the other. That is the sovereignty 
that the jurists should exercise as God-appointed-deputies. 49 
3.2.2. THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI 
Ayatollah Khomeini expressed his opinions on various issues regarding religion 
and governance from the 1940s in his seminary sessions at Qum. until a few 
weeks before his demise in 1989. He performed a dual role as a charismatic 
political leader who took charge of toppling a long-established monarchical 
system. and as a religious and spiritual pontiff extracting Islamic notions for 
practical and political motions. However, due to limited space we should 
summarise our discussion into three major categories envisaged and described 
by Ayatollah Khomeini: I- the political foundations of an ideal government. 2- 
Jurisprudent rule, appointment or election? 3- Ayatollah Khomeini's elaboration 
on democracy. The primary sources in conducting this analysis are Ayatollah 
Khomeini's books: Hukumat-i Islami (Islamic government), Sahifahiy3°ih Nur 
(pages of light) and Wasiyai namahiy)yih Siyasi-I 'badi Imam (Imam's political- 
spiritual will). Towards the end of this section, having explained Ayatollah 
Khomeini's ideas, we will verify to what extent his thoughts were congruent 
with the avowed ideals of "authentic discourse" initially intended by 
intellectuals. 
To be precise. Ayatollah Khomeini's will has been taken as a sample from 
which to extract the fundamental elements upon which he conducted his spiritual 
and political leadership. The result demonstrates ten major concepts which 
Ayatollah chiefly avowed. We have employed two criteria for pinpointing these 
main concepts, first: direct correlation with politics and governance, second: the 
significance and the value these concepts had for Ayatollah Khomeini. To 
measure the significance, we have also considered the juxtaposition of words 
and their denotation: 
41' Schirazi, The ('unsvitution G/ Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, London, 1. B. 
Tauris, 1996. p. 39. 
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I- Isliylal (independence): this concept and its sub-categories: self- 
sufficiency. denunciation of dependence, rebuffing Western or Eastern 
influence, either in terms of political dominance or intellectual 
tendencies. This term has been the most repeated preoccupation echoed 
by Ayatollah Khomeini in his will which amount to 39 times. 
2- A_adi (freedom): in16 occasions this notion is referred to. Interestingly. 4 
citations are related to the negative aspects of Western freedom, such as 
freedom to be immoral. 12 times, however, freedom is praised as a 
positive concept alongside independence. 
3- Hukumat-i Islami (Islamic government): this notion and other 
connotative phrases such as divine rule. divine trusteeship and Allah's 
government were mentioned and emphasised 1l times. 
4- I 'dalat-i ljtama 'i (social justice): 6 times explicit referral is made to this 
concept without taking into account other similar and synonymous terms. 
5- Wahdal miyun-i Rluslimin (unity of Muslim"s): this ideal was mentioned 
6 times. 
6- Yiganagi Din va Siyasat (integration of state and religion): 6 times the 
emphasis on integration and direct interaction between religion and state 
was mentioned. 
7- Hukumat-i A 'dl (just rule): in the terminology used by Ayatollah 
Khomeini. just rule is different from the empirical social justice and is 
meant to represent divine justice. 
8- Ijad-i w ahdui mivan-i Bashar"ivai (unity among human beings): at three 
points, this notion is mentioned as distinct from the call for unification of 
Muslims. 
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9- Ijra-i A 'adilanahijyih Qavanin (just law enforcement): 2 direct 
references are made to the necessity of implementing "just" law and 
regulations. 
10- Nijat-i Bashariyat (Human beings' salvation): 2 reform to how human 
societies should be salvaged from the spiritless restraints imposed on 
them in modern life. 
The abovementioned concepts emphasised by Ayatollah Khomeini indicate and 
also stipulate the qualities upon which a good government is to be based. 
Obviously, these qualities represent a certain political idealism. This idealism 
therefore necessitates an operating institution and that was decided to be the 
Islamic Republic. 50 Statistically, "independence" has been repeated more than 
any other concept, following by "freedom" and at the third stage is the notion of 
"Islamic government''. A very significant issue, frequently mentioned 
throughout the rhetoric of Ayatollah Khomeini, is the "public participation" 
(musharakal). He completely recognises the indispensable role of "revolutionary 
people" in making the "system of Islamic Republic". 
By analysing the text of Ayatollah Khomeini"s will. we can grasp the meaning 
of such participation in two categories: 1- the epistemology of participation. 2- 
the methods of participation. 
I- The epistemology of participation: from Ayatollah Khomeini's 
perspective, public participation is a "responsibility" not merely a 
"right'". He repeatedly stated that people's participation at various field 
relating to governance and government was a religious duty and 
therefore, obligatory. '' He maintained, therefore, that non-participation 
or public apathy was "considered as a sin, and also sometimes a great sin 
"''2 which cannot be pardoned. 
5' Because since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. some radical Islamists criticised the notion 
of republicanism and instead put emphasis on Islamic government. 
il Ruhullah Khomeini, ibid, p. 70. 
`' Ibid. p. 71. 
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2- The methods of participation from Ayatollah Khomeini's point of view 
are various. It encompasses a range of ideologically bound obligations 
which cannot be seen as democratically inspired, rather a set of 
guarantees for the fulfilment of. "voting in elections'"53. "protecting and 
preserving the state and the government"'54. "supporting the government 
in order to solve the problems'. "taking action against errors and 
mistakes either done by the state or others- '6. "seeking to accomplish the 
goals of the Islamic state" 57. "spotting and resisting foreign influence and 
agents-., g 
Having said all this. the most important theory through which Ayatollah 
Khomeini construed the idea of Islamic government is that of jurisprudent rule 
(i+ ilayul al-fagih). We elaborated on this concept in the previous chapter. In this 
section, we will provide more details on how Ayatollah Khomeini formulated 
this concept on first examining his books we may find contradictory precepts on 
the quality and the way of appointment of the ruling jurisprudent. For instance. 
in Al-Bey' (to buy). Ayatollah Khomeini states that the wali fagih is appointed 
by God and relates his argument to the issue of Twelve Imams and their 
legitimate rule according to Shi'ism. Therefore, based on this view. God 
(Share') "assigns the post of jurisprudent rule". then the "just jurisprudents" are 
assigned rulers, so that the people are "ruled over". 59 
This argument is based on the same principal precept of Shi'ism which considers 
only the rule of the infallible Imams as the source of legality and legitimacy. 
Therefore, since the Imam's rule is sanctioned by divine authority due to his 
infallibility, a jurisprudent who acquired the specifications of the Imam would 
be seen as a legitimate ruler. According to this view, people have no role in his 
appointment and should only obey as they were supposed to obey the Prophet. 
The safeguard ostensibly is the persistence and consistence of the qualities for 
53 ' Ibid, p. 54. 
54 Ibid. p. 55. 
Ibid. p. 34. 
Ibid. p. 70. 
s- Ibid. p. 18. 
ibid. p. 49. 
Ruhollah Khomeini. A1-makasch al-Muhar"ami , vol. 
2, Qum. Bita Publishing. 1381 (H. Q), p. 106. 
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which the jurisprudent ruler has been lnown. 60 Once he loses these essential 
qualities and characteristics, he has lost his post too. In addition, the political 
participation of the public materialises through "acceptance of authority" (biy 'at) 
in particular during the occultation period. 
In contrast, Ayatollah Khomeini took a different lead towards the people's role 
in choosing their preferable political regime and also jurisprudent rule during his 
last decade of living. In an interview with the Financial Times he recognised the 
"primary right of each nation to determine its destiny and the structure of 
government. -61 In the interview. he also subjected the structure of the Islamic 
Republic as based on the Islamic precepts and tenets, mainly Shi'ism. His 
interpretation was to uphold the idea of having popular vote and support of the 
people who are devout to their religion for the new Islamic state. Interestingly, 
he defines the nature and structure of the Islamic Republic as a result of adhering 
to Islam alongside referring to people's vote and consent. in order to implement 
Islamic Shari'a law. 62 The issue of people's right appeared to be indispensable 
and in one of his speeches he explicitly declared: "We follow the people's vote. 
whatever people decide. we will do accordingly, and we do not have right. God 
Almighty and the Prophet have not given any right to us for imposing our 
opinion on Muslims. -63 
Mohsen Kadivar assesses Ayatollah Khomeini's commentary and 
commendatory elaborations on the issue of the appointment of ii'ali fagih and 
argues that Ayatollah Khomeini always used terms such as "electing". 
"appointing" and "ratifying" either directly or indirectly by the people for this 
position. this puts him at odds with the clerics who believe 14"ali fagih is 
appointed by God and only needs to be discovered by others (kashf). ý'4 Such 
disagreement was even reflected between Ayatollah Khomeini's students, for 
instance. Ayatollah Mutahhari and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli. The former 
`r0 For example, justice 
61 Quoted in Sahifity ih Nur (the pages of light). ibid. vol. 5. p. 31. 
62 Mahname Ketab. [book monthly], published by Cultural Ministry. Tehran. Farvardin 1380 [March 
2001]. p. 1 1. 
`' Ibid. 
"4 Mohsen Kadivar, Na_arivvih Dam-lat dar Fiqh Shia (theories of government in Shia 
jurisprudence), Tehran. Ney Publishing. 1377 [19981. First Chapter. 
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explicitly advocates the mechanism to elect Nwali fagih by the people and argues 
that the Islamic Republic is a regime whose structure and rulers must be elected 
by the public. " In sharp contrast. Ayatollah Amoli maintains that wali , 
fagih is 
appointed directly from the divine source (Share') and the people have no role in 
this process. 'ý' Now we turn to the institutional dimensions derived by 
implementation of abovementioned Islamic doctrine. 
3.2.3. THE INSTALLATION OF ISLAMIC DOCTRINE INTO THE NEW 
CONS'T'ITUTION 
Despite the involvement of multiple economic, social, cultural and political 
motives and inspirations which provided the driving force for the revolution as a 
pervasive social movement, the constitution evolved to carry a profound Islamic 
character. This swiftly predominated and bluntly eliminated the other aspects of 
Iranian social movements which in fact had had a substantial role in the 
revolution. Legally speaking, this monopolisation began from the drafting of the 
fundamental clauses in the document which precisely defined the new state as an 
Islamic state. "The Islamic nature of the great Islamic Revolution" expressed the 
will "of the Muslim people" to establish the Constitution on the basis of Islamic 
principles and guidelines". 67 The new Constitution even stipulates that the 
distinctive peculiarity of this revolution" lay in its "ideological and Islamic 
character". Indeed, it was this Islamic characteristic that guaranteed its victory in 
contrast to previous revolutions in Iran which. despite the ulama's participation 
in the leadership, had finally failed because they departed from a "noble Islamic 
position-. 68 Hence, the founders of the Islamic Republic deliberately installed 
these Islamic measures to guarantee preserving its entity both theoretically and 
practically. 
" Murtaza Mutahhari. Pirumun-i Inga/ub-i /slarni [about the Islamic revolution], Tehran. Sadra 
Publishing. 1367 [19881. p. 85-86. 
`'' Abdullah Javadi Amoli. Pirunnm-i Ifahr va Rahbari [about revelation and leadership]. Tehran. Raja 
Publishing. 1368 119891. P. 160. 
`'' Quoted from the Preamble in Qanun-i Asasi-i . lumhurirrih Is/ami Iran [The Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran]. Tehran, Ofoq Publishing. 1367 [19891. 
"" ]bid. Qanun-i Asasi. 
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According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. the new structure of state 
is based on principles which are defined by Islam and explicitly presented in 
Article 2 of the Constitution. The wording is significant. as it resembles a sacred 
theological document more closely than a constitution governing a state: 
I. There is only one God ... who 
by right is ruler and lawgiver, and man must 
submit to his command. 
2. Divine revelation has a fundamental role to play in the promulgation of 
laws. 
3. Afterlife and resurrection play an essential role in the process of man's 
development vis-ä-vis God. 
4. Gods justice is inherent in His creation and His laws. 
5. The Imamate will provide the leadership and will play a fundamental role 
in the progress of the Islamic Revolution. 
6. Man is endowed with nobility and elevated dignity. His freedom entails 
responsibility before God. 
In effect. the Constitution envisaged these principles guaranteeing that, by 
means of "dynamic jurisprudence" (ijtihad-i puya) exercised by qualified jurists 
on the basis of the Koran and the Sunna (tradition). along with the employment 
of other necessary requirements, the Iranian nation would achieve political, 
economic. social and cultural independence as well as justice. 69 The Constitution 
explicitly assigns certain Islamic tasks to all the organs of state and the state 
authority. Even the armed forces were given an additional task above being 
merely responsible for the defence of the territorial integrity and that is to bear 
"the burden of the ideological mission. i. e. the Holy War (Jihad) to spread the 
rule of God's law throughout the world". 70 
To this purpose, a new army under the name of the Revolutionary Guards was 
established and constituted within the Constitution (Art. 143). Furthermore, the 
"" Ijtihad is the exercise of independent effort by Islamic jurists in order to formulate new decisions in 
questions of law and faith on the basis of the sources of Islamic law. i. e. the Koran. the sunna 
(tradition), consensus and analogy or reason. Definition by As-har Schirazi in. The Constitution ?f 
Iran, p. 20. 
'70 The Preamble of the Constitution and Article 143. 
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mass media too "must perform the service of disseminating Islamic culture and 
values as part of the process of development of the Islamic Revolution" . 
71 The 
judiciary is also designed to "implement the Shari'a law and defend the rights of 
the people within the Islamic context". Finally, the executive power must pave 
the way for the creation of an Islamic society" and has "a special significance in 
the task of putting into effect Islamic regulations and prescriptions"'. '` To 
implement these ideals, the writers of the Constitution embodied a large portion 
of religious authority into the text which we will study in the next section. 
3.2.4 ýI'I-IE SUPREMACY OF SHARI'A OVER LEGISLATION IN THE 
CONSTITUTION 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic binds the legislative power to the 
Shari'a as defined by Shi'a Islam. The Shari'a either forms the foundation on 
which legislation is based on, or defines the boundaries beyond which it may not 
proceed. Any resolution passed by the parliament (Majlis) must not contradict 
the Shari'a, otherwise it will not become law, whatever absolute majority had 
voted for it. The stipulations of Islamic law are designated in the text of the 
Constitution by the following terms: ordinances (ahkam). regulations 
(inuqarrarat), laws (gavanin), principles (usul or mabani), criteria (ma 'yar), 
foundations (asas). guidelines (_avabit) and standards (mava=in). 73All these 
terms represent the importance and necessity of one obligation under which all 
affairs of the state must be conducted. 
Article 2 confines all legislations to the Shari'a by representing legislation as a 
power reserved for God and acknowledging that revelation has a fundamental 
role in the expansion of laws. Also, Article 170 makes it incumbent on judges to 
refuse to implement government resolutions and decrees when these "contravene 
Islamic laws and regulations"'. The issue here is though Shia school of thought 
is renowned for its flexibility and exercising of independent judgement (ijtihad). 
such absolute and arbitrary authority is given through the Constitution to the 
,1 The Preamble of the Constitution. 
2 Ibid. 
Schirazi. The Constitution of /run, p. 14. 
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clerics who are employed by the Judiciary. Vouchsafing such authority to part of 
establishment to undermine the other part is paradoxical and deteriorating. 
To find out how explicit Islamic ordinances have been employed in the 
Constitution. we can refer to the following articles: 
1. Article 56 conceptualises the term sovereignty and stipulates that the 
sovereignty of the people and the powers originally belongs to the God. as 
absolute dominion is an exclusive prerogative of God and therefore the 
sovereignty of the people is subject to restriction by the authorities who are 
considered to represent the dominion of God (the jurists). 
2. Articles 91-98 describe the function of the authority (Guardian Council) 
entrusted with the task of examining the resolutions passed by the 
parliament, establishing whether or not the resolutions are contrary to 
Islamic principles and the constitution itself. and then declaring them 
invalid if such is the case. 
3. Article 5 as well as Articles 107-1 11. describes the office and the functions 
of the "leader" who as ruling authority, is concerned with maintaining the 
dominion of God. the Prophet and the Imams. and responsible for the 
management and leadership of the community". 
4. Articles 156-174 address the framework of the judiciary. and discuss the 
limits and provisions placed upon the judiciary's organisation and 
functions by the regulations of the Shari"a. Article 61 demands the 
judiciary to set up law courts to which the Islamic laws apply. even if that 
has not been ratified as law by the parliament. 
5. Article 1l binds foreign policy to the principle that all Muslims belong to 
a single community" and thus enjoins the government to strive for the 
unification of the Muslim Peoples. (Inspired from a Koranic verse 21/92). 
6. Articles 10 and 21 set limits on future laws. regulations and planning 
pertaining to the family and social issues including women's rights within 
the Islamic law. 
7. Article 43 prohibits usury. hoarding and "forbidden business activities". 
and Article 42 ensures that all assets acquired through unlawful (against 
Shari'a) means will be returned to the state. 
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3.2.5. ASSURING THE RULE OF THE ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENTS IN 
THE CONSTITUTION 
The constitution explicitly defines the Islamic Republic as a state ruled by the 
Islamic jurisprudents (fugaha). The Constitution states that only those 
jurisprudents are entitled to rule who are "upright, pious, and committed experts 
on Islam" and are recognized as such, and who "are informed of the demands of 
the times" and are distinguished as "God-fearing". "brave" and "qualified for 
leadership [of the state]". 74 They also must hold the religious rank of "source of 
imitation" and be qualified to deliver independent judgments on general 
principles (fa! i as). 75 Article 5 stipulates that an individual jurisprudent endowed 
with all necessary qualities has the right to rule and exercise leadership in the 
Islamic Republic as long as "The Lord of time, the Twelfth Imam of the Shia. 
remains in occultation". Article 57 and 110 respectively define his general and 
specific powers and authorities. Article 57 states that he is to have supervisory 
authority over the three branches of the government, while Article 110 defines 
this supervisory authority in concrete terms. 
I. He appoints the jurists to the Guardian Council. 
2. He appoints the highest judicial authority in the country. 
3. He holds supreme command over the armed forces by exercising the 
following functions: a) He appoints and dismisses the chief of the general 
staff: h) He appoints and dismisses the commander-in-chief of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (Sepah Pasdaran); c) He is in charge of 
setting up the supreme Defence Council which consists of the president. 
the minister of the defence. the chief of the general staff. the commander- 
in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and two advisers appointed 
by the leader: d) He appoints the commander-in-chief of three branches of 
the armed forces; e) He declares war and peace. and calls for a general 
mobilisation of the armed forces. 
4. He signs the certificate of appointment of the president after the latter's 
election by the people. 
'4 Various parts of the Constitution. 
75 Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran, p. 12. 
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5. He appoints the head of the national broadcasting company with its 
exclusive authority to broadcast in the country. 
6. He has the power to dismiss the president if the Supreme Court declares 
that the president has violated his legal duties or parliament issues that he 
is politically incompetent. 
7. Finally. on the recommendation of the Supreme Court. he grants amnesty 
or a reduction of sentence in accordance with Islamic principles. 76 
Obviously such a full-fledged power and authority not only far exceed a routine 
supervisory role, but demonstrate the Supreme Leader's comprehensive 
instrumental power. The rationale behind this accumulation of power in the 
hands of one person lies in the concept of Wiluyul ul-fagih as interpreted and 
introduced by Ayatollah Khomeini, a multifunctional post with vested authority 
and discretion held for a jurisprudent who is discovered77 and appointed by 
elected jurisprudents. 78 
The mechanism to select such a figurative person as the Supreme Leader is 
maintained under the control of other fellow clergy. The Council of Leadership 
Experts which is similarly reserved for (exclusive membership of jurisprudents) 
determines who will be the leader. It also has the authority to dismiss the leader 
should he be no longer capable of fulfilling his duties or no longer possesses the 
necessary qualifications to exercise the office of leadership. `' Moreover, the 
Constitution reserves not only the office of the leader for jurisprudents but also 
many other key government positions. For example. the head of the judiciary, 
the Attorney General, the Minister of Intelligence, the six clerical members of 
the 12 member seats of the Guardian Council and. not surprisingly. all the 
members of the Leadership Expert Council must be elected from the clergy 
guild. Nevertheless, the Constitution bears a substantial portion of conventional 
"' Article 110 of the Constitution. 
"Intentionally used by several high ranking ulama such as Ayatollah Javadi Amoli to describe that the 
selection of the Islamic leader is not a manly and worldly matter like other selections by any human 
assemblies. The only task upon the Expert Council is to find out who possesses the required 
qualifications. 
'x There is serious concern over election vetting process of the Experts Council. as they are being 
vetted by the Guardian Council whose clergy members are indirectly appointed by the Supreme leader. 
79 Article III of the Constitution. 
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principles that are compatible with modern values and underpin a democratic 
framework. We will examine such elements in the following section. 
3.3. DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'S 
CONSTITUTION 
It has been the way of most semi-democratic states to set up various measures 
and mechanisms of democratic procedures upon which they could proclaim that 
such a system is in harmony with the will of the people. Likewise, the authors of 
the Iranian Constitution made an effort to demonstrate that the established 
regime would also be running in accordance to the will of the people. However. 
the preamble of the Constitution puts forward the thesis "that the state from the 
point of view of Islam ... 
is the crystallisation of a political ideal of a people 
who are united in religion and their way of thinking". It also describes that "the 
Islamic principles and guidelines" reflect "the deepest wish of the Islamic 
community". since this wish was clearly revealed by the people's active 
participation in the Revolution. 
Not surprisingly, the people are not defined according to the democratic norms 
of a liberal pluralism but rather as a homogenous community of like-minded 
individuals. In other words, the rights of the people, the majority of whom are 
Muslim. were granted only to establish the new Islamic Republic and the people 
are absolutely forbidden from making amendments under any circumstances. 
Such predetermined will of the people can also be seen in sharp contradiction 
with the concept of ºrilayat al-fagih if we have assumed and understood this 
theory based on the origin of its authority merely from the religious perspective. 
As mentioned before, this interpretation is advocated by some influential 
clergies within the Islamic Republic who do not consider the legitimacy of 
ºawilayat fagih as emanating from the people's vote. RO 
This contradiction is highlighted in section 5 of the Constitution which bears the 
title The Sovereignty of the People and the Powers Thereby Conferred". There. 
80 Le. the early works of Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi 
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in Article 56, it states that God alone has the absolute right to rule over the 
world and all mankind ", and that He delegates that right to the "men at large". 
Accordingly, this "God-given right" is to be "exercised by the people". 
Furthermore, Article 8 explicitly recognises the sovereignty of the people stating 
that "in the Islamic Republic of Iran the administration of the country's affairs 
will be regulated by the will of the people". That will, of course. is expressed 
through elections for the president and members of parliament, as well as for the 
members of the local councils. 8' 
According to Article 7, in addition to the presidency and the parliament. 
provincial councils, council in district towns, and councils in cities and villages 
are all part of the decision-making and administrative bodies of the country. 
Also, according to Article 59, in questions of grave import regarding economic, 
political, social and cultural matters" legislative power may be exercised 
consultation with the people. The Leader, however, is not elected directly by the 
people. but is elected by the Assembly of Leadership Experts. The Leader is 
considered as the highest political authority and must be one of the Grand 
jurisprudents who holds the position of source of imitation (marja'-i taglid). 82 
According to Article 108, the Assembly of Leadership Experts is composed of 
only the jurisprudents who will be elected by the people. However, this limited 
franchise of candidacy is again bound to the discretion of the Guardian Council. 
This assembly will also have the right and duty to monitor the Leader's 
performance in office and to dismiss him should he lose his ability or fairness. It 
should be mentioned here that. having installed such monitoring provisions to 
demonstrate that the office of the Supreme Leader is accountable, this appears to 
be very difficult to achieve. All the jurisprudent candidates who wish to run for 
the membership of the Assembly Expert (which choose the Leader) have to pass 
the vetting process by the Guardian Council, while the six jurisprudents of the 
Guardian Council decide on who can run for the election and who cannot. Thus. 
81 Schirazi, The Constitution of lrun. p. 34. 
82 The necessity of being a Master of Jurisprudence (marj'-i taglid "as removed in amendments ofthe 
constitution in 1989. The required level was brought do\Nn to he only a mujtahiti (jurisprudent). 
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the end result would be an assembly whose members owe their membership to 
the body which is appointed by the Leader himself (a vicious circle). 
3.3.1 THE POWERS OF ELECTED 1 INSTITUTIONS 
A considerable portion of the Islamic Republic's Constitution is devoted to 
describing the role of democratic (elected) bodies. such as the elected parliament 
and city councils. elected president and, supposedly. a separate and independent 
judiciary. However, many contradictions remain right across the board. On the 
one hand, the parliament is supposed to possess a decisive power to legislate and 
supervise. On the other hand. the power of parliament is seriously reduced in the 
Constitution by the right of veto exercised by the Guardian Council. According 
to the Constitution. the right is legally granted for the Guardian Council to reject 
any resolution passed by the parliament if thought to be against the Shari"a. 
Nevertheless, the parliament has other rights to scrutinise the government. The 
most significant are specified in Articles 87-89 concerning the appointment of 
the cabinet ministers. The President should introduce his ministerial nominees to 
the parliament, in order to obtain the vote of confidence. Also. the parliament 
can pose direct questions to the ministers and. if dissatisfied with their work, can 
vote them out of office. 83 
Further powers of the parliament (Majlis) are established by Articles 76-83. by 
which the Assembly is given the right to undertake investigations and inquiries 
into all matters regarding the country". In addition, all "accords. contracts, 
treaties and international agreements" require parliament's approval. Decisions 
concerning any alteration of the national borders, as well as declaration of a state 
of emergency can only be implemented by the parliament. Aware of the 
economic concessions to foreigners in the past, the new constitution reserves the 
absolute right for the parliament to make decisions on any foreign loan, credit or 
financial aid including the employing of foreign experts. 
x' Articles 88-89 of the Constitution. 
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The powers of the President are stipulated in Articles 57,60113 and 124-129. 
The President is recognised as the second highest official in the state after the 
Supreme Leader. He is the link between the three separate branches of 
government and the head of the executive branch, the cabinet. He also holds the 
powers which have not been reserved for the leader. He is responsible for 
implementing the constitution and he fulfils certain duties that have to do with 
the official representation of the country. However. after the amendment of the 
constitution in 1989. the position of linking the three branches has been taken 
from the presidential office and given to the Leader. Indeed, this reduction in 
presidential prerogatives has affected the authority of the president for 
implementing the Constitution and heading the government accordingly. 
The authority of local councils is rather limited despite general amplification in 
Article 7. But Article 100 loosely defines the right of supervision upon the 
administration of their respective parts of the country. There, the Supreme 
Provincial Council is to "draft bills as part of its regular task and present them 
before parliament, either directly or through government". Although the 
elections for the city councils were held twenty years after the establishment of 
the Islamic Republic. until now the Provincial Supreme Councils have not been 
instituted. Governors of the provinces. cities and districts are to be appointed by 
the government, but according to Article 103 they must take into account the 
resolutions passed by the respective councils in the exercise of their powers. 
3.3.2 THE PARTIAL. RECOGNITION OF FUNDANIENTAI_ RIGHTS 
The existence of some democratic or even secular elements in the constitution of 
the Islamic Republic is not only confined to the governmental bodies, but also 
includes a variety of fundamental rights reserved for the people. However, in 
order to explore further contradictions between the democratic and the Islamic 
legalistic components of the constitution it is useful to examine how the 
democratic components of the constitution were dealt with in the same 
document. Nearly three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic 
we may criticise it by arguing that the government's practice on the issue of 
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public rights is utterly below the standard norms (violating democracy). On the 
other hand. we are faced with a large portion of Muslim citizens who not only 
believe but demand implementation of the Islamic law. 84 Therefore, 
implementing Islamic law where the majority of populace is comfortable with it 
and has voted for it seems rather democratic and acceptable (procedural level). 
However, here rises a very important problem which is how to differentiate 
between fundamentals of human rights and the laws regulating both moral and 
socio-political issues, in particular. in conjunction with modern social. economic 
and economic phenomena. 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic stipulates that it is the Islamic legalist 
component of the regime upon which all functions relating to the people and the 
government must be in accordance. 8 Given the strong Islamic sentiment of the 
society it may not be justified to blame only the regime for being rhetorically in 
favour of people's rights and at the same time repressing them by the same law. 
In fact, people's fundamental rights acknowledged in the Constitution are 
permitted only if they do not contradict Islam. In other words, people's rights are 
fully recognised in the line of the Islamic principles not individualism. 
From the outset of the Revolution, in fact, a conflict of interest occurred among 
two major forces involved in the process. It was an ideological division that 
separated revolutionary forces between two camps of the pro-Islamists and pro- 
democrats or seculars. The pro-democrat groups focused on the democratic 
elements of the new establishment such as freedom, political participation and 
democratic procedures. The pro-Islamists were not totally against these 
aspirations, but were absolutely firm in interpreting the goals and means of the 
Revolution through an Islamic prospective. 
The fact that the Constitution mentions the "Fundamental Rights" may be seen 
as a concession to those forces that had aspired to such rights and participated in 
the revolution for the sake of obtaining them. The Constitution devotes 23 
sa In fact. since the moral structure of the society is still based on religious beliefs. people trust in such 
laws and live with them in harmon. Therefore. reinforcing such laws cannot be seen as un-democratic. 
Schirazi. The Constitution of Iran, _p. 
54. v 
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articles to prescribing the fundamental rights in a special section entitled "'The 
Rights of the People". 86 These rights include the equality of all Iranians, no 
matter what ethnic group or tribe they belong to. the prohibition of prosecuting 
individuals for their opinions, the freedom of the press, the freedom to form 
political parties and societies. the respect for privacy, freedom in choosing a 
profession. freedom of assembly. legal protection and the prohibition of torture". 
But, in practice and even by rhetoric these rights are being violated. In short. the 
disagreement is based on whether these rights are given to people according to 
their natural rights, or are given as described by religious context and can be 
easily withdrawn as soon as their application is seen to be turning against 
religion. 87 
3.4. THE CONCEPT OF PARLIAMENT IN THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC 
The first attempt to draft a constitution began in Paris while Khomeini was still 
in exile but enthusiastically preparing himself to return to Iran. 88 Hassan Habibi. 
who served 12 years as Vice President during the whole Rafsanjani's period and 
the first term of Khatami, was charged with writing a draft. After the revolution 
a six member committee consisting of Habibi and five other civil jurists 
reworked the first proposal and submitted it again to Ayatollah Khomeini. 89 
Further revisions were made by a commission chaired by Yadollah Sahabi, an 
advisory minister to the interim Government of Mahdi Bazargan. 90 Surprisingly, 
this document neither contains any reference to tii'ilayul al-fuyih, nor reserves 
any special posts for the Islamic jurists except on the Guardian Council. Even on 
this body the Islamic jurists are in a minority (five of them sitting with six civil 
jurists). ` 1 
86 Articles19-42 of the Constitution. 
87 Schirazi. The Constitution of Iran. p. 43. 
ss Schirazi. The Constitution. p. 27. 
89 Kurhan, Tehran. I February 1979. 
90 Mahdi Bazarzan. the founder of Iran's Freedom Movement, a political ygroup close to Iran's National 
Front. 
9' Shaul Bakhash, The Reign o/Avatollahs, /run and the Islamic Revol Lion. London, I. B. Tauris, p. 74. 
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According to the preliminary document, the Islamic jurists were chosen by 
parliament from an unspecified number of jurists proposed by the highest 
religious authorities. the Sources of Imitation. The civil members of the council 
(three judges. three lawyers) were also to be elected by parliament. The 
Guardian Council did not automatically judge whether laws passed by the Majlis 
would be in conformity with the Shari'a. as it stands in the final text of the 
Constitution. but would only do so if requested. Such a request could be made 
by the Sources of Imitation. the President. the head of the Supreme Court and 
the chief public prosecutor. The key point here is that the Guardian Council had 
the privilege of assessing the legislation with its all members: both the lawyers 
and jurisprudents. 
According to the preliminary document, the resolutions of the Guardian Council 
were to be valid only if passed by a two-thirds majority regardless of the 
clergy's vote or the lawyer's vote and not, as in the final version of the 
Constitution. divided into two cases, against the Constitution and against the 
Shari'a. In matters relating to the Constitution all twelve members had to vote. 
but in matters relating to any possible contradiction with Shari'a, it is only for 
the jurists to decide. `' This provision was not included in the preliminary draft 
but adapted in part in the final version of the constitution. In other words. despite 
all other constitutional states in which the constitution per se has the utmost 
authority, in the Islamic Republic the constitution itself is bound to an ever 
higher authority which is the Shari'a law. The problem arises where this higher 
authority is not clear cut and. of course, is subject to the interpretation of some 
jurists who filled the positions provided by the constitution. 
The major contrast between the preliminary draft and the final text concerns the 
concept of iriluvul u/- ftigih and its political significance. The preliminary draft 
did not envisage the office of the Supreme Leader, and the role of jurisprudents 
was confined to the Guardian Council which was to have I1 members, no more 
than five of whom would be A1u/tahicls. The highest government office was to be 
the President who was not required to be "a man with religious and political 
92 Ibid. p. 83. 
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authority- His sole religious qualifications were that he should belong to 
Twelver Imami school of Shi'ism. Both Habibi's draft and the late official 
preliminary draft. however, were revised in constant consultations with high- 
ranking Islamic jurisprudents including "the Sources of Imitation". As a result. 
the powerful office of the Supreme Leader and several important posts mainly in 
the judiciary were specified only for the jurisprudents. This preliminary draft 
was approved unanimously by the Revolutionary Council appointed by the 
Ayatollah Khomeini and was published on 14 June 1979.3 
3.4.1 INSTALLATION OF WILAYAT AL-FAQIH THROUGH THE 
LEGISLATURE 
Since the formation of the Islamic Republic. the idea of an Islamic state moved 
towards what had been the real goal all along, namely pushing through the 
concept of »'IIGNUt ul- fiigih into reality. This meant for the advocates of this 
theory a unique opportunity in which the idea of rule by the jurisprudent could 
be added to the draft constitution. Thus, the preliminary draft was undermined 
and a new text was submitted. Also, the ease of referring to a referendum for 
approval of the constitution encouraged further action by the Islamic 
fundamentalists who previously could hardly imagine that their goal might be 
realised in such a short period. Subsequently they were increasingly convinced 
that that further steps to install this theory into the constitution were possible. 
In fact. the Constituent Assembly had been promised to be set up. comprised of 
hundreds of delegates to draw up the final version of the Constitution. This came 
with the decree of 4 February 1979, in which Ayatollah Khomeini appointed 
Bazargan Prime Minister of the provisional government. and charged him with 
the task of preparing immediately for the election of this Constituent Assembly. 
During the following months. Ayatollah Khomeini constantly repeated his 
promise to call upon the assembly. However, division occurred in the 
revolutionary camp on the issue of whether the final version of the constitution 
`'' kavhan, 14 June 1979. 
94 Quoted from Bani Sadr, in an interview with As-har Schirazi, The C'on. Wituliun (? / Iran. 
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should be prepared by the Constituent Assembly whose members were to be 
elected directly by the people. or if the official draft approved by the 
Revolutionary Council had to be submitted for public vote. 95 
Those who supported "direct consultation" with the people put forward various 
plausible arguments in favour of their position, including the need to increase the 
pace of normalisation of the political situation. fear that anti-revolutionary forces 
would exploit current instability to launch counter-revolutionary acts and, most 
importantly, the urgent need to pass reform measures that would have the force 
of the law. They rightly argued that all these needs would be ignored for a 
considerable period of time if the endorsement of the preliminary draft were left 
to a Constituent Assembly. 
With the abandoning the idea of a Constituent Assembly, it was now more 
possible to propagate the concept of 14iluyat ul-fagih in the public domain than 
ever. This new phase began with a violent attack against those who criticised the 
monopolistic intentions of the clergy. On the other hand, the preliminary draft of 
the constitution was subjected to a variety of criticisms formulated by Islamist 
hardliners. Surprisingly. from this stage Ayatollah Khomeini shifted his support 
from a moderate "Democratic Islamic Republic" into an "Islamic Republic". The 
row was over the term of "democratic" which could not be accepted by the 
religious establishment mainly based in Qum. As a result, the advocacy of a 
"Democratic Islamic Republic" was denounced as a "betrayal" whose purpose 
was the annihilation of Islam. `' 
This was despite the fact that the Prime Minister belonged to a pro-democracy 
group and that he was the first prime minister of a government which Ayatollah 
Khomeini himself had declared to be in conformity with the Shari'a. A few days 
later Ayatollah Khomeini branded those who wished to limit the ulama from 
political activity (power) as communist supporters. `' He thus declared that he 
disapproved of summoning a Constituent Assembly because we wish to create 
95 Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs. p. 79-83. 
96 Kavhan, 18 June 1979. 
97 Ibid. 
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an Islamic constitution" for which no "Westernised jurisprudents" were needed 
but only "noble members of the clergy'' and other scholars of Islam who were 
not clerics. 98 
However, Ayatollah Khomeini behaved with caution on the critical issue of 
wilayal al. fagih and left the direct and more open promulgation of this concept 
to his other followers. On 20 June 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini received a group of 
clergy from Khorasan province to express their views in a public meeting on the 
preliminary draft of the Constitution. On 23 June Ayatollah Hussein Ali 
Montazeri99 publicly criticised the preliminary draft and demanded that the 
president of the Islamic Republic should preferably be a" Shi 'a rn1fj1ahid'. 
100 On 
11 July. he announced that he was in favour of a "pure Islamic constitution" 
which should be far removed from every Western principle. 101 
Meanwhile, on 27 June the Kayhan newspaper published a letter to Ayatollah 
Khomeini from a member of the clergy enclosing some propositions. 
102 The 
clergyman presented several proposals for amending the preliminary draft 
conceived on the basis of an absolute interpretation of Islamic legalism. He 
demanded, for instance, that the title "Republic" should not have any influence 
on the character of an Islamic state. The right to rule should be accorded to "the 
upright Islamic jurists" who, as the first people in the state, would exercise the 
function of president and in whose hands all three branches of the government 
should be united. Another outbreak was an article published by Khusru 
Alavizadeh in which he expressed the view that all the laws passed by the 
Majlis should require the approval of the Guardian Council in order to become 
valid laws". 103 Also. Hujjat al-Edam Ali Khamenei who, later on became 
Ayatollah Khomeini's successor. put forward the view that the principle of 
wilayat al-fagih" must be included in the Iranian Constitution. 10'ý 
`' Ibid. 
`'O Ayatollah Hussein All Montazeri served nine years as Ayatollah Khomeini's successor. About a year 
before Khomeini's death he was removed from this position. 
100 Kai'han. 23 June 1979. 
101 Ibid. 11 July 1979. 
102 Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Husseini Tehrani. 
10' Karhan. Tehran. 27 June 1979. 
104 Ibid. 
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Therefore. as explained above. Ayatollah Khomeini and his like-minded allies 
decided upon a U-turn in their visible policies in spite of their previous publicly 
announced opinions. It should be added that such a drastic change of policy 
receives a great deal of attention and mostly from political scholars or educated 
people whereas, for the majority of ordinary people who wholeheartedly 
supported the cause of revolution, adding or erasing the term of wily yal u1 fuyih 
was not as significant as for the secular politicians. Moreover, the core body of 
Iranian society considered themselves true Muslims whose mainstream intended 
to replace the Pahlavi regime-which in cultural issues was known as liberal- 
with an opposite system. Thus. implementing some sort of Islamic measures to 
control the government had even more support within the masses. 
Finally. after a massive propaganda campaign which followed in support of 
inserting the position of 1i'ilaya/ al-fagih in to the Constitution. the Islamic 
legalists achieved their goal in the election of an assembly which was called the 
Assembly of Experts instead of the Constituent Assembly. They limited the 
electorate to comprise only "experts" as a substitute for a much wider group of 
candidates from all classes and guilds of society. 105 This election finally took 
place on 3 August 1979 with the desired results. It is widely said by the 
opposition that the Islamic legalists. wherever they could or felt it was 
necessary. manipulated the election process. 106 Also the opposition press 
reported on this with enormous claims that the election was absolutely flawed. 
Apparently their claims were based on the information published in pro- 
Islamists' newspapers. For instance, in several provinces the votes counted and 
accepted as valid exceeded the number people eligible to vote. Obviously, the 
election results were a full scale victory for the Islamic legalists under the 
spiritual and political leadership of Khomeini with 55 clerics out of 72 elected 
delegates. 
The actual ground for inclusion of irilayat al-/ayih in the constitution is Article 
which underpins the core doctrine to form the basis of the Islamic Republic. 
Accordingly. as it describes the primary sources of knowledge and legitimacy 
X05 Schirazi. The Constitution of Iran, p. 29. 
ýÖV Ibid, p. 31. 
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for ruling as the Koran and the sunna. the jurists who can understand it are 
required to take responsibility. Likewise, when it comes to establishing 
regulations for new situations. there is a need for continual jurisdiction (ijtihad) 
which is a matter for appropriate experts. these are the clerics. 107 The adoption 
of, viluyut al-fagih found its most apparent formulation in Article 5. 
In a plenary session. Beheshti justified his proposal with the same arguments 
that he had put forward during the discussion of Article 2 adding: in the present 
system the leadership and legislation cannot merely based on the majority. " This 
would contradict the ideological character of the Islamic Republic". He thus 
rejected democracy as un-Islamic on the grounds that the people could fall into 
error. In his view a state that had to take account of the voice of the people 
would have to submit to laws that were influenced by such errors. '" Articles 
107-109 of the constitution are a further elaboration of Article 5. They concern 
leader or the Leadership Council, the formation of the council in charge of 
electing the leader, as well as the personal qualities which the leader or members 
of the Leadership Council should posses. 
3.4.2 THE ISLAMIC CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran contain the 
concept of people ruling themselves through elected governmental bodies 
including the Consultative Assembly. It is necessary to mention that while in the 
original text of the Constitution the name given to the legislative organ is 
"Consultative Assembly". application of the title of parliament here and 
elsewhere could be conceived as a mere simplification. In other words. giving 
the name of "parliament" to this institution naturally creates a series of 
expectations which other similar counterparts in the world are supposed to 
possess and therefore are compared to the Iranian version which is lacking. 
"" See Mushruh-i Mu: akarul-i Alujlis-i Klnrhre cQan. [The Deliberations of the Assembly of Experts], 
Tehran. Majlis Publishing. vol. I. 1369 [19801. p. 261. 
108 Ibid. p. 379 
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Article 6 states that in the Islamic Republic of Iran affairs of state shall be 
managed by relying on public opinion, through elections such as the election of 
the president. representatives of the Majlis. members of councils and the like, or 
through a referendum in cases set forth in other articles of this law. Also, Article 
7 states according to the instruction of the Koran " whose affairs go by council 
amongst themselves... '" and "... take council with them in the affairs'", councils 
such as Majlis" provincial council. city. local, district, village and the like shall 
be the decision-making and administrative organs of the state. The instances. 
manner of establishment and the scope of functions and authorities of the said 
councils shall be set forth by this law and the laws arising from there. 
Consequently. on 4 March 1980 the first elections of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly were held. The Majlis was, as it is today" supposed to compose of 
"representatives of the people" from across the country, elected through direct 
and secret ballots. 
In general, legislative power is supposed to be a reflection of the people's will. 
This is an obvious and indispensable feature of any republican regime. In this 
light, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not an exception in recognising the 
existence of a capable parliament, although under title of Ma//is-i Shura (Arabic 
name for a consultative assembly). Thus, on the basis of Article 76 of the Iranian 
Constitution, the Majlis has the right to investigate and examine all the affairs of 
the country. Vested with such an authority, each deputy is responsible before the 
people, as defined in Article 84. Since freedom is a prerequisite to such a 
responsibility, each deputy is by law" (in theory) free to express his / her views 
and enjoys immunity from prosecution or arrest. 
Article 71 of the Constitution provides the Majlis with the power to enact laws 
on all matters, within the limits of its competence as laid down by the 
Constitution. It should pave the ground for development in a society based on 
precise Islamic principles and replace regulations hampering the progress of 
society with Islamic laws and orders. Articles 77 and 82 of the Constitution state 
that international treaties. protocols, contracts and agreements must be approved 
by the Majlis and that the employment of foreign experts is forbidden, except in 
cases of necessity and with the approval of the Majlis. In other words, based on 
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the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Majlis is the main institution 
conducting the Islamic Umma (Musilm Community) towards independence, 
growth and freedom. The Majlis is entitled to obstruct "infiltration of 
imperialism" by approving or disapproving all political, economic and cultural 
relations with foreign countries. The Majlis has also the right to pronounce a 
vote of confidence on an individual minister. 
3. -l. ?. 1 "I'IIE DUTIES AND RE. SPONSIßILI "TIES OF TIIE ; ý1 ýýJLIS 
Administratively, the deputies of the Majlis have two major duties to carry out. 
One is to attend the open sessions of the Majlis to express their views, make a 
final survey of the bills and motions, and ultimately pass or reject them. The 
second is to participate in the internal committees of the Majlis. Also, each 
member of the Majlis who is elected is delegating the whole nation not only his 
or her own constituency. 
According to the Constitution the responsibilities of Majlis Deputies can be 
outlined as follow: 
1. Vote of Confidence in ministers: 
2. Supervision over government performance; 
3. Interpellation or dismissal of ministers or the President: 
4. Approval of the annual budget and supervision over its spending: 
5. Endorsement and approval of treaties. protocols. contracts and 
international agreements; 
6. Permission to employ foreign experts: 
7. Permission to take or give loans to foreign and domestic aid grants: 
8. Enactment of executive laws: 
9. Right to express views and investigate all domestic and foreign-related 
affairs of the country: 
10. To act as the highest authority to examine people's complaints: 
11. To determine the procedure of prosecutions and the structure of the 
country's judicial system: 
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12. Ratification of judicial laws; 
13. To specify the qualifications and conditions requisite of someone selected 
to occupy the position of a judge; 
To conduct the Majlis-related affairs the Majlis deputies elect a speaker. two 
vice-speakers, six secretaries and three administrative managers from among 
candidate deputies for a period of one year. This governing council is called the 
Presiding Board of the Majlis. The speaker of the Majlis is the chief of the 
Presiding Board and of all Majlis offices. He is the chief representative of the 
Majlis in all contacts and meetings with other foreign and domestic delegations 
and is responsible for the execution of the Constitution and the Majlis Rules of 
Procedure. There are also two Vice-Speakers who act in the absence of the 
Majlis Speaker. the first Vice-Speaker and in his absence the second Vice- 
Speaker will administer the session. In addition, three Administrative Managers 
assist the Presiding Board in carrying out its duties and are considered very 
important as they are the contact point between the Presiding Board and the 
deputies as well as the government. 
3.5. NON-DEMOCRATIC (APPOINTED) ELEMENTS OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
Having explained the structure and functions of the Iranian parliament, in this 
section of the chapter we will enlist the non-democratic (un-elected) institutions 
of the Islamic Republic which in effect hold major power and authority over the 
system and its hierarchy. As said earlier, the contradictions embedded in the 
constitution resulted in producing parallel institutions which simply counter- 
balance each other. As a matter of fact, it does not only apply to legislative 
procedures, but the executive and judiciary branches also suffer from it. For 
example, the office of Supreme Leader holds the same power and responsibility 
which a president would possess in a well established republic. Or again, the 
judiciary branch is designed to meet all Islamic principles and therefore its 
structure and administration has been changed with this aim. yet it cannot 
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exercise its authority over clerics. Instead, a special department under the 
Supreme Leader's office has been set up dealing with crimes related to clerics. 
These institutions can be listed as the Office of Supreme Leader; the Expediency 
Council; the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution; the Council of 
Guardians; the Council of Experts; and the Supreme Council of National 
Security. The Expert Council is listed here because the procedure by which it is 
elected is not democratic. 109 Also we have included the Supreme Council for 
National Security, because according to its approved mandate, its authorities are 
not bound to mere national security issues like similar institutions in other 
political systems, but rather a military assembly which is entitled to legislate 
whatever it might see as necessary for preserving security. ''(' In short, this 
section indicates the wide scope of autonomy that the ideological hierarchy of 
the Islamic Republic preserves. In this way it is politically and legally capable of 
counter-acting any democratic innovation and movement. 
3.5.1 THE SUPREMACY OF THE SUPREME LEADER OVER 
LEGISLATI. IRE 
Considering the constitutional and legal structure of the Islamic Republic as a 
religiously bound political system demonstrates that the political hierarchy is 
thoroughly derived from a divine legitimacy. In other words, the legitimacy of 
power is shaped according to a specific interpretation of Islam. Ironically. in 
such an Islamic regime. in contrast with other non-democratic states. the 
contention and struggle to gain political power is attributed to fulfilling God's 
wishes. In addition. by comparing the authority and at the same time 
accountability of the N-ali fagih (the leader) in the Islamic Republic. it is shown 
that religious and political authority have been increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of the leader (iruli fuyih) which is far beyond the normative provisions of 
any constitutional system. 
109 Further detail follows in the next section. 
10 The whole legislations of this council are not published due to being perceived as top secret 
documents. However, some decisions are broadcast in the form of a very short summary. For example. 
the council banned the media from publishing Ayatollah Taheri's resignation letter, with no further 
explanations (refer to Chapter 5). 
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However. the discussion about 1+ iluyut al-fagih inside as well as outside the 
Assembly of Experts. revealed a group of hardliners who were unwilling to 
accept even the somewhat limited restrictions which the text of the constitution 
imposed on the power of ruling jurists. The hardliners also expressed their 
displeasure with such "new-fangled" institutions as parliament, especially when 
these were granted powers which they preferred to see reserved for the jurists. 
They demanded much more absolute and concrete rule for wilayat al-faqih with 
the same full authority that the Prophet had exercised as God's deputy on the 
Earth. ''' Ultimately this process went far beyond the conditions laid down in the 
constitution. The high point of this process was reached when in 1987 Khomeini 
declared the rule of wilayat al-fagih to be absolute. 
Although Khomeini quite often showed his intention of not interfering in the 
government's affairs, the critical situation between revolutionary forces led him 
to bring a more personal influence and even presence in order to direct events in 
due course. It was not expected of him to engage with daily and ordinary 
political rivalry since he had decided to reside in Qum instead of Tehran on his 
return from exile. But, the intensity of the situation and the charismatic 
personality of Khomeini played a significant impact on how he modified his 
practice and undertook much more involvement in the executive affairs of the 
state. For example, the way he created the Revolutionary Courts immediately 
after the fall of the old regime. appointing their judges himself and granting the 
courts absolute power. However, he was keen to show his impartiality and tried 
to stay away from the centre of rows by delegating decision-makings to his close 
allies. 
Khomeini's function as the highest legislative power until August 1980, when 
parliament began passing laws. did not appear as an obvious contradiction to the 
sovereignty of the people because he was well recognised as the true leader of 
the revolution. However. once the country's legislative institutions-parliament 
and the Guardian Council-began their work, the contradiction became much 
111 Mashruh-i Mu_akarat-i Majiis-i Khuhragan [The Deliberation of the Assembly of Experts]. Tehran. 
Presidential Publication. vol. 11.1369 [1980]. p. 1065. 
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greater. During this period the most important decisions concerning both the 
legislature and the legislation were still significantly influenced by Khomeini. In 
fact. his influence was so great that it caused several changes in the powers 
conferred to parliament and the Guardian Council, including revisions of the text 
of the constitution in ways the constitution itself does not sanction, and the 
establishment of a council to undertake such revisions. 12 
The first step in changing the balance between two legislative institutions gave 
the Majlis greater authority by which it could pass laws in an emergency with an 
absolute majority even though it would be in contradiction to the Shari'a law and 
the primary Islamic ordinances (ahkam-i avvaliya). 113 The immediate occasion 
for this was a measure taken by the Revolutionary Council and later by the 
Majlis to restrict private ownership of agricultural and communal lands. 114 
Basically, as these measures were in direct contradiction with the Shari'a, the 
Guardian Council rejected them. However, the government of the Islamic 
Republic deemed it vital to increase its wealth and so consulted Khomeini to 
resolve the problem. The answer was positive and in favour of the government 
and the parliament which demanded his approval to bypass the Guardian 
Council. 
This was a temporary relief for the government and the Males. As the Guardian 
Council found other ways to foil resolutions of parliament. Khomeini issued 
another decree on 6 April 1984 in which he declared that the relevant resolutions 
of parliament must depend on a two-thirds majority but that such resolutions 
would no longer need the approval of the Guardian council. However, these 
solutions did not succeed in resolving the persistent deadlock between the 
government and parliament on one hand and the Guardian Council on the other. 
The regime thus saw itself trapped in an equation of acting according to the 
Shari's or being committed to the expediency of its primary interest. Khomeini 
intervened again with a far-reaching measure through establishing a new 
legislative institution. Its primary task was to resolve problems resulting from a 
Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran. p. 63. 
Amir Arjomand, The Turban. for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. Oxford University 
Press. 1989. p. 183. 
114 Schirazi, ibid. 
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contradiction between the Shari's and the demands of modern legislation. 
particularly when recourse to other regulations based on adapting the Shari's 
proved equally unsuccessful. 
In January 1988 Khomeini declared that an Islamic state had the right to 
disregard the Islamic ordinances when passing certain resolutions in the primary 
needs of the Islamic state. The only principle to be followed is "what is in the 
interest (maslahat) of maintaining the regime (Islamic order)"'. At this point 
some observers argue that the aforementioned adoption of bestowing upon the 
parliament the more practical and independent legislative authority should be 
seen as a progressive approach by the highest rank of the Islamic Republic. In 
other words, it was to reclaim the genuine authority of the parliament in a 
modem regime which ought to be affirmative. However, this view seems very 
optimistic and not fulfilled by the wider reality. In essence, Khomeini made 
recourse to set up even un-Islamic laws if that was what was needed to maintain 
the whole entity of the Islamic state. 
In a decree issued on 7 January 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini announced that 
government rule (the rule of the Islamic Republic) is "derived from the absolute 
dominion of the Prophet of God. " So maintaining the rule of God (the Islamic 
Republic) is the first and foremost obligation and stood above all ordinances 
that were derived or directly commanded by Allah. " Therefore, if a measure was 
in the interest of the state and thereby Islam, it could terminate other Islamic 
ordinances. even prayer. fasting and the pilgrimage to Mecca (ahkam-i ilahi). iii 
Accordingly, on 6 February Khomeini set up a body (the Expediency Council) 
with the task of assessing what was in the interest of the state as and when 
required in the case of disagreement between parliament and the Guardian 
Council. 
The logic behind the establishment of the Expediency council was to facilitate 
the task of legislation which had been repeatedly blocked by continuous 
disagreements between parliament and the Guardian Council. However, we 
115 Ayatollah Khomeini's letter to President Khamenei published in Kai hun, 7 January 1988. 
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cannot find any legal ground upon which such institution was set up. In other 
words, Khomeini's decree was recognised as a self-legislating one which had the 
power to create another crucial legislative body, which in essence proved that 
Khomeini had the same power as a constituent assembly. According to his 
decree, the Expediency Council was given the power to make a final decision in 
disputed cases. The task of this council has been increased since Khomeini's 
death and it now acts as the advisory body of the leader as well as fulfilling its 
original task of legislation. 
Therefore, the Islamic Republic now had one more un-elected institution with 
legislative powers whose members were not chosen by the people but by the 
leader. 116 Furthermore, the Expediency Council was not the only body which 
Khomeini endowed with the power to pass legislation independently of 
parliament and the Guardian Council, and even outside the framework of the 
constitution. There was also the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, 
formed in 1980 shortly after the universities were pressurised into closing. This 
council, whose members were appointed by Khomeini, was instructed to 
transform the education system in universities and schools on the basis of the 
Islamic culture and values. Surprisingly, in January 1987, at the request of then 
President Khamenei, the leader conferred on it the right to formulate "guidelines 
and rules" (_avabit va qvai 'd) independently of parliament. 117 
3.5.1.1 THE A: A1EADHENT OF THE CO., N`STITUTIOX 
Of course, there was no provision in the constitution allowing the Leader to act 
independently in this way. Khomeini's decisions of this kind were based solely 
on the principle that the rules of jurists, which in this case represented by the 
person of Khomeini. are practically unrestricted. According to this principle, the 
jurist leader not only has the power to issue government decrees independently 
of parliament and the Guardian Council. but also to issue decrees that would 
Article 1 12 of the Constitution. 
Schirazi, The Constitution o0 ran. p. 65. 
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ignore the constitution if, in his opinion, these decrees are in the interest of the 
Islamic state. ' 18 
However, ten years' experience of the Islamic Republic had proven that the 
existing structure of the constitution can no longer be beneficial as the specific 
balance of power had repeatedly brought the Islamic regime to a standstill. In 
addition, the immediate prospect of Khomeini's demise as a charismatic leader 
alarmed the ruling class to prepare for a safe and sound transfer of power. 
Therefore, the need was felt to amend the constitution in order to achieve a 
merely political goal which was not surprisingly accomplished through a legal 
pathway. However, these developments coincided with the end of the Iraq-Iran 
War and the urgency of reconstructing the country. So both political and social 
grounds were ready to accept that such a change was inevitable and must be 
done without delay. 
Yet it was inexpedient to disregard the constitution in the longer term. 
Therefore. Khomeini announced in April 1989 that the Assembly for Revising 
the Constitution would be set up to consider several issues to be added to or 
amended from the constitution. The Council was responsible for discussing and 
specifying the issues which had been presented by the three branches of the 
government to the leader for initial approval and then to the people to be voted 
on. Three main features can be counted in the amendment of the constitution 
relating to the office of Supreme Leader. In fact. these changes paved the way 
for a much smoother transfer of power to the next leader and administration. 
The most significant modification was to remove the need for the leadership 
candidate to bear the title of "Grand Ayatollah" (the Source of Imitation or 
murju'-i Iaq/icl). It is also worthwhile to mention that while the amendment of 
the constitution was being processed and although the new text had not vet been 
voted by the people in a referendum. due to the death of Khomeini the new 
leader was appointed according to an unapproved version of the constitution. 
The second alteration concerned the judiciary and its highest rank. which 
'1" Ibid, p. 6.3. 
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previously had been the Supreme Council of Judiciary, comprising of high 
profile judges who elected the head of council. According to the new version of 
the constitution, the Supreme Council of Judiciary was abolished and, in turn. 
the Head of Judiciary was to be appointed by the leader. The third alteration 
concentrated on having more items on the list of the leader's powers such as the 
right of appointing and removing the Head of the National Broadcasting 
Company which is the sole broadcasting company in the country. In addition. 
another major change was abolishing the office of the prime minister and 
strengthening the executive power in the hands of the president. 
Moreover. Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Leader frequently employed 
legislative powers without consulting the constitutional bodies of government, or 
even those legislative organs he himself had created. In other words, a full scale 
of what can be named as "arbitrary rule" was in practice. A known routine in the 
Islamic Republic is to refer to the leader and request his intervention in order to 
resolve persistent disagreements between government bodies. Ironically, this 
intervention for the regime's advocates is not only considered as a disadvantage 
and inefficiency for constitutional order, but is regarded as a unique privilege of 
the Islamic regime to ease the crisis with the leader's resolving orders and 
decrees. For example, in one legislative act Khomeini ordered that the Supreme 
Council of Justice should not function as a council but that tasks should be 
divided among its members upon whom greater individual responsibility was 
conferred. Obviously, such decision is of a legislative nature and should have 
been done by the parliament. 119 
Ayatollah Khomeini also announced a decree in December 1982 which 
consisted of eight separate points relevant to the justice system. For instance, the 
decree made it illegal to arrest and interrogate people without a proper court 
order and to search homes without a warrant. 120 All these points had been 
mentioned and sanctioned by the constitution but due to widespread 
wrongdoings by the officials the leader personally had to intercede. Finally, he 
created the Special Court for the Clergy (dadgah-i vi_hiv j'ih Rawhanivai) whose 
119 Arjomand. The Turban for the Crown. p. 182-184. 
120 Schirazi. The Constitution of /ran. p. 66. 
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jurisdiction was exclusively designed to try the clerics only and separated from 
the administration of the judiciary. These decisions were in clear contrast to 
Articles 157 and 158 of the constitution where the Judiciary branch is assumed 
to be responsible for such decisions whether directly or through passing 
legislations through parliament. However. the matter of appealing and requesting 
Khomeini to intervene and legislate on controversial issues was taken for 
granted by almost all the officials inside the government. In other words, 
Khomeini's decrees and commands were the last resort in reaching a decision. '2' 
Not surprisingly. Ayatollah Yazdi revealed some specific cases of such actions 
which simply and routinely ought to be discussed and passed by the parliament 
in an ordinary state of affairs: 122 
1. The standardisation of sentences involving discretionary punishments, a 
problem that Parliament, the Guardian Council and the judiciary could not 
agree upon. 
2. Allowing insufficiently educated judges to practice in the courts. Whereas 
according to Article 162 of the constitution only jurists (Mujlahids) were 
eligible to hold such posts. 
3. Determining those cases in which discretionary punishments involving 
whipping or flogging were appropriate. 
4. Deciding whether justice should be dispended by single judge or several 
judges. and whether this should be after separate consultation or jointly. 
5. Determining under which circumstances appeals could be allowed after a 
legal judgment has been delivered. 
6. Clarification on the issue of whether smugglers. like "hypocrites" 
(munafigin by which was meant members of the MKO (sa.: man-i 
Mujahidin Khalq) Islamic Militant Organisation) or their sympathisers), 
should be tried singly or in their quality as members of a group which has 
121 Arjomand, ibid, p. 161. 
12 He was a member of the Supreme Judiciary Council, who became the Head of Judiciary after 
Ayatollah's Khomeini's death. 
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already been condemned as "insurgents against God or perpetrators of 
corruption on the Earth. '23 
As mentioned earlier, for Yazdi like most Islamists, legislating by the Supreme 
Leader is not only considered an extraordinary way of legislation, but a precious 
tool of governing according to the Islamic principle. Apart from judiciary and 
legislative affairs which naturally would be in contradiction with the Islamic 
Shari'a, the Supreme Leader's supremacy over the executive branch can be 
clearly demonstrated in connection with the most important decisions 
undertaken by that part of government. A salient example is the prominent 
domination of the foreign policy agenda by the Supreme Leader. It is a fact that 
Khomeini was the prime decision maker on both the general guidelines for 
foreign policy, as well as specific steps which were taken in order to put these 
guidelines into practice. ' 24 
In fact, the foreign policy pursued by Ayatollah Khomeini was rooted in his 
conception of an Islamic state and the role he envisaged for it on the world stage. 
His primary goal was to obtain a sharp and absolute independence in relation to 
any other powers, but publicly he admired the idea of the Islamic rule all over 
the world which gave the Islamic Republic a major ongoing task to carry out. 
Effectively, such outrageous policies scared Iran's Muslim neighbours rather 
than any other non-Muslim country in the world with the exception, of course, of 
Israel. 
3.5.2 THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WALL FAQIH 
The i4wali fugih 's representatives are numerous and widespread across the Iranian 
administration apparatus. In almost all governmental administrations whether 
civil or military such positions have been practically installed and the person 
who holds this title benefits from the same treatment and privilege as the head of 
the relevant administration would have. Although the constitution confers only 
12' Kavhan, 27 January 1989. 
124 Rajai Khorasani's interview with newspaper Ettelaa't 12 November 1990. 
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supervisory powers over the government on the leader. in practice the whole of 
the state apparatus is geared to carry out the Supreme Leader's orders which 
literally are conveyed through his representatives. Metaphorically. Hadi 
Khamenei, when he was a member of the Assembly for Revising the 
Constitution. stated that although Ayatollah Khomeini's office consisted of only 
one room. his hands would reach into the most distant corners of state 
administration. '`' 
The leader's representatives amongst the government authorities are in fact his 
special assistants. 126 Officially the representatives of the leader only exercise a 
supervisory function, but in practice. as Mahdi Bazargan writes. they decide on 
everything in the government agency where they are posted . 
117 However, the 
fact that there is no mention of these representatives in the constitution caused 
much difficulty at last in the Guardian Council. which concluded that they be 
legally recognised in the revision of the constitution. It was clearly inappropriate 
that so influential an apparatus of power should not be based on legality. 128 
On the other hand. the persisting intervention of the representatives of the leader 
in the work of the government authorities, and the inconvenience which this 
caused. can be counted as the reason for not making their office a legally quoted 
institution. If they acquired a constitutional status, according to the then Prime 
Minister Musavi. this would paralyse the government. '29 To justify his point 
Musavi described how the heads of other government organisations feared the 
representatives of the leader and how this fear impeded their work. Therefore. it 
is apparent that if these delegates were to be legalised. the existence of the 
government was in great doubt. Even Rafsanjani, a prominent figure in the 
125 Bahman Baktiari. The Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionan- /ran: the lnstitutionali: ation of 
Factional Politics. Gainesville. University Press of Florida. 1996. 
126 Mo: akarat-i Ba: nagari dar Qanun-i Asasi [Debates on the Revising the Constitution], Tehran, 
Majlis Publication. vol. l. p. 286. 
127 See Zendcgi-namirvih Mahdi Ba: argan [Bazargan's Autobiography]. Tehran, Serat Publication, 
1984. p. 122. 
128 It was how Ayatollah Mo'men a member of the Guardian Council, argued in the Assembly for 
Revising the Constitution in defence of his suggestion that the representatives of the Imam should be 
adapted in the Constitution. The Debates on the Revising the Constitution, Presidential Publication, 
Tehran, Vol. II. P. 698 
129 Schirazi. The Constitution of /ran, p. 73. 
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Islamic Republic. expressed his objection to giving institutional status to the 
representatives of the leader. 130 
Eventually, the proposal for the constitutional legalisation of the leader's 
representatives did not obtain a majority in the Assembly for Revising the 
Constitution. However, this office was not abolished and remained until 
Ayatollah Khomeini"s successor took the office of leadership. In addition to this 
aforementioned authorities and powers. whether mentioned in the constitution or 
not, the Supreme Leader has full authority upon all so-called "revolutionary 
institutions'". These institutions are founded upon the properties confiscated from 
the members of the former regime and are estimated to possess about 35 per cent 
of the national wealth. These are the Foundation for the Deprived and War- 
Disabled, the Foundation of Martyrs. and the Committee of the Imam (a 
nationwide charity which has the license to raise cash). 
'31 
In short, all these different powers may be summed up in one sentence: over and 
above the Supreme Leader's functions as religious and political authority, he 
holds in his hands the reins of all branches of government and all other powers 
necessary to run a government. As leader and Source of Imitation (marja' iaglia') 
he can intervene in all matters of government whenever he wishes or is asked to 
do so. Therefore, with such an immense concentration of power in the hands of 
the leader. the sovereignty of the people is simply, for practical reasons, 
abolished. Although it did not correspond to the actual wording of the Islamic 
Republic's constitution. it has been consistent with its spirit and in essence with 
the concept of wilayat al-faqih. 
10 The Debates on the Revising the Constitution. vol. 11. p. 654. 
RI Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure ot'Power in the Islamic Republic. Washington 
D. C. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2000, p. 73-75. 
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3.5.3 THE RESTRICTIONS ON PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (THE GUARDIAN 
COUNCIL) 
The limited sovereignty given to the people in the Constitution is not only the 
result of concentration of unlimited power in the hands of the Leader, 132 but also 
because of the nature of other institutions set up by the constitution presumed to 
represent the people (parliament, presidency and the Assembly of Leadership 
Experts). These institutions have either lost their representative character due to 
their rigged elections or yielded their powers to other state organs not chosen by 
the people. According to Article 62 of the Constitution, the organisation of 
parliamentary elections is left to the legislative institutions themselves. The first 
regulations for holding the First Majlis were decided by the Revolutionary 
Council in February 1980. 
Under these regulations, the eligibility of candidates depended on a series of 
conditions that were open to arbitrary interpretation and set in order to prevent 
unwanted people from being elected or even running as a candidate. For 
example, a candidate must not be "suspected of dishonesty or moral depravity" 
and his "allegiance to the government of the Islamic Republic'" must not be in 
doubt. In addition. as a pre-emptive action the entire body of officials who had 
served the former regime even in level of municipal councils were completely 
banned from nominating themselves as candidates. '33 Also in 1984 further 
amendments were introduced to provide restrictions on parliamentary 
candidates. 
The new legislation required prospective candidates to have made "a practical 
commitment" or an authentic religious profession and commitment to Islam". 
According to this amendment, large landowners who had had barren lands 
registered in their name, people condemned by the courts as apostates or 
sentenced to hadd punishments134 and whose repentance had not been 
'32 It depends on the interpretation of the role and power of wa/i fagih. as whether to assume his role 
absolute and beyond the law or within the law. 
'''' Qanun-i Intakhabat-i Mu/Iis [the parliamentary electoral laws], Tehran. Presidential Publication. 
134 The punishment which has been asserted by the God and quoted in Koran. 
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confirmed, or anyone who fell under the sanctions stipulated by Article 49135 of 
the constitution were disqualified from standing in an election. The irony is that 
the parliament itself passed such non-democratic regulations. 
On the other hand. as mentioned before. according to the Iranian Constitution 
the power of the parliament is greatly limited by the Guardian Council. Of 
course, the extent of these restrictions can only be fully appreciated if we 
analyse how legislation is carried out in practice. This is best understood by 
examining the power of the veto which the Guardian Council is able to exercise 
over all parliamentary resolutions in the name of Shari 'a and the Constitution. 
During the first Majlis the Guardian Council raised objections to 102 out of 370 
(about 27.5 per cent) of the legislations passed by the Majlis. and sent them back 
to be amended. During the second Majlis. this figure rose 118 out of 316 (37.3 
per cent) and during the third Majlis to 96 out of 245 (39.9 per cent). This 
practice was followed with passion during the fourth Majlis in which 128 bills 
were returned for revision. 136 In addition. the number of repeated rejections by 
the Guardian Council even reached to five times in some cases. That caused the 
formation of the Expediency Council to be seemingly indispensable to ensure 
that the legislative body was not completely lifeless. 
Rejections made by the Guardian Council to parliamentary resolutions meant 
that the bill will either dropped altogether or should be altered according to the 
wishes of the Guardian Council. However. since the Expediency Council has 
come into existence, it makes the final decision on resolutions which the Majlis 
and the Guardian Council cannot agree upon. As a matter of fact. the 
parliamentary resolutions which the Guardian Council objects to are of greater 
importance in terms of their influence on political and social life in the Islamic 
Republic than the resolutions which do not make a substantial different in socio- 
political life. A former member of the Guardian Council has categorized such 
resolutions as "Fundamental Bills" against the "Ordinary Bills"'. 137 A published 
report stated that during the first and second parliaments. out of 64 parliamentary 
135 Article 49 lists the professions and businesses which the Shuri'u declares are forbidden. 
Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran, p. 93. 
37 Ayatollah Kashani who is also the temporary Friday Pray Imam of Tehran. 
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resolutions of fundamental importance 31 were rejected by the Guardian 
Council. 138 These were resolutions that dealt with foreign trade, land ownership. 
industrial law, and the co-operative system. 
Also, in regard to examining resolutions, the Guardian Council adopts an 
attitude of dominance towards the Majlis which is quite obvious. As a result, the 
Guardian Council is mostly not concerned about informing parliament of the 
reasons for its decisions. Consequently. the council usually confines itself to 
state its objection on a particular resolution whether it is against the Shari 'a or 
one of articles of the constitution. And in most cases where the Majlis requests 
the Council to give the reasons for such decisions, there is no detailed answer. 139 
This caused public indignation during the first Majlis. The then Speaker of 
Parliament, Rafsanjani, accused the Council of overstepping its limits when it 
rejected a bill approved by parliament concerning buying and selling 
merchandise. 140 He represented the opinion that, if this procedure continued in 
the same way. the power of veto of the Guardian Council would in practice lead 
to the disempowerment of the Majlis. '" He also described the method adopted 
by the Guardian Council as "extremely dangerous" and demanded that it should 
only exercise its powers on request. 142 
Apart from the opposition's point of view in which the whole system of Islamic 
scrutiny is unacceptable. the major criticisms towards the Guardian Council have 
come chiefly from the Islamic leftist camp in the ruling system. The stronger 
their representatives grew in parliament. the more severely the conflict between 
the two legislative institutions became apparent. During the third Majlis in 
which the faction of Islamic Left had the majority. it resisted and continued to 
protest against the Guardian Council's concrete position. While the Majlis and 
government dominated by the Islamic leftists had similar opinions on the bills, 
the Guardian Council supported by the conservatives repeatedly blocked them 
and consequently, tension mounted at the highest level. Ironically, during the 
Resalal, 18 June 1987. 
Ibid. 9 June 1987 
140 Karhan. 15 August 1984. 
141 Ibid. 21 October 1985. 
142 Kavhan. 14 August 1984. 
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1980s the most controversial cases between the Majlis and the Guardian Council 
were about private land ownership. The House of People voted to restrict 
individuals' right to own properties. whereas the conservative Guardian Council 
consistently rejected parliament's resolutions in order to protect the individual's 
right of ownership (even though this was in the name of Islamic law). 
One might ask how the non-democratic Guardian Council was in favour of 
individual rights while the supposedly representative government and parliament 
were both against people's rights. The answer lies in the political constituency of 
these three institutions during that particular period of time. During the first 
decade of the Islamic Republic. the government and the parliament were 
dominated by the radical-populist elements with leftist opinion on political and 
economic issues and the Guardian Council consisted of high profile 
jurisprudents with traditional support and links to the merchants and Bazaar. The 
justification given for such restricted legislation from the government and Majlis 
was the necessity of the time. while the Guardian Council was not willing to 
recognise any necessity other than keeping the Shari 'a law in practice which. 
indeed. was in the interest of their class too. Hence, the contradictions hanging 
over the concept of the Islamic state concern not only the differences between 
'Islamic rule' and 'democratic rule". but also between the Islamic rule' and 
`Islamic law" per se. 
The extent of the intervention by the Guardian Council in every detail of 
governmental affairs such as budgeting well exceeds the boundaries of separated 
powers. According to the Constitution any type of contract, treaty, and accord 
signed by the government must be passed by parliament, otherwise it will not be 
effective. For example, a mutual agreement between the Iranian government and 
India about launching a direct flight between two countries needs to be approved 
by the parliament, if that agreement is to be written and bears the title of 
contract. Of course, the situation worsens when the Guardian Council also 
should examine whether such resolutions are in accordance with the constitution 
and the Shari 'a law or not. 
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Another power reserved for the Guardian Council is specifically stated in the 
constitution-namely the right to interpret the constitution. The Council has 
made use of this right on several occasions. mainly during the early years of the 
Islamic Republic. If these interpretations are passed by a three-quarters majority, 
the Council's verdict on the Constitution will have the same validity as the 
Constitution itself. Otherwise they have the force of advisory judgements and 
are not compulsory. `' According to its own ruling, the Council interprets the 
Constitution when requested to do so by the Presiding Board of the Parliament, 
the Head of Judiciary, the Cabinet or the president. Most observers believe that 
in practice. the Guardian Council through its frequent rulings on interpretation of 
the constitution has tended in a direction which has pleased the conservative 
144 
camp. 
3.5.4 THE EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL 
In addition to the office of Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council which 
have the power of legislation. there are other institutions which participate in 
legislation but which were not set up to represent the people. These are the 
Expediency Council, the Supreme Council of the National Security and the 
Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. However, the institution of the 
Expediency Council obtained constitutional status due to the amendment of the 
constitution and accordingly is responsible for concluding the persistent 
disagreements between the Majlis and the Guardian Council, 145 but it could also 
operate as an independent legislator when it is deemed necessary to do so. In 
other words, the Expediency Council can pass legislations with no referral from 
either parliament or the Guardian Council, but from the Supreme Leader. 
Obviously, the Council from the outset emerged as an exceptional provision 
within the political structure and caused some difficulties over its mandate. 
justification and functions. 146 
See Dr. Mehrpur's interview with Resalal newspaper 23 February 1992 
144 Schirazi The Constitution Doran. p. 95. 
145 Plus advisory status for the Supreme Leader. 
'a(' Anoushiravan Ehteshami. After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic. London, Routledge, 1995. 
p. 33. 
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Of course. this is a perceptible infringement on the Constitution but such statutes 
based on its approval were endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini thereafter. 
'47 Out of 
50 decisions taken by the Expediency Council since the 1992, only 14 were in 
response to the persistent and referred disagreement between the Majlis and the 
Guardian Council. The Expediency Council is free to formulate its decisions 
either by agreeing with the position of the Guardian Council or that of 
parliament. However, it can also decide an independent outcome. ignoring the 
other two institutions. For instance, the law on how to tackle drug trafficking and 
its punishments was ratified completely by the Expediency Council in 1988. 
Consequently, this very self-determined authority was limited slighted by adding 
that: the Council shall meet for consideration on any issue forwarded to it by the 
"Leader" and shall carry out any other responsibility as mentioned in this 
Constitution. Also, the permanent and changeable members of the Council shall 
be appointed by the Leader. The rules for the Council shall be formulated and 
approved by the Council members subject to the confirmation by the Leader. 148 
However, up until 1997. the then President (Hashemi Rafsanjani) was also the 
Head of Expediency Council. But, due to the election of the pro-reformist 
Khatami. the Leader decided to appoint the former President (Rafsanjani) to 
carry on with the job instead of sticking to tradition and assigning the new 
President to lead the Council. The public image at that stage perceived this 
decision as a courtesy towards a powerful president who willingly obeyed the 
law and stepped down from the presidency. But, in effect, this change drastically 
affected the authority of the elected government and weighed on the side of the 
un-elected part of the regime. 
'49 On 18 March 1997. Ayatollah Khamenei issued 
a decree unfolding the new arrangements on the membership. operation and 
leadership of the Expediency Council. In essence. the new structure of the 
"' The Expediency Council's self-approval conducted on 24 October 1989 and was endorsed by 
Khomeini two months later that year. 
14' Article 112 of the Constitution. 
149 Wilfried Buchta. Who Rules Iran? The Structure of the Power in the Islamic Republic, A Joint 
Publication of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Konard Adenauer Stiftung. 
Washington, 2000. p. 61. 
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Council provides far-reaching status for it in terms of superiority over parliament 
coo and government. 
In particular, with the introduction of a new, two type membership, the Council 
tends to act as a Senate more than a mere dispute-solving body. Khamenei's 
order illustrates the various aspects of importance that the council is supposed to 
bear and the extent to which the Leader is free to decree. ' The whole document 
clearly demonstrates a kind of super authority perceived by the Leader. He did 
not hesitate to establish a set of new functions for a newly reformulated 
institution. demanding it to act precisely under his supervision. Consequently. 
the new Expediency Council under Rafsanjani's direction turned into a 
conservative dominated council with a majority membership of famous 
conservative figures. The conservatives who would have occupied governmental 
roles if Nateq Nuri had been able to win the 1997 presidential race found it very 
beneficial to enter the Council and therefore wrestle with a pro-reformist 
government. Finally. the performance of the Council since then proves how far 
its existence was conducive for the efforts made by the conservatives to halt the 
reformists' democratic agenda. This point will he discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. 
ý. ý. 5 111 E SL; NREME C(. )I. JNCIL 1ýOR N. SI; CI; RIIY 
The Supreme Council for National Security is another institution given the right 
to have a legislative power and role. I'2 It was formed on the instructions of the 
Assembly of Revising the Constitution and charged with the task of 
safeguarding the national interest and along with protecting the Islamic 
Revolution, as well as the territorial integrity and the national sovereignty of the 
country". This Council's functions are formulated in Article 176 of the 
Constitution as follows: 
Ibid. p. 62. 
Appendix 1. 
'` Article 112 of the Constitution. 
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1. Determining the country's policies concerning defence and security within 
the framework of the general government policies detennined by the Leader. 
2. Coordination of activities in the areas relating to politics, intelligence, social. 
cultural and economic fields in regard to general defence and security 
policies. 
3. Exploitation of material and intellectual resources of the country for facing 
the internal and external threats. 
The membership of Council is to consist of: heads of three branches of the 
government; chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces; the 
officer in charge of the planning and budget affairs; two representatives 
nominated by the Leader; ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior Affairs and 
Intelligence; a minister related to the issue: and the highest ranking officials 
from the Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps. 
Commensurate with its duties, the Supreme Council for National Security shall 
form sub-councils such as Defence Sub-council and National Security Sub- 
council. Each Sub-council will be presided over by the President or a member of 
the Supreme Council for National Security appointed by the President. The 
scope of authority and responsibility of the Sub-councils will be determined by 
law and their organizational structure will be approved by the Supreme Council 
for National Defence. The decisions of the Supreme Council for National 
Security shall be effective after the confirmation by the Leader. 153 
This council is yet another institution which existed long before it was legally 
recognized. It has been capable of stretching its hands over other official 
government functionaries and therefore, deciding key high profile policies. It 
makes decisions about a whole range of matters, specifically foreign policy. 
which naturally should be made by the president and supervised by the 
parliament. Although the head of council is the president. ironically all decisions 
should be approved by the leader which practically reduces the role of president 
to a secretary level. Also. due to the ideological nature of the Islamic Republic a 
Article 1 12 of the Constitution. 
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wide range of issues relating to the people's freedom are discussed by this 
council. 
In practice. the implementation of different measures to restrict people"s rights 
in the lone term was given to this council. whereas originally it is for the 
parliament to decide on in case of necessity. For example. as clergy Yazdi 
admits, the Council draws up plans for fighting against the cultural invasion 
instigated by the West and its allies within the country" and for restraining 
"social immorality-'. 154 Also, according to the then Speaker of the Majlis, Nateq 
Nuri, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only carries out the preparatory phase for 
respective decisions. The council's intervention in areas which are not normally 
defined as defence and security is no longer rare, because for such an ideological 
state every event becomes a matter of security for the regime. whether it be the 
publication of a political article in a periodical or the protest of teachers for their 
demands for higher salary and better pension scheme. 155 
3.5.6 THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
This council is another institution with legislative power which is not elected by 
the people and was not even mentioned in the Constitution. The Council's 
initiative dates back to the Revolutionary Council in 1980 which established it to 
implement the "Islamization process of universities". Consequently, it began 
with closing down all universities and expelled a considerable portion of 
professors and lecturers. However, in 1984 Ayatollah Khomeini certified its new 
statues which describe its aims and tasks. They clearly demonstrate the extent of 
this council's activity in areas which in a democratic system would normally he 
dealt with by parliament. Amongst its tasks are "to identify the principles for 
cultural policies under the government of the Islamic Republic. and defining the 
goals and the directions of plans for culture. education and research" as well as 
"the spread and reinforcement of the influence of the Islamic culture in all areas 
"'' Resulai. 19 November 1990. 
155 At the time of writing this thesis the issue of teachers' protest in Tehran is being dealt with by the 
S. C. N. S 
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of society, and the intensification of the cultural revolution and promotion of 
approved general culture. "156 
This council debates and approves its own relevant issues put forth as the 
agenda. Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized that such approved issues must be 
regarded as laws. At the same time, there is no indication of such in the 
Constitution that the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution is a legislative 
organ. Nevertheless, the Council's ratified bills are valid as approved laws. All 
in all, in accordance with the instructions of Ayatollah Khomeini and now his 
successor. this council is the final arbitrary body on cultural issues. Following 
the formation of the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution, it declared itself 
the highest body for making policies and decisions in connection with cultural, 
educational and research activities within the framework of the general policies 
of the system and considered its approvals indispensable. In fact, the group of 
seven (in 1980-83) and then 17 (in 1984) that was even expanded to 36 in 1999 
was expected to compile all the cultural policies of the country. 
In addition to the legislative functionaries, the council was planned to operate as 
a controller body to block any independent student movement. This task was 
completed by banning many books and purging thousands of students and 
lecturers through a so-called selection process of applicants who wished to enter 
universities. Also, the Council formed a chain of institutions inside universities 
called "Islamic societies" (anjuman islaini) to oversee students' social. political 
and even personal life. For instance, the latest controversial law-making issue 
occurred in October 2001 when the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution 
ordered that all private Internet Service Providers (must be under state control. ''? 
The decision was never approved by the sixth Majlis but the government was 
ordered to implement it. 158 
15" Alujmu'-i Qavanin va A4uyurraral-i Nahad hail-i ih lnyu/ah-i Island [The Laws of Revolutionary 
Institutions]. Presidential Publication. Tehran. 1372 [1993]. 
"' <w%%w. isna. ir> in an interview with Qulam Hussein Elham. The Judiciary Spokesman on 10 July 
2003. 
158 Ibid. 
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3.6. CONCLUSION 
Despite violent revolutionary upheavals, a bloody war with Iraq, numerous 
internal political protests and power struggles among the ruling elite, the Islamic 
Republic has managed not only to survive but also to maintain a considerable 
degree of political stability. The revival of politicised Shia discourse derived 
out of authentic discourse could successfully mobilise a large portion of the 
populace. This doctrine seized power in 1979 and has been consolidating its hold 
over the levers of power since. It allows the ruling elite to tolerate a limited 
degree of political pluralism. including presidential and parliamentary elections 
every four years. Nonetheless, the clerical regime has weaknesses. It has not 
succeeded in remedying the political, social and economic problems that led to 
the revolution in 1979. In particular, Iran's persistent economic difficulties have 
remained the main problem of successive governments in Tehran. 
The Islamic Republic's power structures are the key to understanding the clerical 
regime's stability as well as the persistent tensions that prevail therein. The 
political system in Iran is characterised by a multitude of loosely connected and 
generally fiercely competitive power centres. both formal and informal. The 
former are grounded in the constitution and in governmental regulations and take 
the form of state institutions and offices. The latter include religious-political 
associations, revolutionary foundations, and paramilitary organisations aligned 
with various factions of Iran's clerical leadership. 1 59 
Generally. the above statement illustrates a summary of how the totality of the 
Islamic Republic is being perceived. It is a system combining of both democratic 
and non-democratic elements enshrined in the constitution. Moreover. due to 
dramatic differences between the rhetoric and aspirations of the Pahlavi regime 
and the Islamic Republic there is a general understanding that is the latter 
fundamentally different from the former. However, there is room for dispute on 
this as there is a huge difference in terms of political institutions and ideological 
preferences. whereas on the part of social structure and functionality of the state 
I`9 Buchta. Who Rides Iran" p. xi. 
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the facts signify otherwise (continuation). Anoushiravan Ehteshami argues that 
there is a structural continuity between the Pahlavi regime and the Islamic 
Republic. He says: "if the issue of the succession has dogged the Islamic 
Republic since its early years, so too have the structures of Pahlavi society. 
many of which remained in place, sometimes essential to the new republic. -16'0 
In other words. the formation of the Islamic regime was a real upheaval in terms 
of political change, but it had little impact on social structures except in the 
replacement of a comprador class loyal to the monarch with an Islamic one. 
Also, as Ehteshami truly articulates "there is considerable evidence to suggest 
that the social relations of `production, circulation and exchange' created by the 
Pahlavi regime remained very much intact under the new system. '"161 
It is also important to note that the paradoxical elements embodied in the 
political structure of the Islamic Republic have created a suitable ground for 
altering social structure. Nevertheless, according to classical political thought the 
linear causality of events is usually perceived otherwise. 162 No doubt, the 
protracted dynamics of the leftist ideology in Iranian politics greatly contributed 
to shaping the new republic, although profoundly mixed with strong Islamic 
aspirations. Mehrzad Boroujerdi argues, "Islamic socialists played a key role in 
the Revolution and its ruling institutions. Indeed, the Islamic vision of revolution 
upheld by intellectuals like Ali Shari'ati had as much-if not more-to do with 
Karl Marx and Jean-Paul Satre than it did with the Prophet or first Shi'a 
Imam. " 163 This argument is furthered by Daniel Brumberg by referring to 
"dissonance" in Iranian politics. He argues: 
The uneasy accommodation of competing visions of authority 
that has animated Iran's political system since the 1979 
revolution is a familiar phenomenon in the Middle East. While 
some scholars use concepts like "corporatism" or "Islamic 
160 Ehteshami. After Khomeini, p. 4. 
161 Ibid. p. 5. 
162 For example, according to classic Marxism, socio-economic change is prior to political change. 
whereas in Iranian case (both Constitutional Revolution and the Islamic Revolution) it was political 
change which took palace first. 
16See Mehrzad Boroujerdi. Iranian Intellectuals and the West: the Tormented Triumph of Natirism, 
Syracuse University Press, 1996. 
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democracy" to capture this phenomenon, I prefer the term 
"dissonance" because it points not to a coherent system (or 
ideological synthesis) but rather to the deliberate and uneasy 
linking of competing notions of political community. '64 
Therefore, despite the strong continuity of authoritarian essence inherited from 
previous regimes in the Islamic Republic and also several reasons why the 
Islamic Republic is not yet compatible with democracy. there is a persistent 
though sluggish political development. In other words, although there are 
various institutional and structural blocks yet preventing the "people's absolute 
right" to be exercised as aptly as it is done in the West. the current regime 
provides far more possibilities for socio-political interactions. For instance. 
holding more than twenty elections with considerable participation in less than 
two decades does demonstrate at least that the procedural level in reaching 
democracy, though with many flows, has materialised. As Brumberg points out 
the influence of "public opinion" in the Islamic Republic is a matter of 
importance, in particular in order "to explain the curious twists and turns of 
Iranian politics both during and after 1990. "165 
To conclude. it is true that the Islamic Republic has introduced an unprecedented 
model of governance in which both democratic and non-democratic institutions 
operate alongside each other. It is hardly possible. however, to ignore the socio- 
political developments occurring in Iranian society and say that the Islamic 
Republic is not treading through a democratising process. This is simply because 
of the expansion of the middle class and its massive participation in the 
production and possession of wealth and subsequently influence over the 
political process. This argument can be proved through scrutinising 
parliamentary politics of the post revolutionary period and its interaction with 
the democratisation process in particular. Therefore, in the next chapter. the 
focus will be the parliamentary politics of the Islamic Republic for its inception 
until 2004. The issues which will be covered in the next chapter are: the conduct 
164 Daniel Brumberg. Is Iran Democratising: ' A Comparatiivist's Perspective in Journal of Democracy, 
October 2000. 
"'` Ibid. 
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of elections. the factional politics before and after elections, people's 
participation and the interactions between the executive and the Parliament 
(Majlis). 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS OF TIIE 
ISLAMIC CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MAJLIS) OF IRAN 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Many have raised the question of "how the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
maintained its form of authoritarian rule. " I have also explained in a previous 
chapter that ingrained contradictions in both conceptual and procedural levels 
have halted Iran's embracement of modernity in general and with regard to 
democracy, in particular. However, ignoring both discursive and institutional 
development in Iran not only disconnects us from the ongoing dynamics of the 
Iranian society, but also prevents us appreciating the overall progress that 
painstakingly has been achieved. By now some serious critics of the Islamic 
Republic have categorised Iran as neither truly democratic nor merely autocratic 
or theocratic. For these critics, however, such complexity explains the longevity 
of the Islamic Republic and also indicates a degree of pluralism. ` The intense 
competition to win seats at general elections, the various elections for both 
executive and legislative branches and also the circulation of power within the 
scope of loyalists to the Supreme Leader prove the existence of a limited 
political dynamic. 
The Islamic Republic has the structural capacity to exercise democratic norms. 
although these institutions are supervised by the religious authority. The forms 
and functions of the rule-making structures in the Islamic Republic were framed 
with the intention that no structure would exceed its power to the extent that 14'ali 
fagih's (Ayatollah Khomeini) authority could be questioned. 3 It is in this context 
that institutions like the Majlis (parliament) have to operate. Nevertheless, the 
assumption that ayatollah Khomeini would use his authority in a fashion that 
1 Aranu Keshavarzian, 'Contestation without democracy: Elite Fragmentation in Iran' in 
Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Regimes and Resistance. (ed) Marsha Pripstein Posusney and 
Michele Penner Angrist, London. Lynne Rienner. 2005. p. 63. 
2 Arang Keshavarzian. ibid. 
Bakhtiar, The Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran. University Press of Florida, 1996. p. 22. 
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would make the role of an institution like the Majlis a formality was proven 
wrong, as in many cases he preferred the decisions reached by the Majlis to the 
verdicts of the Guardian Council. Unlike the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini granted 
greater autonomy and decision-making power to various state institutions and 
factions. "[Instead] he determined what was tolerable in the Islamic Republic 
and maintained a balance between various factions. not allowing one to 
eliminate the other. -4 
In Chapter Two we analysed the discursive development in the field of Islamo- 
Iranian political culture. Specifically we examined the interaction between Shi'a 
political thought and the trajectory of Iranian intellectualism. In Chapter Three, 
we studied the institutionalisation of such discourse and its accumulation of both 
democratic elements and religious precepts as the Islamic Republic. Based on 
this, in the present chapter we aim at understanding the nature and function of 
parliament (Majlis) as the most progressive and democratic institution enshrined 
by the Islamic Republic's Constitution. The institution of parliament has a 
century of history in Iranian politics with various pluses and pitfalls. As 
thoroughly discussed in the second half of last chapter. it is true that the 
Constitution does not recognise political superiority for the Majlis. but it 
balances the government with the pervasive vetting and scrutinising power of the 
parliament. In other words, although we acknowledge the peculiar constitutional 
arrangement-paradoxical distribution of power and legitimacy between 
democratic and non-democratic elements-in the Islamic Republic, it is also 
necessary to appreciate the substantial weight the Constitution has granted the 
Majlis to control government. Our endeavour in this chapter is to highlight the 
function of the Sixth Majlis-renowned for its reform agenda-to underpin our 
hypothesis that although politically speaking there may be no democratisation 
occurring in Iran, at the level of public discourse there is. 
In our research to find elements of an ongoing democratisation process in 
Iranian politics, we are faced with different positions ranging from parliamentary 
Ibid. p. 23. 
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democracy5 to absolute authoritarianism within the last 100 years. Surprisingly, 
Iranian politics has shown that these two contradictory situations (parliamentary 
democracy and absolute authoritarianism) can easily replace each other and it 
can occur regardless of what type of political system is in place, whether it is a 
monarchy or a republic. 6 For example, the Fourteenth Parliament during the 
reign of Pahlavi II acted independently and in a democratically similar way to 
other parliaments of the world in that historical context. 7 It did not, however, 
survive long enough to underpin the democratisation process, but unintentionally 
paved the way for a more authoritarian rule. 8 In fact, the Fifteenth Majlis 
consisted of governmental figures and officials who saw their interest in seeking 
to preserve the absolute source of power (the Shah). 
In this chapter we first endeavour to present an analytical picture of the 
institution of parliament in the Islamic Republic. The focus is on the function of 
the Islamic Consultative Assembly and its characterization as an elected 
(democratic) body. In first section, we also discover a similarity between the 
First Majlis and the Sixth. Both were supposed to be more inclusive and 
reformist compared to their previous counterparts. but both were replaced with 
rigid and radical successors. This chapter also aims at analysing the process of 
factional politics which subsequently resulted in reformist-conservative 
competition. In the second part, we will concentrate on the Sixth Majlis, its 
election under the severe approbatory supervision of the Guardian Council, the 
members, political affiliations, legislations, and the successes and failures of the 
reform agenda. 
` By parliamentary democracy, we mean upholding of democratic procedures in line with the 
democratic cause and not necessarily reaching the point of operative democracy. 
' The Failure of the Sixth Majlis to accomplish the reform agenda and its replacement with a 
fundamentalist Majlis. 7111 Majlis, (Usulgara vs Islahialah). 
The Fourteenth Majlis voted to premiership of Dr. Mosaddeq and nationalized the oil industry. 
8 For instance. in the Islamic republic we can point to the succession of hardliner parliaments after the 
sixth Majlis in 2004. 
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4.2. THE INSTITUTION OF PARLIAMENT IN TI{I_: ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
After the ratification of the Constitution in December 1979, an election bill was 
drafted by the Revolutionary Council on 6 February 1980. Since there was no 
Majlis at that time, the Council was empowered to write the first electoral law. 
This election law had two components: 1- the conditions and qualifications for 
candidacy, and 2- the mechanism of screening and implementation. The first part 
states that elections will be directed with a double balloting system. An eligible 
candidate must have Iranian citizenship, a minimum age of twenty-five. a clean 
criminal record, a belief in the Islamic Revolution (state structure). and the 
ability to read and write. Also, this law enfranchised all citizens aged sixteen and 
over to vote. As we can see. the overall conditions for candidacy and of course 
the franchise are meant to be more inclusive and accessible compared with some 
democratic countries. For instance, it did not require obtaining a certain amount 
of support, a signature or being represented by any party. 
However. the most controversial part of the law was that the elections were 
designed to be held in a two-round system in which candidates must receive an 
absolute majority; or the candidates with the highest numbers of votes must 
compete in the second round of elections. These measures caused considerable 
upset within different political parties. particularly those with no link or 
sympathy to the Islamist core of the regime. 9 Apart from the Islamic Republic 
Party (IRP). whose members were close allies to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khomeini. most groups condemned the new law. These groups. including 
Mujahidin-i Khalq (MKO)10, Iran's National Front (INF). National Democratic 
Front and the Marxist Fadayi, argued that the new law was another measure 
designed by the Islamists to exclude them from the political arena. 11 The 
successful candidate needed to obtain the absolute majority of all votes. In other 
`' Rah-i Tudch. Bulletin No. 3. Vol. 16,1996. 
People's Militia Organisation. 
Bakhtiar. Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran. P. 64. 
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words, it only made electoral success for smaller groups more unachievable than 
12 ever. 
Even in the first round of elections which was held on 14 March 1980 with 
around 2.500 candidates, we can trace back different attempts by the clerical 
hierarchy to dominate the process. 13 Like other election ceremonies-whether 
before or after it-Ayatollah Khomeini exhorted the public to participate in the 
elections. However, there were various accounts of how the election was 
conducted, such as illiterate voters being accompanied into the voting booth and 
attempts being made to alter the geographical dimensions of the districts in order 
to change the balance of the electorate. In addition, as much as the election law 
specifically prohibited endorsements on the television and radio, fundamentalist 
clerics exploited the Friday Prayer sermons-which were broadcast live on the 
radio-simply to endorse the Islamist candidates. More importantly, Ayatollah 
Khomeini himself asked the public not to vote for "those who are ideologically 
and morally corrupt" and urged the masses "to elect those who are one hundred 
per cent Muslim. and are committed to implementing the Islamic principles". '4 
From the beginning, the political direction of the Majlis was considerably in 
favour of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) and its advocates. They had 131 seats 
that included clerics, technocrats, and elements from the Bazaar. The prominent 
members of the IRP were now in the Majlis: Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Ali 
Khamenei, Hassan Ayat, Hassan Habibi and Hadi Qaffari. Also, among the IRP 
deputies. sixty per cent were clerics. '' The other seats were taken by a group of 
approximately sixty-five deputies who were not officially attached to any party 
but were held together by their opposition to the monopolisation of power by the 
clerics. This group of delegates were mainly comprised of advocates of the "Iran 
Freedom Movement" (IFM) and the Liberation Movement of the People of Iran 
(JAMA). '6 
12 A sign of populism in a democratic shell 
Ettela'at. 16 March 1980. 
14 Bakhtiar. Purliamentarv Politics in Revolutionary Iran. p. 68. 
is Bakhtiar. Purliamentarv, p. 68. 
"' Junbish-i Azadi Mellat Iran (JAMA) that was known as the Islamic liberals. 
1 1) 7 
4.2.1. FACTIONAL OR PARTY POLITICS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
The result of the first general election for the Majlis showed that the diversity of 
the electorate in a relatively free situation could result in a non-monolithic 
parliament. In other words. because of a variety of candidates who competed in 
the election, the votes were divided between different kinds of candidates. It is 
argued that this alarmed the ruling clerics, as they saw the Majlis as platform 
giving non-Islamic ideas a chance to be heard and also possibly to become law. 
17 
Such a fear caused them to take a series of pre-emptive measures excluding in 
particulars non-believers in the ideology of wilayal al-fagih as the main 
criterion. It occurred. of course, when the power structure in the Islamic 
Republic was not yet concentrated in the hands of clerical class. Still. other 
participants in the revolution had their right and ability to make their case or 
even gain parliamentary seats. In this light, the Islamists implicitly welcomed 
any attempt to radicalize the political atmosphere of Iran. in order to preserve 
their populist approach-a very efficient way to mobilise the masses. However. 
the impatience of some rival groups and their resorting to military opposition 
directed the Islamists to imply more restrictions and suppress any other voice. 18 
In the run up to the First Majlis election. Ayatollah Khomeini's advocates 
decided to set up a political party named as "the Islamic Republic Party" to stand 
for parliamentary election. The IRP was established in February 1979 by the 
clerics who had been students of Ayatollah Khomeini before his exile from the 
country in 1964. They quickly developed the IRP through their fellow clerics 
across the country. The IRP's founders started to build up their contact networks 
through mosques and traditional merchants across the country which very soon 
appeared as the country's dominant political force. 19 Core members included 
Ayatollahs: Beheshti. Abdul-Karim Musavi-Ardabili. and Muhammad Reza 
Mahdavi-Kani and Hujjat al-Islam: Khamenei. Rafsanjani, and Bahonar. All had 
been active in mobilizing large crowds for the mass demonstrations during the 
Revolution. 
17 Amjad. Iran From Royal Diciutorship Io Theocracy, quoted from translation in Persian. Tehran. Baz 
Publication, p. 229. 
'x For instance, the use of paramilitary methods by the MKO. 
19 Amjad. ibid. p. 217. 
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While it is generally assumed that the political structure of the Islamic Republic 
is a kind of hybrid democracy in which a series of democratic procedures are 
fitted, it is worthwhile to scrutinize its factional rivalry and find out whether 
these provisions can produce critical politics. The election of Second Majlis 
began in 1983 with a strong intention on the part of the Islamists to monopolise 
the result. The political manoeuvre to reach this aim was to bar potential 
candidates from running unless their loyalty to the ruling class was proven. This 
wave was started by an editorial in the IRP's newspaper Jurnhuri Islaini (Islamic 
Republic). The editorial stated that our enemies are well aware that if the 
Imam's followers unite and, as the Imam has said purify our goals and intentions 
and hold elections for the sake of Islam. then no plot can ever threaten the 
Islamic Republic. We will look into the nature of the candidates and their 
"20 character as well as the mode of their selections. 
This statement was an indication of a campaign by the Islamists to draft a new 
law on the procedure of the elections. The motion consisted of 89 articles. An 
overall glance indicates that the new proposal was not very much different from 
the existing law which was passed by the Revolutionary Council four years 
before. The similarities are: elections would be held on direct, general and secret 
voting; there would be a two-round process, and the number of districts would 
stay the same. However, by the time that the Majlis had completed its 
cumbersome process of voting on each article. several changes appeared in the 
final document. ` The ordinary changes were. for example, reducing the voting 
age from sixteen years old to fifteen. or increasing the minimum age for a 
candidate from twenty-five to twenty-six. The main reason behind this 
legislation was to establish a robust supervisory provision to monitor who and 
under what condition they would be eligible to enter the Majlis. 
More importantly, the new law drew a set of political and ideological 
qualifications for the candidates who wished to participate in the forthcoming 
elections. To be eligible, a candidate had to have a spiritual as well as 
20 Jumhuri Islami. Tehran. 29 October 1984. 
21 Bakhtiar. Parliamentary Politics in the Revolutionary Iran. p. 109. 
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revolutionary commitment to Islam, and provide 'evidence' as to his loyalty to 
the Islamic Republic. Second he must have "total loyalty to the Great Leader 
Imam Khomeini and the institution of fagih s rule (wiluj'at aI-fagih)". The 
necessity of "loyalty to. fagih" indicates that both factions (Islamic leftist and 
Islamic right-wing) had decided to exclude the `outsider' candidates (liberals), 
most notably from the Iran Freedom Movement (IFM). It is noteworthy that 
despite differences among the Islamists, they restricted the competition to those 
who belonged to the "inner circle" of the regime's supporter (advocates of 
wilayal al-fagih's theory). 
Ironically, it was the Guardian Council which amended some of the proposed 
articles in favour of expanding the individual's right to register as a candidate. 
For instance, the draft of Article 32 broadly stated "anyone who held a political, 
or administrative position during the Shah's regime, will not be eligible". The 
Council changed the article to apply only to an individual who had been 
involved as an "active and significant player" in the former regime. " The 
Guardian Council also completely rejected Article 30 of the draft, stating that 
candidates could run in the regions in which they were born or in which they had 
resided for only six months prior to the elections. 
It is therefore evident that the Guardian Council initially did not intend to 
perform as pervasively as it decided to do so from 1991 to the present. During 
the first decade of the Islamic Republic the Guardian Council was supposed to 
supervise and monitor the process of elections conducted by the Interior 
Ministry, but in 1991 the Guardian Council interpreted its right to monitor the 
elections more extensively and assigned thousands of operative agents to 
participate in the conduction of the elections. The new method (probationary 
supervision) caused uproar within the political factions, in particular with the 
Islamic leftists. 
The second Majlis, like its predecessor. was divided between maklahis and 
Hujjalis, with no absolute majority over each other. Both divisions strongly 
22 Ibid. p. I 10. 
225 
believed in the implementation of Islamic laws as precisely as it is. because that 
is believed to be the only true way of ruling on the Earth'. RMukiahi in essence 
means a person with a deep belief in the implementation of Islamic principles, 
and Hujjaii describes a person whose only wish is the appearance of the Hidden 
Imam to undertake his promised rule all over the human beings across the 
globe'. '' In fact, it was a real array of political figures within the Islamic regime 
which consisted of devoted Muslims with a political goal. Yet most analysts tend 
to categorise them as fundamentals and conservatives or even label them very 
loosely as leftist and right-wing within the classical context. This division cannot 
be viewed as in other political or ideological divisions in parliamentary politics. 
Thus, viewing the second Majlis in the context of classical right-left political 
frameworks seems nonsensical. In other words. it is a pure simplification to 
consider the second Majlis as composed of different political groups in the 
classical context as both are about the `same divine cause' against all other 
present socio-political concepts. Hence, having a new established political order 
with the running parliament and government, the ruling clerics eventually 
admitted the existence of the two major factions. Rafsanjani was one of the first 
high-ranking officials of the regime who mentioned the existence of two factions 
by saying: "In the country, we have two factions. one supports government 
interference in the economic affairs, such as nationalisation measures, the other 
support the private sector". 24 
To a certain extent, this statement distinguished between the Islamist forces 
composing the whole system in terms of economic related issues, yet it was 
rather loose and inaccurate in political terms. However, again it should be 
emphasized that this kind of differentiation or duality in political forces within 
the Islamic regime does not imply an open-ended circulation of political elites 
throughout the society. The imposition of an absurd proviso for any political 
activists wishing to participate in the election is the proof of his/her loyalty to 
the concept of Nwilaval al-fayih. 
23 Iran Political Culture in the Islamic Republic. (ed) Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi. 
London. Routledge. 1992. p. 78. 
24 Tehran Times. 25 July 1986. 
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The political equilibrium of the 1980's was geared with the emergence of 
Islamic left holding majority in both Majlis and government. Ayatollah 
Khomeini's persistent emphasis on the "downtrodden people" and the urgent 
need to fairly redistribute the economic resources underpinned the power of the 
Islamic left. This phenomenon of the Social-Islamists was in clear contrast with 
the traditional-Islamists who were rooted in the traditional style of the merchant 
class. The traditional Bazaar, a group of merchants whose main activities were 
wholesale brokers of goods, saw the government and Majlis's economic policies 
as a threat to their market-oriented policies and interests. Since the country was 
at war, it was illogical for investors to capitalise their cash to make profits. Thus. 
the only secure way to make business was to buy goods and then sell them. 
However, in addition to the heavy burden of financing the war, the government 
had to import necessary public goods which due to the imbalance of supply and 
demand became capital goods, and thus merchants could make huge profit. To 
tackle this, the government decided to implement restrictive economic and 
financial policies to prevent the private sector from economic interference 
during the war-time situation. 25 
The economically left-oriented government of Prime Minister Musavi was well 
capable of designing these measures with the strong support of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Thus. the last resort for the merchants was to lobby their issues 
through the parliamentary factions and appeal to the right-wing Islamist MPs. 
The immediate reaction by the MPs was to block the policies taken by the 
government to increase its role in the economic and financial sector. ' The 
government argued that the country was at war and they must undertake 
necessary actions to provide enough resources to support the war. The opposite 
faction argued that these measures were firstly against Shari'a law, and 
25 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, Boulder. Westview. 1988, p. 125. 
2" Ahmad Ashraf. "Bazaar-Mosque Alliance: The Social Basis of Revolts and Revolution" in 
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, no. 1, Summer 1988. p. 564. 
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secondly, harmful for the economy since weakening the private sector would 
deteriorate the economy and the country over all. 27 
The collision between the Bazaar and state dominated Iranian politics for the 
first decade. The government sought to expand its leverage and influence in both 
decision-making process and implementation and also trading and retailing. On 
the other hand. the Majlis acted as the proxy of the Bazaari's old-established 
interest and role. Of course, the Bazaari's stance on state-sponsored economy 
was backed by Islamic jurisprudence. This confrontation demonstrated that the 
outright equation of the implementation of Islam with all-pervasive state is not a 
general rule in politics. That is because. Islamic norms of economy are in greater 
congruency with democratic systems, rather than with authoritarian ones. 
The main ground for a battle against nanny state implementation of economic 
policies was the Majlis and its tool of exercising the right of questioning and 
summoning the ministers. However, during the First Majlis, Musavi's cabinet 
was known as a coalition cabinet comprising of both right and left Islamists. 
Hence, he was not entirely satisfied with some of his ministers. He saw the 
inauguration of the Second Majlis as an opportunity to reshuffle his cabinet and 
replaced a handful of ministers. He introduced a new list of ministers to obtain 
the vote of confidence to the Majlis. After two days of discordant debates. 
Musavi"s proposed cabinet suffered a severe setback when five of its members 
failed to gain the support of the Majlis. The result was surprising in the way the 
Majlis treated Musavi's nominees. particularly in light of the assumption that his 
supporters were in the majority. Therefore, as we discussed, even the most 
Islamist Majlis could challenge the Islamist government backed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini and utilised its legislative prerogatives to halt governments 
monopolising expansion. 
The Third Majlis was inaugurated on 31 May 1988. In the election for the 
influential Presiding Board. 9 out of 12 voted in favour of the radicals. Certainly. 
2' For more info see Firouzeh Khala'tbari. 'Iran: A Unique Underground Economy' in The Economy of 
the Islamic Repuhlic: Between Slate and Market. (ed). Thiem Coville, Tehran. Institut Francais de 
Recherche en Iran. 1994. 
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Musavi was delighted with the result and passionately insisted on his radical 
plans to promote social justice and more government control on prices and 
inflation. He placed emphasis on activating Article 49 of the constitution which 
gives the government (state) the authority to confiscate "the wealth. accumulated 
through usury, usurpation, bribery embezzlement. and misappropriation. "" His 
strong speech won him 204 votes out of 217 in favour of his cabinet. 2 
However, the course of ensuing events was so much not in accord with the 
prosperity of the radicals as they expected with the achieved victory of the 
general election. The country was unable to cope with the mounting warfare 
expenditure while there was no predictable point of concluding the war. 
Eventually, Ayatollah Khomeini declared that Iran accepted Resolution 598 
issued by the Security Council of the United Nations to implement a cease fire. 
Yet the disagreement between the President and the Prime Minister continued to 
affect the efficiency of the government. The Musavi government and Majlis 
were faced with a theoretical vacuum which had drastically paralyzed their 
public appeal. In other words, the end of the war was perceived as an 
unavoidable sign for relinquishing the radical policies and therefore radical 
politicians. 
In the meantime. the proposal of amending the constitution by Rafsanjani and 
President Khamenei had been approved by Ayatollah Khomeini. The key point 
of this amendment was to abolish the post of prime minister and concentrate all 
his powers into the hands of president. so that the president would no longer be a 
formal post but the head of the executive branch. 30 Although the radicals 
rigorously tried to preserve the premiership they were defeated by the council 
assigned to draft the amendment. Of course, the Rafsanjani-Khamenei axe 
played an essential part in blocking the radicals' pressures with emphasising the 
eminent need to re-construct the country for a new post-war era. Although the 
third Majlis was in effect paralysed and unable to change the course of events 
they made their feelings clear. By appointing Ayatollah Khamenei as the 
28 Kurhan, 1 April, 1988. 
'9 Ibid. 
30 Daryush Zahedi. The Iranian Revolution Then and Now, indicators of Regime Insluhilire. Boulder, 
Westview Press, 2000. p. 159. 
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Supreme Leader after demise of Ayatollah Khomeini, Rafsanjani was preparing 
to run for the presidency campaign. Former Premier Musavi, an enthusiastic 
follower of the Islamic left, decided to leave politics and Mahdi Karrubi, the 
Deputy Speaker, became the Speaker. 
However, the factional attitude and poor performance of the Islamic left 
(radicals) during the Third Majlis was the main cause for their absolute defeat in 
the Fourth Majlis. Their verdicts on foreign policy issues like the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the Salman Rushdi Fatwa, rapprochement with the West or even 
implementation of detente policy with regional neighbours were badly suited to 
the new period which Iranians were experiencing. The radical deputies had no 
hesitation in embarrassing the new government in its pursuit for relatively 
moderate and rational policies. For example, the radicals organised an 
international conference about the Palestinians' uprising and ways to support it 
more effectively. 31 It was planned to coincidence with the Madrid peace 
negotiations in which all parties hoped to achieve a tangible result. They also 
proposed in the Majlis that troops be sent to defend the Iraqis against the 
Americans during the first Persian Gulf War. 
-I??. THE BACKGROUND OF THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES 
Article 26 of Iran's Constitution allows the formation of parties, societies, 
political or professional associations and Islamic or other religious societies of 
recognized minorities. The law on the activities of parties and political groups 
was approved in Iran in 1981 by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) but 
its enforcement was postponed until the year 1989.32 Before the inauguration of 
President Muhammad Khatami in 1997, some 39 parties, political societies and 
associations received permits from the "Article 10 Commission of the Interior 
Ministry". By January 2000. the number rose to 103 . 
'3 Thus, during the 28 
Katvhan. 31 October 1991. 
End of Iraq-Iran War. 
A 'sr-i Ma, 15 February 2000. 
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month operation of President Khatami's administration, 64 new parties and 
groups were granted operation permits. According to Article 10 of the Parties 
Law, a commission comprising representatives of the State Prosecutor General, 
the Judiciary. the Interior Ministry and two Majlis deputies were delegated with 
the responsibility of issuing operation permits for parties and supervising over 
them. 
The Committee has only permitted loyal or indigenous political and religious 
groups to be established and operate publicly. Not surprisingly, the majority of 
allowed groups are considered as conservatives and the minority belongs to the 
Islamic left. Notably the main conservative parties are: The Association of 
Combatant Clergy (Jami 'ah Rawa"haniyat-i Mubari.: ), the Association of Islamic 
Coalition (Jami 'yat-i Mu'talifa Islami), the Islamic Association of Engineering 
(Jami'ah Islami Muhandisin), and the Association of Ziynab (Jam1 'ah Ziynab) 
whose members are exclusively for females. 34 The main Islamic left groups are: 
The Association of Militant Clergy (Majma '-i Rawhaniyun-i Mubari. ), and the 
Organization of Islamic Revolution Militant (Mujahidin-i Ingalab-i Islaini). 
Therefore, due to the alteration of the political array in the aftermath of Fifth 
Majlis, a new series of political groupings emerged. In other words, the routine 
classification in political factions was no longer suitable to accommodate new 
trends of politics within the public sphere and inevitably caused a series of 
breakdown and coalitions. In particular. the formation of the Executives of 
Construction Party (He_b-i Kargu. aran-i Sa. andagi) in 1996 and the Islamic 
Participation Party (He. b-i Musharakal Iran) in 1998 nurtured such a 
development. 35 However, before discussing the materialization of new political 
factions, we need to address the original classification of the allowed political 
parties in the Islamic Republic. 36 
34 The Association of Zirnah is run by religious women and its target group is also women. 
35 Saed Barzin. Jenah Bandi Sivasi dar Iran: a_ dahitv"ih 1360 la "Khurdad 1376 [Political Factions 
in Iran, from 1981 until May 1997]. Tehran, Nashr-i Markaz. 1377 [1998]. p. 88-100. 
36 An executive background of allowed political parties is stated in Appendix 2. 
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4.3. RADICALS AGAINST CONSERVATIVES 
Considering the new socio-economic circumstances of the post war period. the 
policies by which the Islamic left was identified lost their appeal and were no 
longer plausible in the society. In the mean time, their insistence on keeping up 
the same policies caused them to be known as radicals. Equally, the Islamic right 
gained from public resentment towards the leftist agenda for the post war period 
and built up its reputation as the moderate faction (conservative). Hence, by the 
time of the Third Majlis the political rivalry had reached its climax, but was still 
under the control of key players. Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Majlis who had 
maintained his position through the Iran-Contra affair, became more cautious 
about factional conflict within the Majlis. He elaborately positioned himself at 
the centre of political trends inside the Islamic Republic and secured his 
substantial weight in decision-making. 
In fact, his role was directly approved by Ayatollah Khomeini. Also, his 
negotiable character and attitude made him a pragmatist and this was a key point 
in the formation of a moderate faction within the regime. When the secret arms 
deals of Iran with the United States were revealed in a Syrian-backed Lebanese 
newspaper, Rafsanjani had no choice other than to publicly confirm this, since 
he was the main negotiator. " Apart from a series of investigations and 
condemnations which struck President Reagan's administration, it nearly cost 
Rafsanjani's job as the Speaker of the Majlis. Oddly. he was the highest ranking 
Iranian official who paved the ground for negotiation with a delegation of 
Americans over the buying of weapons in Tehran. ''" The mystery was more 
synchronized in the fact that the US government was habitually being denounced 
by Iranian leaders as their first and utmost enemy. 
This revelation so outraged the Majlis that eight deputies wrote a letter to the 
Foreign Minister to question the facts of the event. '' It put Rafsanjani in a 
dangerous position. Surprisingly, the innovation had the support of both factions. 
'' Weekly AI-Shira', Lebanon, 6 November 1986. 
'R He was agent McFarlane. 
Kayhan, 21 November 1986. 
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bringing down Rafsanjani's leverage over the Majlis. Bakhtiar believes that it 
was precisely to prevent this that Ayatollah Khomeini broke his silence over the 
Iran-Contra affair. Again, in a public speech. Khomeini expressed his 
satisfaction with the performance of the Majlis speaker, and at the same time 
threatened those who criticised Rafsanjani. AO As far as Rafsanjani was concerned. 
Ayatollah Khomeini's `go ahead' was enough. Typically, after Ayatollah 
Khomeini's declaration in which he praised Rafsanjani. the mood in the Majlis 
suddenly changed. Almost all the deputies who had the opportunity to express 
their pre-agenda speech condemned the authors of the letter and accused them of 
"causing rifts in the Islamic Republic". " Revising this even assists us to 
understand the limits and boundaries in which the Majlis can operate. We will 
mention another direct intervention of the Supreme Leader in the exercise of 
parliamentary right in the Sixth Majlis later in this chapter. 
4.4. THE DOMINANCE OF CONSERVATISM AGAINST 
LEFTISTS (RADICALS) 
The prospect of the Fourth elections was accompanied with widespread fear 
amongst the leftists (radicals) regarding their political fate. As the election 
approached, the conservatives demanded that the Guardian Council interpret 
Article 99 of the constitution in a broad context of judging a candidate's 
eligibility, including ideological views. It was not a new proposal. enabling the 
Guardian Council to launch a restrictive vetting process, as they had done on the 
Tudeh Party in 1983 or the IFM. But they needed an extra authority to rule out 
any candidate unfitted to their opinions. It was a necessary measure by the 
conservatives to exclude the old rival (the Islamic left) from competing in a 
general election. The Guardian Council declared its interpretation of Article 99 
which concerns the Council's role in supervising the general elections. The new 
reading was called the `Probation Supervisory act' (ni. arat-i istisvahi). 
40 Late November 1986. 
41 Amjad, a. Dictatori Saltanati tu Din Suluri. p. 245. 
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The Rafsanjani's government, which called itself the 'Construction 
Government', had to undertake the Fourth Majlis election. The Islamic right- 
wing or conservatives gathered under the banner of the 'Association of 
Combatant Clergy" and the Islamic left introduced the newly established 
'Association of Militant Clergymen' as its political brand. The new Interior 
Minister Abdullah Nuri belonged to the centre-left and had to cooperate with the 
Guardian Council. For the first time in the Islamic Republic the 'probation 
supervisory act' was implemented. The new measure angered almost all the 
independent or leftist candidates as their chance to be approved by the Guardian 
Council was no longer based on certain legal check points, but entirely depended 
on the Council's decision. 
' The outrageous result was that the Council did not 
see any necessity to explain or even to prove its argument in disapproving any 
candidates. Mohtashami-pur. the former Interior Minister and a prominent 
radical, denounced this development by saying: 
In the past, our faction was ostracized for its unquestioned 
commitment to the revolutionary philosophy of the ºi'ali fagih 
[Khomeini]; now the same people are attacking us for our 
infidelity to the wali faqih and his chosen successor 
[Khamenei]. These people (the conservatives and in particular 
the jurists of the Guardian Council) who call for absolute 
fidelity to the Supreme Leader are the same people who were 
and continue to oppose the concept of a wilayal. fagih. Now 
they use this as a bayonet against the revolutionary and 
committed forces .... 
it is clear as daylight to me that these 
people are doing what the wicked strategies of America and its 
43 European allies want. 
In the middle of the vetting process in which the Guardian Council was under 
pressure for its unfair and biased attitude towards applicants. Ayatollah 
Khamenei, the Supreme Leader met with the members of the central committee 
42 Ruh-i Tudeh, Vol. 11. No. 215, April 1992. 
Mohtashami-pur, in an interview with As-har Schirazi. The Consiliution of Iran, London, Tauris, 
1997, p. 192. 
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of the Guardian Council. His comments clearly confirmed his political tendency 
in favour of the conservatives and praised the affirmative approach of the 
Guardian Council as watchdog. He said: the durability of the Islamic system 
depends on conformity to its laws and regulations. No corrupt person should be 
allowed to enter an institution that has the function of legislations... . the criteria 
for judging the eligibility of candidates must include practices of moral. 
economic and political corruption... 44 With this statement. Ayatollah Khamenei 
clearly exposed his ideological preference in the factional infighting and bridged 
his opinion with President Rafsanjani's. 
According to the Interior Ministry 3015 candidates had filed applications for 
candidacy by end of March 1992. About 35 per cent (1060) were rejected by the 
Guardian Council. The rejection even included prominent figures with an 
outstanding history of being revolutionary and repeatedly praised by Ayatollah 
Khomeini. such the Deputy Speaker Asadollah Bayat and Sadiq Khalkhali (the 
revolutionary judge appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini). With all the precautions 
employed by the conservatives, the result was a landslide victory for them. Out 
of 130 elected in the first round. 81 had been on the list of the Society of 
Combatant Clergy. 20 on the list of the Association of Militant Clergymen, and 
the rest presumably independent. The new Majlis was inaugurated in late May 
1992 and promptly elected Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri as its speaker by a vote of 191 
out of 230. `x' Hassan Rawhani became the first Deputy Speaker with 200 votes. 
Even Karrubi. the former speaker, and Mohtashami-pur lost their seats and 
which signalled a dramatic shift in the polity. 
By now it was perceived that the victory of the conservatives in obtaining the 
absolute majority in the Majlis alongside a technocrat government led by 
Rafsanjani could bring about the long awaited stability and progress for the 
country. Now both executive and legislative bodies acted in a single direction 
and there were no more excuses for the impotence of the Islamic Republic. 
Rafsanjani, who was elected in the 1989 election and remained popular since 
then, repeatedly demanded a more cooperative Majlis to enable him to carry on 
44 Resalats 12 March 1992 
45 /ran Times, 29 May 1992. 
235 
the reconstruction projects. However, the official gesture still was not to 
recognise the division within the political atmosphere. The new Majlis Speaker, 
Nateq Nuri, stated: "I do not believe in the divisions known as the left and right. 
We must try to solve such problems in society. We have a leader and our 
guidelines should be instructions by the leader. Of course, our tastes might 
differ, but is should not mean clashing and rudeness in society . "'4ý' 
Interestingly, the close and sympathetic relation between Rafsanjani's 
government and the Fourth Majlis was merely an opportunistic political alliance. 
In other words, they remained deeply divided on socio-economic issues. 
Although the majority of the deputies who obviously belonged to the 
conservative camp owed their victory to the fact that they were supporters of 
Rafsanjani, their constituencies' interests were in clear contrast with the task 
Rafsanjani's government had planned to undertake. While the main task of 
Rafsanjani was to pursue economic growth and development through a series of 
modernising projects. the traditional mercantile class felt most vulnerable 
against this new wave of change. In short. the process of privatisation and 
cutting the huge amount of subsidises which was draining the national budget 
were the main priorities of the government. The former underpinned the 
emergence of a new Iranian middle class after the revolution known as the 
Islamic bourgeoisie. The latter caused a sharp increase in prices goods and 
services and also foreign currencies which angered the lower class. 
As a result, the conservatives won the election and gained the fourth Majlis with 
the key slogan of 'supporting Hashemi Rafsanjani', but they soon realised a 
range of conflicts of interest with 'the construction government'. They had to 
choose whether to advocate the socio-economic development plans introduced 
and projected by Rafsanjani's government with all the costs it would bear on 
them, or to oppose them as conservatives whose real interests in preserving the 
socio-economic status quo. Consequently, this paradox appeared as an imminent 
breakthrough for the conservative camp. But strong political and economic links 
with the government prevented a heavy backlash. Moreover, the differences on 
46 Sulam. 4 June 1992. 
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the economic perspective literally brought about an ideological inconsistency in 
the conservative faction. Thus, it was divided into two sub-factions of modern- 
right (rust-i modern) and the traditional-right (rust-i sunnali). The government 
practically represented the modem-right while the Majlis was known as the 
traditional-right. 47 
The reaction of the conservatives to the rapid socio-economic changes was 
rather harsh, compared to the Islamic leftists (radicals). The conservatives began 
to speak of the "Western cultural onslaught" through spreading corruption and 
obscenity, ridiculing sacred Islamic terminology, sanctities and divine traditions, 
propagating debauchery and raunchiness in the Islamic society of Iran. 48 The 
scale of attack on the performance of the government went far beyond and 
caused the Islamic Guidance Minister. Muhammad Khatami. to resign. 
Unquestionably, such a set back against the government could not have 
happened without Ayatollah Khamenei's concession (the Supreme Leader). In 
fact. he himself had theorised the ethos of the Western cultural onslaught. Prior 
to Khatami's resignation. Ayatollah Khamenei stated in a public speech: "the 
enemy's cultural attack is a cultural night raid, a cultural act of plunder, a 
cultural massacre". He made it clear that he considered the United States "the 
main propagator of corruption that materialised the culture raid at Iran". 49 
Immediately after this speech. a large number of the deputies in the Majlis 
signed a letter to Khamenei expressing their full support. Three days later, 
Khatami submitted his resignation. 
47 A 'sr-i Ma. 16 January 1996. 
4" Resalat, interview with Nateq Nuri, February 1993. 
4" Tehran Times. 24 July 1992. 
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4.4.1. THE RIFT WITHIN CONSERVATISM 
The rift within the conservative camp over the economic development mounted 
to its highest level during the last months of Fourth Majlis so that the key 
proposals initiated by the government, including the legalisation and protection 
of foreign investments were blocked. For example. just weeks after the 
submission of the bill concerning foreign investment, Mohsen Nurbakhsh, a 
technocrat Finance Minister stated in an interview that the government no longer 
had any restriction on foreign investments in the country. Consequently. the 
government submitted a bill to the Majlis to clarify Article 81 of the constitution 
regarding the limits of foreign investments. '0 Not surprisingly in Iranian politics, 
the motion was halted in the Majlis in the name of national independence and 
preserving Islamic values. Nateq Nuri, as the Speaker, stipulated that the Majlis 
would not approve any bill that allowed American companies to invest in Iran: 
"any rapprochement between America and the Islamic Republic is out of 
question, and we will not permit American companies to invest in Iran-. 51 
Therefore, the cultural invasion propaganda which shaped the political balance 
between Rafsanjani's government and the Fourth Majlis seemed to be a cover 
for the original dispute about economic issues. It became apparent that the 
majority of deputies were against government's annual budget in proposing 
several amendments to them. For example, the Majlis passed the 1994 budget by 
cutting $1.6 billion from it and stood against normalising the energy prices. 52 
Surprisingly for the conservative faction, all these economic modifications and 
also any disagreement to the government's plans were attributed to the fact that 
the Majlis stood to protect the poor people, whereas their factual cause had 
always been to protect the monopoly of the traditional mercantile class. 
However. in the field of institutional functions. the most considerable action 
played by the Fourth Majlis apparently to fulfil its parliamentary role was to 
launch a public enquiry into the performance of the Islamic Republic of Iran's 
Broadcasting (IRIB). 
5° Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran, p. 227. 
S1 Resalat, 9 June 1992. 
52 Kayhan. 26 February 1994. 
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The inquiry ended with a strong criticism of the management of the IRIB. The 
Head of the IRIB was Rafsanjani's brother and after serving for about twelve 
years in that post he was forced to resign. The Fourth Majlis elaborately 
attempted to limit the influence of Rafsanjani and sided with Ayatollah 
Khamenei who by now had established his authority in the government, the 
Majlis and more, importantly, the armed forces. The prospect of the forthcoming 
Fifth Majlis election for the advocates of Rafsanjani's government (moderate 
conservatives or moderate-right MPs) had the same implication (survival) as for 
the Islamic left in the run up to the Fourth Majlis. 
In the meantime. the Islamic left experienced a hard defeat not only before the 
conservatives but also in the eyes of the public. As a result. they launched a 
drastic revision in their socio-political stand. 53 Perhaps. for the Islamic leftists. 
being out of power meant as an opportunity to reconsider their dogmatic 
understanding of governance and spontaneously changed their manifesto to 
become known as the modern left. On the other hand. the contingency of 
repeating the same treatment used for vetting process of the Fourth Majlis for the 
Fifth Mailis alarmed the technocrats in the government and, with the hindsight 
of Rafsanjani's go-ahead. they created the Party of Kargu_aran Sa. andagi (the 
Executives of the Construction). The result was an interesting alliance between 
the new moderate left and the moderate right which probably could only happen 
in an ambiguous political structure like the Islamic Republic of Iran. By now an 
unprecedented political array within the framework of the Islamic Republic had 
emerged which automatically masterminded further alteration and paved the way 
for the introduction of a so-called reform movement. Thus, before discussing the 
role of political parties in the configuration of future events in the following 
section we illustrate a summarized background of the main parties in the Islamic 
Republic. 
53 For example, many of its cadre had enrolled in University courses after leaving office, and now had 
greater expertise and intellectual influence. 
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4.5. THE EMERGENCE OF REFORMIST PARLIAMENTARY 
POLITICS 
The parliamentary election of the Fifth Majlis which still had 270 seats was held 
on March 8 1996. The Guardian Council disqualified without explanation 
approximately 30 per cent of the 5.359 candidates who wished to compete in the 
election. ' Also, assuming the correctness of official statistics, the overall 40 per 
cent of voters did not participate. This was relatively about the same rate of 
nationwide turn-out in the Fourth general election in 1992. In the first round. 
only 139 candidates received the majority needed to win a seat. and more than 
50 per cent of incumbents lost in this round. Traditionally. Tehran's result is 
seen as an indicator of the whole Majlis characterization. In Tehran. where 400 
candidates competed for 30 seats, the conservative Nateq Nuri and Fae'zeh 
Rafsanjani, Rafsanjani's daughter and a moderate, received the most votes, and 
other 28 seats were left to be decided in the second round. 5' However, many 
speculations sparked as the Guardian Council deliberately declared Nateq's vote 
higher than her competitor in order to avoid an outbreak of humiliation on the 
clerical legitimacy and popularity. 
On April 19 1996 the second round was held to decide another 117 remaining 
seats. The results for 14 seats were declared void by the Guardian Council due to 
electoral complications, and elections for most of these seats occurred the 
following autumn. Only 50 clerics were elected to the Fifth Majlis, consistent 
with the steady decline of clerical representation in the body. which included 
137 clerics in the First Majlis and about half that in the Fourth Majlis. First-time 
members represented 61 percent of the new Majlis. which also consisted of 10 
women. 56 After different figures were declared by the Interior Ministry and the 
Guardian Council. as far as the actual number of people who voted in Tehran 
during the first round of the elections. the final count for the capital was 
announced as 1.971,748. The Guardian Council had previously put the figure as 
high as 2.3 million for Tehran. The table below shows the variance of the 
54< wwwi. moi. ir'fifth> (the Interior Ministry official website). 
55 Ibid. 
56 <www. moi. ir'election> 
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number of people who participated in the election of Tehran's constituency in 
parliamentary elections: 57 
First Majlis 2.398,868 votes %61.13 
Second Majlis 2.791.176 votes %60.34 
Third Majlis 2,356,837 votes %43.23 
Fourth Majlis 2.528,855 votes %39.35 
Fifth Majlis 4.083.083votes %55.74 
Table 2: The Statistics of Tehran's Constituencies Turn out 
The Speaker of the Fourth Majlis. Ali Nateq Nuri, who by now had become the 
most prominent figure in the conservative faction, led a coalition of all groups 
and guilds under the flag of the Association of Combatant Clergy. Throughout 
the country they endorsed 170 affiliated candidates, while their main competitor 
in this election was the "Executives for Construction Party". As mentioned 
before, the new group had a very sympathetic relation to President Rafsanjani. It 
was revealed that during one inner-circle meeting of the Association of the 
Combatant Clergy (ACC) to draft Tehran's 30 candidates. Rafsanjani demanded 
to include five candidates on the ACC's final list, a demand which was later 
rejected by the conservative clergies. This rejection caused Rafsanjani to allow 
his administration to enter the competition independently. The result of the 
enterprise by the ECP was 16 exclusive candidates alongside a dozen joint 
conservative-ECP candidates from the original list of conservatives to make a 
3 is 0-candidate list for Tehran. 
Both moderate (moderate right) and radical conservatives (radical right) claimed 
a 70 per cent majority after the first round of elections as both sides claimed the 
independent elected candidates as their supporters. However, the accurate 
political weight of each was measured in June when the radical conservative. 
57 
Ibid. 
"` Barzin, Political factions in Iran. p. 89. 
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Nateq Nuri defeated his rival Abdullah Nuri, nominated by moderates, with 132 
to 105 as temporary Head of the Presiding Board, a victory confirmed three days 
later by a 146-92 vote. Ten of the twelve leadership positions of the Majlis went 
to deputies from Tehran. even though the Tehran province elected just 30 of the 
270 Majlis deputies. Clerics took half of the twelve leadership positions 
(Speaker, two Deputy Speakers. three commissioners, six secretaries), while four 
non-clerical hard-liners also won positions. 59 
The victory of the radical right in Tehran was decisive, despite some initial 
misconceptions about the overall result nationwide. However, it gradually 
became more obvious that the traditional (radical)-right faction had also won the 
majority in the rest of the country as well. The reason for such a misconception 
was mostly due to the list overlap of many successful candidates, whose names 
were on both lists. Furthermore, many of the provincial deputies could be 
nominally on the ECP"s list but could easily change their line. After a month that 
the new Majlis had been meeting, the picture became much clearer. In addition 
to Nateq Nuri who was elected as the Speaker, of the twelve members of the 
Majlis presiding board, eleven went to the radical conservatives and the twelfth 
was an independent deputy. Not a single position went to anyone remotely 
identifiable with the moderate faction. 
The Rafsanjani's camp of moderate conservatives was seemingly weaker than it 
appeared at first glance. It was a loose coalition of differing views, while the 
radical conservatives were more united. More importantly, the rivals of the 
moderates had full control over the vital Council of Guardians, which had to 
ratify all election procedures and all legislations. The Council switched the 
winner in three districts, in each case from a moderate conservative to a radical 
conservative, and annulled the votes in 23 districts, 16 of which were won by the 
moderates, most of them women, and seven by candidates of unclear ideological 
tendency. 60 That is an exchange of 19 votes from the moderate camp, converting 
a narrow result into a solid conservative win for the radicals. The Council's 
59 <wwwww. moi. -, ov. ir'election> 
60 Sulum, June 19 1996. 
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action was such deliberate vote-rigging that it sparked disturbances in two major 
cities, Isfahan and Tabriz. 
As a matter of fact, the conservatives owed their win in the Fifth Majlis election 
to the implementation of the "Probation Law", by which a selective list of 
candidates were allowed to take part in the general election. It only furthered a 
patronized misunderstanding among the conservatives about their real public 
status. Thus, they showed reluctance to change their ultra-conservative attitudes 
on social policies. Nonetheless in most cases such policies remained intact and 
even became harder. 6' At this point, the most ossified pattern of power was in 
place and the internal political factions had failed to deliver the minimum of 
competency. As a result. debate over conceptual issues regained its prominence 
and influenced the populace. The new wave of Islamic intellectualism (Soroush. 
Shabestari, Aqajari, Kadivar. Eshkevari) began to criticise both the theory and 
the function of clerical rule. Their campaign simply aimed to purify Islamic 
thought from what has been interpreted and implemented by the clergy since the 
Islamic Revolution. A considerable number of university students sympathised 
with the new trend introduced by the afore-mentioned scholars and a new 
paradigm of intellectuality began to emerge, as discussed in the Chapter Two. 
Obviously, such a development in the universities could not be tolerated by the 
conservatives and plans were drawn up to prevent the penetration of Western 
thought into the academic institutions of Iran. according to conservatives. The 
degree of anxiety inside the regime was so high that the Supreme Leader in his 
opening speech letter at the inauguration session of the Fifth Majlis stated: The 
duty of the Majlis is, in the first instance, to stand against the demands of deviant 
Western liberalism. "62 Then he called for the Islamization of the universities. 
complaining that they are not Islamic today. This theme was followed with 
enthusiasm by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. who is known as an ultra-radical 
Islamist and secretary of the Guardian Council. He vigorously demanded the 
expulsion of the impious professors who poisoned the students against the 
"' For example. the conservatives launched a project named as Islamisation of the universities, more 
restriction on dress code, even for men. Like the prohibition of wearing short sleeve shirts for men in 
universities. 
62 Resalat. 22 August 1996. 
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Islamic regime. It is also said that Jannati is the inspirational leader of a violent 
hard-line movement called the Ansar-i He: bollah (Followers of the Party of 
God). While Jannati is the most outspoken. many other conservative leaders 
allude that they would not support Ansar's thuggish attacks. 
All in all, the radical conservative coalition which intended to achieve complete 
domination failed to achieve its goals as a tiny but bold opposition emerged from 
the heart of the conservatives. At the same time, a progressing social dissent 
movement-based on Islamic intellectualism-gained further pace. The 
blossoming circle of religious intellectualism expanded in terms of subject area 
as well as the scope of advocates throughout the universities. The ideas proposed 
by this trend became known as reform in terms of socio-political issues and its 
supporters as reformists. Both moderate right and Islamic left which had 
experienced the exclusionary goals and policies of the core conservative 
faction-aimed at ousting other incumbents-saw the new religious 
intellectualism as the alternative for maintaining their influence within the 
political system. 
For the moderate-right it was necessary to show its existence and differences 
with the radical conservatives and reach out to the broader social strata. Of 
course, such a new in-system alternative clashed with core Islamist factionalism, 
so that radical Islamists kept their upper hand in pressing more against any 
reformist opinion. However. the consequence of creating a new faction inside 
the conservatives turned out to be a costly decision for the moderates. 
Obviously, hardliners tried to offset the moderates support to shape a different 
political landscape by branding them alongside other non-Islamic groups. The 
sanctity of Ayatollah Khamenei for the hardliners and his political guidelines 
created a devoted uncritical faction who proudly claimed to be melting in the 
ºi'ilapai al-fayih. A group of veterans affiliated to the Revolutionary Guards 
established a kind of para-military group called Ansar-i He_hollah. Their 
primary target was to be present at any venue when a secular or religious 
intellectual figure or a pro-reform activist planned to give a lecture or speech. 
They went far beyond political issues and even interfered with socio-cultural 
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events. They insulted any innovation in the social, political and economic 
grounds as a liberal action against Islamic values. 63 
The conservative dominated Fifth Majlis was rather indecisive which did not 
only lessen the division between the factions. but caused a new epoch of rivalry. 
With the hindsight of future events, the Fifth Majlis was a failure for the 
conservatives as it revealed their incompetence and inefficiency in working out a 
sustainable development plan. 64 On one hand, the inception of economic 
development had injected a vast sum of cash into the market while the political 
ground was so intense and unstable. 65 On the other hand, the speedy rate of 
inflation. accumulation of foreign debts and high levels of consumption caused 
the society to demand reform. Thus the focus was fixed on the presidential 
election in which the mainstream conservatives planned to elect Nateq Nuri as 
president. This would fulfil their long awaited task of creating an ideal Islamic 
state. 
However, given the nature of the world politics from the beginning of the 1990s 
and the inception of the third wave of democratisation. Western observers 
veered to perceive the conservatives as more ideologist and fundamental than 
their fellow leftists who were previously known as radicals. Also. the critical 
discussion between EU and Iran on human rights and security issues helped to 
create a feeling that there are "listening ears- in Iran and they consisted of 
moderate right and leftists. The perception was that the out-of-power group. the 
left, and the moderate right which was a group on the edge of ousting from 
power could be categorised as a new moderate section of the Islamic Republic. 
even with the more fashionable title of reformist. The reason for such optimism 
was seemingly due to the implementation of easing some socio-economic 
policies which had been hitherto banned (e. g. advertisement, producing and 
selling a limited kind of music. allowing women to do sports under certain 
conditions). However, the major shift occurred in Iran's foreign policy which 
attempted to pursue a detente policy with its neighbours. 
Purum lmru_. August-September 1996. p. 35 
Ibid. p. 43. 
''` Ibid. 
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4.5.1. THE EMERGENCE OF NEW ALLIANCES 
In the meantime. the strategic coalition between the moderate right (technocrats) 
and the Islamic left was maintained through Sulam newspaper which found a 
reasonable public appeal. As said before, being out of power led some of the 
leftists to reconsider their dogmatic and out-dated opinions (Saeed Hajarian. 
Abbas Abdi, Asqarzadeh, etc) and formulate a more intellectual and youth- 
oriented approach under the title of the Islamic Intellectualism. Therefore, as 
much as the conservatives gradually commenced to undertake a strict Islamic 
approach, the opposite side tended to attribute itself to a more democratic 
discourse. even though the core elements of new faction had serious 
authoritarian commitments. 
The performance of the Fifth Majlis could be seen as a mixture of political 
obstinacy with rapid socio-economic alteration. On one hand. Rafsanjani's 
government had been engaged with a serious economic development plan: on 
the other hand, the parliament turned out to be an ultra-conservative institution 
with many backward ideas and motions. 
66 However, as far as the legislation 
process is concerned, the conservative dominated Majlis had no difficulty in 
passing any legislation as the approval of the Guardian Council was only a few 
steps away. In other words, both of these institutions shared the same aspirations 
and attitudes in almost all political, economic and social issues. It also was like 
the Fourth Majlis in that the intimacy of the Majlis and the Guardian Council 
reached the highest level since the establishment of the Islamic regime. 
In short. the Fifth Majlis did not promote and protect people's socio-political 
rights directly, but with its conservative mandate created a widespread public 
dismay throughout the country. Notably. the passing of two significant laws by 
the Fifth Majlis caused great anger in public opinion and of course the rival 
faction took advantage of it to generate a comprehensive dislike of the 
conservatives. One law was a legislation to ban the use of satellite dishes after 
"" For example. Abbas Abbasi, deputy from Bandar Abbas. south of Iran. in a formal discussion on 
Iran's signing the Kyoto treaty asked "why do we need to join this treaty to protect the Ozone Layer? 
Whoever made a hole in it should pay to prepare it himself not us. " 
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almost half of the population in Tehran had installed them. The second law was 
to amend the press law, which affected the liberty of newspapers under the law 
ratified by the Revolution Council in 1980. In addition. the Fifth Majlis 
attempted to impeach two key ministers from Khatami's cabinet. The first 
attempt, to sack Mohajerani from the Ministry of Culture failed, but the second 
attempt succeeded in toppling the reformist Interior Minister. Abdullah Nuri. 
Nearly two months before the termination of the Fifth Majlis. it amended the 
Press Law in April 2000. It aimed to put more restrictions on the press. 
Following the amendment, some 20 reformist newspapers and journals were 
closed down by the judiciary on charges of violating Islamic values and 
defaming government officials. Consequently, a considerable number of 
reformist journalists were also tried and put into prison on similar charges. The 
whole event dominated the pre-election politics and almost all reformist 
candidates for the Sixth Majlis vowed to make new amendments to the Press 
Law upon their entry into the parliament. 67 Since the public mood was in 
sympathy with the banned newspapers and journalists, the advocacy of the 
reformists multiplied their popularity and guaranteed an easy electoral victory. 
We may divide the Fifth Majlis's performance into two categories, the pre- 
presidency election of 1997 and the post-election period. Given the fact that the 
Speaker Nateq Nuri had planned to run for the presidency in 1997 with the 
obvious support of the Supreme Leader. the whole political spectrum in the 
country split into two major factions. One side was in favour of Nateq Nuri 
becoming president and other side did not want him to become president. The 
perception towards such pre-determination in the political arena caused a 
widespread feeling of resistance and gave momentum to its opponents. The 
politics of presidential election in 1997 proves that Khatami's candidacy came 
up as the last-ditch attempt by so-called reformist groups (moderate right and 
new-Islamic left). In fact. Khatami was convinced by these groups to nominate 
`'' Such vows were repeatedly stated in the pre-election campaign either in the form of pamphlet 
statements or through interviews. 
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himself for the sake of saving a marginal but proven vote. 68 Thus, Khatami 
appeared as an alternative to produce a consensual vote of opposition to the 
conservative camp. although the ground for his victory had been laid by two 
factors: 1- Emergence of new Islamic intellectualism advocating pluralism. 
tolerance and compatibility with democratic norms. 2- Rafsanjani's economic 
development policies which paved the way for any political re-configuration. 
The disenchanted public opinion became receptive for any possible or even odd 
coalition and cooperation to block the election of Nateq Nuri-as a symbol of 
Islamic totalitarianism-even without any existing plan or agenda offered by 
Khatami. That is why the so-called reformists after the Second-Khurdad (23 
d 
May 1997) victory of Khatami were faced with a lack of programme, scheme 
and even target69. As interpreted by many. the landslide victory of Khatami in 
the presidential election was more an immense No to the conservatives rather 
than a yes to him and his team. However. Rafsanjani's advocates (the ECP party) 
were well organised and did not allow Supreme Leader Khamenei to dominate 
on election results. This facilitated Khatami's victory. Moreover, Rafsanjani 
personally supervised the election to prevent a highly predictable partiality in 
70 favour of Nateq Nuri. 
After Khatami's surprise election and during the two years proceeding to the 
Sixth Majlis general election, the political terrain witnessed a dramatic rise in 
political activities, reflected in the formation of new political organizations and 
also publications. This trend had been set out since the 1996 Majlis elections. 
The ECP represented the first revisionist and modernist deviation from the 
clerical establishment aiming of financial prosperity and technical progress. 7' 
Thus. it hugely contributed to create a public perception that the Islamic 
Republic allowed a sort of pluralism in government. albeit at a restricted level 
which still would filter out the secularists as political outsiders. In sum. that 
`'" It was hoped that Khatami would gain a maximum 7-8 million votes and accordingly the reform 
coalition could then work to increase it for next presidential election. 
" Ahbas. Ahdi. Islahut dar Islahat. [reform in reform], Tehran. Tarh-i Naw. 1381 [2002]. p. 68. 
70 See Rafsanjani's direct warning against rigging the election at his Friday Prayer speech a week 
before the election. Irna News Agency, 16"i May 1997. 
" Parum burn:. January February 1998. 
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seemed enough to stimulate the masses, even the most disaffected people to 
participate in the process and cast their votes. 
However, despite ECP's acceptable performance in the 1996 Majlis election 
where it won 60 seats from its oven exclusive list72 and its crucial support for 
Khatami's presidential campaign in 1997, it was unable to secure widespread 
appeal in the long run. Public criticism was directed at them for their 
"technocratic and arbitrary style of politics". 73 In particular. the ECP's main 
preoccupation with economic policies at the expense of other issues of concern 
to the Iranian voters decreased its sway on public opinion. As a result, the ECP 
did rather poorly in the Sixth Majlis election and could only save 27 per cent of 
its seats in the Majlis. The ECP's weak showing was actually interpreted as a by- 
product of two factors: a sharp decline of Rafsanjani's reputation due to a vast 
smear campaign against him in the run up the Sixth Majlis. and the rapid success 
of its coalition partner-the Islamic left-who swiftly managed to offer a radical 
package of reform. 
=I. 5.2. THE NEW LEFT AND EMBODIMENT OF DEMOCRATIC 
RHETORIC 
As the ECP declined, the new so-called reformists group of the Islamic Iran 
Participation Front strengthened its public domain. The Islamic Iran 
Participation Front (IIPF) was formed in 1998 by close supporters of President 
Khatami's government. In its initial declarations the title was the Islamic Iran's 
Participation Front' which later was changed to the Party. According to its 
constitution. the IIPP aimed to support and promote people's participation in the 
determination of their fate, advancing political and cultural development. 
', It is common in parliamentary elections that various parties and groups introduce joint and exclusive 
lists. The former is combined of variety of candidates despite their primary political affiliation and the 
latter is for only affiliated candidates. 
'' Ibid. 
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reducing the government's role in these fields and also the government's 
supervision over the economic affairs of the country. 
74 
For the first year Mohsen Mirdamadi, one of the former `Students Following the 
Line of the Imam' and former governor of Khuzestan Province was the secretary 
general of the IIPP. Muhammad Reza Khatami (Deputy Minister of Health 
during first two years of Khatami's presidency), Saeed Najarian (political 
advisor to President Khatami and member of Tehran City Council), Abbas Abdi 
(journalist), Muhammad Reza A'ref (Vice President of President Khatami). 
Habibollah Bitaraf (Energy Minister), Mustafa Tajzadeh (Deputy Interior 
Minister for Political Affairs), and Hussein Nasiri (presidential advisor and 
secretary of the High Council of Free Trade Zones) were among the main 
members of the IIPP. The IIPP was mainly composed of the members of 
elections campaign headquarters of President Khatami who after the election 
obtained high level administrative posts. 
The IIPP's orientation could be described as a mixture of religious, nationalist, 
and neo-liberal ideas compressed within a New Leftist tendency. The party 
could rapidly achieve considerable popularity and success in Iran's political 
landscape as a result of its affiliation with Khatami and its exploitation of open 
dissatisfaction with the conservative establishment. Adopting an all-inclusive 
slogan. "Iran for all Iranians" by the IIPP broadened its influence into other 
religious and ethnic minorities. The IIPP skilfully placed the blame for economic 
and other problems on the conservatives' shoulders while taking credit for 
Khatami's reform agenda. The group was determined to gain a majority in the 
election of the Sixth Majlis. However, the IIPP's election euphoria had scarcely 
worn off when one of the key architects of the reformist campaign. Saeed 
Najarian. was shot at point blank range by assassins believed to be members of 
Iran's own para-military forces. This, and the disqualification of some successful 
IIPP candidates by the Guardian Council. indicated that pro-Khatami forces still 
faced entrenched resistance from the conservative establishment and hard-line 
security forces. who still wielded much power. 
74 Less economic control is in contrast to what most leftist groups are known to favour. while the IIPP. 
like a conservative group. advocates privatization. 
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Apart from a deep gap in political attitude between the IIPP and the conservative 
faction, the IIPP suffered an internal contradiction on the economic agenda too. 
Since Khatami's government was based on a coalition of ECP and IIPP, the 
economic strategy of the government lacked a cohesive direction. In other 
words, although the IIPP had shown its support on economic liberalization, due 
to its leftist grass roots it was obliged to consider pro-state policies. It only 
furthered the division between the ministers responsible for economy and 
financial affairs of the government and was marked as a failure to achieve pre- 
set targets by the Third Five Year Plan. ' In fact, the cabinet ministers were 
divided as traditional left and new left. For instance, the traditional left opposed 
Iran's controversial entry into the World Trade Organization and advocated 
"interventionist industrial and agricultural policies". 76 This tendency was 
represented by the Labour House (Khanah Kargar), the Islamic Labour Party 
(He: b-i Islami Kar) and, to a lesser extent, the Militant Organization of the 
Islamic Revolution (MOIR). In the Fifth Majlis. the traditional left managed to 
introduce pro-worker legislation. principally by wielding influence in the Majlis 
committee on labour and social affairs. Compared with the poor showing of the 
old left. the new left, mainly represented by the IIPP and its affiliated student 
and professional organizations-the Office to Foster Unity (Daf ar Tahkim 
Wahdat) performed well in the 2000 elections. Some of the new leftists 
advocated neo-liberal strategies to combat poverty, such as job creation through 
economic growth and extending the private sector role in the economy. 
4.5.3. THE RUN UP TO THE SIXTH MAJLIS ELECTION 
In their preparation for the 2000 elections, the conservatives formed a coalition 
headed by three major groupings: the Association of Combatant Clergy (ACC): 
the Association of Islamic Coalition (AIC): and the Association of Qum 
Seminary Teachers. This coalition was titled The Coalition of Imam's Line and 
the Leadership'. Although the conservatives had the guaranteed approval of their 
75 Pavam lmru_. November/December 1999. 
"' For example, Former Economy Minister Hussein Namazi played a controversial role in opposing 
liberalization and finally left the cabinet. 
251 
candidates by the Guardian Council, the question is why the Council declared a 
wide range of reformists qualified to run in the election. This concession by the 
Guardian Council was welcomed by most reformists as sign of triumph for 
'Second Khurdad's (May 23rd) movement'. Even a reformist newspaper 
Tawsi'ah wrote: The core conservative block of the Islamic system (the 
Guardian Council) has now come to believe and admit the righteousness of the 
reform manifesto presented by Khatami". 77 
Nevertheless, it seems rather a simplification to endorse such an explanation. We 
can count three specific reasons why the Guardian Council unwillingly felt 
compelled to qualify a wide range of reformists to take part in the elections. 
First. Khatami's unprecedented efforts to unveil the misery of "chain 
assassinations'7 8 had hugely increased his popularity despite his failures on 
other issues. Therefore, he appealed from the public to elect a Majlis conducive 
to work with his reformist government. Second. the student riot of 18 Tir (8 
July) had a frightening impact on the conservatives making them concerned 
about the stability and security of the whole system if another uproar should 
arise. Third. the conservatives had become aware of their disastrous public 
standing, as according to some unofficial polls, their strongest candidate could 
not compete with any reformists, even new and anonymous ones. Thus. their 
insistence on not allowing the reformists to take part in the election would only 
courage people to boycott the election. In fact. the boycott could be read as an 
indicator of the illegitimacy of the Islamic regime and this was not an option to 
risk. 
Therefore. the progress of the reformists on the eve of general elections cannot 
be seen as a real political superiority over the conservatives, but instead, a 
rational and temporary retreat by the conservatives in terms of real politick. In 
addition. the conservatives focused on the weakest point of the reform camp 
where disagreements and inconsistencies between the moderate right and the 
Islamic left occurred. Initially. the conservatives took advantage and welcomed 
^' Taii si 'ah. 29 January 2000. 
'% After Khatami's victory in the election of 1997, a series of political dissents were murdered in a 
mysterious wa, until the Ministry of Intelli-ence admitted a number of its cadre have committed these 
murders absolutel out of their code of conduct. 
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Rafsanjani's candidacy as the leader of moderate right. This issue sparked an 
extensive disagreement and conflict within the reformists and split the 
reformists' coalition, as to whether support Rafsanjani's candidacy or to oppose 
to it. Incumbent conservative members of Fifth Majlis had also wisely shielded 
themselves from reformists' attacks by passing some of Khatami's economic 
bills in the last month of the Fifth Majlis. Also, the Fifth Majlis raised the voting 
age from 15 to 16. which meant fewer youth votes for the reformist candidates. 79 
However, the conservatives' motion to eliminate the run-off component of the 
election process was blocked by the reformist minority of Fifth Majlis who 
feared this was detrimental to their interests too. 
80 The conservative coalition 
campaigned rather poorly. Their xenophobic slogans against Khatami's civil 
society, tolerance and reform programme had little impact on the electorate, 
except to encourage them to take part and oust the conservatives from the 
Majlis. The result was a massive defeat in the February 2000 elections which 
prompted soul searching in the hard-line camp. Some have conceded that they 
had lost touch with the electorate and that their behaviour in the Fifth Majlis was 
arrogant and divisive. 8' Not willing to relinquish power to their opponents. the 
conservatives nevertheless mounted a spirited counterattack to minimize the 
impact of the reformist victory by utilizing their strongholds like the Judiciary 
and the Guardian Council. 
In terms of economic legislations. the key economic decisions relating to the 
Third Five Year Plan were already made by the Fifth Majlis before the new 
Majlis convened in May 2000. The incoming new deputies were most likely to 
focus on socio-political and judicial matters, institutional reform, and foreign 
policy, instead of the economy. What is certain. however. was that the 
parliamentary majority of the reformists in the sixth Majlis inherited a great deal 
of controversial legislation which was against its proclaimed mandate. 
"' Pm am lmru:. November'December, 1999. 
Obviously. they were worried not to let situation worsen as their own re-election could be 
jeopardised. 
81 <ýýww. reterl. orýý features'iran'> 
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PART TWO 
4.6. THE REFORMIST SIXTH MAJLIS 
So far we have studied major aspects of parliamentary politics of the five 
consecutive parliaments since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Our main primary 
target has been to evaluate the essential factors shaping and directing the 
institution and function of parliamentary election and the Majlis per se. We also 
attempted to describe the assumption that the institution of parliament in the 
structure of the Islamic Republic should be considered slightly different 
compared with its counterparts. This is because of the strong presence of Islamic 
principles in the Constitution and subsequently in the function and purpose of 
the Majlis. In other words, we came to recognise that a totally ideological style 
of parliamentary system in terms of institution could be also capable of 
performing and functioning as relatively proportionate representation. For 
example. the scope of public discussion and the popularity of the Majlis during 
the 20 years of the Islamic Republic is more far reaching than the five 
parliaments during last two decades of the Pahlavi regime. Although the Islamic 
Majlis as its name indicates has proved to be an institution so religiously driven. 
however, its ability to embrace more engagement with the public is seen to be 
more credible than its predecessors. 92 
The First Majlis comprised almost all revolutionary parties including moderate 
or radical conservatives as well as Islamic and to some extent secular left. 
although it has not yet been split into the (Islamic) left or right. In fact, the First 
Majlis was the symbol of Islamic unity against the other participants of the 
revolution. From the parliamentary point of view, the birth of the Islamic 
Republic party can be seen as the most decisive event prior to the First Majlis 
election. The party put massive efforts into organising its affiliates all across the 
country and grasped the majority of seats. The dominance of the Islamists in the 
82 See Table of Tehran's turn out Statistic. 
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First Majlis paved their way to launch a refining operation which swept away a 
wide range of officials on a cross section scale. 83 
However, like other inevitable `devolutionary' processes, the Islamists began to 
divide towards the Second Majlis election. The rift was mostly over the validity 
of two Islamic political ideologies. The Islamic left was identified as mak/abis 
which was in favour of pro-state economic policies and the Islamic right was 
named as hujjalis with conservative and relatively liberal `economic' trends. 
This division publicly revealed a factional conflict within the Islamic Republic, 
though unofficially. The war with Iraq prevented further division but by the 
Third Majlis, the tension between the left and right intensified and led to the 
emergence of the AMC (Association of Militant Clergy). Ayatollah Khomeini 
acknowledged and approved such political and ideological devolution which 
entered the Islamic Republic into an internal pluralism. But surprisingly, after 
his demise the balance of political rivalry in the Islamic Republic seemingly 
vanished and a sort of one party government ruled for eight years. 
Accordingly, the Fourth and Fifth Majlis were fully dominated by the Islamic 
right (the conservatives) while their rivals were left out with only a few 
publishing news papers. This unbalanced situation did not last long and further 
devolution by emerging ECP shaped a new era in Iranian politics. The artificial 
but strategic alliance between `defected moderate right' and 'Islamic left' 
created a space for envisaging reformist ideas and slogans. Notwithstanding, the 
wider political institution could not adapt that quickly to implement such reform. 
The possibility of becoming a candidate, however, was exclusively limited to a 
new and would-be popular political force combined with a huge public desire for 
change. 
The new trend started with the election of Pro-reform President Khatami. His 
landslide election surprised political observers as well as the public and 
84 suggested that the Islamic Republic would be capable of democratising. The 
x' Implementation of Selection Process (Gu. inish) through which any employment opportunity is 
allocated by means of an ideological and political vetting procedure. 
xa See Ali Ansari. Islam, Iran and democracy, intro. London, Tauris. 2001. 
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advocates of this argument mainly relied on the possibility of such democratic 
change within the current structure of the regime which according to classical 
models would be unusual in such a religiously based political regime. As a 
result. it was believed that the current Constitution could provide an appropriate 
framework for the materialisation of a democratic reform of the state. 85 At the 
same time. however, some analysts expressed rather pessimistic views on reform 
movement. For example. David Menashri argued that "Khatami's election to the 
presidency was expected to turn into a momentous catalyst for policy change. " 
He added: "A year later, with no substantial improvement in social and 
economic fields... the direction of change. areas of reform. and rhythm of 
transformation are not vet clear. "86 
Khatami's first two years of struggle and sluggish progress to advance his 
mandate was chiefly attributed by his advocates (Islamic reformists) to the lack 
of a cooperative legislative body. The emphasis on this assumption by the 
reformists led to an extensive expectation from the next incoming Majlis, as the 
ultimate solution. Thus, the idea of a reformist Majlis was greatly promoted 
through the public as the only way to bring about reform in the Islamic Republic. 
The Islamic reformists deemed that the success of their reform mandate was 
subject to having a reformist legislative organ. This is our subject of 
investigation in the second part of this chapter and we will explore the 
emergence of the Sixth Majlis from its tantalisingly attractive pre-election 
politics to its sporadic performance as the first reformist parliament in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. 
"` President hhatami was frequently quoted as saving that by fulfilling all aspects of the Islamic 
Republic Constitution. it is feasible to reach democracy. 
"° David Menashri. Iran Under Khatarni, A Political, Economic, and AMilitun" Assessment, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 1998. p. 14. 
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4.7. THE HN1PORTANCE OF A REFORMIST NV1A. (LIS 
Twenty years after the regime change in 1979, the revolution had brought about 
an urgent need for reform in different political, economic and social aspects of 
Iranian society. Having a reformist President in office who was incapable of 
fulfilling his plans compelled the non-conservative political activists to support 
the idea of electing a reformist Majlis. The initial evaluation by advocates of 
Khatami prescribed that the only possible and practical mean to guarantee the 
implementation of the people's will would be through gaining a majority in the 
Majlis. 87 However, the overall assessment of the Sixth Majlis. performance plus 
the recent developments (the election of Seventh Majlis) has proved this to be a 
naive analysis of the politics of the Islamic Republic. 
Some reformists finally realised that they could not reinstate the power of the 
democratic elements (elected government and elected parliament) against the 
unlimited rule of religious leadership with its arbitrary authority. 89 This authority 
is also constitutionally granted. However, despite the mounting rivalry with 
winning the parliament by the reformists and the media frenzy over its 
importance. the reformists were struggling to win an already lost battle. 
Although the reformists convinced the public that with their majority in the 
Majlis. Khatami could eventually be able to fulfil his promises to implement his 
democratic mandate, in reality, however, it did not mean the end of the power 
straggle, since all the legislations passed by the Majlis were subject to be 
scrutinized by the conservative Guardian Council. The reformists also believed 
that by having gained such a democratic standing alone with massive public 
support they would be capable of overcoming the power of conservative 
dominated strongholds. 89 Yet, the election was not over: a conservative English 
language paper sought to undermine the expectations of the incoming Majlis by 
writing: 
x' Abbas Abdi. 'Khuruj az Hakamiyat' [Why to quit from Government] in Islahat dar harahar Islahai 
[reform in reform], [et all, Tarh-i Naw. Tehran, 1381 [2002]. pp. 77-79 
xx Ibid. 
Ali Reza Alavitabar, 'Mulahazat-i Rahburdi baraiyyih Ayandah' [the Strategic Consideration for 
Future] in Saed Hajarian [et all. Guftagu-i Inliqadi, Islahat dur 1. s/ahal [a critical dialogue, reform in 
reform]. Tehran. Tarh-i Na". 1381 [2002]. pp. 72-75. 
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Even though observers have seen a `revolution within a 
revolution', Iran is a young nation and is simply moving with 
the times. However, those who expect or predict that 'big 
changes' will take place in Iran after the elections either do not 
know the legal framework of the country, or they simply 
provoke the people to stand up to make the basic changes in the 
system. Although there may be a more open socio-political 
atmosphere in the country, which is but natural, this does not 
necessary mean that the basic pillars of the system will be 
scrambled. 90 
From the beginning. the importance of the Sixth Majlis and its reformist 
mandate was overstated. Since the factional politics within the Islamic Republic 
had reached a point that seemed to be indicating of a major breakthrough. some 
hoped to see the performance of the Sixth Majlis as a turning point in resolving 
the Islamic Republic's prolonged power struggle and reforming a totalitarian 
style of governance in favour of a democratic government. This anticipation was 
pioneered in particular by a popular and reformist President who was also in 
office at the time. 91 It was thought that a reformist Majlis could accomplish the 
task of 'reform and progress' promised by President Khatami's government. 
Since Khatami's landslide presidential election victory in May 1997. his 
government was prevented from fulfilling its promises, mainly by a conservative 
dominated Majlis. In essence, Khatami's government effectively posed to act as 
the opposition. despite his huge popular mandate. Thus, both Khatami's 
advocates and he himself came to believe that only a sympathetic parliament 
could eventually change the divergent spectrum of the Islamic Republic. 92 
From public opinion perspective, the reformists' mandate was to provide a 
convergence between the Majlis and the government to boost a political reform. 
However, the nuanced difference between public expectations and the 
reformists' own perception and capability was based on a unilateralist view of 
`" Tehran Timis. 17 February 2000. Tehran. p. 7 
')I Irma News Agency. 17 November 1999. 
92 Saeed Hajarian. in A1ua'ma-i hakamirar Qanun dar Iran [the dilemma of rule of law in Iran]. Abbas 
Tadayun, and Abbas Abdi (ed), Tehran. Tarh-i Naw Publishing. 1381 [2002]. p. 112-1 13 
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political power. In other words, the paradox of the reform movement in the 
Islamic Republic became more apparent when the route of reaching the 
objective-reforming the system-was planned through an accumulation of power 
in the hands of one faction (the reformists). That was, in effect an intrinsic 
contradiction towards pluralism and the democratic reform of the political 
system. Although the reformists repeatedly revealed their enthusiasm for the 
idea of reform, given the structure of political hierarchy in the Islamic Republic, 
their strategy of integrating political power-through elections-seemed 
substantially inappropriate. In fact, the strategy of aligning the executive and 
legislative branches together might work normally in the early stages of 
developing countries, provided they undergo an extended economic and 
industrial reform, like South Korea and Malaysia. 
93 
Interestingly, the previous conservative but economically reform-minded 
government of Rafsanjani attempted to implement this method in Iran's post-war 
reconstruction period. But it failed to accomplish its goals, first and surprisingly 
due to a rigid opposition to his economic reforms among his own backbenchers 
(the conservative faction), and secondly due to the constitutional barrier to 
opening up the economy and conducting necessary privatisation. 
94 In the early 
years of the construction period, the radical conservatives could hardly defy 
most economic reforms introduced by Rafsanjani's moderate conservative 
government, but gradually became furious and obstructed any plan for broader 
reform. Instead, they realized that they must maintain a protective grip on the 
Judiciary. the Guardian Council, security related issues and organisations. as 
well as the state broadcasting services. 9' Moreover, since the conservative- 
dominated Fourth and Fifth Majlis had proved their firm resistance towards 
social, economic and political reform. it was the government which persuaded 
the MPs to approve its semi-reformists bills. 96 In other words, the supposed 
`'' This could be applied until the achievement of economic development, as afterwards a series of 
political reforms is inevitable. 
94 On one hand, although Rafsanjani's government privatised vast number of state-owned companies, 
the main infrastructure and up-stream industries remained in the control of government according to 
Article 44 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the elements of pervasive state control prevented a 
fair and healthy privatisation, which also led to further setbacks and scepticism. 
`" AJiab Emru_. Vol. 5, no. 58, February/March 1998. 
For example, the vote of non-confidence in Rafsanjani's Finance minister and blocking his economic 
reform . 
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representatives of the public were against altering and reforming the status quo 
97 and this task was being prompted by the then current governments. 
The formation of the Sixth Majlis and prospective performance was subject to 
many speculations. It was widely thought that the new Majlis would not only 
enable President Khatami to enhance democracy at home but also to accelerate 
his policy of rapprochement with the West and, in particular. the US. In fact, the 
combination of a reformist Majlis was seen to be beneficial not only for Iranian 
society and politics but for the whole region and beyond (the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. the war against terrorism. etc). 98 As the surprise election of Khatami 
had created a broad wave of hope that change was coming throughout Iranian 
society, both the domestic pro-reform polity and the international community 
were readily striving for alteration. As some commented on the stunning turnout 
in the 2°d Khurdad (May 23` 5, the vote of the people was in fact. a "no" to the 
conservatives and then a vote of "yes" to Khatami and his manifesto. 99 We 
should bear in mind that although Khatami's reformist mandate gained public 
trust, it also severely suffered from repeated contradiction and incongruity. 100 
Therefore, it seems plausible to argue that the strategy of gaining the majority of 
Majlis which is elected only for a four year period to facilitate the 
implementation of a reform mandate (democratisation) alongside a homogenous 
government lacked practical feasibility. In fact, the theory of providing a 
cooperative Majlis for a reformist government was perceived to be capable of 
concluding a prolonged power struggle within the Islamic Republic. From the 
reformists' point of view, the only way to reform was to seize legislative power 
through general election under a democratic banner, whereas they had to 
reconsider the practical distribution of power within the Islamic Republic's 
hierarchy, and press to change it before making any promises. 101 But they only 
focused on the election of their prominent advocates in parliament. In effect, the 
97 It was the case during Rafsanjani's government and first two years of Khatami's presidency. 
98 Editorial. Asr-e A: adegan. February 2.2000 
99 Alireza Rajaie, Iran Farda. Tehran. September. 1997. vol. 6. no. 34, p. 45 
""' For example, in the pre-election period Khatami had insisted on the implementation of the principles 
of civil society, he amended his opinion after the election and stated that he meant the Islamic civil 
society. not the civil societies which exist in the West. 
101 Alireza Rajaie. Iran Farda, Ibid. 
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reformists did not intend to create any reform within the system, but rather a 
refurbishment of political figures-not a reform for the system as a whole. 
Furthermore, the mere triumph of reformists in the parliamentary elections could 
hardly provide them with an affirmative outcome to secure their proclaimed 
democratic or reformist cause, since. the Constitution had already disqualified 
the parliament and the government from performing as the main decision- 
makers. 102 Thus, for the reformists, the control of both parliament and 
government could not bring much ability to manoeuvre, as they had to deal with 
more restrains under the regulations of formal politics. They now had to tread 
cautiously for two reasons. First, they were no longer able to attribute the 
system's failure to the conservative faction (as they now possessed the majority 
of government and the parliament). Second, due to the compulsory scrutiny of 
all the legislation passed in the parliament by the Guardian Council. the 
conservatives still enjoyed ample legal authority to block any serious attempt to 
reform the system. 
As for the reformists. they would have three ways to succeed in carrying out 
their agenda. If we assume their cause as popular and reformist, they needed to 
employ either of the following methods. The first would be a series of 
institutional changes, i. e. revising the Constitution and therefore dismantling the 
Guardian Council as the main obstacle to reform. The second would be to resort 
to resource mobilisation, i. e. massive demonstrations, civil disobedience, etc. 
The third option would be to encourage discursive and contextual development. 
aimed at both society and state apparatus levels. 103 As mentioned before, the first 
option could not be the case as the reformists were elected and given the 
political authority and legitimacy according to present institutions and any 
changes would undermine their own positions, not to mention the constitutional 
obstacles of pursuing this method. The second option (resource mobilisation) 
also could not be exercised as the majority of the reformists for long were 
known as loyal Islamists who had even fought for the Islamic Republic. hence. 
102 By giving a full authority to the Supreme Leader. 
This notion was repeatedly stated by various reformists as farhang sari or hastar sari (contextual 
development and introductory phases). 
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felt unable to rally against the current political system. However. to materialise 
what they had expressed as their goals and aspirations within the time limit of 
four years. they had no option but to resort to either of these two methods. 
Saeed Hajarian, whose theories were received with great attention prior to and 
during the reformists' presence in power, metaphorically described the solution 
as such: 'Pressure from below, negotiating from the top. '" 104 He envisaged that 
by implementing a limited but combined application of aforementioned 
methods, the reformists would be able to achieve their targets in time and with 
minimum costs and instabilities. For instance, a wave of new reformist 
newspapers and journals began to publish right after Khatami's election in 1997. 
Generally, the issues and the language they used were unprecedented in the 
Islamic Republic era with the exception of first two years. 
For the first couple of years. these radical reformist newspapers gained 
substantial audience and dominated the headlines. However, the reformists 
completely had forgotten that the maximum circulation rate of 400,000 that their 
most popular newspaper reached cannot be sufficient to guarantee the public 
support throughout a country of seventy five millions. As a result, it is plausible 
to argue of a determined failure of agency in conducting reform in the political 
structure of the Islamic Republic. According to Hajarian's theory. media ought 
to play a decisive role in provoking and encouraging masses up to certain extent 
which was set before the threshold of public revolt. 
In the following section we try to give a thematic evaluation of the reformist 
Sixth Majlis, its achievements and failures. First. we summarize the arbitrary 
nature of Iranian politics and the uncertain role of Majlis to promote a reform 
mandate. Second. since the discourse of reform in post-revolutionary Iran has 
integrated to Khatami's presidency as a popular and democrat minded President. 
his main perceptions on reform movements and social change in Iranian society 
will be mentioned. Third, we look at the factional politics within the loyal 
groups of the Islamic Republic in winning the Sixth Majlis election. Fourth, we 
104 
. Suhh-i Imre, 24 January 1998. 
262 
focus on the latest legal procedures of holding the Majlis election. We will also 
assess the promising impact of the Sixth Majlis election on Iranian foreign 
policy. Finally, the chapter will be concluded by analysing the failure of 
parliamentary reform in the Islamic Republic, while however. acknowledging a 
discursive progress towards reaching conceptual level necessary for achieving 
democratisation. 
4.8. A DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: BAZAAR-ULAMA 
STRONGHOLD 
After all these high expectations. one could raise the question: can the sixth 
parliamentary election be categorized as a democratic election or not? From 
idealist point of view it can be seen as the least democratic election but, on the 
other hand. for an essentially ideological state it could be argued to be relatively 
democratic. 105 Of course. the full detail to support this argument is laid in the 
structure of power in the Islamic Republic and its unique hierarchy. As far as the 
decision-making process is concerned, at the top is the Supreme Leader (wali- 
_fagih) 
who somehow is thought to be given his authority as a divine 
representative. Therefore. he practically and legally enjoys the last word and the 
power of veto over all matters. ' 06 
He is not just the spiritual leader of the nation but also the ultimate political 
decision maker of the country. He controls the military. the police. radio and 
television, and the judiciary system. Some of the most important commercial and 
industrial foundations are also directly or indirectly are under his control. As 
mentioned before. below the Supreme Leader are the Guardian Council, the 
Expediency Council, and the Assembly of Experts. The combination and 
function of all these depend on the Leader's discretion while the legality of their 
decisions in addition to their constitutional position. is also ascribed to the 
legitimacy of the Leader. 
'°` Hussein Mara'shi, ECP's reformist MP in the Sixth Majlis in an interview with author. An extract 
from this interview will be given at the end of this chapter. 
For example, Ayatollah Khamenei in 2004 encouraged designers to produce a national modelling 
dress in order to replace the Western style with it. 
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Two very important political factors characterise this sophisticated power structure: 
first, the aforementioned decision-making organs which are composed of a group of 
conservative clerics. They form a closed circle of the ulama which is unaccountable to 
the public and more importantly, is impenetrable to `outsiders In fact, this circle is 
also able to constrain the Supreme Leader on the basis of belonging to the guild of 
clergy and to some extent through the Council of Experts which supposedly supervise 
the Leader. Moreover, this ruling class of the ulama has long had intimate relations 
with and the support of the most powerful traders (Bazaaris) and merchant capitalists 
who control the Chamber of Commerce and the largest import-export companies. 
107 
Bazaaris are the merchants, shopkeepers, employees, hawkers. and other urban 
Iranians who make their living inside the Bazaar or depend upon it for a living. " 109 
A strong link between the clergy and the merchants is rooted in the historic 
socio-economic structure of Iranian society. That is to say that there is a mutual 
and profound collaboration between the traditional Bazaar which is only willing 
to preserve itself as a pre-modern pattern of commerce (incomprehensible 
income accounts and tax evasion) and the strong patronage of the ulama 109 On 
the other hand, the ulama also depend on the largesse of the Bazaaris to fund 
their schools, seminaries and networks through generously defined religious 
donations such as: khumsýl0 and Imam's portion (sahm-i imam). "' 
In other words, the political structure of the Islamic Republic is based on a well 
organized network of ulama with strong economic links to the masses who strongly 
believe in religious matters. '' 2 To support this argument some scholars have studied 
107 Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 192-193. 
108 Arang Keshavarzian, Tehran's Bazaar: Continuity or Change in Guft-u-Gu. no. 41. January 2004, 
pp. ] 148. 
'09 Members of traditional Bazaar tend to refuse government supervision over their financial activity in 
order to escape heavy taxation, instead they insist on paying religious pay-outs to the clergy instead of 
tax. 
110 Khums is a1 /5 of net benefit left annually and its saving and spending according to Shi'ism is 
prohibited. 
111 According to Shia school of Islam, each Muslim should calculate his annual profit and allocate 1/5 
of it for poor people or who the current Imam considers eligible to receive it. Also, Imam's portion is 
the money each prosperous Shi'a Muslim allocates for the Hidden Imam as a sign of his loyalty and 
devotion to Him and his cause. Of course. during the occultation period, the jurisprudents act as 
Imam's representative (viceregent) and collect this fund. 
112 For example, the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council. the Expediency Council. 
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the internal dynamic between bazaar and the ulama and attempted to measure the 
leverage of influence it exerts into political power. 113 "The Bazaar's close cooperation 
during the revolution with the ulama (Shi'a Islamic leadership) engendered scholarly 
claims of an historical Bazaar-Mosque alliance. "' 14 Or "outside of ulama itself. no 
group in Iran has been as constantly labeled "Islamic" as bazaaris" "5 
Therefore, it seems, we cannot easily reject the argument that the institutions of 
government and parliament in Iran are to some extent an institutional accessory 
designated to administrate the affairs, not to shape and direct the distribution of 
resources and wealth. Apparently, given the size, autonomy and influence of 
Bazaar and the institution of ulama throughout the society, it provides sufficient 
concentration of authority to block any attempt to reform the state without 
considering reforming the old-established interaction between Bazaar and ulama. 
In other words, there always has been a functioning-although undemocratic- 
form of state-society interaction in the Iranian society. As a result, it has not yet 
been possible to create civic (secular) state-society relationship. 
The election of a president or representatives of the Majlis can be seen as 
exercises of democratic procedures which act as the veneer of democracy on the 
Islamic Republic. The signs of intra-state demand for reform began to emerge on 
the eve of the Fifth Majlis elections in 1996. The emergence of the reform 
movement can be attributed to the participation of the post-revolutionary middle 
class in the political procedure. This participation was felt needed and therefore 
welcomed through the unity of both "moderate right'" and "Islamic left" as one 
front aiming to prevent the "radical right" faction from seizing the absolute 
power and allocating all the resources to its "Bazaari-Ulama alliance'". 
Therefore, we should appreciate the difference between Iranian society's 
demand for reform and the political reconfiguration between Islamic left and 
moderate right. 
113 For example, Ahmad Ashraf, Thaiss, and Keshavarzian. 
114 Ahmad Ashraf. 'Bazaar-Mosque Alliance: the Social Basis of Revolts and Revolutions', in Politics, 
Culture and Society, no. 1,1988, pp. 538.67. 
15 See Gustav Thaiss, 'The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religion and Social Change' in Iran Faces the 
Seventies, (ed) Ehsan Yarshater, New York, Praeger, 1971. 
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Applying the term "reformist" to this political alliance should be seen as a 
linguistic compromise which has gradually become standard. Interestingly, the 
usage of the term "reform" has little trace before the landslide election of 
Khatami in 1997. In other word, these reformists never had an explicit intention 
of restructuring the system or even deposing the radical conservatives, but of 
gaining their share of power. ' 16 In this light. the widespread socio-political and 
economic dissatisfaction created an inevitable but very ambiguous notion of 
reform. Such un-clarity caused huge confusion throughout the social strata and 
of course political factions. The new popular alliance found itself at the critical 
juncture. having to choose between making unrealisable promises to encourage 
public support, or advocating those more limited measures which they were 
actually capable of delivering. The new left faction (IIPP) chose the first path 
and rallied against the strongholds of the system. 11 
7 As a result, the conservative 
establishment positioned itself wisely behind the Supreme Leader as the 
guarantor of the status quo and extensively tried to halt any reformist action. The 
conservatives felt compelled to resist the spreading of reformist rhetoric-not 
mentioning reformist initiatives or practices-therefore banning reformist 
newspapers and intellectuals followed as preventive measures. This aspect will 
be addressed in more detail in the interview with MP Hussein Mara'shi later in 
this chapter. 
For example, when Qualm Hussein Karbaschi was the mayor of Tehran. he 
launched his plan for a massive chain store to supply goods in Tehran in order to 
offset the traditional monopoly of the merchants in Tehran's Bazaar. The 
conservatives reacted by accusing him of spreading capitalism. ' 18 But worse for 
them was the publication of the daily newspaper Hamshahri (fellow citizen) 
which introduced a relatively liberal form of lifestyle, and which angered the 
conservatives by undermining their rigid attitudes towards life. In addition. 
antagonism became more apparent through the emergence of the ECP and its 
extraordinary performance during the Fifth Majlis election and then the 
presidential election. The new trend aimed to modernize society albeit within the 
'"' Majid Muhammadi. an article in <wwwv. goova. com akhhar> 
W, The announcement by IIPP for reconsideration of the Constitution and holding a refrundum. 
1 is tiavhan, 12 November 1996, P. 2. in editorial it points to chain supermarkets Sharvand. 
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Islamic rules, and it was enough to be encountered and blocked by the 
conservative opposition. The trial and imprisonment of the Head of ECP 
(Karbaschi) was the least price that a political group had to pay for attempting to 
change parts of socio-economic status quo. 
4.9. THE POLITICAL FACTIONS 
For nearly seven years. from 1989 to 1996, factional activity became halted in 
Iran. 19 Since Ayatollah Khomeini's demise the Islamic left was expelled from 
all three branches of government. As mentioned in chapter 4, on the eve of the 
Fifth Majlis election the conservatives split into two: moderate and hardliner 
factions. The hardliner (traditional) right gathered around the Association of 
Militant Clergy. whereas the moderate (modern) right found the left faction to be 
the only option to ally with. This alliance was however a tactic for the moderate 
right to maintain its ever growing influence, but for the left faction it was an 
historic opportunity for resurgence and a chance to reorganise itself as a 
reformist trend. 
4.9.1. THE AMODEK4 TE ISLAMIC LEFT (REFORMISTS) 
The Moderate or new Islamic left descended from the traditional Islamic left 
which was a mixture of socialism and political Islam. After the demise of 
Ayatollah Khomeini and with the dominance of the conservatives. the Islamic 
left underwent a series of transformations and altered its traditional juxtaposition 
on economic and social issues. Although the new left still was dominated by 
mainly traditional leftists. their new and popular rhetoric attracted public appeal 
and prepared the ground for their election. The traditional left however, 
remained intact on economic. social and cultural issues. They strongly opposed 
Iran's entry in the World Trade Organization and advocated state intervention in 
industrial and agricultural policies. 120 
Hamid Reza Jalaipur, Jami'ah Shanasi-i Junhish-harvih Ijtama'i [the Sociology of Social 
Movements], Tehran. Tarh-i Naw Publishing. 1381 [2002], p. 204. 
IN Puvam Imru=, ibid. 
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This tendency used to be represented by the Majma' Rawhaniyun Mubariz 
(AMC), the Labour House, and the Islamic Labour Party and. to a lesser extent, 
the Organization of the Militants of the Islamic Revolution (OMIR). Salam, the 
newspaper published by Musavi Khoeiniha (senior member of AMC) in 1992. 
was the only paper to broadcast the left faction in the Islamic Republic. It 
continued until the election of the Fifth Majlis and emerging of a new coalition 
between new left and moderate conservatives. This alliance was received 
warmly by the public and Salam became more popular to shape public 
opinion. '`'' Its editorials' articles and also its famous open column (alo-salam) 
introduced a new form of dialogue which was unprecedented. It published and 
promoted concepts like human rights, freedom of speech, ethnic and minorities' 
rights, political pluralism, etc. Salam hugely assisted in rebuilding a new face for 
the Iranian left. To this end. the Islamic left embraced a number of democratic 
concepts for the first time in the Islamic Republic and attempted to ease various 
restrictions on social, economic and political issues. '22 This coalition greatly 
contributed and prepared the ground for the landslide victory of Khatami in 
1997. 
After the election of President Khatami, a group of moderate leftists initiated the 
establishment of a coalition comprising of the major reformist groups. They 
planned to bring all eighteen political groups which supported Khatami during 
the presidential campaign into one front. From the beginning, they failed to 
convince other partners to accept this offer and the proposed front altered to 
become a party, Iran's Islamic Participation Party (IIPP). This was officially 
founded in 1998 by Khatami's closest political allies under the leadership of his 
brother Muhammad Reza Khatami. '23 The newly formed reformist party 
strengthened its public profile, emphasizing its liberal reformist discourse. 
The orientation of the IIPP could be described as a mixture of religious, 
nationalist and neo-liberal ideology compressed within a New Left tendency. 
12' 
Jalaipur. ibid. p. 205 
' A sr-i Ma, 18 December 1998. 
''' A day after announcing its formation, several groups declared their independence and emphasised 
their wish to preserve their identity. for example, the Executives of Construction Party (ECP). 
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Also, by adopting the inclusive slogan, "Iran for all Iranians. " the IIPP attracted 
various groups of people across the country, in particular the religious and ethnic 
minorities. 124 For a short period, it achieved considerable success in Iran's 
political landscape, in particular at the sixth Majlis election. However. some 
believe that the IIPP's success was the result of its affiliation with Khatami and 
the exploitation of widespread dissatisfaction with the clerical establishment. In 
addition, to better understand why the majority of constituencies voted 
overwhelmingly in the forthcoming elections in favour of IIPP's candidates (the 
sixth Majlis and Khatami's second term). we need to consider its rentier status 
as a government backed party. 
In the meantime, Khatami pressed the Intelligence Ministry to reveal its 
responsibility for a chain of dissident assassinations. It was the most striking 
event in the history of the Islamic Republic and brought a wave of condemnation 
and resentment within the masses and elites. Consequently. Durri Najafabadi the 
Minister of Intelligence was forced to resign. However, in the aftermath of 
investigations, the reformists' papers launched a critical attack on the fact- 
finding process. Most notably. Akbar Ganji, a reformist journalist at the Subh-i 
Imru: newspaper, envisaged that such terrors must have been directed from top 
officials and that the resignation of the intelligence minister was not 
125 
satisfactory. 
He went further and implicitly accused Rafsanjani as one of the masterminds of 
chain assassinations'26 The result of such media frenzy surely damaged 
Rafsanjani's reputation among the public and marginalised his political position. 
On the other hand, Rafsanjani's candidacy for the Sixth Majlis election put the 
Executives of Construction Party (ECP) in a difficult situation on whether to 
support him or not. For sure, the ECP could not refuse to enlist Rafsanjani since 
he was its main founder. Thus, the rift between the IIPP and ECP deepened. As a 
124 Arabs in Khuzestan or Turkmens in Golestan province. 
125 Subh-i Iniru:. 19 January 2000. 
126 A'ii janab Surkh Push! The Red Worn Lord! Akbar Ganji, in editorial of Neshat, 15 January 2000. 
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result, the ECP's reputation started to decline and gradually lost public 
confidence. 1` 
The IIPP also skilfully placed the blame for the failure of Khatami's government 
to solve social, economic and political problems on the conservatives' shoulders 
while taking credit for Khatami's reform agenda. The party was determined to 
gain a majority in the oncoming election of the sixth Majlis. However, the 
disqualification of some hopeful IIPP candidates by the Guardian Council and 
the assassination of Saeed Hajarian indicated that the pro-reform forces still 
faced entrenched resistance from the clerical establishment both on legal and 
constitutional grounds, together with using the harshest of violence. '28 
Aside from political rivalries, which pretty well disintegrated the reform 
coalition, economic mismanagement and disagreement within the government 
was a great matter of concern. The conflict emerged between the ECP and the 
free market supporters in the IIPP against the pro-state control leftists. Since 
Khatami's cabinet consisted of two ideologically opposed economic ministers, 
this disagreement and chaotic decision-making affected his political 
achievements. The confusion even caused the postponement of the Third Five 
Year Plan for a year. '29 Obviously, the original differences between the modern 
right (ECP) and the moderate left on economic issues became more apparent and 
halted the government performance as a whole. For instance, the continual 
disagreement between the Central Bank and the Economic Ministry over the 
monetary policies frustrated the government; hence Khatami personally 
interfered to solve this persistent problem. Also, the privatisation process which 
had commenced under the previous government underwent a critical review and 
came to a standstill. 130 
127 This decline began with backing of Rafsanjani in the Sixth parliamentary election 
128 The Guardian Council rejected Abdullah Nuri as a candidate for the Sixth Majlis election. while 
Saeed Askar who shot Najarian is believed to he a member of the Basij. 
'2' Bran an, Tehran, 24 May 2002. 
I'0 Abrar Egtasadi. Tehran. 6 March 2000. 
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4.9.2. THE. C 1)_' SER L1 TI VES 
In their preparation for the sixth Majlis elections. the conservatives formed a 
coalition headed by three major groupings, the Association of Combatant 
Clergy. the Society of Islamic Coalition" and the Association of Qum Seminary 
Teachers. This became known as the "Coalition of the Imam"s Line and the 
Leadership". Ostensibly, the conservatives knew there was little chance in 
gaining any victory in the Majlis election and therefore took a defensive 
approach. Perhaps the reason why Nateq Nuri avoided registering as a candidate 
was that the conservatives were aware that this was a lost battle and thus 
retreated to prevent more embarrassment. 
'3' On one hand. the Council of 
Guardians disqualified many of the secular reformist candidates. notably the 
IFM's candidates such as Ezzatollah Sahabi, Ibrahim Yazdi, and Peyman. On 
the other hand, the conservative camp welcomed Rafsanjani's candidacy and 
enlisted him to the top position. 
Of course, there was a split among the conservatives whether to support 
Rafsanjani's candidacy. 132 But at the end. Rafsanjani conceded that his name be 
added on the conservative list, and it was perceived to be useful for the 
conservatives in order to weaken the reformists in the long run. At the same 
time, as said before. the radical reformists intensified their attacks on Rafsanjani 
over his role in the chain of assassinations and, with persistence. discredited his 
entire career. 133 In fact. separating Rafsanjani from the reformist campaign was a 
real success for the conservatives though they were badly defeated in the general 
election. 
An earlier change in the election law and raising the voting age from fifteen to 
sixteen also benefited the conservatives in the light of the massive majority of 
Iranian youngsters having crude pro-Khatami sentiments. The conservative 
coalition campaigned rather poorly. Their xenophobic slogans against Khatami's 
reform programme had little impact on the electorate. The presidential defeat 
A sr-i Ma, 15 June 2000. 
Ka, vhan, a prominent conservative tribune, consistently expressed its dismay at Rafsanjani's 
candidacy. 
For example. Abbas Abdi. 
271 
and the prospect of another massive defeat in the February 2000 elections 
prompted soul searching in the hard-liners' camp. Some acknowledged that they 
had lost touch with the electorate and that their behaviour in the fifth Majlis had 
been arrogant and divisive in the eyes of the public. 134 
Not willing to relinquish power to their opponents, the conservatives 
nevertheless mounted a vigorous counterattack to minimize the impact of the 
imminent reformist victory. Given the fact that they were now about to become a 
minority, their ability to maintain influence over the legislative process was 
constrained but, thanks to the constitution, the Guardian Council could still 
legally reject any legislation. Even then, they tried to reach out to the 
independents and moderate reformers in an effort to isolate the more radical 
reformers. 135 In addition. during the last months of the fifth Majlis, the 
conservative camp squeezed its power to obstruct any foreseeable reform plans. 
For example, the Guardian Council issued a verdict saying that the institutions 
under the leader's appointment were excluded from the Majlis supervisory status 
and legally were bound to be responsible to the Leader. ' 36 
4.10. THE SOCIO-POLITICAI. TRANSFORMATION OF IRANIAN 
SOCIETY-A REFORMIST DISCOURSE 
The legal and political framework in which the election of the Sixth Majlis was 
conducted could not be assumed to be democratic as far as the normative pattern 
in other democracies is concerned. But in the context of the urgent social 
imperatives which accompanied the Sixth parliamentary election. it produced a 
sense of having achieved a democratised election. '' Saying that this election 
took place democratically" cannot convey the whole picture. In fact, this election 
was held in an arbitrary atmosphere and through a vetting mechanism which 
only approved loyal candidates to the regime. Therefore, many would-be 
134 Resalat. Editorial by Amir Muhebiyan. 5 March 2000. 
"` For example. Qudrat Ali-Khani. who belonged to the reformist camp. repeatedly acted or voted in 
favour of conservatives in the Majlis. 
Such institutions include the National Broadcasting Organisation, the Judiciary and all its sub- 
sections. the armed forces, and even the giant Charity of Imam Khomeini's Relief. 
137 By introducing the term Islamic Democracy (mardum-salary-i dini) 
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candidates (mainly secular) were rejected and barred from standing in the 
election. The whole process occurred with a desperate hope for change. It was in 
contrast with Khatami"s inability to utilize his presidential prerogatives and also 
mobilise the masses. However, a series of daily political events and tragedies 
provided a great deal of courage and enthusiasm for the pursuit of a reform 
movement within Iranian society. 138 
The chain of assassinations of socio-political dissidents and violent riots in the 
universities had a far-reaching impact on creating such stirring circumstances. 139 
In early summer of 1998, Teheran University students engaged in a peaceful 
demonstration opposing the closure of Salam, a popular reformist daily 
newspaper, when they were violently attacked by hundreds of plain cloth 
security forces and thugs. Dormitories were destroyed, one person was officially 
reported killed, dozens were wounded and hundreds were arrested. Of those 
accountable for this attack, not a single person was convicted except for a low 
profile policeman who was fined for stealing a razor. 140 Instead, many students 
were given long prison sentences and at least two were sentenced to death. 141 
These incidents added to the public demand for radical reform within the system 
and of course, it was perceived achievable through the upcoming parliamentary 
election of Sixth Majlis. 
The conservative faction which were surprised and seriously outvoted by twenty 
million voters in the presidential election of 1997, started to take all necessary 
precautions and prepared the ground for a less embarrassing defeat in the 2000 
election. They did so through the Fifth Majlis by passing a motion giving the 
Guardian Council more strict supervision rights over the eligibility of the 
candidates for the Majlis elections. This bill allowed the Council to disqualify 
any candidate they deemed unfit. 142 Subsequent to this legislation, eight hundred 
1; K For instance, the chain of assassinations of political dissidents and attacks on university students. 
179 These riots broke out after students protested against the closure of the Sulum newspaper for 
revealing some information on the assassinations. Plain clothed security forces burst into the University 
of Tehran dormitories and beat students. The incident led to rioting throughout the country in places 
such as Shiraz and Tabriz. 
140 Suhh-i lmru=. 17 October 1999. 
141 Ahmad Batebi was condemned to death. After three years trial, the verdict was reduced to 15 years 
imprisonment. 
142 The amendment to the election law was passed in 1999. 
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of the most popular reformist candidates were disqualified from a field of six 
thousand. 143 At the same time, intense pressure was meted out against the 
reformist press. 
Prominent critics of the status quo (the conservative dominance). including of 
the most popular candidates such as deposed Interior Minister Abdullah Nuri, 
former MP Mohsen Kadivar, the Shi'a scholar, and Musavi Khoeiniha. publisher 
of Salam. either were jailed or barred from political activity. '44 Extra measures 
were taken to discourage voter participation in the election. Election campaigns 
were limited according to the new amendment. in terms of the length of time. the 
size of posters. and even the colour of leaflets. The voting age was raised from 
fifteen to sixteen and the duration of voting was reduced to twelve hours. The 
last two measures alone reduced the number of voters by hundreds of thousands. 
In order to enhance the chances of incumbents being re-elected, the legislation 
also reduced the percentage of votes necessary to win the Majlis seats from 33 
per cent to 25 per cent. '45 
The conservatives did not confine themselves to these antidemocratic procedural 
measures. They did their best to divide the solid lines of the rival faction. This is 
where Hashemi Rafsanjani stepped in as a candidate. While Rafsanjani's party, 
the Executives of Construction (ECP), was considered part of the reformist 
movement, his overall political career is better characterised conservative. 146 
Rafsanjani's candidacy created friction within the reformists. Although he had 
been tried to be known as reformist, there was a general consensus that his real 
intention was to resume his previous position as Speaker of the Majlis, thereby 
gaining control over the reformist representatives. The majority of reformists 
showed their despair at his candidacy. A question to raise here is why the ruling 
clergy in general and the Guardian Council in particular bothered to take all 
these complicated endeavours instead of rigging the election? The answer would 
ia' Purum Imr_. ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Asr-e A=adegan. January 12 2000, p. 3 
146 Hamid Reza Jalaipur, ibid. pp. 307& 310. 
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be that, by giving the election a veneer of democracy, they sought to gain 
legitimacy for the regime as a whole. 147 
The rift between the public and dominant conservatives had reached its highest 
level and lack of public confidence became more obvious. 
'4 Thus, the 
conservatives were fearful of the consequences of rejecting the election result. in 
particular when from the government point of view (hhatami's government) the 
election was seen as healthy one. 
149 In addition, when the possibility of a social 
uprising or chaos, whether immediately or sometime later, could not be ruled 
out. the conservatives felt compelled to approve the totality of elections. 
'50 The 
next question to consider is: can the overwhelming participation of the people in 
the election be interpreted as a supporting factor for the current structure? And if 
not, why did they take part in this election so massively and by doing so 
legitimise the regime? Answering this question requires a closer look at Iranian 
society and its contemporary political history. 
15' 
In fact, due to the lack of a modern civil society in the shadow of a politicized 
religion and also the persistence of a rentier state, neither a viable. independent 
working-class movement nor a strong national bourgeoisie has materialized in 
Iran. I 2 This could be seen as the main reason why in 1979 a group of hard-line 
clerics easily took the leadership of a popular revolution, consolidated their 
power quickly. and practically eliminated alternative political opinions and 
movements soon after. However, the overwhelming majority of Iranians. 
particularly the younger generation. found an interest in a political faction which 
claims to conduct a series of reform. This advocacy was neither ideological, nor 
politically driven. but participation in the political process to satisfy their socio- 
economic demands. 
147 Rah-i Tudeh. Bulletin. No. 17. April 2000 
148 Pavam /mru: % ibid. 
149 Khatami's government. 
1s° See in the resolution of the Militant Organization of Islamic Revolution (MOIR), April 2000. 
151 See Hajarian article on Populism and Iranian polity, in Altuh, Tehran. February'March 2002 
15' For more argument in this regard see Homa Katouzian. History and Politics in Iran. London. 
I. B. Tauris. 2003. 
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As a result. a broad coalition of workers, peasants, urban and rural poor. 
shopkeepers, government employees, writers, artists, students, and teachers who 
were ready to vote (not fight) turned out and their say was counted. 1'' In this 
light, some analysts argued that this development of people"s votes which 
change the officials (reformists instead of conservatives) means that the 
democratisation phase to some extent had come to a practical stage. They 
believed that Khatami's victory began the period of reform and that the Sixth 
Majlis would accomplish that significantly. 154 
In fact, it was by the end of the Iraq-Iran War that a general empathy for basic 
social and political rights emerged throughout the public. in particular the 
emerging middle class. 1>5 After Khatami's election, this phase was called the 
"reform movement" without exactly specifying reform of what and how. In 
other words, there was a general agreement between the public and the moderate 
political actors over issues of reform such as easing some social restrictions, but 
neither the public nor the politicians knew what modifications should be made to 
the system. 156 Although in the aftermath of Khatami's election. his advocates 
attempted to envisage a reformist programme aimed at social, economic or 
political reform, it did lack the operational management which eventually led to 
the waning of its public appeal. 157 It could be defined as a social sympathy and 
desire (not a profound and deep-rooted movement) that took advantage of the 
exceptional opportunity offered by the presidential election of May 1997 to 
provide a massive show of public opinion. 
Therefore, the lack of a strong. unified and determined leadership with a clear 
political and economic programme for the future was the weakest point of this 
so-called social movement. As the 2003 election of City Councils showed, the 
public quickly withdrew its support from the reformist faction and demonstrated 
15, Seventh and eighth presidential elections. first City Councils elections and the Sixth Majlis 
elections. 
154 Hajarian. A/iah1 ibid. 
155 Jalaipur. ibid. p. 66 
156 In January 1998, Khatami conducted an interview with CNN about the rapprochement with the US 
which was promptly blocked by Khamenei. 
157 Khatami's repeated emphasis on the fact that public should not expect him to reform the system. 
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a massive apathy towards political participation. ' Most of the reformists 
attributed their extreme caution in taking firm action to the internal and external 
dangers to the territorial integrity and national unity of the country. ' 59 Their 
ambiguity to stand firm or keep silent was disappointing enough. According to 
them, they preferred to try only the available means within the Constitution to 
move closer to their goals, instead of using violence and chaos. 160 It had become 
clear that pursuing their pre-election slogans would endanger their situation in 
the system, thus, they began to change previously made promises. Instead, they 
stressed that "reform is a steady and time consuming process which needs huge 
patience and that their opponents will eventually acquire the benefits of the 
discourse of reform and would finally join into the reformists' camp. - 161 
However, the fundamental contradictions remained untouched. As the 
representative (elected) part of sovereignty was trying to convince the other 
wing to accept the majority's desire. the gap between the public and the 
reformists became deeper. Khatami's re-election in 2001 again raised the 
dilemma of whether the reformist approach could make progress in the structure 
of the Islamic Republic or not. In other words, the question was. how real was 
the possibility of having participating sovereign citizens whose votes would 
influence the outcomes of a decision-making system? Or should the decisions be 
made by a hierarchy of conservative theocrats descending from a Supreme 
Leader who himself is not elected by the people and is not accountable to them? 
The reformists actually proposed that their agenda was to make a balance 
between these two contradictions, not to alter the system. 162 There were also 
differences of opinion within the reform coalition as to whether this 
contradiction could be resolved within the framework of the existing 
Constitution or not. 
15$ See the results of the second City Council elections and the seventh Majlis. in both the conservatives 
won 
159 Taqi Rahnama. Naqad-i Qudrat, Mavani' Na=ari-i isligrar-i Democracy dar /ran [the Criticism of 
Power, the Theoretical Obstacles of Democracy in Iran]. Tehran, Nashr-e Soraaie. 1381 [2002], p. 
'60 For example, Khatami's twin bills which aimed to clarify the election law and the presidential 
power both were obstructed and retuned. 
161 Muhammad Quchani. Sharq. 31 October 2003. 
162 Editorial A 'sr-i Mu . 
March 23 2000. 
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On the other hand, some first-hand reports and conversations with voters 
revealed a high degree of political sophistication on the part of the participants. 
163 As the conservatives did their best to discourage people from voting and also 
by disqualifying most of the well known popular candidates. many less known 
or unknown names appeared on the lists of candidates. The political background 
of thousands of candidates had to be carefully studied in a short period of time 
by the voters. Political discussions among family members and friends were 
intense and spirited. This election did not seem to be a ritual of going to the polls 
to choose between two candidates selected by party mechanisms and introduced 
to the voters in television adverts. rather it opposed to be a genuine channel 
conveying a public message. 
The Sixth Majlis election was a spectacular success for the Islamic reformers 
and a striking setback for the conservatives. The results went beyond the 
expectations of many both inside and outside Iran. Close to 80 per cent of 
eligible voters participated. Of 290 Majlis seats. the reformists won 185, the 
conservatives 60. and the independents 40. The public preference in choosing 
one reformist faction over the conservative took place without rebellion or 
resorting to widespread violence. Also it ought to be noticed that the Iranian 
society could exercise its preference in a less ideological fashion than three 
decades ago. thanks to the engagement of the youth and women in the 
64 process. 
Significant cultural transformations in film, music, painting, fine arts, and 
historical and literary research also took place. The number of books published 
and the circulation of daily newspapers and their quality of political content 
reached levels unprecedented in Iran's history. 165 This is true. as well, of more 
academic magazines and journals. If we add the fact that 93 per cent of those 
between the age of six and twenty-four are literate, compared to 50.5 per cent 
before the revolution, and that there are a million and half university students, 
1o3 Interview with several voters in three poll stations during the sixth Majlis election in Tehran. 
February 2000. 
"'' The impact of first-time voters in determining who went to the Majlis was noticed by both political 
factions. (Ra'v Avvuli-ha) cited in the IIPP's Resolution. January 2000. 
Various periodicals covered socio-political issues on regular basis such as Payam Imruz. Kiyan. 
Rah-i Nu, Gardun, etc, however, most of them were banned towards the end of Khatami's presidency. 
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more than half of whom are women, then a clearer picture of the cultural 
transformation that is taking place in Iran appears. '66 
However, as discussed extensively in the second chapter, the mainstream of 
intellectual debate and the dominant discursive paradigm in Iranian society had 
become a mixture of religious intellectualism and secular modernist school of 
thought. Although the reformists were attributing their manifesto to the religious 
intellectualism in accord with Islamic principles and notions, the degree of 
influence received through the translated works written by the Western liberal 
thinkers such as John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, Immanuel Kant, Max Weber. 
Karl Popper, etc. was profound. 167 In fact, for the conservatives, the Islamic 
intellectualism had been developed in correlation with the "Western cultural 
invasiori'. 168 The image portrait by both camp's politicians result was to show a 
deepening socio-political rift in Iranian society that is polarised between 
reformist (modem) forces and conservative (traditional) factions. However, for 
the majority of people such debates were obscured and had little meaning, not 
more than a series of political tricks for grasping more portion of already divided 
rule. 
4.11. PRE-ELECTION POLITICS 
Prior to the Sixth Majlis election, the nature of factional politics reached its 
climax in terms of political division between "reformists" (islah-talab) and 
"totalitarians" (igtidar-gara). These terms were introduced to define the forces 
involved in the polity. 169 The reformists were quick to blame all the deficiencies 
and failures of their government (Khatami's) on the Fifth Majlis and its 
conservative (totalitarian) composition. In fact, the aim was to convince public 
opinion that a new reformist Majlis could reverse the course of events in favour 
of people's rights and also that it would determine the fate of the reform 
"'`' Iran Fact Book, Tehran. published by the Centre for Statistic, 1379 [2000-2001 J. 
167 The author's survey during the field research in Shahr-i Ketab book shop in Tehran. Spring 2006. 
16' The famous phrase coined by Ayatollah Khamenei and repeatedly used by the conservatives. 
169 Neshat. 27 January 2000. 
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movement. 170 One might describe it as a real demagogy through which the 
reformists could grasp the confidence of the public while they knew that the 
Majlis on its own has a very limited power to legislate and coordinate a 
profound reform programme. Nevertheless, a critical view by the regime's 
opposition portrayed the reformists' mandate as neither capable of delivering 
their targets nor believing in what they were apparently after. 171 
Beside the public adversary between reformists and conservatives. one may 
interpret a delicate re-allocation of power holders aiming to buy legitimacy, and 
even a seductive attempt to redirect the opposition to the regime as opposition to 
one faction within the regime. More skeptical is the argument that the reformists 
would need the conservatives to prevent the secularization of Iranian politics, a 
case which even the Islamic reformists could not allow to happen. Conversely, 
the conservatives needed the reformers because they would give popular 
legitimacy to the totality of the regime. Indeed, we can argue that the 
conservative faction, also the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
perceived the presidency of Khatami as the last best chance for the survival of 
the Islamic Republic. Practically, the same compromise compelled the 
conservatives to accept the Sixth Majlis elections. Although the reformists 
thought that the conservatives' retreat was a clear sign of their obedience 
towards the majority, they reluctantly disregarded their opponents' stand on 
permanent seats of power while their seats were subject to a four year period. 
The conservatives truly recognised that they could obstruct the reformists' 
agenda without any need to prevent them possessing the Majlis. 
In the meantime, international pressure on Iran was increasing over three major 
issues: human rights. Middle East peace process and the production of weapons 
of mass destruction. '72 Thus, for the conservatives, a more democratic image of 
Iran would be better suited to relieve foreign and international pressure and even 
boost trade and investment. The conservatives saw this as a unique opportunity 
170 The use of the term totalitarian instead of conservative by the reformist newspaper can be seen as 
stepping up the pressure on the conservatives to accept the reformists' policies. 
171 Sharq. 19 June 2003 
172 The UN Human Rights Commission condemned Iran's behaviour on human rights, civil liberty and 
ethnic and minorities' rights. 
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to enhance their economic and logistical influence and to be prepared for the 
next general elections (the second City Councils election of 2003 and the 
Seventh Majlis election of 2004). The conservatives, however, seemed well 
aware that despite their utmost attempts to sabotage Khatami's mandate, his 
popularity remained high. The political front runners who were Khatami's 
advocates still had a great chance to be elected, the only solution for the 
conservatives to defuse the reformists' progress was to dissuade the electorate 
from casting their votes in the forthcoming elections. A maximum participation 
began to be seen as a means for an absolute defeat. In this light, a bitter factional 
rivalry continued although it did not reach a climax. 
4.12. THE SIXTH MAJLIS 
In approaching the sixth Majlis election, the prospect of reform was entering into 
its crucial stage. It was a general perception amongst political activists that the 
fate of sixth Majlis would determine the fate of reform in Iran. 173 The pro- 
Khatami media was repeatedly telling the public that by sending reformist 
candidates into the Majlis, Khatami would be able to deliver his manifesto 
including freedom of speech. the promotion of social diversity and the 
development of civil society. 174 Since the former parliament was in control of 
the conservatives, the prospect of taking over the incoming Majlis seemed 
significant as the only step towards the implementation of the reform project. 
Both the public and the elites shared the simplified view that the new reformist 
Majlis would be competent enough to tackle the issue of authoritarianism. The 
idea was that the reformist Majlis would be the real voice of the public arising 
through the legislative branch in order to change the course of general 
175 policies. 
17' Almost all pro-reform newspapers illustrated such hopes in their editorials for at least six months 
prior to the election. 
174 All Muhammadi. The Six Majlis Election and Prospect of Democracy in Iran', in Iran 
Encountering Glohalisation, (ed), London, Routledge Curzon. 2003, p. 228 
175 Rah-i Tudeh Bulletin, ibid. 
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However, before answering the question of how far this theory was valid and 
whether it could be verified by subsequent events, we need to take into 
consideration the experimental circumstances under which the sixth Majlis 
emerged. In fact, despite the rhetorical background reflected on the sixth Majlis 
which illustrated it as an unprecedented and unique form of democratic 
institution in the history of Iranian parliamentary politics. the Whole process was 
more or less identical to the routine of Iranian politics. If we look at it more 
carefully we can hardly see any significant alteration in the circumstances prior 
to or after its inauguration. 
Politically, apart from the re-election of Khatami, the reformist Majlis proved 
incapable of altering the conservative status quo. Socially, although the public 
(chiefly in the capital) was ever becoming more aware of their rights and gaining 
more tools to voice them, the broad social fabric still contained many traditional 
elements which could be conducive to reversing any reformist mandate. 176 
Economically, the country was in a steady situation: although the unemployment 
rate and inflation were ever increasing, the pace of this was slow enough not to 
trigger a major uprising. The only real change was the development of a public 
dialogue on issues like the importance of civil society, the value of freedom of 
expression and to some extent the meaning of pluralism. 
Reform can be achieved either by integrated social forces bound to bring about a 
change-mainly due to a compelling socio-economic situation-or by a well 
organised reformist elite capable of engineering constitutional changes. By 
observing Iranian society neither kind of pressure can be seen, although the 
public are seemingly dissatisfied with government's performance. 177 The 
middle class is of course in favour of these slogans and has overwhelmingly 
voted for them four times from 1997 to 2001. but it is logistically unready to 
conduct another revolution and pay the costs of another mass action. Therefore. 
the only alternative would be a reform through elite. Khatami's landslide victory 
176 
For instance. the outcome of City Councils elections in 2003 and the seventh Majlis in February 
2004, which in both the conservatives won. 
1'' For example. the strong operation of the Tehran Stock Market, or the huge eagerness of young 
people to get into university could be seen as indicators that the society is doing reasonably well and 
therefore a major outbreak seems unlikely. 
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created the hope of reform within both masses and parts of elites. Saeed Hajarian 
argues that Khatami's manifesto recalled the elites to gather and project the 
process of reform in the Islamic Republic, and parliament is the best place to 
pursue it. 1 78 However, since the political structure of the Islamic Republic has 
been designed to operate according to certain ideological principles, the ideal 
form of consensus reflected by elites cannot be attained. 
All in all, the institution of parliament in Iran has always lacked the essential 
credibility of acting like its counterparts in democratic countries. In this light. 
the sixth Majlis is not an exception but a figurative example of another failed 
attempt of a single-division, short-term democratisation. The following section 
will discuss major aspects of the sixth Majlis from its pre-election politics to its 
severe challenges with the conservatives in the legislation of the bills it had 
promised to pass through. In this section we will pay more attention to the views 
and performance of prominent reformist MPs. We will also cover the optimistic 
notions regarding Iran's foreign policy and its rapprochement with the West and 
in particular. with the US in the aftermath of the sixth Majlis election. Finally. 
the issue of the legitimacy crisis in the Islamic Republic will be discussed. 
4.12.1. THE ELECTION LAW 
Article 99 of the Islamic Republic's Constitution was a particularly acute issue 
in the 1999 campaign phase. The article states: The Council of Guardians has 
the responsibility of supervising the elections of the Assembly of Experts for 
Leadership, the President of the Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, 
and the direct recourse to popular opinion and referendum". Questions over the 
meaning and interpretation of "advisory supervision" were passionately debated 
in 1999. as the law was used to disqualify about 600 potential candidates in what 
had come to be a highly politicised process. Perhaps what reflected this most 
strongly was President Khatami's apology to disqualified candidates during his 
February 8 speech. 179 
178 Suhh-i /mru=, 16 August 1999. 
179 Mosharekat. 9 February 2000. 
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Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri. who headed the Assembly of Experts in 1979 
which prepared the Islamic Republic's first constitution, told seminarians in June 
1999 that the way Article 99 is currently implemented; the Islamic Republic 
actually has a two-stage election process. In the first stage. the Guardian Council 
selects the acceptable candidates. In the second stage. the public is allowed to 
choose from among the approved candidates. 180 Montazeri added. That is 
clearly in contravention of the spirit and the wording of Article 99. Experts who 
drafted and approved the Constitution at the first Assembly of Experts never 
intended Article 99 to convey such a meaning. " Montazeri repeated these 
sentiments six months later, when he said that, The law [constitution] is explicit 
on the fact that the supervisory role of the Guardian Council pertains to 
`supervision over the elections' and not `supervision over the candidates"'. ' 81 
In August 1996, the Fifth Majlis approved an amendment to the electoral law 
that said, The Guardian Council will have the supervisory task in every stage of 
the parliamentary elections. This supervision will be expedient and 
comprehensive in every election related to the Majlis. "'82 Moderate deputies 
tried to modify this by introducing a bill that stated candidates must be given a 
legal reason for disqualification so they would have a greater chance to appeal. 
But the Council of Guardian, which must endorse all legislation. rejected this 
measure. because in some cases the explanation could create corruption and 
destroy an individual's reputation. "' 83 
Moreover, Interior Minister Hujjat al-Islam Abdulvahed Musavi-Lari 
complained that the Guardian Council is responsible for supervision and the 
Ministry of Interior is responsible for administration. Any move which damages 
""Weekly Aban. 12 June 1999. 
181 Reuters. January 13,2000. See also The Guardian, January 13,2000. The editors of Suhh-i Inaru=. 
Falh, and Asr-i A_adegan had to appear in court because they published parts of these interviews. 
182 Karhan, 12 August 1999. 
183 Suhh-i lmru_, 21 September 1999. 
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the separation of responsibilities or puts the supervisor in place of the 
administrator is contrary to the constitution. " 184 Musavi-Lari added that the 
government tried to reach an understanding with the parliament and the 
Guardian Council on the election law, but unfortunately the Guardian Council 
rejected the single article that was supposed to be the basis of the agreement". 
" 
At the end of September, the fifth Majlis concluded its discussions on the draft 
election law, and eliminated Article 60, which gave the Guardian Council 
authority to "disqualify any candidate for the Majlis who commits any type of 
offence-or any offence which may affect the outcome of the election-and 
declare the election null and void". 186 
The Guardian Council continued to increase its powers, declaring in January 
? 000 that it is not sufficient for parliamentary candidates to be Muslims; they 
also must show commitment to Islam. The disagreement went further and the 
rejected legislation was passed on to the Expediency Council for decision- 
making. The advocates of the motion argued that judging a person's faith and 
religion "is entirely in the hands of Almighty God". '87 Several political figures 
sent an open letter urging Khatami to ensure that the parliamentary election was 
not rigged. ' 88 
Other aspects of the electoral laws caused problems too. In January, the 
conservative deputy proposed eliminating second-round run-offs, suggesting that 
anybody who gains a plurality should win, whereas under then-current laws the 
winner had to gain at least one-third of the votes. A walkout occurred and it was 
not possible to form a quorum when deputies objected to the proposal. After a 
closed-door session the next day, a compromise was reached in which it was 
"4 Khurdad, 20 September 1999. 
185 IRNA, 24 September 1999. 
"' Kay"han, 28 September 1999. 
187 Iran, 5 January 2000. 
188 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Network 1, January 29,2000. IRNA, January 4,2000. 
Among the letter's signatories were the Secretary-General of the Militant Clerics Association, Mahdi 
Karrubi, and his deputy Musavi-Khoeniha: the Secretary-General of the Islamic Assembly of Women, 
Fatimah Karrubi: Islamic Labour Party founder Soheila Jelodarzadeh: and former Ayatollah Khomeini 
adviser Seved Mahdi Imam-Jamarani. 
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decided that whoever earned a minimum 25 per cent of the vote would win and. 
in case of a second round, the winner just needed to gain a majority. 189 
By 18th December of 1999. about 6.860 applicants, including 504 women and 35 
non-Muslims. had registered as candidates for the February parliamentary 
elections. Five parliamentary seats are reserved for non-Muslims. Within ten 
days, 401 candidates had been rejected. 190 The candidates' eligibility, in terms 
of their personal, political, and ideological backgrounds, was investigated 
initially by administrative commissions in each constituency. The work of these 
commissions had to be endorsed by supervisory councils that fielded the 
complaints of disqualified candidates. The supervisory councils endorsed or 
reversed the decisions of the local commissions on the basis of evidence offered 
by the rejected candidate. And the supervisory councils had the option of 
explaining their decisions in cases where doing so would not have (unexplained) 
"unwelcome consequences". 191 Many candidates were rejected on the basis of 
Article 28 of the election law which calls for "belief in and practical 
commitment to Islam and the Islamic Republic system" and loyalty to the 
constitution and the Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisconsult (wila), at al-faqih). 
Others were rejected, per Article 30, because they had worked to strengthen the 
monarchy in the past or had acted against the theocracy more recently. 192 
The Guardian Council announced on January 27 that its investigation of appeals 
was complete. and it confirmed the rejection of 600 candidates (out of an 
original total of 758 rejected), and two days later it announced that a further 669 
candidates were rejected, with 192 candidacies being reinstated and 99 new 
candidates being disapproved. 193 The Council's spokesman explained that. 
"candidates were rejected because their files were filled in mistakenly. The 
reasons for the rejection of most of the candidates were that they did not have 
the educational qualifications. were not old enough or had not resigned their 
'R`' Hamshahri, 15 December 1999. 
10 Ibid, 28 December 1999. 
'°' Iran News, 20 December 1999. 
192 IRNA, 29 December 1999. 
Ayatollah Reza Ustadi, quoted by Jun-e Jum, 27 January 2000. 
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posts in those professions which they were legally obliged to resign. Some of 
them did resign, but their employers did not accept their resignation within the 
deadline. " 194 
According to the Council's spokesman. the rejection of a candidate did not mean 
he or she was not worthy: "We just observed the law. " Possibly predicting 
complaints, he also stated: "The council does not favour any particular faction or 
individuals. And when the final results are announced, the people will definitely 
make a fair judgment". 195 The politicians were complaining already. Hujjat al- 
Islam Hadi Khamenei. Secretary-General of the reformist group, the Followers 
of the Imam's Line, said: "some people. feeling a sense of religious duty. permit 
themselves to step beyond the bounds of the law when vetting candidates". 196 
The head of Iran's Election Headquarters said that "some of the candidates were 
not even told why they were disqualified, and he wondered why those whose 
candidacy was approved in previous elections were rejected this time, ". 197 
Most of the rejected candidates were identified as reformists while others were 
fairly outspoken opponents of the regime. 198 Among the former group were 
Islamic Iran Participation Party's founders Abbas Abdi and Ali Reza 
A'lavitabar. Among the latter group were Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, director of 
the banned Islamic Union of Students and Graduates, and nationalist-religious 
figures like Ezattollah Sahabi, Habibollah Peyman, and Ibrahim Yazdi of the 
banned (but tolerated) Iran's Freedom Movement. 
President Khatami also expressed his dismay with 'advisory supervision' at this 
time. As if to reassure any hardliners. Khatami said during a meeting with 
students that. "even if we leave this society alone and do not place supervision or 
conditions over it, the choice of most of the people would be religion, 
194 
IRNA, ibid. 
'95 Jam-e Jam, ibid. 
196 Suhh-i Imru=. 25 January 2000. 
'`'' Interior Ministry Deputy for Socio-political Affairs Mustafa Tajzadeh. quoted by Iran, February 2nd 
2000.40 deputies who had served in previous parliaments were rejected this time. 
, 9" Muhammad Reza Babadi. Tehran's deputy governor and head of Tehran's Election headquarter. 
quoted in Iran, 31 January 2000. 
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independence, and honour. "199 In an added warning, he said: "We should refrain 
from useless pressure and strictness. which are called for neither by religion nor 
by law. " A few days later. Khatarni restated these themes. 200 He said that the 
public still wanted Islam, but an Islam that had respect for these people that 
wanted to see the establishment of a popular government and to have the people 
decide for themselves and determine their own destiny. Turning to advisory 
supervision and its critics, Khatami remarked that: Some people may like this 
law, some people may not like this law, but the right thing for us to do is to 
respect the law. " Khatami added that "no right should be trampled, neither the 
right of the voter, nor the rights of the people being elected. -. 201 
After intense consultation between government and the Council of Guardians, 
the council announced its ultimate list of 576 rejected candidates on February 7. 
The list sent by the Guardian Council to the election headquarters, dated the 
eighteenth of Bahman [February 7]. is final and should form the basis for 
action. "202 But a week later it was reported that the Council was trying to reject 
more candidates. 203 Campaigning officially started on February 10 and, two 
days before the election, the Interior Ministry announced that there were a total 
of 6,083 candidates running for parliament. The same day, the Interior Ministry 
announced that 890 candidates had withdrawn, which would bring the total to 
5.193.204 The Council announced on February 15 that all disqualified candidates 
were provided with written explanations. Those who appealed were given a fair 
hearing and were shown the relevant documents. except in cases where this had 
to be done for legal reasons and for the sake of safeguarding the rights of third 
persons or the country's interests. '" 205 
199 Jam-e Jam, 25 January 2000. 
2°Ö Ibid. 3I January 2000. 
201 Jam-e Jam. ibid. 
20" (bid. 8 February 2000. 
°' Interior Minister. Musavi-Lari. quoted by Hamshahri, February 14 2000. 
xw Iran, 16 February 2000. 
205 Jam-e, lam, 15 February 2000. 
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4.12.2. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF CANDIDATES LIST 
Although about 10 per cent of the candidates were disqualified by the Guardian 
Council, many members of the "18-member pro-Khatami Second of Khurdad 
coalition" were accepted. In theory, this would work to their advantage but one 
interesting analysis suggested that the conservatives' strategy was to permit 
many reformist candidates to run so that they would divide and weaken the 
reformist vote. 206 Also, voters would be so sufficiently confused that they would 
just vote for the most familiar, that is, incumbent names. Indeed, splits within the 
reformist coalition had emerged in the autumn over Rafsanjani's acceptability. 
The leftist groups. in particular the IIPP, refused their support. while the ECP 
supported him actively. The gap became even wider when an important member 
of ECP accused the IIPP of eavesdropping on one of its meetings. 207 Eventually. 
the reformist groups enclosed different candidate lists: the OSU (Office of 
Student Union). the ECP, the AMC (Association of Militant Clergy), the IIPP 
and, most interestingly, the Proposed List of Tehran's Journalists. 
In Tehran, the IIPP"s list had only shared four members with ECP, while 11 
names on the ECP's list also appeared on the IIPP's. Of the 26 Tehran 
candidates supported by the ECP. 15 were also on the AMC's (Association of 
Militant Clergy) list. There was greater unity in the candidate lists presented by 
the main conservative factions- the hardliner Islamic Coalition Association and 
the conservative ACC (the Association of Combatant Clergy). There was even a 
slight overlap with some ECP candidates appearing on the ACC list. Rafsanjani 
also appeared on the conservatives' faction list. the Islamic Coalition 
Association (ICA). 208 The variety of candidates had slightly concerned the 
reformists as Ayatollah Montazeri suggested that some candidates should 
withdraw so that the reformist vote would not be diluted. 209 He said: 
"Candidates should consider the expediency of Islam. the country and their 
206 Monthly Iran Focus, Tehran, ol. 3. No 1. January 2000. 
207 Fae'zeh Hashemi of the ECP publicly claimed that Suhh-i Imru= s directors bugged a meeting and 
then published the transcript in the paper. Quoted by REF/RL (Radio Free). Iran report. January 3 
2000. 
209 Iran News, 9 February 2000. 
209 Ayatollah Montazeri is implicitly considered as the reformists' spiritual leader, in contrast to the 
conservatives whose formal and spiritual leader is Khamenei. 
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constituency and, if necessary, withdraw in order to create unity and to allow the 
-2 1 best person to win. ° 
4.12.3. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
By law, the campaigning period lasted just one week, from February 9 to 
February 16. But newspaper coverage of electoral issues had started much 
earlier, and obviously many of the newspapers were deemed to be de facto party 
organs. 211 For the reformists the substantial arena of the election campaign was 
the newspapers, the quantity and quality of which had risen sharply since 
Khatami had come to office. The penetration rate of published material in 
Iranian society has always been low. 212 Therefore, political figures realised it 
was necessary to travel around the country to address `election meetings' well 
before the official campaigning began. 
As with any political event, most of the meetings related to the reformists' 
candidates or party activists were accompanied with violence and quarrelling. 
For example, Ibrahim Asqarzadeh of the OSU was severely beaten and injured 
when he visited Rasht, a provincial capital in the north of Iran, in January 2000. 
213 The IIPP's executive Muhammad Reza Khatami was treated similarly when 
he visited Sari. 214 In parts of Khuzestan, where some tribes of Iranian-Arab 
live, ethnic sentiments had been a political issue in the past and according to the 
Jumhuri Lslami newspaper, "some of the candidates and their supporters were 
involved in inciting pro-separatist feelings and provoking ethnic tendencies 
among the people to obtain votes. " 215 There also were reports of election unrest 
in Tabriz and Ardabil which have large populations of Azeris. 
210 Ref/RL (Radio Liberty). quoted from Reuters, 12 February 2000. 
211 I. e. Resalat belongs to the conservatives, the Ka-t han promotes the radical right, the Hamshahri 
promoted the moderate right and left (and IIPP). the A4osharekat belonged to IIPP. 
2'' Hussein Bashiriyah. Dibachah-tai har. lami'ah Shanasi-i Sivasi-i Iran. [An Introduction to Iranian 
Political Sociology], Tehran, Negah-i Mu'asir Publishing. 1381 [2002]. p. 57. 
21" Suhh-i lmru:. 5 January 2000. 
214 Iran, 8 February 2000. 
215 Jumhuri Islami, 3 February 2000. 
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Once the campaign was officially underway, there were more violent incidents. 
A hard-line pressure group physically assaulted members of the reformist OSU 
at a rally in Ardabil, and a similar incident occurred in Qum. 216 An IIPP 
candidate's office in Mashhad was set on fire, 217 and a 16-year-old who 
distributed IIPP campaign literature was stabbed. 218 An IIPP candidate was 
attacked when he said Ayatollah Montazeri should be released from house 
arrest. 219 Two candidates in Tehran said the Law Enforcement Forces attacked 
their office. 220 A percussion grenade exploded near the headquarter of the former 
Minister of Intelligence and Security Ali-Akbar Fallahian, a candidate in 
Isfahan. A week later another one was thrown at his residential house. 221 In 
response, the hardliners attacked the election headquarters of another candidate. 
former Interior Minister Hujjat al-Islam Ali-Akbar Mohtashami-Pur. 222 
At an IIPP rally the audience chanted 'Political liberation is impossible with 
Rafsanjani', and also denounced Fallahian. 223 Bystanders at an ECP Tehran 
rally destroyed posters of Rafsanjani . 
224 A meeting featuring the nationalist 
figure Habibollah Peyman was disrupted when a fight broke out. 225 In Qazvin. 
the nationalist journalist Fatemeh Govarai was arrested. 226 In addition to this 
sensational violence, the election campaign featured serious debate over issues 
such as limiting judicial power, addressing the serial killings of political 
dissidents, liberalizing the economy, and improving relations with the United 
States. There was also some political gamesmanship when the IIPP suddenly 
changed the order of its candidates list, choosing the president's brother, 
Muhammad Reza Khatami, as its top candidate. In a clever move. the IIPP also 
selected an Armenian candidate, Artanus Baghumian. for its Isfahan list. 227 He 
was one of the only minority candidates ever to be on a mainstream candidate 
216 Hamshahri, 11 February 2000. 
'" This candidate was All Ta_jernia. 
218 Associated Press (AP). 1I February 2000 
216 Ahamd Shirzad. quoted by Reuters. 13 February 2000. 
220 Suhh-i lmru_, 12 February 2000. 
' Kalvhun, 14 February 2000. 
22Asr-e A=adegan, 14 February 2000. 
``' AFP. 13 February 2000 
74 Kavhan, 16 February 2000. 
''s Fath, 17 February 2000. 
226 Ibid. 
227 AFP. 14 February 2000 
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list. Voters can either choose one minority candidate or an entire list of regular 
candidates, but they cannot do both. 
The reformists also employed Western campaigning techniques. recognizing that 
old methods would not work on the younger generation. Campaign slogans 
shifted away from ideology and revolutionary commitment. The ECP 
emphasized 'Security, Prosperity, and Freedom' and the IIPP called for "Iran for 
all Iranians". The reformist candidates often described their academic 
qualifications or technical experience in promising to build a better future and 
spoke of themes such as economic reforms, pluralism, greater individual 
freedom, and the equality of all citizens before the law. Reformists were usually 
pictured as smiling, like President Khatami, and dressed in a chic suit with 
designer stubble long enough to meet theological requirements but not long 
enough to look like a cleric. 
The conservatives also changed their approach a little. Two of the main 
conservative bodies-the Association of Combatant Clergy and the Coalition of 
the Line of the Imam and Leader-emphasized 'understanding' and `virtue' in 
their slogans. In their speeches, however, conservatives most often spoke of their 
religious qualifications as they promised to maintain the original values of the 
revolution. Their speeches stressed spiritual integrity and faith in theocracy. In 
their campaign posters the conservatives did not smile. 
4.12.4. THE ROLE OF RAFSANJANI 
Rafsanjani was the most flagrant in his attempts to appeal to voters as a 
reformist. When the ACC criticized President Khatami at the end of September 
1999, Rafsanjani distanced himself from the organization: an informed source' 
said that Rafsanjani had long since discontinued his organic links" with the 
group (ACC) and "in a distant past" he only "routinely and sporadically" met 
some of its members. " `28 Rafsanjani also advocated some of the causes raised 
by Abdullah Nuri during his trial. He claimed that the restrictions on Ayatollah 
22R Iran, 29 September 1999. 
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Montazeri would be lifted and that he tried to block Nuri's five-year prison 
sentence. 229 Regarding ties with the United States, he said: "severance of ties 
will not continue. I believe that this issue must be resolved some day. " He 
added: the solution is very clear. The solution is that America demonstrates 
goodwill. " 230 
The next major event in Rafsanjani's candidacy was the release from prison of 
the former mayor of Tehran (Karbaschi), who was imprisoned in early 1999 on 
corruption charges, despite his popularity as a reformist. Some commented that 
Rafsanjani wanted to obtain some credit for Karbaschi's release, while a 
reformist newspaper claimed that Rafsanjani actually wrote Karbaschi's appeal 
for clemency. 231 A reformist deputy predicted that Karbaschi's release would 
bring the Second of Khurdad Front and the ECP closer together. 232 Known as a 
wave-maker for his part in engineering Khatami's presidential victory, one 
newspaper asked whom Karbaschi would coronate this time. " Yet, the former 
mayor stayed silent during the campaign period, though he spoke out on 
Rafsanjani's behalf after the election. 234 
As a substitute Friday Prayer leader. Rafsanjani was in a strong position to 
discuss campaign issues, since the Tehran Friday Prayers are normally broadcast 
on state radio and TV. He used this platform to call his critics "sanctimonious 
extremists" who are acting "just for the sake of gaining a few votes from the 
people or the uninformed young people'". 235 Rafsanjani later suggested that 
people who were once insiders (Khudi) were now at odds with the revolution 
and sought "refuge in foreign powers and global arrogance"'. 236 He added that 
the so-called reformists are actually extremists: "You wouldn't imagine how 
much I suffered in trying to curb their excesses-hangings, trials, and 
'"' Abdullah Nuri, the former interior Minister, reported by AFP News Agency. 21 December 2000. 
AFP News Agency, ibid. 
''` REF! RL. 26 January 2000. 
23,2 Deputy of Majlis Muhammad Baqir Zakeri. quoted by daily Arya, 26 January 2000. 
'" /run, 26 January 2000. 
230 Alosharekat, 23 February 2000. 
235 dam-edam, 22 January 2000. 
236 Ibid. 26 January 2000. 
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confiscation of private property-in the early years of the revolution. '"37 
Rafsanjani seemed to acquire the most attention because his candidacy was so 
controversial. But other candidates and parties were also engaged in the early 
campaigning. Expediency Council secretary Mohsen Rezai, for example, 
suddenly became a great fan of the Second of Khurdad's movement (reform 
movement), calling it a `Golden Page' in Iranian history. 
138 
4.12.5. CASTING VOTES 
Putting aside the factional benefit of less participation for the conservatives, on 
the state level the maximum participation was in much need. State officials and 
religious figures urged the public to vote in the days before the election, 
although they gave different reasons for doing so. Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei told prospective Hajj candidates in an address broadcast by state radio 
that they should participate wholeheartedly in the election, because the 
elections symbolize the people's participation and restoration of their rights . 
239 
Saying that voting is both a right and a duty, he added that. "it is important what 
percentage of people who could vote take part in the elections and vote. " He 
urged the public to vote for candidates who are "able to stand up to coercion, 
scare-mongering, excessiveness. and avarice of world powers, and assess the 
problems of the country and the nation. "240 
President Khatami also advised women and the youth, among his greatest 
supporters. to participate actively" in the elections. 241 Khatami said that there 
had been progress in women's affairs, but much more remains to be done if 
women are to have an active presence in economic. social. and political affairs. 
In the same speech. Khatami apologized to disqualified candidates. However. in 
237 Iran, 26 January 2000. although he did not name anybody, but seemed referring to individuals like. 
Abbas Abdi or Ibrahim Asgarzadeh, who were organizer and conductor in seizing the American 
Embassy in Tehran in 1979. 
238 Iran, 29 January 2000. 
1. ') Jam-e . lam. 15 February 
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240 Ibid. 
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several speeches by Khatami to urge people to take part in the election, his pleas 
seemed faction-oriented. In a speech marking the revolution's anniversary, he 
urged people to elect candidates who would not oppose the executive branch's 
policies. 242 Khatami said: The government will be able to take more confident 
steps to serve you. if it were to enjoy the cooperation of a qualified parliament 
and a parliament which carefully scrutinizes the behaviour and decisions of the 
executive officials and the judicial authority. " Two days before the election. 
Khatami urged the nation to vote. He said: "Noble and great nation of Iran! 
Friday is a day for mapping your destiny. "243 
Surprisingly. in the run up to the election, to increase the possibility of a massive 
turn out. the senior conservatives too joined the campaign in inviting the masses 
to take part. Senior clerics, such as Sources of Emulation Ayatollah Nasser 
Makarem-Shirazi and Ayatollah Yusuf Sane'i, recommended massive 
participation. So did Friday Prayer Leaders such as Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi- 
Amoli. 244 Hujjat al-Islam Abbas Vaez-Tabasi, supervisor of the Razavi (Imam 
Reza) Shrine Foundation in Mashhad. said: If the people are united and if they 
participate in large numbers in the elections for the sixth Majlis and choose the 
best candidates, they will defeat our enemies. Ayatollah Montazeri urged 
people to choose their candidates with care, because if a parliamentarian pursues 
harmful policies, those who elected him or her are considered accessories. 246 
Interior Minister Musavi-Lari also insisted on massive participation, because the 
"election is a manifestation of republicanism of the system and an opportunity 
for the entire community to play a role in the management of the country . 
-247 
After all, according to table 5.1. the sixth Majlis election shows that the 
participant percentage has hit the highest record since 1979. 
242 ibid. II February 2000. 
24' Ibid. 16 February 2000. 
244 Qum's Friday Pray Sermon, quoted by Jam-e Jan,. 5 February 2000. 
245 Jane-e Jam. 4 February 2000. 
246 Suhh-i Imru:. 12 February 2000. 
247 Iran, 12 February 2000. 
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Table. 5.1 Nationwide participation 248 
Number Of eligible 
voters 
Number of votes 
cast & Percentage 
First Majlis 1980-1984 20.857.391 10,875.969 %52.14 
Second Majlis1984 1988 24,143,498 15,607.306 %64.64 
Third Majlis 1988-1992 27.986,736 16,714281 %59.72 
Forth Majlis 1992-1996 32,465,558 18,767,042 %57.81 
Fifth Majlis 1996-2000 34,716.000 20,482,440 %59.01 
Sixth Majlis 2000-2004 38.726.431 26.082,157 %67.35 
4.12.6. THE ELECTION RESULT 
Four days after the Election Day on 22 February 2000, the result appeared to 
show another landslide triumph for the reformists. The reformists' camp won 
170 seats in the 290-seat parliament, while hard-liners and conservatives took 45 
and independent candidates 10.249 However, the outcome of 65 seats was left to 
be decided in the run-off in April. Interestingly, it was the first time since 1979 
that the conservatives and the radical right were to lose control of the Majlis in 
this massive scale; in particular. in Tehran where the whole 30 seats went to the 
reformists. The other surprise which stunned almost everybody was the 
magnitude of the personal defeat suffered by former president Ali-Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani. Being twice president. twice speaker of parliament, he 
scored badly: coming 40th in an election for 30 seats. Even some of his advocates 
argued that he made the drastic mistake of standing in the Tehran 
ý; o constituency. ' 
era Source: Interior Ministry Official Website <www. moi. ir/election> 
241) w, -N, " hhc. co. uk world 'middleeast'archive iran 2'(' For instance, interview with A'triyan-far, the then Director of Tehran City Council, in Hamshuhri, 
29 March, 2000. (It was before the annulment of 700.000 votes in Tehran. which brought Rafsanjani to 
29'h place. 
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All in all, the result was very delightful for the reformists and interpreted as a 
turning point for the reformists and especially for Khatami in continuing his 
reforms both in domestic and foreign affairs. For him and other reformists, the 
result was perceived as the final link in the chain to persuade the conservatives 
to let them fulfil their plans. Notably, Khatami's first response to the election 
result appeared in the field of foreign policy. In his speech in the Foreign 
Ministry he stated: 
Iran's foreign policy will continue to pursue detente as a 
fundamental principle. as we believe that destiny. security and 
peace are common interests to humanity. And for this reason 
we believe in existing alongside and forging relations with, all 
countries, including the industrial developed world, on the basis 
of mutual respect and interests. Our policy is to eventually 
reduce the number of our enemies and the scale of hostilities 
against our country and to increase the number of our friends 
and allies-whilst abiding by our principles, especially our 
sense of Islamic and Iranian honour. 251 
The US's welcoming reaction was unprecedented for more than twenty years. 
Washington was quick to praise the election, possibly expecting changes in this 
area. US Secretary of State Madeline Albright commented on the large public 
participation, saying on 19th of February 2000 that "[the Iranian people's] 
enthusiasm is testimony to the growing strength of democracy in Iran, which we 
do welcome. -252 Following to that the State Department spokesman James 
Rubin's comments on February 21 were even more enthusiastic. All indications 
are that this election is an event of historic proportions. The Iranian people have 
demonstrated unmistakably that they want policies of openness and engagement 
with the rest of the world. They have also made clear their preference for 
internal policies that allow them greater freedom within Iran. We welcome 
153 that. 
25 1 Iran News, 19 February 2000 
25, www. stale. gov/p/nea/ci 
25, Ibid. 
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In fact, a new era was to emerge in the scope of the Iranian political gesture. 
However, the conservatives did not give up instantly and concentrated on the 
power and authority which had been left to them. Therefore, not surprisingly, the 
Guardian Council in a statement on 21 April announced a considerable number 
of irregularities in the election result of the Sixth Majlis in the Tehran 
constituency. `' Consequently, and according to its unlimited authority on 
supervision of the elections, the council declared the annulment of 726.266 
votes out of the total of 2,931,113 votes cast. As the remaining 2,204,848 
votes cast were recounted, 28 candidates garnered 25 per cent (551,212) of 
votes, and were declared elected to the Majlis from the Tehran constituency. 
Notably, the annulment done by the Guardian Council caused the sole elected 
deputy of the IFM be removed from the list and instead Haddad Adel (a 
conservative) was entered as the elected candidate. " 
The result of the election shocked the conservatives as their absolute defeat was 
more than apparent. Except for the office of leadership. they could now only 
preserve the judiciary and the Guardian Council. Thus. utilising these two (un- 
elected) constitutionally institutions was top of the agenda. Obviously. the first 
encounter between a reformist Majlis and the conservatives occurred during the 
approval process of the election result. where the endorsement of the Guardian 
Council is required legally. By approving only 27 constituencies (excluding 
Tehran) and the election of 157 delegates to the Majlis in the first round, it 
became apparent that the sixth Majlis would not have enough majorities to be 
inaugurated as scheduled on May 27 2000. 
The Guardian Council was to suspend Tehran's election under the excuse of 
widespread misconduct and delinquency during Election Day and counting 
votes. The decision was to put a hold on Tehran's election result which, in 
practice, prevented the Majlis from being inaugurated. That caused a serious 
crisis in the summit level of the regime and the government pleaded the Leader 
to urge the Guardian Council to endorse the election. Also, the Guardian Council 
was under pressure to confirm the results of polls in 28 out of 52 constituencies, 
Kmvhan, I April 2000. 
Ibid. 6 April 2000. 
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where run-offs were held on May 5 to elect 66 remaining deputies of the sixth 
Majlis. The Majlis, comprising of 290 deputies, can formally convene with 194 
delegates. It seemed that the Guardian Council was not willing to approve the 
minimum constituencies in order to enable the Majlis to be inaugurated 
according to the schedule. Again, it was the Leader who solely and powerfully 
can resolve all the difficulties. 256 After all, there could not be a great difference 
among reformists' candidates, largely due to the Guardians Council's vetting 
process. Some had warned that the election results might not be translated into 
real changes or increased transparency because "Iranian politics is a lot like a 
private club. -257 
Although the conservatives formed a minority in the sixth Majlis. their ability to 
maintain influence over the legislative process was not constrained. Instead. they 
tried to reach out to "independent deputies and moderate reformers in an effort 
to isolate the more radical reformers". 258 In their effort. they focused on 
incumbent left deputies whose political careers went back to the early years of 
the revolution and who according to the conservative newspaper Kayhan, are 
keener on preserving the Islamic Revolution"s interests and values than serving 
factional interests. "259 This tactic proved useful by the conservatives when 
reformists tried to repeal the restrictive press law that paved the way for the 
closure of over a dozen newspapers in April 2000. An overwhelming vote to 
repeal the law was expected to indicate that the conservatives would have to face 
a serious battle during the sixth Majlis. The conservatives were afraid the 
reformists would pass such a vote. even though the Guardian Council had the 
power to reject it. The motion was withdrawn by the Speaker Karrubi upon 
Ayatollah Khamenei's recall. 
However, the 2000 election was somewhat like the 1997 presidential election in 
that voters registered a protest. Many analysts believe that Iranians, on both 
occasions voted against the status quo. 26° The elected deputies were the 
256 Weekly Shoma. the Organ of Mu'talifah Party, 22 April 2000. 
257 AFP News Agency. 17 February 2000. quoted Khosro A'bedi a political observer. 
258 Kayhan, 24 September 2000. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Asr-e A_adegan. 5 March 2000 quoted I'mad al-din Baqi. 
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candidates who had protested against the current situation and it was enough for 
voters to make them elected . `6' 
However, it is hard to say what the public voted 
for, because the candidates were members of a wide variety of political factions 
(not in Tehran. but across the country). Even provincial factions within major 
coalitions had different candidate lists. In short. the defeat of the conservatives' 
candidates was the victory of the reformists". Yet, it should be emphasised that 
the meaning of refOrmisi in the recent political literacy of Iran is rather vague 
and indeterminate, as has been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, the new Majlis would have to face many of the same issues that its 
predecessor faced, including restricted press laws, restrictive electoral 
regulations, social codes that were unevenly enforced. a weak economy and high 
unemployment. privatisation of state-owned industries, and troubled relations 
with the United States. With hindsight, the new parliament's ability to act was 
severely limited. The Council of Guardians must approve all legislation before it 
becomes law. State security organizations. the military and state broadcasting 
are under the supervision of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's office 
and are not answerable to the executive or legislature. Even to mark the 
prospective challenge. the Press Courts and the Special Court for the Clergy 
launched a new wave of banning and imprisonment of socio-political activists. `'` 
In addition. the humiliation imposed on Rafsanjani could not be considered 
beneficial for the reformist camp. although the radical reformists primarily 
thought differently. In fact, contrary to what most reformists believed. the defeat 
of Rafsanjani did not result in his leaving the scene, but that he automatically 
joined the camp of the conservatives. Whether it was a miscalculation by the 
reformists or a measure to purify the reform movement, it cost the reformists far 
beyond previous estimations. 263 His role as the head of the Expediency Council 
further confused the situation. In this position, however, he continued to have a 
great deal of power over legislation. Bitterly for some reformist groups, they 
now had to moderate their hostility toward him to reach a compromise if the 
'`'' Ibid. 
2(2 Gary Sick, 'Iran's Election: Out of Chaos. Chanýge*, in Middle East Economic Survey, 28 February 
2000. p. 27-28 
2(3 Pavam /mru:. in an interview with Ziha Kalam. February 2000. 
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legislative body was to be obstructed by the Guardian Council. However, there 
was still disunity among the various reformist groups, which may have resulted 
in intra-factionary conflicts. 
New representatives of the political affiliations predicted how they would vote 
on crucial legislations. In the previous parliament, the large block of 
independents did not follow any consistent voting pattern because the deputies 
voted in opportunistic, rather than ideological, terms. 
264 On local issues. they 
voted to benefit their constituencies, but on wider, national issues, they voted in 
an ultra-factional fashion. And when they did so, they were not accountable to 
any political organization. 265 Such problems also existed in the new parliament. 
Many candidates who called themselves independents were in fact 
conservatives, since once in office they voted against reformist legislation. 
266 
Beyond the optimistic speculations about the sixth Majlis and its reformists' 
majority. the volume of a pragmatic and pre-planned agenda was low. reformist 
newspapers then proceeded cautiously, warning that the people should not have 
wonderful expectations of the reformists.,, 267 Another daily newspaper warned: 
"Let's be careful! Let's study this golden age. ''268 Also, it was not clear what the 
reformists' plans for the future were. One reformist daily asked: "The elections 
are over, what will happen tomorrow? -269 
Saeed Najarian of the IIPP predicted that the reformists' strategy would not be 
factional, because all the factions had worked together in the past, and would 
therefore enact a four-year (the length of a term) national strategy. Reformist 
candidate Behzad Nabavi warned: "We should not be after outlandish 
programmes and must not create expectations among people. "270 However, the 
newly elected representatives also made contradictory statements about their 
264 I. e. MP Tatari. an independent deputy of Kermanshah who would constantly swap between different 
factions. 
265 Ahmad Shirzad, What are the independent candidates committed to? Mosharekat. 13 January 2000. 
26" Abolfazl Bazargan (Son of Mahdi Bazargan). cited in Suhh-i lniru=. 25 January 2000. 
267 Ham Milian. 23 February 2000. 
268 Asr-e A_adegan, 23 February 2000. 
269 Arta. 19 February 2000. 
270 REF/RL, the Bulletin. 21 February 2000. 
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immediate plans. For example. on one hand. new Isfahan representative Rajabali 
Mazru'i said a first step would be to change the law banning satellite dishes. 271 
Soheila Jelodarzadeh, on the other hand, said women's issues would top the 
agenda. 272 To this end, a reformist newspaper highlights: 
The people who elected the reformists in February are the same 
ones who elected President Khatami in 1997. Until now, his 
supporters have been able to argue that a conservative 
parliament has blocked Khatami's plans and a reformist 
majority in the Majlis eliminates this excuse. Thus, if the socio- 
political reforms which were promised are not forthcoming. and 
if the jobs people need did not materialize, Khatami may lose 
much of his domestic public support. 273 
In contrast. the conservatives stressed the necessity of economic improvements. 
They pointed to the fact that the country was suffering an estimated 25 per cent 
inflation rate. 274 Now it was the conservatives' turn to highlight the economic 
deficiencies and reflect upon the unsuccessful attempts to build up the country. 
For sure, the conservatives did so at the expense of downgrading the socio- 
political reforms upon which the new Majlis was elected. An editorial in one 
radical newspaper published the following sentences which portrayed the new 
gesture by which the conservatives planned to deal with the issues: 
The unemployment is officially at 16 per cent, which in effect 
is estimated to be at least 25 per cent. Even those who are 
employed often go unpaid for months. Iran is dependent on 
food imports because of under-investment, mismanagement. 
and corruption in the agricultural sector, which has led to more 
unemployment and greater reliance on subsidies. 27 
271 AFP. 22 February 2000. 
272 Iran, 27 February 2000. 
273 Asr-e A: adegan. Editorial. 28 April 2000. 
274 Resalat. in editorial, quoted an statistic from Iran Fact Book, 1380.2001. 
275 Ibid. 
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But a reformist deputy. Muhammad Baqir Zakeri, had warned even before he 
was re-elected that none of the political factions had a clear economic plan. 
276 
4.13. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SIXT11 MAJLIS 
There are various opinions regarding the legislative performance of the Sixth Majlis. 
Perhaps the best way is to categorise its performance in economic and socio-political 
issues. According to mellat website. the economic legislations of the sixth Majlis 
outnumber the socio-political ones. 
277 Given the constitutional barrier, the Majlis 
actually enjoys great deal of power over the government. Practically, the government 
cannot function without achieving the Majlis' consent. Nevertheless, other 
constitutionally defined institutions have overridden the Majlis authority and 
undermined it. For example, every politically motivated legislation of the Sixth Majlis 
was rejected by the Guardian Council. At the same time, the conservatives accused 
the reformists of abusing the parliament as their political tool by insisting on passing 
legislations incompatible with Islam. 278 
Statistically, not more than 3 per cent of all legislations were politically related. In this 
interwoven situation. therefore. analysing and evaluating the performance of the Sixth 
Majlis is rather difficult. Within the circles of political elites, there are three 
perspectives towards the Sixth Majlis: reformists. moderates and conservatives. The 
reformists approved of and praised the overall performance of the Sixth Majlis despite 
all the predicaments . 
279 The moderates valued the formation of the Sixth Majlis. but 
criticised how the reformist MPs acted and even manipulated the whole reform 
mandate to their own narrow perceptions and interests. 280 The conservatives. 
`K however. saw the Sixth Majlis as a threat to the existence of the Islamic revolution. ' 
276Javan, affiliated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Crop (IRGC) Tehran, 25 February 2000. 
277 Official website of Iranian Majlis: <www. mellat. majlis. ir> 
278 Keyvan Mehregan, Kann"ahi-ha va nakami-haitv"ih Majlis /slahat [the successes and failures of the 
reformist Majlis]. cited by MP Jalal Jalali zadeh in his interview with the author, Tehran. Omid Iranian 
Publishing. 2005, p. 68. 
"`' See the interview with MP Rajab Ali Mazrui'. cited in Kam-i ahi-ha. ibid, p. 33-42. 
290 In an interview with Hussein Mara'shi, ECP MP in the Sixth Majlis. 
281 See various volumes of Suhh-i Sadiq (IRGC organ) and Parer-i Sukhan (Imam Khomeini's 
Research Centre affiliated to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi) during 2000 and 2003. 
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MP Mazru'i argues that the Sixth Majlis fulfilled its historical mission within the 
framework of the Islamic Republic by opening a new chapter in legislating. Serious 
attempts by the reformist MPs to ratify democratic legislations belong exclusively to 
this Majlis. He explicitly points out to the legislations on "defining political crime", 
"prohibition of torture" and also "jury committee" as fundamental laws for running a 
country democratically. However, due to "constitutional barriers these legislations did 
not become law and remained as the 'Sixth Majlis's resolutions'. -2g" He 
acknowledges that the reformists wanted to protect the Islamic Republic by 
implementing some reforms. 
The moderate view is represented mainly by the ECP members. The following is the 
extract of an interview with MP Hussein Mara'shi. 283 He is a close relative and ally of 
Rafsanjani and was a key candidate in the joint list of IIPP and ECP for the Sixth 
Majlis election. 
Q: Do you agree with this statement that the Sixth Majlis was 
the most democratic parliament in the Islamic Republic? 
A: No, the Sixth Majlis maybe was more democratic than the 
Fifth or the Fourth Majlis, but the Sixth Majlis like the Third 
Majlis was in the hands of the left faction. The experience 
proved that such political monopoly led to a full-fledged right- 
wing (conservative). It happened at the Sixth Majlis too, when 
it was replaced with an anti-reform Majlis (the Seventh). 
Q: What do you think about the inclusiveness of the candidates 
running for the Sixth Majlis? Do you not think that it was the 
most democratic one? 
2S2 Keyvan Mehre-an, Kann"ahi-haa, ibid. 
2 This interview was conducted by the author on the 11"' of April, 2006 in Mr. Marashi's office in 
Tehran. 
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A: No, if you want to compare. the First Majlis was the most 
democratic since the liberal candidates also could run. It is not 
the case for the Sixth Majlis. For example. IFM candidates 
were barred from taking part. 
Q: What about the participation rate? 
A: Well, it is an important index to evaluate the legitimacy and 
significance of any elected body. Nevertheless. it does not 
make the Sixth Majlis the most democratic one. I believe that 
the First Majlis was democratic. 
Q: How do you measure the performance of the Sixth Majlis? 
A: I think that the Sixth Majlis failed in delivering its goals by 
inclining towards political activism instead of focusing on its 
main task which is legislation. 
Q: So do you see the failure of the Sixth Majlis due to the 
structural paradox of the Islamic Republic, or due to lack of a 
coherent and suitable programme by the reformists? 
A: I add another dimension to your question and that is the 
pathology of the whole reform mandate which began with 
Khatami's presidency in 1997, May 23`(. The movement had no 
organisational plan. strategy or directing management. We 
experienced a complete chaos in political leadership. No 
contingency plan was in place and political figures merely 
acted to their instinct. 
Q: You mentioned the lack of leadership. where do see 
Khatami's role? 
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A: President Khatami ought to act more effectively. To my 
opinion, he acted reluctantly 
Q: In this case, do you not see any conflict of interest between 
the office of President and being partisan in politics? 
A: No. he needed to act as the head of the winning party. 
Although I admit that the current Constitution would not easily 
allow for such manoeuvring. 
Statistically, the Sixth Majlis has performed more effectively compared to its 
predecessors. In other words, in terms of parliamentary function was the most active 
parliament in terms of holding public sessions, receiving letters from the public, 
conducting investigative inquiries, questions cabinet ministers, warning the ministers 
and impeaching them. It shows that although the Sixth Majlis was not successful in 
reforming the political structure, it performed well in terms of its supervisory mission 
and upholding public scrutiny over the government. It is noteworthy that, despite the 
affinity between Khatami's reformist government and the reformist Sixth Majlis. the 
number of impeachments at this period is more than previous parliaments. 
The following charts demonstrate the abovementioned statement with more detail: 284 
" Author has collected the data from the Centre for Research for the Majlis in Tehran, April 2006. 
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4.13.1. THE SIXTH MAJLIS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
The composition of the sixth Majlis reflected a promising prospect for both 
internal and external observers. In foreign policy, too, the high expectations 
generated by the dramatic election results in fact required a dose of realism. In 
general, the institution of parliament in the Islamic Republic lacks any firm 
authority over policies and institutions; nevertheless, the government itself has a 
limited authority in foreign policy decision-making. 285 Hence, for the ever- 
contentious issue of relations with the United States, even a reformist Majlis 
seemed unlikely to bring the rupture between the two countries to a quick and 
positive conclusion. At the same time, the impact of the election itself should not 
be discounted; the frank campaign rhetoric sanctioned a new climate for public 
debate on all these issues, and the outcome has empowered a distinctly less 
radical agenda and a new state of parliamentarians keenly attuned to the 
demands of a disenchanted public. 286 
However, policy of detente incepted by Rafsanjani's government had achieved 
considerable success. But the negative record of Iran on human rights and, in 
particular, state-sponsored terrorism led to a deterioration in relations with the 
West. Specifically, the Mikonos verdict halted Iran's relation with European 
states, leading them to withdraw their diplomats from Tehran. 287 However, with 
Khatami's election and his government's attempts, not only did the relations 
resume but they flourished to their highest level since 1979.288 Despite this 
progress, many critical issues remained unsolved and most officials and analysts 
believed that a reformist Majlis could reinforce and finally materialize the 
reform mandate (such as rejoining the international community). To be precise, 
the aim was to pursue the policy of detente towards the US and a more positive 
approach on the Middle East peace process. Simply the question was: would the 
reformist dominance in the parliament have an impact on Tehran's foreign 
policy? 
285Sharq, 20 June 2004, cited President Khatami's Letter for the Future. 
286 Middle East Policy, June, 2000, Suzanne Maloney 
2S7 In 1994 in Germany at Mikonos restaurant a group of opponents of the Islamic Republic were 
assassinated. After nearly two years investigation by Germany's Prosecution authority, Iran's officials 
were charged with commanding the terror and their name submitted to the Interpol for arrest. 
288 For example, consider President Khatami's state visits to France, Germany and Italy. 
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Some deputies were hopeful that their weight could be influential. To this end, 
the Committee of Foreign Affairs and National Security launched a series of 
parliamentary trips to Western countries, aiming to promote and strengthen the 
relation between Iran and "the global community far beyond governmental 
capacity". 289 In the meantime, Iran's Supreme National Security Council 
allegedly voted in favour of improving relations with the United States. Not 
surprisingly, the motion was vetoed by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei. 290 Though most reformists attribute the failure of rapprochement 
with the US to the conservatives' opposition and, at the top, the Leader 
Khamenei, the complexity of Iran-US relations is also a matter of principle. As 
the Majlis deputy and a leading reformist, Muhammad Reza Khatami repeated 
Tehran's normal policy stand when he said: "We are interested in detente and in 
the birth of relations based on equality and on mutual respect. But we want 
concrete acts, like for example the lifting of the embargo, not mere diplomatic 
"29' bowing and curtsying. 
On the other hand, Clinton's administration was reaching a turning point in 
dealing with Iran. However, the State Department spokesman James Rubin 
described the kind of changes the US government hoped to see in Iran: "For our 
part, we would like to see a change in specific policies of concern. They relate to 
Iran's attitude towards the Middle East peace process, they relate to the seeking 
of weapons of mass destruction and the support for terrorism". 292 But Secretary 
of State Madeline Albright offered an unconditional negotiation with the Iranian 
government. 293 Ironically, the offer was rejected by Iranian foreign minister 
Kamal Kharazi. He claimed that at that stage any negotiation with the US was 
pointless, because the US government was not honest. 294 
289 Mosharekat, cited deputy Mirdamadi, Chairman of National Security and Foreign Affairs 
Committee 
290 Asr-e A_adegan, April 21,2002, which by revealing this news was prosecuted and banned from 
publishing. 
Yas-i Naw, 24 June 2000. 
292 Ibid, 26 June 2000. 
293 Bahar, 9 May 2000. 
294 Ibid, 14 May 2000. 
312 
More interestingly, the Majlis not only lacked the authority or even a 
consultative role in foreign policy, but it was also implicitly banned from talking 
about it. 95 There were some reports in spring 2002 which indicated that a series 
of negotiations between Iran and US were underway. 
296 However, some 
reformist deputies described them as the secret Iran-US talks. For instance, 
Mohsen Mirdamadi who at the time was head of Majlis' National Security and 
Foreign Policy Committee discussed the advantages of Iran-US talks, subject to 
informing the Majlis. According to him, the committee was told that such talks 
had indeed been conducted in Cyprus by foreign ministry personnel and with the 
approval of very top officials (implying the Supreme Leader). Mirdamadi went 
further and added: "We must direct our policy [towards the US] in accordance 
with the needs of the time. In the past, hostility to the US suited our interests, but 
this is not the case today. Our interests today lie in openness towards the US. "297 
However, the Iranian foreign ministry emphatically denied that the talks had 
taken place. 298 Consequently, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ruled out any 
talks with "the Great Satan" and described it as treason. 
Soon after, the Tehran Justice Department rushed to announce that it had 
decided to put on trial journalists who promoted dialogue with the US, claiming 
that this was based both on Khamenei's directive and on Iran's Press Law. 
Surprisingly, the judiciary also prohibited newspapers from interviewing Majlis' 
deputies if the correspondence related to Iran-US relations. Some argued that the 
reason behind such a harsh reaction by the Leader could be that the reformists 
were close to success in opening a dialogue between Iran and the US. 299 
The event caused reformists both in the Majlis and the press to protest against 
this obvious restriction. However, President Khatami did not side with them. 
Instead, he made a general call for the freedom of deputies to voice their views 
while at the same time urging deputies to respect other organs of the state. 300 
295 The ban was issued by the Supreme Council for National Security. 
296 Iran and US both confirmed the meetings but stressed that the mandate was about Afghanistan and 
Iraq, not mutual relationship. 
297 Norou_, 7 May 2002. 
298 Iran News, 9 May 2002. 
299 Bunyan, 19 May 2002. 
300 Ibid, 21 May 2002 
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Deputy Elahe Kulayi called the judiciary's action an "unconstitutional move". 
She strongly criticized the decision of Tehran's judiciary as shocking and 
stressed that "no entity may encroach on the legislative branch's rights by setting 
laws and regulations of its own as the Tehran Justice Department did, not even 
in the name of protecting the independence and territorial integrity of the 
country. , 301 Naser Qavami, Chairman of the Majlis Committee for Legal 
Matters, also called the Justice Department's decision `unconstitutional', since 
promoting dialogue with the US is not a crime. 302 Muhammad Reza Khatami, 
deputy Majlis chairman, stated that the decision was "illegal and illegitimate", 
warning that expression of opinions could not be stopped by force. 303 Ma lis 
Judicial Committee reporter, Muhammad Kazemi, also stated that the "Press 
Law" does not deem relations with a foreign country to be a crime. 304 
The judiciary's ruling was even faced with criticism from moderate officials as a 
dangerous move against freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 
Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Ahmad Masjed Jame'i warned against 
treading on the red lines of the freedoms of expression and the press: "Press 
activities are beyond the authority of provincial organizations (such as the 
Tehran Justice Department). "305 In fact, it was a clear violation of the 
constitutional rights of both the Majlis and the press. It is worth remembering 
that Article 113 of the constitution stipulates the President's right and duty to 
protect and guarantee the Constitution. 
Surprisingly, Khatami only addressed the issues of the power struggles between 
the reformists and the judicial system days after the Majlis members and the 
reformist journalists set the tone. As always, he spoke out only after Supreme 
Leader Khamenei stated that the status of the Majlis must not be harmed. In his 
speech before the Majlis, Khatami protested the Judiciary's supremacy over the 
Majlis and challenged the judiciary's attempts to restrict the Majlis activities. He 
emphasized the Majlis legislative authority and its supervisory authority over 
301 Iran Daily, 27 May 2002. 
302 Norou_, 27 May 2002. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Iran, 27 May 2002. 
301 Ibid. 
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other government bodies: "Despite the independence of the judiciary, the Majlis 
must be fully aware of how people are treated by the judiciary just as it has to be 
fully aware of other ministries' performance". 
306 
He complained about the devaluation of the Majlis status, particularly in its 
present session, and criticized the conservatives' disrespect towards Majlis 
members. He said: "How come insulting the parliament has become as good as 
gold, but insulting certain other circles (the conservative dominated bodies) is 
regarded as damaging the system? " He also complained about his own 
weakness, being responsible for supervising the proper implementation of the 
constitution, yet having no power to punish those who violated the 
constitution. 307 
In fact, the only role the sixth Majlis played in foreign policy was to be a cover 
for the anti-democratic and anti-human rights practices of the Islamic regime, 
although unintentionally. Nowadays, it is difficult to explain to foreign observers 
or officials that a popular parliament has no influence on the socio-political 
aspects of its country, not to mention that the government itself also suffers 
similarly. Hence, the decorative function of the Majlis in the political structure 
of the Islamic regime now becomes more apparent. Even with regard to the sixth 
Majlis, it has acted against its cause. Most notably, during the EU-Iran 
negotiations on human rights issues, after a trip to Tehran and holding meetings 
with various officials, the EU delegate decided not to table a resolution 
criticizing the human rights situation in Iran in the UN General Assembly's 
Third Committee. As Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller said, "[on the 
grounds of] helping the reformists in Iran who are the majority in the country, 
we will give dialogue a chance. "308 This happened despite the fact that the 
essential rights of the deputies were being suspended by the judiciary. 
309 
306 Norou:, 29 May 2002. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Iran, 21 October 2002. 
J09 For instance, the arrest of MP Hussein Loqmanian, and the summoning of Mirdamadi and Armin, to 
the judiciary on the grounds of their parliamentary speeches. 
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4.13.2. KHATAMI'S ACCOUNT OF THE REFORM MANDATE IN 
POWER 
In spring 2001 as President Khatami prepared for his re-election campaign, he 
addressed the Fifth Majlis. In his speech he illustrated a comprehensive account 
of the reform mandate which was supposed to be implemented by the [Islamist] 
reformists. The following is Khatami's categorized speech prior to his re- 
election with relevant cross referencing to the main points of his reform mandate 
during his initial four years in office. 310 It is noteworthy that although the Iranian 
society had not managed to form a vibrant civil society and its relevant 
organisations-no strong middle class-popular political figures such as 
Khatami repeatedly referred to a profound public demand for reform. Peculiarly, 
this unsubstantiated perception led to more demands by the public without 
generating the capability to pursue them. 
4.13.2.1. REFORIIISTS VS. CONSERVATIVES 
First, Khatami adamantly criticized the conservative attempts to frighten the 
Iranian people before his election as President in 1997, referring to the claims 
that "his reign will cause a setback for Islam in Iran, the [Islamic] Revolution 
and the security of the State". 311 He replied by saying "not only has the Islamic 
Revolution not been threatened under his reign, but his office term could be a 
`huge opportunity' for the Islamic Revolution". Khatami rejected the 
`provocative' accusations by his opponents that the reformists headed by him 
were against the Islamic Revolution's ideals and insisted: "All the Iranian people 
want reforms that will be logical and within the framework of the Constitution". 
Khatami warned, referring to the murder of Iranian intellectuals in 1998, that the 
"real danger to Iranian society comes from the existence of an extremist group 
within the institutions of the government in Iran". He concluded "the whole 
people of Iran have suffered serious blows at the hands of this group and that 
310 The main source for his speech is Bahar, March 11,2001, other references have been mentioned 
respectively. 
311 Ayatollah Mahdavi kani, in an interview by Resalat on 7 May 1997. 
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must be stopped". 312 Therefore, from Khatami's point of view any reform would 
be meaningful if applied within the Islamic principles. 
Khatami further criticized his opponents for their refusal to accept the changing 
of time and the will of the people, claiming that they (opponents to reform) may 
be regarded as the enemies of the people. He added: "There are two groups that 
stand against the reforms. One opposes any progress and stubbornly insists on 
moving on this uncompromising road. The second consists of those who see any 
progress in society as connected to foreign elements. " According to Khatami the 
opponents of the reform are worried that any development is the beginning of 
the change in the Iranian Revolution and government. Thus, "the expectations of 
both groups do not comply with the real reform sought by the Iranian people 
who want civil rights and oppose an approach based on replacement of the 
Constitution. Khatami's main emphasis was placed on the importance of 
people's knowledge and sympathy about government and society in Iran. He 
argued that historically there has been mistrust between these two and the 
solution lies in filling this gap. The strategy of prohibition and of [limiting] 
knowledge and culture, as well as the excessive dissemination of propaganda 
every day, prompt a clash of values between the government and the society. As 
a result two cultures are emerging in Iran. "Why not" asked Khatami "blame 
those who seek to stop the reformists as being connected with the enemy? " 313 
4.13.2.2. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHANGES 
Khatami mentioned several significant social changes that occurred in Iranian 
society since the Islamic Revolution in 1979: "The huge urbanization, the 
growth of the middle class and the emergence of deep economic gaps within 
Iranian society. These developments culminated in a change in the value system 
in Iran. Today, " he said, "there are new ideological groups within society and 
the role of intellectuals and academics has significantly grown, which is why 
various sectors of Iranian society felt they can demand the strengthening of the 
Constitution as the source [of authority] and the principle by which society 
312 Bahar, ibid. 
313 Ibid, ] 1 March 2001 
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should be conducted". 314 Before winning the presidency, he eagerly 
demonstrated his support of greater openness in domestic politics by saying that 
"outside (Western) influence is unavoidable, and even advantageous, subject to 
preserving Iran's identity and independence. "315 Khatami also feared that "the 
political, social, and economic realities in Iran could spill far from its borders to 
discourage Islamists elsewhere, and even endanger Islam. "316 Khatami also 
portrayed the gravest problem facing the world of Islam as a self-sufficient 
attitude that prevents Muslims to look at other civilisations to learn. He went 
further and said: "the West has made great strides in science, politics, and social 
regulations, though it is not mistake-free. "317 
4.13.2.3. FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY; AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Khatami stressed the need to anchor basic values such as freedom and 
democracy to the Constitution, which he regarded as "the huge achievement of 
the Islamic revolution. " However, he was careful to package this call in an 
Islamic guise. He elaborated on the need "to establish a religious democratic 
regime" which was preached by the Islamic revolution: "Imam Khomeini too, " 
he said, "preached the establishment of a democratic regime. " "This is what we 
heard from Imam Khomeini, that the wishes of the people are the criteria by 
which the regime should go. There is no other way but to accept the people's 
democratic religious regime". Khatami stated that there is no contradiction 
between Islam and individual rights and that the Islamic Republic embodies the 
ideal combination of both Islam and freedom. "The Religion complies with 
human rights and civil rights; freedom complies with Islamic cultural values. 
The Islamic Republic was created for the sake of this combination". 318 
314 Bahar, ibid. 
315 Menashri, Iran Under Khatami, p. 25. 
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4.13.2.4. KH. ATA? I1I'S ACHIEVE! 'LIENTS 
Considering all obstacles and failures in the implementation of the reform 
mandate, President Khatami as the ideologue of the reform movement felt it 
necessary to summarise his successes and through a speech prior to his second 
candidacy in spring 2001 emphasized the achievements of his first term 
presidency: 
1. the rise in the participation of civilians in political life; in particular youth 
and women; 
2. the rising role played by the media; 
3. more trials being conducted in a transparent fashion and being open to the 
public. 
"Today, " concluded Khatami, "the citizens know their rights and know the limits of 
the government and what it can do". 19 Also, Khatami's attitude on gender issues was 
summarized in a4 July 2005 statement in Tehran, when he said, "we should have a 
comprehensive view of the role of women and before anything else, should not regard 
women as second-class citizens. We should all believe that both men and women have 
the capability to be active in all fields, and I emphasize, in all fields. " 320 However, 
Farideh Qeyrat, a lawyer and the spokeswoman for the Association for the Defence of 
Prisoners Rights, hold a different opinion, though admitting a kind of improvement. 
She states: "the political atmosphere is more open now than it was eight years ago and 
Khatami has created an environment that encourages women to participate. "321 
However, this trend has not produced any significant improvement in the legal arena. 
According to Qeyrat "legally, there has been no change [in the condition of women], 
we cannot say that women now, according to the law, have more competence in 
taking responsibilities. Women still have trouble with ordinary laws, not to speak of 
running for office. " 322 The Sixth Majlis attempted to improve the legal conditions for 
women by passing a legislation permitting single eligible female students of 
universities to be accepted for scholarship abroad. This legislation too was blocked by 
the Guardian Council. 
319 Bahar, ibid. 
320 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 3 August 2005. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid. 
319 
4.14. CONCLUSION: 
The persistence of conflict between elected bodies and un-elected ones over the 
implementation of their basic rights and duties inevitably leads to a 
constitutional crisis. This is the situation which the Islamic Republic was 
deemed to be within during the sixth Majlis. The solutions to exit from this over- 
balanced condition for the reformists and the conservatives perceived 
differently. The conservatives tended to keep up their policy of sustainable 
opposition aimed to exhaust and frustrate both public and elected bodies until 
the next general election in which they could oust the reformists from their seats. 
On the other hand, the reformists only manoeuvred to draft reforming legislation 
and amend the system utilizing its own capacities. By evaluating the Sixth 
Majlis performance it became clear that its authority to be effective as a 
legislative body is under harsh restriction of constitutional provision. Therefore, 
whatever the Majlis determined to push through its reformist mandate, 
constitutionally it has been disarmed and malfunctioned. 
For instance, six months after Khatami's re-election for his second term in 
office, he introduced two fundamental bills to the sixth Majlis to safeguard the 
very fragile entity of democracy. 323 The first bill was for increasing the 
President's authority to oversee the implementation of the constitution and, if 
necessary, to be able to take appropriate action. The second bill was for the 
amendment of election law, adjusting the unlimited Guardian Council's power in 
the vetting process. Both bills were overwhelmingly ratified by the sixth Majlis 
but not surprisingly rejected by the Guardian Council. The bills were handed 
several times between two institutions with no foreseeable conclusion. 
According to the constitution at this stage the Majlis ought to refer the rejected 
legislations to the Expediency Council. However, fearing the probable alteration 
to the bills by the Expediency Council, prevented the referral of the bills and 
caused Khatami to call upon the Majlis to send back the bills to the government. 
323 Nawru_, 8 December 2002. 
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Khatami showed that he was well aware of previous referrals to the Expediency 
Council which rarely resulted in pleasing his reformist government. 
324 The recall 
of the twin bills proved that a popular president who was awesomely elected on 
two occasions alongside a reformist Majlis was simply unable to pursue his 
mandate in the framework of the constitution. The IIPP at its Third Congress the 
then ruling party issued a resolution describing the current situation of the 
Islamic regime as at its most critical state when both elected government and 
parliament are unable to exercise their right on governance. 
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Also, in the aftermath of the sixth Majlis, many analysts expressed their 
concerns over incoming obstacles towards reform agenda. For example, Saied 
Hajarian illustrated that the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic was now based 
on a duality. One relies on the people's vote and the other is granted by the 
religious authorities and guaranteed by the constitution. Moreover, Abbas Abdi 
explained that the Islamic Republic is in a legitimacy crisis and in essence is 
losing `the public's trust'. 326 Muhammad Reza Khatami added, "The gap 
between the rulers and the people is widening. This is a situation of double rule, 
which is ideal for the conservatives. "327 He explained, "After we use all our 
abilities and means and reach the conclusion that we can no longer run state 
affairs. We will abandon the scene, and then [the conservatives] will be held 
accountable [to the people]. "328 
Five years after beginning the reform movement in 1997, the first signs of 
quitting the political structure were seen. The Majlis deputy speaker and 
prominent reformist Behzad Nabavi in his pre-session speech warned the 
opponents of reform by saying: "[They] should realize that they cannot run the 
country with only 20% of the votes, and they cannot rely on [blaming] foreign 
powers [for domestic problems]. They should also know that they cannot resort 
to arrests and violence in order to rule. " Concurring with the reformists' threat to 
quit, Nabavi added: "Indeed, [the conservatives] have not succeeded in 
324 } aas-i Nall,, 12 January 2002. 
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dismissing us from the government, but the current situation is no better than 
quitting it. "329 Here criticism is diverted from the conservatives to the reformists 
for being too slow and incompetent. 
While the political deadlock loomed, neither the reformists nor the conservatives 
were able to reverse the course of events. In fact, the massive propaganda on 
reforming the system before the sixth Majlis had lifted people's expectations too 
high; yet the capacity for such aspirations, whether legally or politically, was too 
limited. In the meantime, some political analysts like Abdi maintained a kind of 
sharp criticism in the hope of ringing alarm bells, though unsuccessfully. He 
warned that the process of reform in the regime is "slow and frustrating". The 
[conservatives'] continued effort [to block the reformers] cannot go on, and 
those who oppose the reforms should [realise] that there is no way of reversing 
the situation in their favour. 
It should be clear that the reforms are the will of the people, and urgent action is 
needed. " He criticized the reformists too for adopting a "too moderate policy in 
their demand for reforms". 330 Rajabali Mazru'i also criticized the conservatives: 
"Continuing the reform is the only way to overcome the current crisis", and went 
on to criticize "the narrow-mindedness of some, who do not understand domestic 
and global developments. The Guardians Council's repeated refusal to ratify 
Majlis legislation has no outcome other than showing how inefficient the system 
"33 is. Economic progress comes [only] with political and cultural development. 1 
Accordingly, 151 Majlis deputies signed an open letter to the Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei which was read by Majlis deputy Muhammad Nai'mipur 
and broadcasted on national radio. The letter condemned the conservatives' 
oppressive measures through the constitutional institutions. The language of the 
letter was strong and frank and put blame on the Guardian Council and the 
judiciary as the main obstacles against reform in Iran. The letter denounced: 
329 Ibid, 21 August 2002. 
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The closure of more than 80 reformist newspapers over the past 
three years; the ruling against prominent Majlis members and 
owners of the reformist paper Norouz (shut down July 2002) 
Mohsen Mirdamadi; the dissolution of the Iran's Freedom 
Movement (Nehzat-e Azadi) and the prison sentences, of up to 
20 years for its members; and the arrest of writer Siamak 
Pourzand, 71, being accused for "acting in favour of the U. S. 
and undermining the Islamic regime. " "In democratic 
systems", the letter read, "the judiciary is entrusted with the 
mission of protecting civil rights. However, in Iran the attorney 
general is the main force behind the closure of daily 
newspapers. 332 
The continuation of conflict between the reformists and the conservatives had 
only one tangible result. This was the deterioration of human rights and growth 
of public unease in the Islamic regime. 333 At least, these factional quarrels 
allowed violence against human rights to become more known and visible. 
Interestingly, as the legislative branch had been discharged of its original 
functions, it became a centre for people's petitions and complains against other 
governmental bodies, including the judiciary. 334 However, in an absolute 
contrast to the constitution, the Majlis deputies were to be charged and subjected 
to prosecution by the judiciary because of their comments in the Majlis. 335 In 
short, both government and parliament run by reformists in the Islamic Republic 
have become dysfunctional institutions whose formalised roles only show that 
the regime is a Republic. Some radical critics even compared it with the former 
East Germany or North Korea if they too can be considered as Republic. 336 
In short, the sixth Majlis, elected in February 2000, raised huge expectations 
among Iran's reform-oriented electorate. It was supposed to work alongside 
President Muhammad Khatami and the entire reformist-controlled executive to 
332 Hayat-i Nu, 5 August 2002. 
333 According to the Federation of International Free Press, Iran is known as the first country to 
imprison the journalists. 
334 Yas-i Naw, 5 January 2003. 
335 MP Hosseuin Loqmanian, who was arrested by the Hamedan Judiciary in December 2001. 
336 <www. goova. news> (February 12,2005), in an article posted from Nimaa Rashedan. 
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bring about real and substantive changes. Unfortunately, this proved not to be 
the case. For a short period of time, both people and reformists forgotten that 
those who wield decisive power in the Islamic Republic are not subject to 
elections. 337 An overall review of such interactions between parliament and 
government on one hand, and the Supreme Leadership, the Guardian Council 
and the Judiciary on the other proves the incapability of these constitutionally 
sanctioned institutions to function democratically. The whole system seems to be 
a mixture of modern institutions combined with arbitrary principles at the top. 
The political structure of the Islamic Republic is in practice based on religious 
and unempirical principles, while to some extent, democratic elements are also 
embedded. 
We conclude this chapter by referring to our main frameworks of evaluating 
democracy and democratisation process which were considered at conceptual, 
procedural and operative levels. We discussed that in order to have a self- 
maintained and operative model of democratic regime; it needs necessarily both 
procedural measures and conceptual consistency. The emergence of the sixth 
Majlis as a reformist parliament displayed a successful example of democratic 
development at procedural level, but the inconsistency at conceptual level in the 
constitution has prevented the system from operating democratically. Therefore, 
paying extra attention to procedural measures before attaining a consensus over 
conceptual issues cannot resolve the democratic dilemma. To solve the 
conceptual paradox, Hashem Aqajeri suggested that the only way to have 
political reform in Iran is to re-interpret Shi'ism. He pointed to the principle of 
emulation and imitation, and strongly ruled it out. 
338 He advocated a non- 
politicised religion which is separated from state affairs but present in the culture 
and morality of the society, which then will allow modern institutions to 
function correctly. 339 
337 Mahan Abedin, in an interview with Daily Star published in Beirut on 6 December 2004. 
338 He has also described one person following another as blind as a monkey which sparked off an 
uproar. 
339 REF/RE daily bulletin, II July 2002. 
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
5.1. CONCLUSION 
This thesis attempted to study the Iranian experience of the democratisation process. 
From the outset, it became clear that our examination ought to be inclusive of both 
institutions (i. e. parliament) and also conceptual elements (i. e. political culture and 
religion). It was necessary to understand democracy as a qualifying concept outside of 
its Western liberal narrative. Chapter One tried to portray an inclusive picture of 
democracy as the least bad method of governance. Through our comparative 
presentation of various models of democracy, the supremacy of the Western-liberal 
narrative of democracy was challenged, and other applications of democracy were 
introduced and discussed. 
In Chapter Two, I traced the origins of Iran's encounter with modernity and explained 
the significance of political culture and religious sentiments in shaping politics. To 
grasp the authentic principles of religious influence in Iran, I investigated Shi'ism as 
the dominant religious ideology. The notion of intellectualism in contemporary Iran 
was also addressed in both its secular and religious incarnations. I assessed very 
briefly the incomplete and un-authentic experience of secular and anti-religious 
advocacy of modernity, then its antithesis: secular critics of modernity who brought 
about the concept of authenticity discourse, similar to German romanticism. And 
finally, the synthesis: a religious critique of modernity which resulted in the Islamic 
revolution. If secular intellectualism brought the modern institutions into Iran, 
religious intellectualism engaged the majority of citizens in the equation. Regardless 
of the success or failure of such composition, the main issue is the engagement of 
structure (political, economic and social institutions) and citizens whose primary and 
collective mindset is Islamic. 
In Chapter Three, I focused on the Islamic Republic as a political institution 
embodying with Islamic precepts as the indigenous elements of Iranian political 
culture. It was noticed that the institution of the Islamic Republic as a mixture of both 
modern and traditional institutions is bound to function within a constitutionally 
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defined nation-state. In other words, Iran experienced an unprecedented combination 
of modern structure alongside authentic agency (Islam as the most revered religion). I 
utilised the theory of institutionalism to examine the function of political institutions, 
in particular parliament. Discursive evaluation was also employed to understand 
Iran's conceptual trajectory towards democracy. The outcome is therefore conducive 
for the betterment of conceptual consensus in achieving democratisation (research 
hypothesis). The following analysis and discussion aim to conclude the thesis in more 
detail. 
The experience of Islamic revolution in Iran contradicts the absolute validity and 
application of scientific discourse in political studies such as linear theory of progress. 
The phenomenon of Islamic revolution however, reinforces the credibility of "critical 
social theory" which takes into account immeasurable elements such as political 
culture and beliefs. The quintessential role of Islam in mobilising the masses for 
toppling an autocratic but ostensibly modernist Pahlavi regime did not leave any room 
for further reluctance within academic and political institutions over the substantial 
weight that religion can exert. Of course, the Middle East has seen several ideological 
and political movements since the mid nineteenth century, either against colonialism 
and Western cultural domination or in pursuit of Arab-nation-state building. ' We can 
hardly, however, compare any of these movements with Islamic revolution of 1979 as 
having such coercive origins and consequences. It brought about a discursive 
evolution as well as political (reform movement from the within). 
The foundation of the Islamic republic with its solid implementation of certain Shi'a 
principles created an unprecedented situation in which an Islamic critique could 
utilise its capacity in scrutinising the notions and motions of an Islamic state. The 
complex and sometimes perplexing philosophical, social and political literature on 
religious intellectualism in both post- and pre-revolutionary Iran offers a vast area for 
study and exploration. By considering these dynamics we can approach the concept of 
democracy with more accuracy and applicability. We investigated the core meaning 
of democracy and its implementation in respect of public participation and state 
accountability to the people. Also, for a better understanding of the very sophisticated 
1 For the latter we can refer to cross-Arab Ba'thist Party movement and the former to the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt. 
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nature of democracy and its related issues, we envisaged a framework within which 
we could accommodate our assumptions. This framework provided us with three 
critical levels regarding how to perceive democracy in a society: the conceptual level, 
the procedural level and the operative level. 
At a `conceptual level', the importance of the interpretation of democracy in any 
target society was explained. For instance, the meaning and ultimate merits of 
democracy could differ in France and in an Arab country. That does not 
necessarily mean that either the definition of democracy lacks universality or a 
religious and undemocratic society is naturally unable to acquire it. In fact, we 
need to broaden our perception of democracy to become more inclusive, given 
the necessity of preserving cultural as well as political pluralism. At a 
`procedural level', it was argued that although many countries have employed 
democratic measures like establishing modern political institutions and holding 
regular elections, they cannot however be categorised as democratic. In other 
words, democratic procedures are necessary conditions but not sufficient ones. 
Finally there is an `operative level' around which a democratic regime is built 
and maintained from within. 
In the case of Iran, we analysed that although there has been a range of 
democratic measures and institutions such as the constitution and parliament, it 
was the lack or inconsistency of a conceptual consensus between the ruling class 
and the people which foiled any attempt at consolidating those democratic 
measures. To support this argument we referred to political culture to explain 
why such necessary consensus for democracy was not reached in Iranian society. 
Nevertheless, there are other significant social, political and economic reasons 
for the failure of Iranian democracy; these include the lack of a coherent middle 
class, the absolute reliance on oil revenue and geo-strategic pressures. In 
addition, although the majority of debates throughout this thesis relate to the 
procedural level, i. e. the malfunctioning of the Iranian parliament, the focal point 
lies with the potential paradoxical conception of democracy and the role of 
political culture and religion. In other words, the theoretical problem in the case 
of Iran is the incompatibility of the social structure (still to some extend 
traditional) with new (modern) political institutions. 
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Given the importance of the institution of parliament as the most tangible and 
measurable element in assessing the implementation of democracy, we have 
concentrated on the Iranian parliament. It was necessary, however, to underpin 
our theoretical assumptions about democracy and the democratisation process 
which we have done in the first chapter. We tried to analyse the core denotation 
of democracy, the solidity of its meaning and flexibility of its practice. We 
examined the theory of liberal democracy as the prevailing version of democracy 
and concluded that it does not provide a workable solution for most developing 
countries, and in particular for Iran, the object of this case study. However, since 
the state is an instrumental complex of social economic and political institutions, 
its democratisation process involves a greater structural framework that 
combines social coherence, legitimate power, persuasion and bureaucracy. 
Therefore, any attempt to democratise a state should include a wide range of 
factors such as political culture, political economy and also geopolitics, which 
respectively have been looked at in this research. 
In fact, the Islamic Revolution was one of ideological content and symbolic 
political features, rather than a revolution that was fostered by social conflict. 
Historically, the linkage in Iran between central power (monarch) and landlords 
across the country was the main guarantor of the political stability of the state. 
This socio-political balance, however, was damaged by the implementation of 
the Land Reform in the 1960s. Instead, far from worrying about losing its 
stabilising feet, the Pahlavi regime relied on the ever-increasing oil revenue and 
pursued the accumulation of a weaponry arsenal in order to fulfil its ambitious 
programme. During the Pahlavi regime, apart from the Fourteenth Majlis, all 
other Assemblies can be seen as arbitrary councils taking orders from the 
monarch. Surely, one cannot deem the Shah or the government or the deputies as 
the only causes of this failure to deliver a suitably functioning parliament. The 
blame should also lie with socio-economic imbalances such as the absence of a 
viable middle class, being a rentier state and foreign influence and pressure. 
We briefly touched upon causes that led to the collapse of the Pahlavi regime. 
Then the new political structure-shaped on an unprecedented concept of 
wilayat al-faqih and its superiority over the conventional and democratic 
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institutions-was duly discussed. The concept of h'ilayat al-faqih received a 
great deal of attention. It was analysed in depth both historically and 
theoretically. The purpose was basically to investigate whether the new system 
contradicts democratic notions and procedures, even though the important 
democratic elements embodied in the Constitution were realised as well. 
Accordingly, Chapter Four specifically explored the parliamentary politics of 
post-revolutionary Iran. It briefly covered the main features of the five post- 
revolutionary parliaments and focused on the formation and performance of the 
reformist Sixth Majlis. The emergence of Sixth Majlis despite all the 
institutional weaknesses proved that the religious intellectualism is reconcilable 
with democratic norms and procedures. The popularity of the Sixth Majlis and 
its reformist mandate reveals the public inspiration and desire for democratic 
reform. 
However, predicting the result of the ongoing struggle between the two 
fundamental and reformist trends over the gain of the political leadership of the 
Islamic Republic is seemingly difficult, particularly in a period when Iran's vital 
regional and international importance is in focus. Today, not only is Iranian 
politics engaged in a severe domestic struggle; it is also faced with accusations 
of supporting international terrorism and attempting to obtain nuclear weapons. 
Subsequently, these factors render even more complexity into the prediction of 
the fate of the reform movement and more importantly that of the 
democratisation process. 
The study of the parliamentary experiment of the Islamic Republic signified a 
linear continuity and progress within the framework of the Islamic regime. For 
instance, during the 1980s, while the country was going through a destructive 
eight years war, no single election was cancelled, although the whole election 
process could not have been compatible with democratic norms. Moreover, the 
rate of people's participation in the parliamentary elections during 1980-2000 
shows a clear ambivalence in terms of fluctuation in people's apathy and 
sympathy towards the regime. On the whole, there is far more socio-political 
engagement of the public during the Islamic Republic than during the Pahlavis. 
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This greater engagement contradicts the assumption that the Islamic regime is 
totally authoritarian and therefore incompatible with democracy. In fact, the 
existence of democratic elements in the Islamic Republic alongside the 
indigenous political culture has been greatly conducive in maintaining the 
participation of people in the political process. Nevertheless, although the main 
goal of the Islamic Revolution was to destroy an entire system of deep-rooted 
authoritarian governance and replace it with a popular republic, the function of 
the new political order (the Islamic Regime) remained in sensitive cases like 
legislative body similar to its predecessor (the superiority of Kali faqih over 
legislation). 
The thesis has also carefully examined the political structure of the Islamic 
Republic with special focus on legislative authorities and their performances. 
Under the Constitution, the Islamic Consultative Assembly was granted 
considerable power and authority within the Islamic Republic, but failed to 
function as democratically as it was expected to. The reasons for such 
disappointment lie both in the institutional obstacles embodied in the Islamic 
Constitution, as well as in the structural dilemmas in the fields of culture, 
economics and politics (lack of consensus over the concepts). In early years of 
1990s, increasing restrictions on cultural activities, NGOs and social liberties 
alongside an unprecedented inflation and unemployment rate had caused a deep 
scepticism throughout the emerging middle class and therefore paved a way for 
the breakthrough. 
For many, this breakthrough was the landslide election of Muhammad Khatami 
in the presidential election of May 1997. Khatami's unexpected victory had 
different messages for supporters and opponents of the regime. Advocates of the 
regime described it as a sign to approve that there is a working Islamic 
democracy, while the opponents saw it as the end of Islamists' superiority over 
Iranian politics. The reformists in the first group thought that having a 
government and a parliament that are popular and reformist-Khatami's 
government and the sixth Majlis-could greatly contribute to the 
implementation and consolidation of democratisation process. However, the 
experience of the last eight years proved that, to the contrary, and because 
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several democratic bills remain unapproved, the various plans for economic, 
cultural and political reforms remain unrealised and finally, the reformist Sixth 
Majlis was replaced with an Islamic hard-line one (the Seventh Majlis). 
The formation of the sixth Majlis alongside the reformist government of 
Khatami transferred the evolution of the Islamic Republic to a critical stage, 
where a moderate but still Islamic version of reform mandate overcame and 
seized the formal power. We counted the reasons according to the Constitution 
as to the base of real power and authority, being in the hands of Supreme Leader 
and explained that any substantial and permanent reform is subject to 
appropriate adjustments to the role of Supreme Leader (wali faqih). At the same 
time, from the beginning of the Islamic Republic until now there have been a 
referendum, 9 presidential elections, 7 parliamentary elections, 3 elections for 
the Council of Experts and 3 City Councils elections but still the regime lacks 
the essentials of a democratic system. The recent episodes through which the 
Islamic reformists lost their constitutional positions to the Islamic totalitarians 
prove that democratic transition or democratisation cannot be considered as a 
pre-determined process but a reversible one. Unless, of course, certain structural 
prerequisites are met at cultural, economic and political levels. 
The important issue here is although a series of reformist seizures of power 
occurred lawfully under the Constitution, it was again under the same 
Constitution that the opponents of reform took over. It is true that it seems a 
reverse step in the process of democratisation, when a reformist government and 
parliament is replaced with a fundamentalist one, but the positive point here is 
that this political rivalry materialised without violence and through peaceful 
means. Also, considering the history of political opposition in Iranian politics we 
see that opposition has been against the totality of the ruling regime either during 
the Pahlavis or the Islamic Republic. In other words, until the defeat of the 
reformists in regaining of the Majlis and the executive since 2004, the political 
opposition literally and practically was against the Islamic regime whereas now, 
the out of power reformists can play a very necessary role of political opposition 
without challenging the establishment. This new situation gives the reformists 
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the credibility of becoming a genuine political opposition to the government not 
to the regime and therefore unlikely to be suppressed or forced into exile. 
Yet, there is no consensus across society, from the lower classes to the elites, as 
to which model of governance is valid: democracy or theocracy. The official line 
is a kind of third way, somewhere between the two, Islamic Democracy 
(Mardum salari). We cannot, however, ignore the existence and exercise of 
democratic procedures within the Islamic Republic which are unprecedented in 
Iranian history. It is true that these procedures are often incomplete and cannot 
be compared to the Western models, but they have been successful in engaging 
the majority of the population in exercising their democratic rights so far. The 
experience of the Islamic Republic as a modem regime with a religious 
foundation has transformed Iranian society and produced a discursive 
accumulation conducive for social change. The Islamic republic which emerged 
after the failure of anti-religious secular discourse incorporated religious 
sentiments. These sentiments, as the main elements of Islamo-Iranian political 
culture, have been transformed into political institutions. This process acts as a 
refining conduit for enhancing the conceptual level and will hopefully help 
society to reach the operative level of a self-sustained democracy. 
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APPENDIXI. 
The Expediency Discernment Council which was formed upon the initiative of 
the late Imam Khomeini (peace be upon him) and later included as an article in 
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic thanks to the wisdom and foresight of 
those revising the Law, is one of the best legal organs established in the Islamic 
Republic ever since its inception. This is a lasting and blessed institution which 
was created by the great Leader of the Islamic Republic thanks to his keen 
sagacity and broader scope of things at a time that the country needed such a 
Council and with its invention the supreme administrative system of the country 
was complemented. 
According to the Constitution, this Council acts as the trusted advisor of the 
Leader in shaping the general policies of the System and solving major disputes 
and differences which occur among the executive, judiciary and legislative 
powers. Moreover, when the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Guardian 
Council differ on a bill, the Expediency Council steps forward and solves their 
difference. Therefore, with an eye to the duties and responsibilities of the 
Expediency Discernment Council prescribed in the Constitution, this Council 
acts as the highest advisor of the Leader in the Islamic Republic System. 
In past years, the Expediency Discernment Council has rendered valuable 
services to the nation when there have been differences between the Majlis and 
the Council of Guardians regarding the Majlis approvals, and has issued 
appropriate verdicts concerning numerous cases that I have referred to them. 
Now that with the widespread participation of the nation in all the political, 
social and economic arenas and with the endeavours of the officials and 
administrators of the executive, judiciary and legislative powers, the sacred 
Islamic Republic System has been firmly established and has found a 
commendable dignity, it is appropriate for the Expediency Discernment Council 
to fully discharge its duties and responsibilities and act as a senior advisor to the 
Leadership. For this reason besides the present members, it would be appropriate 
to appoint other senior politicians and clerics to enable the Council to discharge 
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its important task in shaping the general policies of the System and to examine 
all important problems that are normally faced by the country. 
Therefore, the new makeup of the Expediency Discernment Council of the 
System is declared as follows: 
1. The legal personalities are: 
a. The esteemed heads of the three powers. 
b. The prominent jurists of the Council of Guardians. 
c. The minister concerned depending on the subject under discussion. 
2. The other personalities are: Messrs. Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mahdavi-Kani , 
Amini Najafabadi, Vaez Tabasi, Ahmad Jannati, Muhammad Imami Kashani, 
Hassan Habibi, Mir Hussein Musavi, Dr. Ali Akbar Wilayati, Muhammad Rey- 
Shahri, Shaykh Hassan Sane'i, Hassan Rawhani, Muhammad Musavi 
Khoeiniha, Habibollah Asgar Owladi, Qurbanali Durri Najafabadi, Ali Larijani, 
Mustafa Mirsalim, Muhammad Reza Tavassuli Mahallati, Abdullah Nuri, 
Murtaza Nabavi, Dr. Hassan Firuzabadi, Qulam Reza Aqazadeh, Bijan Namdar 
Zanganeh, Muhammad Hashemi, and Mohsen Nurbakhsh. 
All these members have been appointed for a five year period and the Head of 
the Council will be Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani. The Expediency Discernment 
Council should have an active and significant secretariat to prepare the cases that 
are to be discussed in the sessions and to make necessary arrangements. Its head 
should be from among the members of the council and its liaison officer to be 
appointed by me, whenever necessary. 
The Council is duty-bound to draw up, in its early sessions, some comprehensive 
regulations pertaining to the manner of formation of sessions, putting forward 
and approval of subject matters, as well as other details, and then send the same 
to me for my approval. For this eminent institution to be able to discharge its 
important duties particularly in the matter of general policy making of the 
country, it should benefit from the latest expertise of the governmental 
responsible agencies and at the same time must avoid setting up parallel expert 
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groups. I pray to God the Almighty for the success of these gentlemen in 
fulfilling their important duties. 2 
Z <www. iranmania. com/info. expediencv> 
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APPENDIX 2. 
The Association of Combatant Clergy (ACC) 
The Association of Combatant Clergy (ACC) is perhaps the oldest political- 
clerical group since the 1979 victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The ACC 
is known as the leading conservative group where conservative groups were in 
practice obliged to coordinate their political behaviour and policies with the 
views and decisions of the Association. Ayatollah Muhammad Reza Mahdavi- 
Kani is ACC's Secretary General and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar 
Nateq Nuri, Hassan Rawhani, Muhammad Imami Kashani (former member of 
the Council of Guardians and substitute leader of Tehran Friday prayers), 
Muhammad Yazdi (former Head of the Judiciary), Seyed Reza Taqavi (Head of 
the Islamic Guidance Commission of the 5`" Majlis and ACC spokesman), 
Ahmad Jannati (substitute leader of Tehran Friday prayers and Secretary of the 
Guardian Council), and Qurbanali Durri Najafabadi (former Intelligence 
Minister) are among prominent members of this group. Contrary to other groups 
and parties, the ACC does not publish any newspaper or magazine and has not 
obtained a permit from the Interior Minister for political activities. The ACC 
was among the major supporters of Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri (Khatami's main rival) 
in the May 23,1997 Presidential elections. During the impeachment of former 
Islamic Culture and Guidance Minister Ataollah Mohajerani and former Interior 
Minister Abdullah Nuri, ACC advocates were among the main opponents of 
Mohajerani and Nuri. 3 
THE ASSOCIATION OF ISLAMIC COALITION (JAMI'AT-1 MUTALIFIYYIH ISLAMI) 
Jami yat-i Mu'talifa Islami or the Association of Islamic Coalition (AIC) is 
among the old parties in Iran which was formed through the merger of three 
religious groups in the Tehran Bazaar before the Islamic revolution. The 
common objective of the three underground groups was campaigning against 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran and following up the instructions 
of Ayatollah Khomeini. The AIC considers itself as the first political-ideological 
group in the contemporary history of Iran, formed under the leadership of 
3 Barzin, The Political factions in Iran, p. 90-91. 
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wilayat al-faqih and under the supervision and guidance of the clergy away from 
Western and Eastern partisan patterns. The AIC advocates full commitment to 
the emulation of mujtahid in the real and genuine sense of the word. The AIC 
reduced its activities after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and most of its 
members joined the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). But in 1988, it was 
reorganized with an aim "to better coordinate the faithful towards ultimate 
triumph of pure Islam, the path of the Imam and ia'ilayat al fagih. "4 
Habibollah Asgar Owladi who is known as a veteran combatant and 
representative of the Supreme Leader at the "Imam Khomeini's Relief 
Committee" was for many years the AIC Secretary General. Assadollah 
Badamchiyan, Ali Akbar Parvaresh, Saeed Amani, Muhammad Javad Rafiq- 
Dust, Habibollah Shafiq and Asqar Rukhsefat, all well-known businessmen of 
the Tehran Bazaar, are among the prominent members of the AIC. The AIC is 
among the genuine parties in Iran. The party, which is composed of the main 
conservative groups, enjoys full partisan discipline and its branches are active in 
various parts of the country. During the May 23 Presidential elections of 1997, 
the AIC supported Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri and played an important role in 
impeachment of two ministers of Khatami's administration-Abdullah Nuri and 
Ataollah Mohajerani-in the final year of Fifth Majlis. 5 
SOCIETY OF ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS OF THE BAZAAR & TRADE UNIONS (JAMI'-I 
ANJUMAN-HAIYYIH ISLAMI-I BAAZAAR VA ASNAF) 
The Islamic Associations of Bazaar & Guild Unions (IABGU) is a group 
composed of members of Islamic associations of various trade unions in the 
Tehran Bazaar. Its objective is to forge coordination among Islamic associations 
of trade unions and Bazaar businessmen in order "to create a healthy atmosphere 
in the bazaar, to execute the Islamic practice of inviting to good and preventing 
from forbidden, and to help achieve independence and self-sufficiency". 6 From 
the financial point of view, this group is the main supplier of the needs of its 
like-minded groups (the conservatives). Saeed Amani, the Secretary General of 
4 <www. motalefeh. org/book/ashnaee. pdf> 
5 Payam Imru=, October 1998. 
6 Resalat, 27 May 1996. 
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the IABGU, is also among the prominent members of the AIC. The IABGU 
holds a session in one of the important mosques in Tehran every month and one 
of the personalities supporting the Society would elaborate on the latest political 
and economic developments of the country. The IABGU calls for the 
government's diminishing role in the economy, particularly in foreign trade. In 
the 1997 presidential elections, the IABGU also supported Ali Akbar Nateq 
Nuri. 7 
THE EXECUTIVES OF THE CONSTRUCTION PARTY (HEZB-1 KARGUZARAN 
SAZANDIGI) 
The Executives of the Construction Party (ECP) was formed during the Fifth 
Majlis elections campaign and its members are senior aides of the former 
President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. They support the policy of economic 
development and its members consider themselves the closest group to 
Rafsanjani. They believe they are a moderate party. The Secretary General of the 
party is former Tehran Mayor Qulam Hussein Karbaschi. There is little doubt 
that Karbaschi's contribution was essential for Khatami to win the presidential 
election. This contribution cost his post and imprisonment for nearly two years. 
From the beginning of his trial, he conferred his authority to Hussein Mara'shi 
the Majlis deputy from Kerman and prominent member of the ECP, Hussein 
Mara'shi, as the acting secretary general. 8 
Ataollah Mohajerani (former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance), 
Muhammad Hashemi (vice-president for executive affairs), Ms. Fae'zeh 
Hashemi (former MP from Tehran), Mohsen Nurbakhsh (former Governor of the 
Central Bank of Iran), Muhammad Ali Najafi (former Vice-President and Head 
of the Planning and Budget Organization) and Mustafa Hashemi-Taba (former 
Vice-President and Head of the Physical Education Organization) are among 
senior members of the ECP. In the 1997 presidential elections, the ECP was 
among the 2"d Khurdad (May 23rd) coalition groups who supported the 
candidacy of Muhammad Khatami. The party has had no official publication, but 
for temporary periods the newspapers of Hamshahri and Hammihan advocated 
7 Barzin, Political Factions in Iran, p. 93. 
8 Butcha, Who Rules Iran? p. 14-15. 
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its political line. 9 However, since 2005 and after the election of President 
Ahmadinejad, this party commenced the publication of its press organ named 
Kargu: aran. 
THE ASSOCIATION OF MILITANT CLERGY (MAJMA' RUHANIYUN MUBARIZ) 
The Association of Militant Clergy (AMC) comprises the clergy who broke 
away from the ACC. It announced independence in the last years of Ayatollah 
Khomeini's life and upon his permission. The AMC authenticated the existence 
of various thoughts and versions of religious, political and cultural issues among 
the clergy. The AMC comprises of persons some of whom were members of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini's office. "Safeguarding the bases and objectives of Islam, 
campaigning against global arrogance, listening to the logical statements of the 
opponents, spreading Imam Khomeini's attitudes, and explaining the historical 
status of the sacred institution of the clergy are among the stated goals of the 
AMC. " "o 
Muhammad Khatami, Mahdi Karrubi, Muhammad Musavi Khoeiniha (former 
Attorney General and managing director of the banned Salaam daily), 
Muhammad Reza Tavassuli (former Head of Ayatollah Khomeini's office), 
Muhammad Ali Abtahi (former President Khatami's chief of staff), Abdulvahed 
Musavi-Lari (Interior Minister), Majid Ansari (MP at Majlis 6th), and Ali Akbar 
Mohtashami-pur (former Interior Minister and MP for Third and Sixth Majlis) 
are among the main members of the AMC. The new AMC's mandate (after the 
war) was to support political and cultural development policies and it was 
among the major supporters of President Muhammad Khatami. Mahdi Karrubi 
acted as the Secretary General of this association until 2005. The AMC does not 
have any official publication or organ, but the currently banned daily Salam was 
known as its tribune. ' 1 
9 Ibid. 
10 AMC's Mission Statement 
11 Barzin, Political Factions in Iran, p. 52-53. 
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THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION MILITANT ORGANISATION (SAZMAN-l MUJAHIDIN 
INQILAB-I ISLAM I) 
The Militant Organisation of Islamic Revolution (MOIR) was among the 
staunch supporters of President Khatami's administration. "Safeguarding the 
values and principles of the Islamic Revolution; achievement of a developed, 
free, and independent society; the strengthening and promotion of the ideals of 
the Islamic Revolution in the world; and promotion of people's ideological and 
political knowledge in order to participate in the affairs related to the revolution, 
society and their own destiny" are among the objectives of this political 
organization. 12 MOIR was formed immediately after the victory of the Islamic 
Revolution through the coalition of seven underground and semi-secret 
organizations of the Pahlavi era. The organization advocated defence of the 
achievements of the revolution and campaigned against parties and assemblies 
opposing the revolution. Due to internal disputes at the beginning of the Iraq- 
Iran War, the MOIR suspended its activities until the end of the war. 
A number of the initial members of this organization joined the Islamic 
Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC), such as Mohsen Rezai (former IRGC 
commander), Muhammad Ja'far Zulqadr (Deputy Commander of the IRGC), 
and Alireza Afshar (senior IRGC Commander). After the end of the Iraqi war 
against Iran in 1988, a number of the initial members of the organization who 
felt the need for activities of parties in Iran revived the MOIR. Behzad Nabavi, 
Mustafa Tajzadeh, Mohsen Armin (journalist and MP at the Sixth Majlis), 
Feyzollah Arab-Surkhi (Deputy Commerce Minister), Hashem Agajari 
(university lecturer) as well as Saeed Hajarian (former advisor to President 
Khatami and member of Tehran City Council) are among the main members of 
the MOIR after resuming activity. Muhammad Salamati (former Agriculture 
Minister and former Deputy Cooperatives Minister) is the secretary general of 
the MOIR. The biweekly A'sr-i Ma was the official organ of the organization 
with Mohsen Armin as editor-in-chief. The MOIR was among the essential 
12 A'sr-i Ma, 16 April 1996. 
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supporters of Muhammad Khatami during his presidency and always attempted 
to theorize the reformists' trajectory. 13 
13 Barzin, Political Factions in Iran, p. 54. 
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